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In 1995, when Jonathan Band and Masanobu Katoh published Interfaces 
on Trial, the technology landscape was very different. But their vision and 
insights have proven to be timeless.
At the time, a gigabyte hard drive was unheard of and the Internet was 
unknown to many people. Now you can carry several gigabytes around in 
your pocket, and the Internet is the platform upon which a significant por-
tion of global commerce occurs every day.
The early interoperability legal battles that Band and Katoh described 
so vividly in Interfaces on Trial highlighted devices like the Apple II and 
video game cartridges. Today, interoperability fights involve everything 
from word processing file formats to DVD encryption to the “jailbreaking” 
of Apple iPhones. While the underlying technology has advanced consider-
ably, the legal issues have not changed, and many of the actors remain the 
same. Indeed, today interoperability is more important than ever, and the 
threats to its prevalence are greater than ever.
A legal regime that permitted technological interoperability has rein-
forced the open architecture of the Internet. This regime grew out of an 
intellectual-property framework that balanced the goals of protection with 
the goals of follow-on innovation—a framework that is well established 
in developed economies around the world. Nonetheless, some technol-
ogy companies have sought to improve their positions in the marketplace 
by attempting to mold IP law through litigation and lobbying to exercise 
ever more restrictive control over who can interconnect with what. These 
demands are invariably presented with a self-interested, simplistic view 
that more protection of intellectual property is always better. But that isn’t 
the case, and it never has been. IP policy must continue to give creators 
adequate incentives to innovate without enabling rightsholders to broadly 
foreclose competition. As the U.S. Supreme Court recognized in its Grokster 
decision, “[t]he more artistic protection is favored, the more technological 
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innovation may be discouraged; the administration of copyright law is an 
exercise in managing the trade-off.”
In the years since the enactment of the Digital Millennium Copyright 
Act in the United States, the difficulty of managing the interoperability 
trade-off has become evident. Even more troublesome, courts willingly 
entertain “clickwrap” licenses with provisions that are decidedly inimical 
to competition. Whether through technological control or contract, the 
ability to dictate how—and even whether—competitors can interoperate 
with a dominant software or hardware product represents a threat to the 
competitiveness of the technology industry.
As corporations and governments make billion-dollar investments in 
mainframe technology, and as consumers spend billions on digital media 
and devices, the question of whether a software or hardware provider can 
leverage its intellectual-property rights to dictate control over those invest-
ments looms large. If IP law prevents competitors from achieving interoper-
ability, the competition landscape will be barren.
We can only hope that policy makers—armed with insights from authors 
such as Jon Band and Masanobu Katoh—will reject unbalanced intellec-
tual-property policies and renew their commitment to openness and multi-
faceted innovation.
Ed Black
President, Computer & Communications Industry Association
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1 The Interoperability Debate
1.1 Introduction
We live in an interoperable world. Computer hardware and software prod-
ucts manufactured by different vendors can exchange data within local 
networks and around the globe via the Internet. Competition enabled by 
interoperability has led to innovation and lower prices, and this has placed 
extraordinary computing capacity in the hands of ordinary users.
This interoperable world represents a dramatic change from the comput-
ing environment of the 1970s. In those days, once a company purchased a 
computer system, the company was essentially “locked in” to that system: 
the system was not compatible with the products manufactured by other 
companies, and the conversion costs were high. Although “locking in” was 
extremely profitable for dominant vendors, such as IBM, competitors and 
users suffered from high prices, indifferent service, limited choice, and slow 
innovation.
Many factors have contributed to the transition from the locked-in envi-
ronment of the 1970s to today’s interoperable world, including consumer 
demand, business strategy, government policy, and the ideology of tech-
nologists. One factor that is often overlooked is the evolution of copyright 
law over the past 30 years. Because computer programs are copyrightable, 
copyright law determines the rules for competition in the information-
technology industry. For this reason, there has been a 30-year debate con-
cerning the application of copyright to software.
The parties to the debate are the dominant vendors (who want to lock 
in users and lock out competitors) and the developers of interoperable soft-
ware products (who want to compete with the dominant vendors). The 
debate has occurred in courts in North America, Europe, and the Pacific 
Rim; in the U.S. Congress and the European Parliament; and in law schools, 
think tanks, and legal publications. It has centered on two related matters: 
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the scope of copyright protection for program elements necessary for 
interoperability and the permissibility of the reverse engineering necessary 
to uncover those elements in a competitor’s program. Underlying these two 
matters is the central competitive issue confronting the software industry: 
Could one firm prevent other firms from developing software products that 
interoperated with the products developed by the first firm?
In 1995 we published Interfaces on Trial: Intellectual Property and Interoper-
ability in the Global Software Industry. That 370-page book closely examined 
the interoperability debate in the United States, the European Union, and 
Japan. Its first chapter provided a general overview of computer technol-
ogy, the structure of the computer industry, and the significance of intel-
lectual-property protection to innovation and competition in the industry. 
Its second chapter reviewed the fundamentals of intellectual-property law, 
focusing on copyright and on the application of copyright to software. Its 
third chapter tackled the first controversy in the interoperability debate: 
copyright protection for interface specifications. It explored the early mis-
steps in the 1980s by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, and 
the Second Circuit’s1 1992 landmark decision (rejecting the earlier rulings) 
in Computer Associates v. Altai. Its fourth chapter treated the second contro-
versy in the interoperability debate: the permissibility of software reverse 
engineering. It reviewed the resolution of this controversy by the Ninth 
Circuit in Sega v. Accolade. The book then addressed the development of 
the EU Software Directive (in chapter 5) and the interoperability debate in 
Japan (in chapter 6).
To our pleasant surprise, Interfaces on Trial ran through three printings; 
to our great relief, it received very favorable reviews.2
At the time we published Interfaces on Trial, we thought that the interop-
erability debate was largely over. In the United States, several appellate 
courts had followed Computer Associates and Sega, so those decisions’ 
1. The U.S. federal court system has three levels: the federal district courts (which 
conduct trials), the intermediate U.S. Courts of Appeals (which hear appeals from 
the district courts), and the U.S. Supreme Court (which hears appeals from the U.S. 
Courts of Appeals and from state supreme courts). Most of the judicial decisions 
discussed in this book were issued by the U.S. Courts of Appeals. These courts are 
organized in eleven regional circuits. In addition, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Federal Circuit has exclusive jurisdiction over patent appeals. In this book, “a deci-
sion by the Ninth Circuit,” for example, means a decision by the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.
2. Robbie Downing, book review, 3 International Journal of Law and Information Tech-
nology 198 (1995); book review, 15 Northwestern Journal of International Law and Busi-
The Interoperability Debate 3
holdings seemed well entrenched. In the European Union, the member 
states had implemented the EU Software Directive’s reverse-engineering 
exceptions with little difficulty.
Although the Software Directive ended the interoperability debate in the 
European Union, the debate continued in the United States and elsewhere. 
In the U.S., litigation proceeded on both the protectability of interface spec-
ifications and the permissibility of reverse engineering. Outside the Third 
Circuit, courts have issued decisions consistent with Computer Associates 
and Sega.
However, two new threats to interoperability emerged in the United 
States. First, several courts enforced contractual restrictions on reverse engi-
neering, even when the vendors placed the restrictions in “shrinkwrap” 
or “click-on” licenses for widely distributed consumer software. Second, 
the World Intellectual Property Organization Copyright Treaty, adopted 
in December 1996, required signatories to take adequate measures to pre-
vent the circumvention of copy-protection technologies for purposes of 
infringement. As Congress was implementing this requirement, developers 
of interoperable software recognized that the broad prohibition Congress 
was considering would allow dominant firms to frustrate interoperability 
by placing “locks” on their software. Accordingly, the developers lobbied 
for and secured an interoperability exception in the Digital Millennium 
Copyright Act (DMCA).
Significantly, the European Union anticipated both of these issues in 
its Software Directive, which contains provisions that expressly invalidate 
contractual restrictions on reverse engineering and that permit the circum-
vention of technological protection measures for the purpose of perform-
ing lawful reverse engineering.
The interoperability debate also continued in the Pacific Rim after 1995. 
Dominant U.S. companies, with the assistance of the U.S. Trade Represen-
tative, vigorously opposed the adoption of reverse-engineering exceptions 
based on the EU Software Directive in Australia, Hong Kong, Korea, and the 
Philippines.
This book picks up the story where Interfaces on Trial left off. Sections 
1.2 and 1.3 of this chapter provide a quick review of the interoperability 
debate in the European Union and the United States before 1995. Chapter 
ness 707 (1995); Book review, 20 New Matter 35 (1995); Zack Higgens, book review, 9 
Harvard Journal of Law and Technology 585 (1996); Robert Brookshire, book review, 7 
Law and Policy Book Reviews 206 (1997).
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2 discusses the U.S. copyright cases since 1995 addressing the protectability 
of interface specifications and the permissibility of reverse engineering, and 
closes by noting that the executive and legislative branches have finally 
endorsed this pro-interoperability case law. Chapter 3 looks at the legisla-
tive history of the interoperability exception in the DMCA, as well as the 
interoperability cases decided under the DMCA. Chapter 4 examines the 
enforceability of contractual restrictions on reverse engineering, including 
the treatment of this issue in the context of the Uniform Computer Infor-
mation Transactions Act (UCITA). Chapter 5 reviews the interoperability 
debate in the Pacific Rim, with stops in Australia, Singapore, Hong Kong, 
South Korea, and the Philippines. Chapter 6 briefly considers issues that 
may have more impact on interoperability in the future.
In this book, certain terms have the same meanings as in Interfaces on 
Trial:
• “Interoperability” is synonymous with “compatibility” and has two 
dimensions: interchangeability and connectability. “Interchangeability” 
refers to the degree to which one product can substitute for or compete 
with another product. “Connectability” refers to the degree to which a 
product can participate in a joint activity with another product.
• “Interface” means a functional characteristic of an element’s interaction 
with other elements of the computer system, i.e., a permissible input, out-
put, or control. This book focuses on interfaces between software and hard-
ware, or between two software elements. This book does not examine user 
interfaces—that is, the interfaces between users and computers.
• “Interface specifications” are the rules of interconnection between two 
program elements. An interface specification can have different implemen-
tations—e.g., it can be encoded in different ways. A programming language 
or particular commands can be a form of interface specification.
• “Disassembly” and “decompilation” refer to the translation of machine-
readable object code into a higher-level, human-readable format. “Disas-
sembly” is the term usually used in the U.S. legal context; “decompilation” 
typically is used outside the United States. Accordingly, we will use “disas-
sembly” when discussing the activity in the context of U.S. legal devel-
opments, and “decompilation” when referring to the activity in the 
international policy context.
• “Black-box reverse engineering” means observing the externally visible 
characteristics of a program as it operates, without looking into the pro-
gram itself.
These terms, and computer technology generally, are discussed in much 
greater detail in Interfaces on Trial.
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The present volume is intended to connect to, and not substitute for, 
Interfaces on Trial. Thus, it does not repeat the earlier volume’s background 
information on computer technology, the structure of the computer 
industry, intellectual-property law, and the economics of standardization. 
Additionally, since the publication of Interfaces of Trial there has been a pro-
fusion of scholarly writings concerning the complex interaction between 
copyright and digital technology.3 This book does not attempt to address 
this vast academic literature. Rather, it provides the second volume of the 
history of an ongoing legal debate.
Although we attempt to present contentious issues in a balanced man-
ner, the reader should be forewarned that we are hardly objective observ-
ers in this debate. Rather, we have devoted significant time and energy 
over the past 20 years to advocating the views of developers of interoper-
able software. We believe that the triumph of interoperability will benefit 
both the information-technology industry and computer users around the 
world.
1.2 The Interoperability Debate in the European Union before 1995
In 1991, after a vigorous debate (described in detail in Interfaces on Trial), the 
European Union adopted its Software Directive.4 During the three-year process 
that led up to the promulgation of the directive, dominant firms, developers 
of interoperable software, and computer users battled over the protectability 
of interface specifications and the permissibility of reverse engineering. The 
directive that emerged from this political process reflects a policy judgment 
that copyright should not interfere with interoperability. The Software 
3. See, e.g., Pamela Samuelson and Suzanne Scotchmer, “The Law and Economics of 
Reverse Engineering,” 111 Yale Law Journal 1575 (2002); Peter Menell, “Envisioning 
Copyright Law’s Digital Future,” 46 New York Law School Law Review 63 (2002–03); 
Douglas Lichtman, “Property Rights in Emerging Platform Technologies,” 29 Journal 
of Legal Studies 615 (2000); Peter Menell, “An Epitaph for Traditional Copyright Pro-
tection of Network Features of Computer Software,” 43 Antitrust Bulletin 651 (fall-
winter 1998); Dennis Karjala and Peter Menell, “Applying Fundamental Copyright 
Principles in Lotus Development Corp. v. Borland International Inc.,” 10 High Technology 
Law Journal 177 (1995); Pamela Samuelson, Randall Davis, Mitchell Kapor, and 
Gerald Reichman, “A Manifesto Concerning the Legal Protection of Computer Pro-
grams,” 94 Columbia Law Review 2308 (1994); Andrew Johnson-Laird, “Software 
Reverse Engineering in the Real World,” 19 University of Dayton Law Review 843 
(1994); Dennis Karjala, “Copyright Protection of Computer Software, Reverse Engi-
neering, and Professor Miller,” 19 University of Dayton Law Review 975 (1994).
4. Council Directive 91/250/EEC, 1991 O.J. (L 122).
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Directive has been implemented by all 27 member states of the European 
Union, and also by Croatia, Norway, Russia, Switzerland, and Turkey.
Article 5(3) of the Software Directive provides a broad exception from 
liability for “black-box reverse engineering”—activities such as observing 
the behavior of a program as it runs, input/output tests, and line traces. 
Article 6 provides a narrower exception for decompilation. Decompilation 
or disassembly involves translating machine-readable object code into a 
higher-level, human-readable form. Article 6 permits decompilation for 
purposes of achieving interoperability when the information has not pre-
viously been made available, when the decompilation is limited to those 
parts of the program necessary for interoperability, and when the final 
product created by the reverse engineer does not infringe on the copyright 
of the original product. There has been extensive debate on exactly what 
these provisions mean,5 but to date there has been no copyright litigation 
concerning article 6.6
One particularly enigmatic provision is article 6(1)(b), which requires 
that “the information necessary to achieve interoperability has not previ-
ously been readily available” to the reverse engineer. One commentator has 
stated that “since the information must be ‘readily’ available, third parties 
would have no duty to ask for information if it is not contained in generally 
available documentation. Nor can it be said that interface information is 
‘readily’ available if the rightholder is only willing to disclose it upon pay-
ment of a license fee, since this would undermine the very purpose of lim-
ited, but reliable access to interface information.”7 Others have interpreted 
this provision as requiring the reverse engineer to request the interface 
information from the developer of the target software before decompila-
tion. The reverse engineer obviously would prefer not to have to make such 
a request, because the request would alert the first developer to the reverse 
engineer’s business plans and would delay the decompilation.
5. See Jonathan Band and Masanobu Katoh, Interfaces on Trial: Intellectual Property 
and Interoperability in the Global Software Market (Westview, 1995), at 246–255. The 
governmental bodies of the European Union were lobbied heavily concerning the 
Software Directive. The Business Software Alliance attempted to limit the article 5 
and 6 exceptions as much as possible. The European Committee for Interoperable 
Systems, led by Olivetti, Fujitsu Espana, and Bull, lobbied for broad exceptions. See 
id. at 230–241.
6. As will be discussed below, the European Court of First Instance interpreted the 
word “interoperability” in the directive during the course of the European Commis-
sion’s competition case against Microsoft.
7. Thomas Drier, “The Council Directive of 14 May 1991, on the Legal Protection of 
Computer Programs,” 9 European Intellectual Property Review 319, 324 (1991).
The Interoperability Debate 7
Article 9(1) of the Software Directive provides that any contractual 
restriction on the reverse-engineering exceptions in articles 5 and 6 is “null 
and void.” Similarly, article 7 contains a reverse-engineering exception to 
the directive’s prohibition on the circumvention of technological protec-
tion measures.
Thus, since 1991 there has been a high degree of certainty and predictabil-
ity in Europe concerning the lawfulness of reverse engineering. The reverse 
engineer incurs no copyright liability for black-box reverse engineering for 
any purpose, nor for decompilation for purposes of achieving interoper-
ability. The reverse engineer can ignore with impunity a contractual term 
prohibiting reverse engineering, presumably even in a negotiated contract. 
Further, the reverse engineer can circumvent a technological protection 
measure for purposes of engaging in other lawful reverse engineering.
The Software Directive does not address with any specificity the ques-
tion of the scope of copyright protection: To what extent could the reverse 
engineer use what he learned through his reverse engineering? Rather, arti-
cle 1(2) provides that “[i]deas and principles which underlie any element 
of a computer program, including those which underlie its interfaces, are 
not protected by copyright.”8 Commentators have interpreted this to mean 
that interface information necessary to achieve interoperability must fall 
on the idea side of the idea/expression dichotomy; otherwise the detailed 
decompilation provision in article 6 would be of little utility. Once again, 
there has been no copyright litigation in Europe concerning this.
In sum, the Software Directive settled the copyright issues relating to 
interoperability within the European Union in 1991. Indeed, in 2000 the 
European Commission issued a report on the implementation and effects 
of the Software Directive which concluded that “the objectives of the Direc-
tive have been achieved and the effects on the software industry are sat-
isfactory (demonstrated for example by industry growth and decrease in 
software piracy).”9 Accordingly, “there appears to be no need to amend the 
Directive.”
Since 1991, the legal battle in the European Union concerning interop-
erability has centered on a competition-law (antitrust, in U.S. terminol-
ogy) complaint brought by the European Commission against Microsoft. 
8. The directive’s eleventh “Whereas” clause defines interfaces as “the parts of the 
program which provide for . . . interconnection and interaction between elements of 
software and hardware.”
9. Report from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament and the 
Economic and Social Committee on the implementation and effects of Directive 
91/250/EEC on the legal protection of computer programs, COM(2000) 199 final, at 2.
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Though significant, this litigation is beyond the scope of this book because 
of its basis in competition law rather than copyright law.
However, the European Court of First Instance (CFI) did interpret the 
meaning of the word “interoperability” in the directive during the course 
of the litigation. This interpretation ratified the European Commission’s 
long-standing view of the scope of the article 6 decompilation exception.
The case concerned Microsoft’s alleged abuse of its dominant position 
by withholding interface information necessary for Sun Microsystems to 
make its Solaris operating system fully compatible with technologies based 
on Microsoft Windows.10 In 2004, after an investigation, the European 
Commission found that Microsoft had abused its dominant position and 
ordered it to provide the necessary specifications to Sun and other compa-
nies on reasonable and nondiscriminatory terms. Microsoft appealed the 
Commission’s decision to the CFI, arguing inter alia that the Commission’s 
order was inconsistent with the legislative policy of the Software Direc-
tive. Specifically, Microsoft asserted that “interoperability” in the directive 
meant only the ability of one computer program to connect to another 
program. Because Microsoft licensed interface information to developers of 
application programs designed to run on Windows, Microsoft claimed that 
it satisfied the directive’s objectives and thus did not abuse its dominant 
position.
The Commission, on the other hand, interpreted “interoperability” in 
the directive more broadly to mean the ability to connect to or substitute 
for another program. Because Microsoft refused to license interface infor-
mation to Sun, whose Solaris operating system competed with Windows, 
the Commission argued that Microsoft frustrated the directive’s intent and 
thereby abused its dominant position.
In 2007, the CFI ruled as follows:
[W]hat is at issue in the present case is a decision adopted in application of Article 82 
[of the European Community Treaty], a provision of higher rank than [the Software 
Directive]. The question in the present case is not so much whether the concept of 
interoperability in the contested decision is consistent with the concept envisaged in 
that directive as whether the Commission correctly determined the degree of interop-
erability that should be attainable in the light of the objectives of Article 82 EC.11
Nonetheless, the CFI held that the Commission’s “two-way” interpretation 
of “interoperability” as including the ability to connect to and substitute 
10. For a more detailed discussion of the case, see Pamela Samuelson, “Are Patents 
on Interfaces Impeding Interoperability?” 93 Minnesota Law Review 1943, 1989–1996 
(2009).
11. Case T-201/04, Microsoft Corp. v. Comm’n, 2007 E.C.R. II-3601 ¶ 227.
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for computer programs “is consistent with that envisaged in” the Software 
Directive.12
By interpreting the word “interoperability” in the directive as it did, the 
CFI eliminated any possible ambiguity concerning the scope of article 6’s 
permitting decompilation “to obtain the information necessary to achieve 
the interoperability of an independently created computer program with 
other programs.” Without question, article 6 allows the reverse engineer 
to decompile an existing computer program for the purpose of developing 
his own connecting or competing computer program. The Commission has 
consistently understood article 6 in this manner since 1991.13 The CFI deci-
sion thus finally laid to rest the argument that article 6 permits decompila-
tion only for the purpose of developing connecting products.14
The CFI decision also strongly implied that article 1(2) of the directive 
excludes copyright protection for interface specifications. As was noted 
above, article 1(2) provides that “[i]deas and principles which underlie any 
element of a computer program, including those which under lie its inter-
faces, are not protected by copyright.” The CFI stated:
In requiring, by way of remedy, that an undertaking in a dominant position disclose 
the interoperability information, the Commission refers to a detailed technical de-
scription of certain rules of interconnection and interaction that can be used within 
the work group networks to deliver work group services. That description does not 
extend to the way in which the undertaking implements those rules, in particular, to 
the internal structure or to the source code of its products.
The degree of interoperability thus required by the Commission enables compet-
ing operating systems to interoperate with the dominant undertaking’s domain ar-
chitecture on an equal footing in order to be able to compete viably with the latter’s 
operating systems. It does not entail making competitors’ products work in exactly 
the same way as its own and does not enable its competitors to clone or reproduce its 
products or certain features of those products.15
12. Id. at ¶ 225.
13. Commission of the European Communities, Twentieth Report on Competition 
Policy (1991); Michael Sucker, “The Software Directive—Between the Combat 
Against Piracy and the Preservation of Undistorted Competition,” in A Handbook of 
European Software Law (Oxford University Press, 1993).
14. During the drafting of the directive, BSA attempted to limit the decompilation 
exception to the development of connecting products. See Band and Katoh, Inter-
faces on Trial at 237–240. Similarly, as other countries have considered reverse-engi-
neering exceptions, BSA has argued that article 6 applies only to the development of 
connecting products. See chapter 5 below.
15. Case T-201/04, Microsoft Corp. v. Comm’n, 2007 E.C.R. II-3601 Summary of Judg-
ment ¶4.
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The distinction the CFI drew between the “detailed technical descrip-
tion of certain rules of interconnection and interaction” and the way in 
which a company “implements those rules” in “the internal structure” or 
“the source code of its products” parallels the idea/expression dichotomy 
embodied by article 1(2).
Although the Software Directive resolved the copyright issues relating to 
interoperability within Europe, since 1995 fierce legislative wars have been 
waged in several Pacific Rim countries over the adoption of the Software 
Directive’s exceptions for reverse engineering. These wars are described in 
chapter 5.
1.3 The Interoperability Debate in the United States before 1995
In the United States, the story before and after 1995 is much more com-
plex for both of the central questions of the interoperability debate. This 
is because both questions were resolved in the United States in a common-
law, case-by-case manner by the federal courts, rather than by the legisla-
tive process of the Software Directive.
1.3.1 The Unprotectability of Interface Specifications
Between 1983 and 1995, U.S. courts became increasingly sophisticated in 
their understanding of the unique characteristics of computer programs. 
The courts became more aware that, although the copyright law classifies 
programs as literary works, they in fact are functional works operating in 
highly constrained environments. Accordingly, by 1995, courts understood 
that many program elements should not receive copyright protection, par-
ticularly the information necessary for achieving interoperability.
When courts first looked at the issue of interoperability, they favored 
protection of interface information. In 1983, for example, the U.S. Court 
of Appeals for the Third Circuit suggested that compatibility was a “com-
mercial and competitive objective which does not enter into the some-
what metaphysical issue of whether particular ideas and expression have 
merged.”16 Under this reasoning, copyright could protect interface speci-
fications. Three years later, the Third Circuit reinforced this protectionist 
trend in Whelan v. Jaslow.17
16. Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240, 1253 (3d Cir. 
1983), cert. dismissed, 464 U.S. 1033 (1984).
17. Whelan Associates, Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Laboratory, Inc., 797 F.2d 1222 (3d Cir. 
1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1031 (1987).
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1.3.1.1 Whelan v. Jaslow (1987)
Jaslow, the owner of a dental laboratory, hired Whelan, a computer pro-
grammer, to develop a computer program to run his business. They agreed 
that Whelan would retain the copyright in the program and that Jaslow 
would try to market the program to other dental laboratories. Jaslow soon 
realized that the Whelan program, written in Event Driven Language (EDL) 
for an IBM Series One computer, was not compatible with the computers 
many dental laboratories already possessed. Jaslow then developed a dental 
lab program in BASIC, which could run on these computers. Whelan sued 
for copyright infringement.
At trial, Jaslow’s expert testified that he compared the source and object 
code of the two programs, and found “substantive differences in program-
ming style, in programming structure, in algorithms and data structures.”18 
Whelan’s expert agreed that the Jaslow program was not a simple transla-
tion of the Whelan program, but stated that the programs were similar in 
several respects. The file structures and screen outputs, for example, were 
virtually identical. Further, five important subroutines “performed almost 
identically within both programs.”19 Even Jaslow’s expert confirmed that 
the programs had “overall structural similarities.”20
The district court ruled for Whelan. Jaslow appealed. Jaslow’s primary 
argument on appeal was that copyright protected only the literal elements 
of a computer program—the actual lines of source or object code—and not 
the non-literal elements such as program structure. In a lengthy opinion, 
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit rejected Jaslow’s argument 
and held that copyright could program the non-literal elements of a com-
puter program, including its “structure, sequence, and organization.” The 
reasoning and language used by the Third Circuit, however, went much 
farther than necessary to reach this conclusion.
Upon completing a background discussion on the basic principles of 
copyright law applicable to the case, the Third Circuit turned to “whether a 
program’s copyright protection covers the structure of the program or only 
the program’s literal elements, i.e., its source and object codes.”21 The court 
observed that “computer programs are classified as literary works for the 
purposes of copyright,” and that “[o]ne can violate the copyright of a play 
or book by copying its plot or plot devices.” Accordingly, the court reasoned 
that copyright protection should extend to a computer program’s structure.
18. Id. at 1228.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 1234.
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The court then formulated the following rule for separating idea from 
expression in utilitarian works:
[T]he purpose or function of a utilitarian work would be the work’s idea, and every-
thing that is not necessary to the purpose or function would be part of the expression 
of the idea. Where there are various means of achieving the desired purpose, then the 
particular means chosen is not necessary to the purpose; hence, there is expression 
not idea.22
The court defined the idea in the case before it as “the efficient manage-
ment of a dental laboratory.”23 It then went on to say that “[b]ecause that 
idea could be accomplished in a number of different ways with a number 
of different structures, the structure of the [Whelan] program is part of the 
program’s expression, not its idea.”24
The Whelan court’s reasoning contained two related flaws. First, the 
Whelan court identified a single, highly abstract idea in the entire computer 
program. Second, the court incorrectly reduced the idea/expression dichot-
omy to the merger doctrine. In the court’s view, if several means existed 
for performing the program’s basic function (its idea), then the means did 
not merge with the function and thus were protected expression. The court 
failed to understand that each means of performing the function could in 
its own right be unprotected under section 102(b) as a procedure, process, 
system, method, or operation. Patents, not copyrights, protect “the means 
for carrying the idea out.”25 By protecting the means for performing a func-
tion, the Whelan court in effect used copyright to protect patentable subject 
matter.26
The Whelan decision contained two justifications for this extreme result. 
First, because Congress classified computer programs as literary works, the 
court treated them as traditional literary works, comparable to novels and 
plays, without recognizing their utilitarian nature.27 Second, the Whelan 
court noted that “the coding process is a comparatively small part of pro-
gramming,”28 whereas “among the more significant costs in computer 
22. Id.
23. Id. at n. 28.
24. Id.
25. Kruger v. Whitehead, 153 F.2d 238, 239 (9th Cir. 1946), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 774 
(1947).
26. See Arthur J. Levine, “Comment on Bonito Boats Follow-Up: The Supreme 
Court’s Likely Rejection of Nonliteral Software Copyright Protection,” The Computer 
Lawyer 29, 30 (July 1989).
27. Whelan, 797 F.2d at 1237 (citations omitted).
28. Id. at 1231.
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programming are those attributable to developing the structure and logic 
of the program.”29 It observed that “[t]he rule proposed here . . . would 
provide the proper incentive for programmers by protecting their most 
valuable efforts, while not giving them a stranglehold over the develop-
ment of new computer devices that accomplish the same end.”30 The court 
evidently believed that a programmer’s method for solving a program 
deserved protection—so long as other methods for solving the program 
existed—because the method was the most valuable part of the program.
In other words, Whelan suggested that, in the computer context, the 
court need only assess whether alternative methods of accomplishing the 
basic ideas exist to determine whether the elements the defendant cop-
ied constitute protected expression. This truncated protected expression 
analysis invariably affords programs “thick” copyright protection—indeed, 
thicker protection than is accorded traditional literary works such as nov-
els and plays, which undergo a complete protected expression analysis. 
Although Whelan did not specifically concern interoperability, its reason-
ing inevitably led to the conclusion that detailed program elements such as 
interface specifications received copyright protection.
The Whelan decision was controversial from the moment it was issued. 
Just five months later, the Fifth Circuit rejected its reasoning in a case 
involving programs with similar design specifications that assisted cotton 
farmers in growing and marketing their product (Plains Cotton Co-Op Ass’n 
v. Goodpasture Computer Serv., Inc.).31 Nonetheless, lower courts followed 
Whelan until 1992, when the Second Circuit revealed its serious flaws in a 
case that did involve interoperability: Computer Associates Int’l, Inc. v. Altai, 
Inc.32
1.3.1.2 Computer Associates v. Altai (1992)
Computer Associates developed an application program with a component, 
ADAPTER, that permitted the application to run on different IBM main-
frame operating systems. Altai developed a similar application designed to 
run on a single IBM operating system. Altai then decided to develop a com-
ponent that allowed its program to run on other IBM operating systems. 
Computer Associates filed suit, alleging that Altai’s component, OSCAR 
3.4, infringed the copyright in ADAPTER. Altai determined that 30 per-
cent of the OSCAR 3.4 code was copied from ADAPTER, and it conceded 
29. Id.
30. Id. (footnotes omitted).
31. 807 F.2d 1256 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 821 (1987).
32. 982 F.2d 693 (2d Cir. 1992).
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liability with respect to OSCAR 3.4. Altai then rewrote its component in a 
clean room, without access to ADAPTER. Computer Associates amended 
its complaint to allege that the new version, OSCAR 3.5, also infringed its 
copyright.
The district court rejected Whelan as simplistic and as leading to exces-
sively broad protection for computer programs. The court then compared 
the two programs. Because of the use of the clean room, the code was com-
pletely different. The parameter lists and macros of the programs were simi-
lar, but the court determined that these similarities were dictated by the 
IBM operating systems with which the programs were designed to interop-
erate. There was overlap in the list of services, but this too was dictated by 
function. Finally, the court found similarity in the programs’ organization 
charts, but the charts were “simple and obvious” and of de minimus impor-
tance. Accordingly, the district court concluded that the programs were not 
similar in protected expression.
Computer Associates appealed. After reviewing the principles of com-
puter program design and the facts of the case, the U.S. Court of Appeals 
for the Second Circuit acknowledged the “essentially utilitarian nature of a 
computer program.”33 Identifying the seminal U.S. Supreme Court decision 
in Baker v. Selden as the “doctrinal starting point in analyses”34 of the scope 
of protection for computer programs, the Second Circuit emphasized that 
“compared to aesthetic works, computer programs hover even more closely 
to the elusive boundary line described in Section 102(b).”35
The Second Circuit rejected the principles for analyzing computer pro-
grams offered in Whelan, holding that “[t]he crucial flaw in [Whelan’s] 
reasoning is that it assumes that only one ‘idea’ in copyright law terms, 
underlies any computer program.”36 It also agreed with the district court 
that a computer program’s “ultimate function or purpose is the com-
posite result of interacting sub-routines.”37 The Second Circuit wrote: 
“[S]ince each sub-routine is itself a program, and thus, may be said to have 
its own ‘idea,’ Whelan’s general formulation that a program’s overall pur-
pose equates with the program’s idea is descriptively inadequate.”38 The 
Second Circuit further agreed with the district court’s rejection of Whelan’s 
33. Computer Associates, 982 F.2d at 704.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 705 (citations omitted).
37. Id.
38. Id.
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terms “structure, sequence and organization,” observing that they were 
based on a “somewhat outdated appreciation of computer science.”39
Noting that “Whelan’s approach to separating idea from expression in 
computer programs relies too heavily on metaphysical distinctions and 
does not place enough emphasis on practical considerations,”40 the Sec-
ond Circuit proposed a three-part procedure for determining whether an 
allegedly copied program is “substantially similar” to another copyrighted 
program:
In ascertaining substantial similarity under this approach, a court would first break 
down the allegedly infringed program into its constituent structural parts. Then, by 
examining each of these parts for such things as incorporated ideas, expression that 
is necessarily incidental to those ideas, and elements that are taken from the public 
domain, a court would then be able to sift out all non-protectable material. Left with 
a kernel, or perhaps kernels, of creative expression after following this process of 
elimination, the court’s last step would be to compare this material with the struc-
ture of an allegedly infringing program.41
The Second Circuit based its first step—abstraction—on Judge Learned 
Hand’s famous test in Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp.42 The court explained:
In a manner that resembles reverse engineering on a theoretical plane, a court should 
dissect the allegedly copied program’s structure and isolate each level of abstraction 
contained within it. This process begins with the code and ends with an articulation 
of the program’s ultimate function.43
The discussion of the second step—filtration—is perhaps the most sig-
nificant part of the opinion. The court adopted the “successive filtering 
method” proposed by the well-respected treatise Nimmer on Copyright, which 
“entails examining the structural components at each level of abstraction 
to determine whether their inclusion at that level was ‘idea’ or was dictated 
by considerations of efficiency, so as to be necessarily incidental to that 
idea; required by factors external to the program itself; or taken from the 
public domain and hence is nonprotectable expression.”44
The “successive filtering method” is a refinement of Judge Hand’s 
abstractions test. In its classical formulation, the abstractions test calls for a 
court to analyze a work’s levels of abstraction and to then draw a line above 
39. Id. at 706.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. 45 F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1930), cert. denied, 282 U.S. 902 (1931).
43. Id. at 707.
44. Id.
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which everything is idea and below which everything is expression. Here, 
the Second Circuit suggested that idea and expression may be present at 
each level of abstraction.
The court then provided additional detail on the non-protectability of 
elements dictated by efficiency and by external factors. It observed that 
“[e]fficiency is an industry-wide goal,”45 and that “[w]hile, hypothetically, 
there might be a myriad of ways in which a programmer may effectuate 
certain functions within a program—i.e., express the idea embodied in a 
given subroutine—efficiency concerns may so narrow the practical range of 
choice as to make only one or two forms of expression workable options.”46 
Under these circumstances, the expression would merge with the idea and 
would not receive copyright protection.
Discussing external factors, the Second Circuit stated that “in many 
instances it is virtually impossible to write a program to perform particular 
functions in a specific computing environment without employing stan-
dard techniques.”47 The Second Circuit went on to hold that under the 
doctrine of scènes à faire copyright protection should not extend to those 
program elements in which a programmer’s “freedom of design choice”48 is 
“circumscribed by extrinsic considerations such as (1) mechanical specifi-
cations of the computer on which a particular program is intended to run; 
(2) compatibility requirements of other programs with which a program is 
designed to operate in conjunction; (3) computer manufacturers’ design 
standards; (4) demands of the industry being serviced; and (5) widely 
accepted programming practices within the computer industry.”49 Apply-
ing these principles to the facts before it, the Second Circuit affirmed the 
district court and held that Altai had not copied protected expression.
Thus, relying on the scènes à faire doctrine, the Second Circuit held that 
similarities resulting from the need to interoperate with other compo-
nents of a computer system did not constitute copyright infringement.50 
45. Id. at 708.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 709 (quotation omitted).
48. Id.
49. Id. at 709–710.
50. Under the scènes à faire doctrine, courts “deny protection to those expressions 
that are standard, stock or common to a particular topic or that necessarily follow 
from a common theme or setting. Granting copyright protection to the necessary 
incidents of an idea would effectively afford a monopoly to the first programmer to 
express those ideas.” Gates Rubber Co. v. Bando Chem. Indus., Inc., 9 F.3d 823, 838 
(10th Cir. 1993) (citations omitted).
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In essence, the Second Circuit ruled that interface specifications were not 
protected expression, and that a competitor could conform to the rules 
of intercommunications developed by another vendor without infringing 
that vendor’s copyright.
The reasoning of the Computer Associates decision was so powerful that 
many courts throughout the United States and abroad adopted it rapidly.51 
Whelan was thoroughly repudiated, and courts began applying the abstrac-
tion-filtration-comparison methodology in a wide range of copyright cases, 
including cases that did not involve computer programs. Additionally, 
other courts soon followed Computer Associates’ specific rulings concerning 
interoperability.
1.3.1.3 Atari v. Nintendo and Sega v. Accolade (1992)
Just three months after the Second Circuit issued Computer Associates, the 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit relied upon it in Atari Games 
Corp. v. Nintendo of America, Inc., stating that “the court must filter out as 
unprotectable . . . expression dictated by external factors (like the com-
puter’s mechanical specifications, compatibility with other programs, and 
demands of the industry served by the program).”52 In Atari, both the dis-
trict court and the Federal Circuit extended protection to Nintendo pro-
gram elements that currently had no purpose but that Atari argued would 
be necessary for Atari to achieve compatibility in the future with Nintendo 
products not yet on the market. The Federal Circuit stated that “[t]he dis-
trict court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to allow Atari to rely 
on speculative future events to justify inclusion of unnecessary [Nintendo] 
program elements in the [Atari] program.”53 The Federal Circuit made it 
clear, however, that it would not protect program elements needed to 
achieve compatibility at the time of the writing of the compatible program.
A month later, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, also rely-
ing on Computer Associates, expressly recognized, in Sega Enters. Ltd. v. Acco-
lade, Inc., that computer programs “contain many logical, structural, and 
visual display elements that are dictated by . . . external factors such as 
compatibility requirements and industry demands,” and that “[i]n some 
51. To get the full flavor of the Computer Associates tidal wave, see Band and Katoh, 
Interfaces on Trial at 131–150.
52. 975 F.2d 832, 839 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
53. Id. at 845.
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circumstances, even the exact set of commands used by the programmer is 
deemed functional rather than creative for purposes of copyright.”54
1.3.2 The Permissibility of Reverse Engineering
Following Computer Associates, the Sega court had little trouble concluding 
that copyright did not protect program elements necessary for interoper-
ability. A trickier issue for the Sega court was the permissibility of the copy-
ing that occurred while examining a competitor’s product to uncover these 
program elements. To be sure, the U.S. Supreme Court has long recognized 
that there is nothing inherently wrong with studying a competitor’s prod-
uct to understand how it works and to figure out how to make a better 
product. For example, in Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp.55 the Supreme Court 
stated that “trade secret law . . . does not offer protection against discovery 
by fair and honest means, such as . . . by so-called reverse engineering, that 
is by starting with a known product and working backward to divine the 
process which aided in its development or manufacture.”
The Supreme Court has also recognized the benefits of reverse engineer-
ing: “Reverse engineering . . . often leads to significant advances in tech-
nology.”56 Further, the Supreme Court has noted that “the competitive 
reality of reverse engineering may act as a spur to the inventor, creating 
an incentive to develop inventions that meet the rigorous requirements of 
patentability.”57
Copyright law, however, has the potential of raising obstacles to reverse 
engineering of software. Because of the nature of computer technology, 
reverse engineering of software almost always requires the making of a 
reproduction or derivative work. For example, the reverse-engineering 
method of disassembly or decompilation involves “translating” the pub-
licly distributed, computer-readable program into a higher-level, human-
readable form. This act of translation could be considered the preparation of 
a derivative work.58 Black-box reverse engineering is less intrusive than dis-
assembly because an engineer observes the program’s behavior and interac-
tion with its environment without looking at the program itself. Although 
less intrusive than disassembly, black-box reverse engineering requires that 
the program be copied into the computer’s random-access memory (RAM) 
54. 977 F.2d 1510, 1524 (9th Cir. 1992) (citations omitted).
55. 416 U.S. 470, 476 (1974).
56. Bonito Boats, Inc., v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 160 (1989).
57. Id.
58. See 17 U.S.C. §106(2).
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as the computer runs the program. Such copying arguably infringes the 
reproduction right.59 As was noted above, the European Union, in its 1991 
Software Directive, established a statutory copyright exception excusing 
the copying that occurs during reverse engineering. In contrast, in the early 
1990s U.S. courts employed the doctrine of fair use, codified at 17 U.S.C. 
§107, to permit reverse engineering.
The first thorough judicial consideration of software reverse engineer-
ing occurred in 1992 in Sega Enters. v. Accolade Inc.60 Accolade, a developer 
of computer games, decompiled software in the Sega video console and in 
Sega-compatible games in order to learn the interface specifications that 
would enable it to port its games to the Sega console. Sega sued for copy-
right infringement, and the district court issued a preliminary injunction 
against Accolade. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed, 
finding that “where disassembly is the only way to gain access to the ideas 
and functional elements embodied in a copyrighted computer program and 
where there is a legitimate reason for seeking such access, disassembly is 
a fair use of the copyrighted work, as a matter of law.”61 In the Sega case, 
the court concluded that achieving interoperability between the Accolade 
games and the Sega game console was such a legitimate reason.
Much of the Sega court’s fair-use analysis centered on the second of the 
four fair-use factors: the nature of the copyrighted work. The court recog-
nized the unique characteristics of software and understood that if reverse 
engineering were not permitted the developer would receive de facto protec-
tion over uncopyrightable ideas. In Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of America, 
Inc.62 the Federal Circuit reached the same conclusion for the same reason.
In sum, by 1995 courts in the United States had ruled that copyright 
did not protect interface specifications and that the copying incidental to 
the reverse engineering necessary for interoperability did not infringe copy-
right. But, as we shall see, the interoperability debate was far from over.
59. The Ninth Circuit in MAI Systems Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc., 991 F.2d 511 (9th 
Cir.), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1033 (1993), found that the loading of a program into a 
computer’s RAM constituted a copy for purposes of the Copyright Act. However, as 
we discuss below in section 2.5, the Second Circuit’s decision in Cartoon Network LP 
v. CSC Holdings, Inc., 536 F.3d 121 (2d Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 2890 (2009), 
suggests that not all temporary copies are fixed within the meaning of the Copy-
right Act.
60. 977 F.2d 1510 (9th Cir. 1992).
61. Id. at 1527–1528.
62. 975 F.2d 832 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
 

2 Copyright Cases in U.S. Courts
By the mid 1990s, U.S. courts had ruled on the two copyright issues criti-
cal to interoperability. First, following the Second Circuit’s methodology 
in Computer Associates Int’l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc.,1 several courts had refused to 
extend copyright protection to interface specifications. Second, both the 
Ninth Circuit and the Federal Circuit had found the copying incidental 
to reverse engineering permitted by the fair-use doctrine. In the ensuing 
decade, courts continued to reach similar conclusions. Additionally, both 
the executive branch and the legislative branch had endorsed this case law. 
Thus, the unprotectability of interface specifications and the permissibility 
of software reverse engineering are well established in U.S. copyright law.
2.1 The Unprotectability of Interface Specifications
In July of 1992 (only a month after the issuance of Computer Associates), in 
Lotus v. Borland,2 a district court narrowly construed the Second Circuit’s 
withholding of copyright protection from interface specifications. In effect, 
the district court found that copyright did not protect the interface speci-
fications necessary to attach to an existing product, but that copyright did 
protect the specifications necessary to replace the existing product. In 1995, 
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reversed the district court, 
finding that Lotus’s command structure was an unprotectable method of 
operation. Lotus appealed the decision to the U.S. Supreme Court, which 
affirmed the First Circuit’s ruling in a 4–4 ruling (Justice Stevens having 
recused himself). Since Lotus v. Borland, courts have withheld copyright 
protection from interface specifications under several different theories, 
including variations of the idea/expression dichotomy and the fair-use 
1. 982 F.2d 693 (2d Cir. 1992).
2. Lotus Development Corp. v. Borland Int’l Inc., 799 F. Supp. 203 (D. Mass. 1992), rev’d, 
49 F.3d 807 (1st Cir. 1995), aff’d by an equally divided Court, 516 U.S. 233 (1996).
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doctrine. These decisions have helped to alleviate the concerns of many 
developers regarding their exposure to copyright-infringement liability for 
their interoperable products.
2.1.1 Lotus v. Borland (1995)
During its pendency, Lotus v. Borland was characterized in both the popular 
press and the computer press as a “look and feel” case.3 Indeed, District 
Court Judge Keeton, although he criticized the term “look and feel,” largely 
viewed the case as such. His focus on the user interface was completely 
understandable: in the forerunner to Lotus v. Borland—Lotus v. Paperback4—
the Paperback and Lotus user interfaces shared many features. Further, 
at the outset of Lotus v. Borland, Lotus alleged that Borland International 
Inc. had copied a number of user-interface features. By the time the case 
got to the First Circuit, however, the only similarity at issue was the com-
mand structure of Lotus 1-2-3. Free from the baggage of the Paperback deci-
sion and the early complaint against Borland, the First Circuit correctly 
perceived that this case did not concern the “look and feel” of the user 
interface at all, but instead concerned interoperability. And once the First 
Circuit understood the role of the command structure in achieving interop-
erability, it had little difficult reversing the lower court.
2.1.1.1 The Factual Background
In the late 1970s, Visicalc developed the first computerized spreadsheet, 
which ran on Apple II computers. Soon after the introduction of the IBM 
PC, Lotus Development Corporation released Lotus 1-2-3, a spreadsheet 
program that was compatible with the IBM PC. Lotus 1-2-3 soon dominated 
the spreadsheet market, eclipsing Visicalc, and its popularity contributed to 
the success of the IBM PC.
Although Lotus 1-2-3 incorporated some of Visicalc’s commands in its 
user interface, it had an original menu tree structure in which more than 
400 commands were arranged in a clearly defined hierarchy. Using differ-
ent code, Paperback Software developed a program that re-created the entire 
Lotus 1-2-3 command structure and other features of the Lotus 1-2-3 user 
interface. Lotus sued for copyright infringement, and prevailed in 1990.5 
Paperback did not have the resources to appeal the judgment.
3. This subsection is based on Jonathan Band, “Lotus v. Borland Viewed through the 
Lens of Interoperability,” The Computer Lawyer, June 1995, at 1.
4. Lotus Development Corp. v. Paperback Software Int’l, 740 F. Supp. 37 (D. Mass. 1990).
5. Id. After Lotus’s victory, 300 picketers protested Lotus’s litigation strategy outside 
Lotus’s headquarters in Cambridge. See Michael Alexander, “Lotus Litigation Draws 
Protest,” Computer World, August 6, 1990, at 6.
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Another Lotus competitor, Borland International, sensed that it was 
next in line, so it initiated a declaratory judgment action against Lotus in 
what it hoped would be a more hospitable forum in California. Lotus then 
filed suit against Borland in Massachusetts, where it had brought the Paper-
back action. The case was assigned to the same judge who had decided 
in Lotus’s favor in Paperback: Judge Robert Keeton, a former Harvard Law 
School professor. A jurisdictional tussle between the federal district courts 
in California and Massachusetts ensued, and Lotus succeeded in having the 
two cases consolidated before Judge Keeton in Massachusetts.
Borland’s Quattro Pro could operate in two different modes: a native 
mode (which was completely different from Lotus 1-2-3) and a 1-2-3 mode 
(which offered the user the same command structure as Lotus 1-2-3).6 As 
in Paperback, there was no allegation that Borland copied any Lotus code. 
In contrast with Paperback, however, the Borland user interface, even when 
in the 1-2-3 mode, looked completely different from Lotus 1-2-3. Despite 
this absence of visual similarity, Lotus claimed that Borland infringed its 
copyright by copying the 1-2-3 command structure.
Although familiarity with the technical facts is important in every soft-
ware copyright case, it is particularly important in this case because of the 
dual function of the Lotus 1-2-3 command structure. First, the Lotus com-
mands appear on the screen in a logical order to inform the user about 
the available options at that stage of operation, and the user invokes a 
sequence of the commands to instruct the program directly to perform 
certain spreadsheet functions. In this role, the commands act as an inter-
face between the user and the program. Second, the spreadsheet user can 
employ the Lotus commands to write a “macro”—a program that employs a 
sequence of menu commands to perform a series of spreadsheet operations 
in a particular order. In this role, the command structure acts as an interface 
between the spreadsheet program and the user-written macro.
Although Lotus 1-2-3, taken as a whole, is an application program, it 
assumes some of the characteristics of an operating system with respect to 
the user-written application programs—the macros—that attach to it. In 
other words, Lotus 1-2-3 serves as a platform upon which the macros run. 
The syntax and the semantics of the communication between a macro and 
the Lotus platform are those of the Lotus commands.
Lotus users had invested substantial time and resources in developing 
libraries of customized macros appropriate to their business needs. Because 
of this, the Lotus users were “locked in” to the Lotus environment; as they 
6. Borland’s 1-2-3 mode also offered the user additional commands not found in 
Lotus 1-2-3.
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expanded their operations, they simply would not purchase spreadsheet 
programs developed by a Lotus competitor such as Borland unless the Bor-
land spreadsheet could execute their macros.7
The most basic form of macro-compatibility required the Borland 
platform to have the ability to translate the user-written macros instruc-
tions into instructions intelligible to the Borland platform, and vice versa. 
Because the set of instructions used by the macro was a subset of Lotus’s 
commands, the Borland platform had to translate those instructions from 
the macros by means of a file that replicated the Lotus 1-2-3 command 
structure, syntax, and semantics. Borland called this file the Key Reader.
2.1.1.2 The District Court Decisions
In finding for Lotus, Judge Keeton primarily considered the Lotus com-
mand structure in its user-interface role.8 Relying heavily on the Third Cir-
cuit’s decision in Whelan v. Jaslow,9 he found the command structure to be 
protected expression. Although Judge Keeton rejected Whelan’s simplistic 
one-idea-per-program rule, he nonetheless adopted Whelan’s abbreviated 
copyright analysis, in which the idea/expression dichotomy was reduced to 
the merger doctrine. In Judge Keeton’s view, if an author had alternatives 
available to him, there was no merger, and if there was no merger, there was 
protected expression. Because a programmer theoretically could construct 
many different spreadsheet command structures, copyright protected the 
Lotus 1-2-3 command structure. Accordingly, the Borland user interface in 
the 1-2-3 mode infringed Lotus’s copyright.
In one of his four decisions in the case, Judge Keeton specifically 
addressed the Key Reader and macro-compatibility. Keeton ruled that the 
Key Reader infringed Lotus’s copyright just as the Borland user interface 
did. Keeton acknowledged that under Computer Associates v. Altai,10 issued 
only a month before his macro-compatibility ruling, “aspects of computer 
software cannot be subject to copyright if they are greatly circumscribed 
by the hardware or software with which they are designed to interact.”11 
Nonetheless, Keeton concluded that this proposition did not apply to the 
7. Neil Gandal, “Hedonic Price Indexes for Spreadsheets and an Empirical Test for 
Network Externalities,” 25 Rand Journal of Economics 160 (spring 1994).
8. Lotus Development Corp. v. Borland Int’l Inc., 799 F. Supp. 203, 206 (D. Mass. 1992), 
rev’d, 49 F.3d 807 (1st Cir. 1995), aff’d by an equally divided Court, 516 U.S. 233 (1996).
9. 797 F.2d 1222 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1031 (1987).
10. 982 F.2d 693 (2d Cir. 1992). Judge Keeton issued his decision on July 31, 1992; 
the Second Circuit issued Computer Associates on June 22, 1992.
11. Borland, 799 F. Supp. at 212.
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Key Reader. He reached this result by limiting Computer Associates’ rejec-
tion of copyright protection for interface specifications to situations where 
“what the program was designed to fit was already in existence before the 
program was designed to fit.”12 In other words, whether a program charac-
teristic received protection turned on the constraints existing at the time of 
that program’s creation, and not on the constraints existing at the time of 
the allegedly infringing program’s creation.
Under Judge Keeton’s reasoning, a second programmer writing a new 
application program could copy the interface specifications of an earlier 
application program designed to run on a pre-existing operating system, 
because those interface specifications had been constrained by the operat-
ing system and thus did not receive copyright protection. A second pro-
grammer writing a new operating system, however, could not copy the 
pre-existing operating system’s interface specifications to permit the new 
operating system to run the two application programs, because the inter-
face specifications of the first operating system were not constrained at the 
time of their creation and thus did receive copyright protection. This result 
would have effectively eliminated competition in operating systems or any 
software product that functions as a platform for other software products. 
Judge Keeton, therefore, interpreted Computer Associates as permitting only 
the development of products that attached to, but did not compete with, 
a pre-existing platform. A developer of interoperable software could write 
programs to run on the opposite side of the interface from the pre-existing 
platform, but not on the same side. 
In the Paperback decision, Judge Keeton had articulated an interesting 
policy rationale that appears to underlie this outcome. Paperback, like Bor-
land, had raised the issue of macro-compatibility. Paperback argued that 
because the Lotus command structure had become a de facto standard 
among spreadsheet users, Paperback should be free to copy it. Judge Keeton 
responded by attributing Lotus’s de facto standard status to the creativity 
of the Lotus programmers. In his view, it would be perverse for the com-
mand structure somehow to lose its copyright protection simply because 
the Lotus programmers had done such a good job that they had established 
a de facto standard that now constrained competitors.13 Had the Lotus pro-
grammers been less creative, and had 1-2-3 been less successful, it would 
12. Id. at 213. The similarities between the Computer Associates and Altai programs 
resulted in large part from constraints imposed by the pre-existing IBM operating 
systems with which they interoperated.
13. Paperback, 740 F. Supp. at 79.
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not have become a de facto standard and Paperback would not seek to use 
it. Copyright should reward creativity, he argued, not penalize it.
Judge Keeton’s narrow reading of Computer Associates flowed directly 
from this analysis. From his perspective, it would have been perverse to 
allow Borland to copy the Lotus command structure in order to compete 
with Lotus 1-2-3; Lotus should not be disadvantaged by the fact that its 
innovative product became as popular as it did. This reasoning reveals that, 
at bottom, Judge Keeton still viewed the case in terms of “look and feel” 
rather than interoperability. That is, he viewed Borland as trying to free ride 
on a popular product developed by Lotus, much as a maker of jeans or ten-
nis shoes tries to sell products that look like those of the market leader. He 
saw only two parties in the copyright calculus: Lotus and Borland. Almost 
completely absent from his analysis were users, without question the most 
important party from the perspective of the U.S. copyright system. Had he 
looked at the case through interoperability lenses, he would not have com-
mitted this error.
The scant attention Judge Keeton gave users is visible in three distinct 
ways. First, he failed to take the user-written macros seriously. In the deci-
sion he used trivial examples of macros involving only a handful of steps. 
In the business world, however, a macro could have thousands of steps, 
and could represent a significant investment by the user. Second, Judge 
Keeton’s decision gave no meaningful weight to the problem of user lock-
in. Because of their significant investment in the macros, users were not 
willing to switch to a rival platform, even if it were technologically supe-
rior. Third, Judge Keeton did not acknowledge the users’ contribution to 
the de facto standardization of the Lotus command structure. Lotus 1-2-3 
became the standard in large measure because of users’ significant invest-
ment in macros.14 To be sure, Lotus 1-2-3 contained many innovative fea-
tures when it hit the market, but its success was at least partly attributable 
to many other causes, most notably the development by users of macros 
dependent on 1-2-3.
Judge Keeton did not fully appreciate the interoperability dimension of 
the case, but the First Circuit did. Unlike Judge Keeton, the First Circuit was 
aided by amicus briefs emphasizing interoperability. These briefs were filed 
by the Software Entrepreneurs Forum (an organization of more than 1,000 
independent software developers, consultants, and providers), by a group 
of 27 leading computer scientists, by a collection of 20 groups of personal 
14. See Federick R. Warren-Boulton, Kenneth C. Baseman, and Glenn A. Woroch, 
“Copyright Protection For Software Can Make Economic Sense,” The Computer 
Lawyer, February 1995.
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computer users, and by the American Committee for Interoperable Systems 
(whose 30 members include Sun Microsystems, Storage Technology, Bull 
HN, Amdahl, and Broderbund).
2.1.1.3 The First Circuit’s Opinion
On March 9, 1995, the First Circuit reversed Judge Keeton.15 The opinion 
of the court, written by Judge Stahl, focused on interoperability from the 
outset. Judge Stahl described the macro-compatibility function of the com-
mand structure in the third paragraph of the opinion. In the fifth para-
graph, he addressed Borland’s motivation for copying the 1-2-3 command 
structure in terms of interoperability: “Borland included the Lotus com-
mand hierarchy in its programs to make them compatible with Lotus 1-2-3 
so that spreadsheet users who were clearly familiar with Lotus 1-2-3 would 
be able to switch to the Borland programs without having to learn new 
commands or rewrite their Lotus macros.”16
The court defined the question before it very narrowly: “whether a com-
puter menu command hierarchy constitutes copyrightable subject matter.” 
It then opined that this was a question of first impression. With no hesita-
tion, the court proceeded to conclude that the Lotus command structure 
was a method of operation not protected under section 102(b) of the Copy-
right Act. “The Lotus menu command hierarchy,” the court explained, 
“provides the means by which users control and operate Lotus 1-2-3. . . . 
Users must use the command terms to tell the computer what to do. With-
out the menu command hierarchy, users would not be able to access and 
control, or indeed make use of, Lotus 1-2-3’s functional capabilities.”17
The First Circuit rejected the district court’s argument that copyright 
protected the Lotus command structure because Borland could—and did 
—develop its own command structure using different terms and a different 
arrangement. “If specific words are essential to operating something,” the 
First Circuit stated, “then they are part of a ‘method of operation’ and, as 
such, are unprotectable.”18 This is true even if a parallel set of words could 
operate a parallel program. That is, the mere fact that a programmer could 
construct other methods of operation in no way renders a given method of 
operation protected expression.
The court then turned to the underlying theme of interoperability:
15. Lotus Development Corp. v. Borland Int’l Inc., 49 F.3d 807 (1st Cir. 1995), aff’d by an 
equally divided Court, 516 U.S. 233 (1996).
16. Id. at 810.
17. Id. at 815.
18. Id. at 816.
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That the Lotus menu command hierarchy is a “method of operation” becomes clear-
er when one considers program compatibility. Under Lotus’s theory, if a user uses 
several different programs, he or she must learn how to perform the same operations 
in a different way for each program used. . . . We find this absurd. The fact that there 
may be many different ways to operate a computer program, or even many different 
ways to operate a computer program using a set of hierarchically arranged command 
terms, does not make the actual method of operation chosen copyrightable; it still 
functions as a method for operating the computer and as such is uncopyrightable.19
The court amplified this theme in the context of macro-compatibility:
Under the district court’s holding, if the user wrote a macro to shorten the time 
needed to perform a certain operation in Lotus 1-2-3, the user would be unable to use 
that macro to shorten the time needed to perform that same operation in another 
program. Rather, the user would have to rewrite his or her macros using that other 
program’s menu command hierarchy. This is despite the fact that the macro is clearly 
the user’s own work product. We think that forcing the user to cause the computer to 
perform the same operation in a different way ignores Congress’s direction in Section 
102(b) that “methods of operation” are not copyrightable.20
The opinion closed by proclaiming its consistency with the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Feist v. Rural Telephone21 and by paraphrasing the policy 
embodied by Feist:
We also note that in most contexts, there is no need to “build” upon other people’s 
expression, for the ideas conveyed by that expression can be conveyed by someone 
else without copying the first author’s expression. In the context of methods of op-
eration, however, “building” requires the use of the precise method of operation 
already employed; otherwise, “building” would require dismantling, too. Original 
developers are not the only people entitled to build on the methods of operation 
they create; anyone can. Thus, Borland may build on the method of operation that 
Lotus designed and may use the Lotus menu command hierarchy in doing so.22
2.1.1.4 Judge Boudin’s Concurring Opinion
Judge Boudin23 wrote a concurring opinion that delved even deeper into 
the economic and policy ramifications arising from the interoperability 
dimension of the case. He noted that most of the law of copyright had 
developed in the context of literary works, such as novels, plays, and films. 
19. Id. at 817–818.
20. Id. at 818.
21. 499 U.S. 340 (1991).
22. Borland, 49 F.3d at 818 (footnote deleted).
23. Judge Boudin replaced Judge Breyer on the panel after Breyer was elevated to the 
Supreme Court.
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He explained that “to assume that computer programs are just one more 
new means of expression, like a filmed play, may be quite wrong,” and 
that “[a]pplying copyright law to computer programs is like assembling 
a jigsaw puzzle whose pieces do not quite fit.”24 Judge Boudin observed 
that, because of the utilitarian and functional nature of a computer, the 
danger of over-protection is greater than in the case of traditional liter-
ary works: “[A] ‘mistake’ in providing too much protection [for traditional 
works] involves a small cost: subsequent authors treating the same themes 
must take a few more steps away from the original expression.”25 But in 
the case of computer programs, the improper grant of copyright protection 
“can have some of the consequences of patent protection in limiting other 
people’s ability to perform a task in the most efficient manner.”26
Turning to the facts before him, Judge Boudin remarked that “the pres-
ent case is an unattractive one for copyright protection.”27 He noted that 
“the menu commands . . . are largely for standard procedures that Lotus 
did not invent and are common words that Lotus cannot monopolize.”28 
Further, if Lotus could receive a copyright in its command structure, users 
who invested in learning Lotus 1-2-3 and writing macros compatible with it 
would be “locked” into Lotus, and the copyright would preclude competi-
tors from developing products capable of interoperating with the installed 
base. Judge Boudin wrote:
Requests for the protection of computer menus present the concern with fencing off 
access to the commons in an acute form. A new menu may be a creative work, but 
over time its importance may come to reside more in the investment that has been 
made by users in learning the menu and in building their own mini-programs—mac-
ros—in reliance on the menu.29
If Lotus could obtain a monopoly in the 1-2-3 command structure, users who 
have learned the command structure of Lotus 1-2-3 or devised their own macros are 
locked into Lotus. . . . Apparently, for a period Lotus 1-2-3 has had such sway in the 
market that it has represented the de facto standard for electronic spreadsheet com-
mands. So long as Lotus is the superior spreadsheet—either in quality or in price—
there may be nothing wrong with this advantage.
But if a better spreadsheet comes along, it is hard to see why customers who have 
learned the Lotus menu and devised macros for it should remain captives of Lotus 
because of an investment in learning made by the users and not by Lotus. Lotus has 
24. Borland, 49 F.3d at 820 (Boudin, J., concurring).
25. Id. at 819.
26. Id.




already reaped a substantial reward for being first; assuming that the Borland pro-
gram is now better, good reasons exist for freeing it to attract old Lotus customers: to 
enable the old customers to take advantage of a new advance. . . .30
In view of the obvious benefits to the user resulting from withholding 
copyright protection from program elements necessary for interoperability, 
the question for Judge Boudin “is not whether Borland should prevail but 
on what basis.”31 The judge identified two possible bases. The first of these 
was the basis articulated by Judge Stahl: viewing the command structure as 
an unprotected method of operation. The second was permitting Borland’s 
use under the fair-use doctrine. Judge Boudin candidly acknowledged that 
the majority’s “formulation is as good, if not better, than any other that 
occurs to me now as within the reach of courts.”32 Nonetheless, Judge 
Boudin explored the concept of fair use further. Borland’s use here would 
be privileged because “it is not seeking to appropriate the advances made 
by Lotus’ menu; rather, having provided an arguably more attractive menu 
of its own, Borland is merely trying to give former Lotus users an option to 
exploit their own prior investment in learning or in macros.”33
Judge Boudin emphasized that the privilege would be available only 
because Borland was providing the user with additional functionality; had 
it simply copied the menu using different code, but contributed nothing 
significant of its own, Judge Boudin would not have permitted the use.
Judge Boudin conceded that Borland’s use might not fit squarely within 
the fair-use doctrine under its current formulation, but added that “the 
doctrine of fair use was created by the courts and can be adapted to new 
purposes.”34 He further acknowledged that widespread application of the 
fair-use doctrine for purposes of achieving interoperability “would entail 
a host of administrative problems that would cause cost and delay, and 
would also reduce the ability of the industry to predict outcomes.”35
Judge Boudin’s reasoning is unabashedly oriented toward results. The 
fair-use doctrine, however, encourages precisely such reasoning. As the 
Supreme Court stated in Stewart v. Abend, the fair-use doctrine is an “equi-
table rule of reason which permits courts to avoid rigid application of the 
copyright statute when, on occasion, it would stifle the very creativity 
30. Id. at 821.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 822.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 821–822.
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which the law is designed to foster.”36 Judge Boudin recognized that pre-
venting interoperability invariably stifles creativity; new firms cannot 
introduce new products for the locked-in base, and the monopolist has 
little incentive to innovate—and innovation is the ultimate goal of the 
intellectual-property system. Interoperability, conversely, permits competi-
tion, which stimulates innovation—the ultimate good of the intellectual-
property system.
2.1.1.5 The Treatment of Computer Associates
Much of the briefing before the First Circuit centered on how the Second 
Circuit’s decision in Computer Associates should be applied to the facts of 
the case at hand. Interestingly, Judge Stahl, in a section devoted entirely to 
Computer Associates, concluded that the Computer Associates abstraction-fil-
tration-comparison test was “of little help.” He explained that the Computer 
Associates test might be useful in cases involving non-literal copying, but 
that this case involved “Borland’s deliberate, literal copying of the Lotus 
menu command hierarchy.”37 Judge Stahl further stated that the Computer 
Associates test in this context might actually be “misleading” because it 
could cause the identification of expression at a low level of abstraction 
while obscuring the fact that the expression may be part of a method 
of operation at a higher level of abstraction. In other words, Judge Stahl 
flipped the standard critique of the Computer Associates test on its head. 
Tony Clapes (then an intellectual-property lawyer with IBM) and others 
have argued that the Computer Associates test could lead to the “atomiza-
tion” of a computer program, thereby obscuring expression in the selec-
tion, coordination, and arrangement of non-protectable elements.38 For 
Tony Clapes, atomization leads to under-protection; for Judge Stahl, it leads 
to over-protection!
To be sure, the sloppy application of the Computer Associates test can lead 
to either over-protection or under-protection. Although Computer Associates 
and its progeny (notably Gates v. Bando39) have crafted a highly structured 
legal test, the test still is only as good as the judge applying it. Thus, careful 
application of the Computer Associates test to the facts of this case would not 
mislead a court.
36. 495 U.S. 207, 237 (1990) (citations omitted).
37. Borland, 49 F.3d at 814.
38. Anthony L. Clapes and Jennifer M. Daniels, “Revenge of the Luddites: A Closer 
Look at Computer Associates v. Altai,” The Computer Lawyer, November 1992, at 4.
39. 9 F.3d 823 (10th Cir. 1993).
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Indeed, one could argue that, even though Judge Stahl stated that Com-
puter Associates was of little help, both he and Judge Boudin applied the 
Computer Associates test successfully. Because the case involved literal copy-
ing, the First Circuit could skip the abstraction step altogether and focus 
on filtration—that is, on determining whether copyright protected the ele-
ment Borland had copied word for word (the Lotus command structure). 
In performing the filtration step, the First Circuit appears to have been 
informed by the teachings of Computer Associates and its progeny on the 
utilitarian nature of computer programs. It appears to have been similarly 
informed by these cases that copyright should not be applied in a manner 
that hinders interoperability.40 Accordingly, even though the First Circuit 
seemed to distance itself from Computer Associates, its decision falls squarely 
within the Computer Associates tradition.
2.1.1.6 Lotus v. Borland before the Supreme Court
Lotus petitioned the U.S. Supreme Court to review the First Circuit’s deci-
sion, and the Supreme Court granted its request. Because Lotus was to be 
the first software copyright case ever decided by the Supreme Court, the 
industry expected final resolution of the scope of protection question gen-
erally and the interoperability debate in particular.
In its petition for writ of certiorari, Lotus argued that the First Circuit’s 
decision was a “jarring departure” from the recent decisions in the other 
circuits.41 Lotus contended that under the First Circuit’s reasoning the user 
interface of a computer program would always constitute an unprotectable 
method of operation. Lotus contrasted this result with other courts’ grants 
of protection to user interfaces. Lotus further argued that, by the First 
Circuit’s logic, “it is unclear what, if any, elements of computer program 
would merit protection, because all programs to some degree described a 
‘method of operation’ for a machine.”42 Amicus briefs filed by the Intellec-
tual Property Owners and the Information Technology Industry Council in 
support of Lotus echoed the criticism that First Circuit’s ruling “contains 
no limiting principle by which to differentiate the aspects of a program that 
are copyrightable from those that are not protectable.”43
40. See, e.g., Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of America, Inc., 975 F.2d 832 (Fed. Cir. 
1992); Sega Enterprises Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510 (9th Cir. 1992).
41. Brief of Lotus Development Corp. in support of Petition for Writ of Certiorari, 
Lotus v. Borland, 516 U.S. 233 (1996) (No. 94-2003), at 22.
42. Id.
43. Brief Amicus Curiae of Information Technology Industry Council, Lotus v. Bor-
land, 516 U.S. 233 (1996) (No. 94-2003), at 11.
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In response, Borland contended that it was Judge Keeton, rather than 
the First Circuit, who was in conflict with the other circuits. Borland then 
demonstrated that the First Circuit’s decision was in fact consistent with 
the recent decisions in other circuits. Finally, Borland argued that the First 
Circuit’s clear exclusion of menu command hierarchies from protection 
would enhance productivity in the software industry by providing develop-
ers with much-needed certainty.
On September 27, 1995, the Supreme Court agreed to review the First 
Circuit’s decision. In its opening brief, Lotus sharpened its criticism of the 
First Circuit’s methodology. Lotus contended that the First Circuit had 
agreed with Judge Keeton that the Lotus 1-2-3 command structure con-
tained expression that was separable from its idea and functionality, but 
that the First Circuit nonetheless refused to extend copyright protection 
to this expression because it was an element of the program’s method of 
operation. Lotus also repeated its earlier arguments that, under the First 
Circuit’s reasoning, no copyright protection remained for any element of 
a computer program, because all such elements were ultimately part of a 
method of operation. Heavy lobbying by Borland stopped both the Intel-
lectual Property Owners and the Information Technology Industry Council 
from filing amicus briefs on the merits in support of Lotus. Nonetheless, 
Intel, DEC, Xerox, and Gates Rubber filed a joint amicus brief in favor of 
Lotus. Moreover, the American Intellectual Property Law Association filed 
a brief that officially was “in support of neither party” but which in fact 
made the same arguments as the Lotus brief, only more persuasively.44 
Significantly, neither Lotus nor its amici addressed the question of macro-
compatibility in any detail.
In its answering brief, Borland did not respond directly to Lotus’s spe-
cific attacks on the First Circuit’s methodology. Instead, it explained that 
the First Circuit had reached the correct result, and that the Lotus com-
mand structure could be protected only by the patent laws. A torrent of 
amicus briefs supported Borland, three of them filed by groups of law pro-
fessors and others by economists, computer scientists, users of personal 
computers, and software entrepreneurs. Many of these briefs addressed 
macro compatibility and the dire consequences of protecting program ele-
ments necessary for interoperability.
Only one brief, filed jointly by the American Committee for Interop-
erable Systems (ACIS) and the Computer & Communications Industry 
44. Brief Amicus Curiae of American Intellectual Property Law Association, Lotus v. 
Borland, 516 U.S. 233 (1996) (No. 94-2003), at 1.
34 Chapter 2
Association (CCIA), attempted to defend the First Circuit’s methodology in 
addition to its result.45 ACIS and CCIA contended that the First Circuit never 
conceded that the command structure contained separable expression. To 
be sure, the First Circuit had acknowledged that the Lotus developers had 
made some expressive choices when selecting and arranging the command 
terms. But the appellate court made it clear that those choices had merged 
with the command structure. The question thus became whether the com-
mand structure, as a whole, was idea or expression. According to ACIS and 
CCIA, the answer to this question turned on the definition of a phrase 
used by Lotus in its brief: “same functionality.” If a command structure 
with the “same functionality” as the 1-2-3 structure could offer exactly the 
same selection of functions as 1-2-3, but with different terms in a different 
sequence, then Lotus should prevail. Conversely, if a command structure 
with the “same functionality” as 1-2-3 meant one which was completely 
compatible with 1-2-3, then Borland should prevail. Not surprisingly, ACIS 
and CCIA argued that “same functionality” meant complete compatibility.
Although on January 8, 1996 the federal government was closed down by 
one of the worst blizzards in Washington’s history, Chief Justice Rehnquist 
ordered that the oral arguments scheduled for that day, including those in 
the Lotus v. Borland case, proceed as planned.46 All the justices and the law-
yers participating in the case succeeded in reaching the Supreme Court—
even Justice Souter, whose car reportedly got stuck in a snowbank and who 
had to be rescued by the Supreme Court police. Justice Stevens’s flight back 
from his home in Florida was canceled, but he would not have participated 
in the oral argument; he had recused himself from the case for undisclosed 
reasons.
Henry Gutman of the New York office of Baker & Botts, representing 
Lotus, argued first.47 He contended that the First Circuit had erred in failing 
to separate the expression in the selection and arrangement of the words 
of the 1-2-3 command structure from the underlying functionality of the 
program. At this juncture, Justice Souter asked whether the case really was 
an “analysis” case, as Lotus suggested, or a “choice” case. In other words, 
45. Brief Amicus Curiae of American Committee for Interoperable Systems and Com-
puter & Communications Industry Association, Lotus v. Borland, 516 U.S. 233 (1996) 
(No. 94-2003).
46. This subsection is based on Jonathan Band, “Oral Argument in Lotus Foreshad-
ows Outcome,” Intellectual Property Strategist, January 2006, at 8.
47. The transcript of the oral argument can be found at 51 Patent, Trademark & Copy-
right Journal 381 (January 18, 1996).
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Justice Souter was suggesting that the issue before the Supreme Court was 
not so much whether the First Circuit had employed the correct method 
of analysis in separating idea from expression as whether it had made the 
correct choice in determining that the Lotus command structure fell on the 
idea side of the idea/expression dichotomy. Soon thereafter, Justice Gins-
burg expressed concern for users who had invested substantial time and 
effort in creating macros with the 1-2-3 command structure, and wondered 
whether Borland’s copying of the command structure should be excused 
because it enabled the users to take full advantage of their own investment. 
Gutman, in perhaps the most significant development of the argument, 
conceded that there might be a legal difference between Borland’s using the 
Lotus command structure in the Quattro Pro user interface and Borland’s 
using the command structure in the “Key Reader” file (which allowed Quat-
tro Pro to execute user-written macros). Gutman stated that the infringe-
ment claim was “weaker” in the case of the Key Reader. The justices asked 
no more questions concerning the Key Reader and macro-compatibility, 
focusing instead on the command structure in the user-interface mode. Jus-
tice Breyer, for example, used the analogy of a department store’s “system,” 
in which departments are arranged in a particular order on particular floors, 
and suggested that a department store’s owner should not be able to use a 
copyright in the arrangement of the names of the departments to prevent 
others from copying the system. Justice Breyer further suggested that the 
names of the departments might “merge” into the system of the arrange-
ment of the departments.
Arguing on behalf of Borland, Gary Reback of the Silicon Valley law firm 
Wilson, Sonsini emphasized that what Lotus sought to protect via copyright 
could be protected only by patent. Justice Ginsburg stated that it appeared 
that the First Circuit had concluded that the command structure was a 
method of operation, and then had made no effort to determine whether it 
contained separable expression. Justice O’Connor appeared dismayed that 
Borland had made an identical copy of all 469 terms in the Lotus command 
structure. Justice Scalia disagreed with Reback that Borland had to use the 
same words on the screen display as Lotus to provide the user with the same 
functions. He contended that Borland did not have to use any words at all; 
rather, its program simply had to be able to interpret the user’s keystrokes. 
Balancing these hostile questions, Justice Breyer added the analogy of an 
airplane cockpit with a control panel of 469 buttons, each with a label. He 
indicated that copyright would not protect the layout of the buttons nor 
the labels. Justice Souter seemed to accept Reback’s description of the com-
mand structure as a language.
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In sum, Justices Breyer and Souter leaned toward Borland, while Justices 
O’Connor and Scalia leaned toward Lotus. Justice Ginsburg leaned toward 
Borland with respect to the Key Reader, but toward Lotus with respect to 
the user interface. The other justices’ questions did not reveal their sympa-
thies or their thinking.
Just a week after the oral argument, on January 16, 1996, the Supreme 
Court surprised the software industry by issuing a two-sentence per curiam 
order affirming the First Circuit’s decision with a vote of 4–4.48 (As has 
already been noted, Justice Stevens recused himself.) The quick affirmance 
reflected the division within the panel that was apparent during the oral 
arguments. However, because the Court’s per curiam order did not disclose 
how the justices voted, there is no way to determine whether they voted 
consistent with their questioning at oral argument. Although the four votes 
to reverse the First Circuit’s ruling evidence concern with aspects of the 
appellate court’s decision, the flow of the oral argument suggests that none 
of the justices was troubled by the First Circuit’s refusal to extend copyright 
protection to program elements necessary for software interoperability.
2.1.1.7 Significance of Lotus v. Borland
Technically, the affirmance by an equally divided Supreme Court left the 
Borland decision as binding authority only in the First Circuit. Thus, the 
per curium order did not provide the industry with the definitive, sweeping 
resolution it had sought. Nonetheless, the Supreme Court’s affirmance of 
Borland allowed the trend throughout the circuit courts toward excluding 
copyright protection for function-dictated aspects of programs, particularly 
those elements necessary for interoperability, to continue unchecked.
Although the Computer Associates decision held that program elements 
constrained by interoperability requirements—interface specifications—
could not receive copyright protection, Judge Keeton’s Key Reader decision 
limited that holding to the specifications necessary to attach to the pre-
existing platform, excluding those necessary to compete with it. Because of 
the large concentration of software-development activity in Massachusetts, 
and because of Judge Keeton’s scholarly reputation, the Key Reader deci-
sion had the potential to retard the development of interoperable software 
products significantly. The First Circuit’s reversal of Judge Keeton lifted the 
cloud of uncertainty that had been hanging over developers of interoperable 
software products and their many customers. The First Circuit ruled unam-
biguously that program elements necessary to achieve interoperability—to 
48. Lotus v. Borland, 516 U.S. 233 (1996). 
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attach as well as to compete—were, by definition, methods of operation 
not protected by copyright. Judge Boudin further suggested that, to the 
extent such elements were not methods of operation, their use should be 
permitted under the fair-use doctrine.
The First Circuit also expanded the concept of interoperability to include 
not only the ability of different products to work together, but also the abil-
ity of a user to employ the same skill set with different products. The court 
essentially reasoned that a method of operation is a method of operation, 
whether it is performed by a person or by a program.
Notwithstanding the First Circuit’s ruling, many program elements 
remain subject to copyright protection. The First Circuit specifically stated 
that the screen displays (apart from the command structure), and the com-
puter code implementing the command structure in both its user-interface 
and macro-compatibility roles, could still receive copyright protection.49 
This combination of proprietary and non-proprietary elements meets 
the copyright imperative of balancing the need to provide incentives to 
the developers of new technologies with the need to permit competition 
through interoperability.
2.1.2 Protectability of Interface Specifications after Lotus v. Borland
As discussed above, one of the central issues in Lotus v. Borland was the 
protectability under copyright of elements necessary to achieve interop-
erability.50 Judge Keeton of the U.S. District Court for Massachusetts had 
ruled that such elements did receive protection. The First Circuit, however, 
reversed Judge Keeton on this point and withheld protection from the Key 
Reader file that allowed macros compatible with Lotus 1-2-3 to run on Bor-
land’s spreadsheet program. Although Lotus did not specifically appeal the 
First Circuit’s ruling on the Key Reader file, Borland and its amici empha-
sized to the Supreme Court that interoperability was central to the case.
Had the Supreme Court decided the case on the merits, we would have 
definitive answers to whether copyright protects interface specifications, 
and, if it doesn’t, under what theory it doesn’t. But the Court did not reach 
the merits, and thus the law continued to evolve in the lower courts. Four 
courts subsequently refused, under a variety of different theories, to extend 
protection to interface specifications. They continued the lower courts’ pro-
interoperability tilt, but did so in a way that did not endanger copyright 
49. Borland, 49 F.3d, at 815–816.
50. This subsection is based on Jonathan Band, “Interoperability after Lotus v. Bor-
land: The Ball Is in the Lower Courts Again,” The Computer Lawyer, March 1996, at 11.
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protection for those program elements that deserve it under law. The Third 
Circuit, however, found that the reproduction necessary for interoperabil-
ity infringed copyright.
2.1.2.1 Bateman v. Mnemonics (1995)
Brian Bateman developed a single-board computer for use in automated 
parking systems. A subsidiary of Mnemonics, Inc. purchased the Bateman 
computers and developed compatible application programs. After Bateman 
and Mnemonics had conducted business with each another for several 
years, Mnemonics began experiencing difficulties with the Bateman com-
puters. When Bateman could not correct the problem, Mnemonics disas-
sembled51 the Bateman operating system to discern the interfaces necessary 
for compatibility with the existing application programs, then developed 
its own compatible operating system. Bateman filed suit for, among other 
things, copyright infringement of its operating system. After trial, a jury 
found for Bateman.
The appeal centered on the jury instructions. Mnemonics claimed that 
the district court had committed reversible error by instructing the jury to 
filter out only nonliteral similarities when applying the Second Circuit’s 
“abstraction-filtration-comparison” test and by failing to instruct the jury 
on the legal consequences of copying elements dictated by compatibility 
requirements.
Application of Abstraction-Filtration-Comparison Test
Mnemonics had asked the trial judge to instruct the jury to filter out unpro-
tected features appearing in literal as well as nonliteral elements of the Bate-
man program before comparing it to the Mnemonics program.52 The trial 
judge, however, instructed the jury to filter out only non-literal elements, 
thereby allowing comparison of unprotected literal elements. According to 
Mnemonics, this “effectively rendered futile [Mnemonics’] efforts to rebut 
Bateman’s evidence of literal similarity with regard to elements of the work 
for which copyright was claimed, thereby nullifying several of [Mnemon-
ics’] key defenses, including compatibility, efficiency, and standard pro-
gramming techniques.”53
51. Disassembly is a form of software reverse engineering that involves translating 
machine-readable object code into a higher-level, human-readable form. The Bate-
man court’s treatment of reverse engineering is discussed below.
52. In computer programs, “literal elements” refers to the source and object code; 
“non-literal elements” refers to the program’s structure and organization.
53. Bateman v. Mnemonics, 79 F. 3d 1532, 1544 (11th Cir. 1996).
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In its decision on the appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh 
Circuit acknowledged that the Second Circuit, in Computer Associates v. 
Altai,54 had fashioned the abstraction-filtration-comparison methodology 
to address the copying of nonliteral elements, and that the First Circuit, 
in Lotus v. Borland,55 had suggested that this methodology might be of “lit-
tle help” when considering the copying of literal elements. The Eleventh 
Circuit observed, however, that this disagreement was “more a matter of 
semantics than substance.”56 “Even if the Altai test is limited to nonliteral 
copying,” the Eleventh Circuit stated, “. . . a parallel type of analysis must 
be undertaken in examining alleged instances of literal copying of com-
puter code. . . . Whether one chooses to call the consideration of such gen-
erally recognized challenges to literal code copying as merger and efficiency 
‘filtration’ is of little consequence; what matters is that these well-estab-
lished ‘defenses’ are considered.”57 The trial judge, in essence, instructed 
the jury not to consider these “defenses” with respect to the instances of 
literal copying. This was “a manifest distortion and misstatement of the 
law,”58 and sufficient grounds for a new trial insofar as much of Bateman’s 
evidence concerned literal copying.
In a footnote, the Eleventh Circuit explained the critical significance of 
separating idea from expression in the context of computer programs:
It is particularly important to exclude methods of operation and processes from the 
scope of copyright in computer programs because much of the contents of computer 
programs is patentable. Were we to permit an author to claim copyright protection 
for those elements of the work that should be the province of patent law, we would 
be undermining the competitive principles that are fundamental to the patent sys-
tem.59
In support of this proposition, the Eleventh Circuit cited the U.S. Supreme 
Court’s decisions in Baker v. Selden60 and Bonito Boats v. Thunder Craft Boats61 
and the Federal Circuit’s decision in Atari v. Nintendo.62 The Eleventh Cir-
cuit signaled that it viewed computer programs as utilitarian literary works 
54. 982 F.2d 693 (2d Cir. 1992).
55. 49 F.3d 807, 815 (1st Cir. 1995), aff’d by an evenly divided Court, 516 U.S. 233 
(1996).
56. Bateman, 79 F.3d at 1545.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 1541, n. 21.
60. 101 U.S. 99 (1879).
61. 489 U.S. 141 (1989).
62. 975 F.2d 832 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
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63. Bateman, 79 F.3d at 1547.
64. Id.
65. 26 F.3d 1335 (5th Cir. 1994).
66. Bateman, 79 F.3d at 1547.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 1548, n. 33 (emphasis added).
69. Id.
that should receive “thinner” copyright protection than more expressive 
literary works such as novels and plays.
Copying Dictated by Compatibility Requirements
The trial judge had instructed the jury that computer programs are utilitar-
ian articles that contain elements that may be dictated by external factors, 
“such as compatibility requirements.” Mnemonics, on appeal, argued that 
this instruction, though technically correct, did not go far enough, because 
it failed to direct the jury to filter out those portions of the Bateman operat-
ing system dictated by the interface with the Mnemonics program.
The Eleventh Circuit concluded that if Mnemonics was arguing that 
interface specifications are not copyrightable as a matter of law, it was 
wrong: “It is an incorrect statement of the law that interface specifications 
are not copyrightable as a matter of law.”63 The Eleventh Circuit hastened 
to add, however, that the trial court had erred “in not instructing the jury 
on the legal consequences of copying dictated by compatibility require-
ments.”64 The appellate court then explained what it meant. It reviewed the 
decisions from other circuits, including Sega v. Accolade, Computer Associ-
ates v. Altai, EDI v. SSI,65 and Atari v. Nintendo, which found “that external 
factors such as compatibility may work to deny copyright protection to 
certain portions of a computer program.”66 Next, it stated that “[w]hether 
the protection is unavailable because these factors render the expression 
unoriginal, nonexpressive per 17 U.S.C. § 102(b), or whether these factors 
compel a finding of fair use, copyright estoppel, or misuse, the result is to 
deny copyright protection to portions of the computer program.”67
The Eleventh Circuit emphasized in a footnote that it was merely hold-
ing that external factors such as compatibility “may negate a finding of 
infringement.”68 “Such a finding,” the court noted, “will depend on the 
particular facts of a case, and thus it would be unwise for us to formulate 
a bright line rule to address this issue, given the importance of the factual 
nuances of each case.”69
In sum, the Eleventh Circuit refused to issue a per se rule that inter-
face specifications cannot receive copyright protection. At the same time, 
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the court provided five different theories under which such specifications 
would not receive protection.70 Borland addressed two of these theories: 
the majority relied on the idea/expression dichotomy in section 102(b), 
whereas Judge Boudin relied on fair use under section 107.
Further, by ordering the district court in the new trial to instruct the jury 
on “the legal consequences of copying dictated by compatibility require-
ments,” the Eleventh Circuit presumably insisted that the district court 
enumerate these theories to the jury.71 Thus, although the Eleventh Circuit 
refused to draw a permanent “bright line” around interface specifications, 
it certainly penciled a line in.
The Eleventh Circuit’s reluctance to categorically exclude interface spec-
ifications from copyright protection makes sense when one recognizes that 
“interface specification” is a programming term, not a legal term of art. The 
Bateman decision does not define “interface specification,” and also refers 
to “interface commands” and “operating system interface” in the same sec-
tion. The Eleventh Circuit correctly recognized that it would be reckless 
for it to attach legal results to terms whose meaning and technological sig-
nificance may change over time. Instead, it provided a framework within 
which elements related to interoperability should be examined. The wis-
dom of retaining the freedom to look at “the factual nuances of each case” 
is demonstrated by the decision in Compaq v. Procom.
2.1.2.2 Compaq v. Procom (1995)
The Compaq servers at issue in this litigation held several “hard drives” (i.e., 
hard disk drives). The server contained the Compaq Insight Manager pro-
gram (CIM), which, among other things, monitored the operation of the 
hard drives and generated a pre-failure warning when a hard drive’s perfor-
mance fell below a certain level. Compaq then replaced the hard drive free of 
charge. The CIM thus helped effectuate Compaq’s warranty to its customers.
What the CIM actually monitored were five parameters contained in 
the Monitor and Performance (M&P) partition of the hard drive. The M&P 
partition appeared to be firmware. For each parameter there was a threshold 
value; if that value was exceeded, the CIM generated a pre-failure warning.
Procom sold Compaq-compatible hard drives. The Procom hard drives 
could interoperate with the Compaq server even if they did not contain 
70. By including copyright misuse in this list, the Eleventh Circuit breathed new life 
into this theory, which until then had not gained much legitimacy outside of the 
Fourth Circuit.
71. Bateman, 79 F.3d at 1547.
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any of the parameters in the M&P partition; the CIM simply would never 
issue a pre-failure warning. Moreover, the CIM could function if the Pro-
com parameters contained different threshold values; the CIM would then 
just issue its pre-failure warning at a different time from when it would 
have had a Compaq hard drive been used. The CIM could not work prop-
erly, however, if the M&P partition contained different parameters (i.e., 
monitored different functions).
According to the decision, Procom never completely understood how 
the M&P partition worked. Thus, it simply copied the parameters and 
the threshold values from the Compaq M&P partition. Compaq sued for 
infringement.
The district court ruled on a motion for preliminary injunction that 
the five threshold values constituted a protectable compilation. Accord-
ing to the court, the values were not empirically verifiable facts, but rather 
resulted from Compaq’s decision-making process. First, Compaq had to 
make a prediction when the disk drive would actually fail. Then, Compaq 
had to make a business decision as to when—before that actual point of 
failure—it was willing to replace the disk drive under its warranty. “In mak-
ing this decision,” the court ruled, “Compaq must weigh several consider-
ations such as the cost of replacing drives too early in their life versus the 
risk of waiting too long to replace the drive and having it fail while in use. 
It seems unlikely that other drive manufacturers, facing different economic 
considerations and different customer expectations, would choose the 
exact same point in time to replace a drive that Compaq chose.”72 In other 
words, the court did not view the parameter values as dictated by function. 
That court acknowledged, however, that merger would be implicated if the 
values were solely engineering predictions of when the drives would fail.
Though the court extended copyright protection to the set of particular 
parameter values established by Compaq, it refused to protect the param-
eters themselves:
. . . to obtain prefailure warnings through CIM, the drive must have the five numbers 
representing the five parameters monitored by the program. A third party attempt-
ing to gain access to CIM has no choice but to also select those five parameters for 
observation. If a third party selected other parameters, then any warnings that CIM 
issued would be meaningless.73
The court likewise recognized that the CIM would not function properly 
if the parameters appeared in the M&P partition in a different sequence. 
72. Compaq v. Procom, 908 F. Supp. 1409, 1418 (S.D. Tex. 1995).
73. Id. at 1419.
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Accordingly, the parameters and their sequence were not protected as a 
system or under the merger and scènes à faire doctrines.
The court also rejected Procom’s fair-use argument on the basis that Pro-
com had no real need to copy the values of the parameters. The court dis-
tinguished this case from Sega v. Accolade74 by emphasizing that, whereas 
Accolade sought to understand how Sega’s product worked and took only 
what was necessary to achieve interoperability, Procom never really under-
stood Compaq’s product and thus took more than was necessary.75
This decision demonstrates the importance of courts’ understanding the 
“factual nuances” of the cases before them. Had it reviewed the facts in 
a cursory manner, it might have concluded that, because business judg-
ments went into the selection of the parameter values, the parameters as 
well as the set of values should receive copyright protection. Alternatively, 
the court might have decided that both the parameters and the values 
were related to interoperability and thus that neither the parameters nor 
the values deserved protection. By closely examining the facts, however, 
the court succeeded in drawing a line between interface specifications and 
implementations: the parameters and their sequence are the specifica-
tions; the values are the implementations. Therefore, it was possible for the 
court to withhold copyright protection from the interface specifications 
under section 102(b) but still give meaningful copyright protection to the 
implementations.
Because the Procom hard drive could function in the Compaq server 
even if the CIM did not function properly, the court could have concluded 
that the parameters were not really necessary for interoperability. The court 
understood, however, that Procom hard drives would not be as desirable to 
customers if they were not CIM compatible. In other words, the court rec-
ognized that there were degrees of interoperability, and allowed Procom to 
perform the copying necessary to achieve complete interoperability.
2.1.2.3 Softel v. Dragon Medical (1996)
In 1996, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit had the oppor-
tunity to revisit the methodology it had articulated in Computer Associates 
v. Altai. Although the case did not involve interoperability, the court did 
74. 977 F.2d 1510 (9th Cir. 1992).
75. The Procom court interpreted Sega as permitting disassembly for purposes of 
developing a product that competed with the target of the disassembly. Some com-
mentators have incorrectly suggested that Sega permitted disassembly only for pur-
poses of developing products that attached to the target of the disassembly.
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clarify some features of the abstraction-filtration-comparison methodol-
ogy; for that reason, the case merits a brief discussion.
Softel developed for Dragon’s computer programs certain modules that 
demonstrated medical conditions and procedures. After a business dispute 
between the companies, Dragon replaced the Softel modules with its own. 
Softel alleged that Dragon’s new modules infringed its copyright in its mod-
ules. The district court concluded that Dragon’s modules were not similar to 
Softel’s in protected expression. Softel appealed to the Second Circuit, argu-
ing that “its software combined certain computer programming design ele-
ments in an expressive way and that Dragon had copied that expression.”76 
Specifically, Softel contended that the integration of four elements—an 
external file structure, English-language commands, functional modules, 
and hierarchical menus—constituted protected expression. It claimed that 
“[t]he genius of the structure, sequence, and organization of plaintiff’s pro-
gram is in the way it receives, assembles, calculates, retains, correlates, and 
produces information on screen,” and that “[s]ince there are other ways 
of performing those functions to achieve the same purpose as the Softel 
program, plaintiff’s copyrighted work is a protectable expression of ideas.”77
Reviewing Computer Associates and other copyright precedents, the Sec-
ond Circuit concluded that “an allegation of infringement based on simi-
larities in architecture cannot be ignored merely because many or all the 
design elements that make up that architecture are not protectable when 
considered at a lower level of abstraction.”78 The court quoted Harvard Law 
School professor Arthur Miller: “Individual program elements that are ‘fil-
tered’ out at one level may be copyrightable when viewed as part of an 
aggregate of elements at another level of abstraction.”79
Turning to the facts before it, the Second Circuit stated that “Softel 
presented an argument, supported by some evidence, that the manner in 
which it had combined certain computer design elements was expressive 
for purposes of copyright law.”80 Further, the Second Circuit found that 
the district court had “either ignored or misanalyzed Softel’s argument, 
and consequently failed to perform the Altai analysis at the highest level 
of abstraction—here, the interrelationships among the four identified 
76. Softel, Inc., v. Dragon Medical and Scientific Communications, Inc., 118 F. 3d 955, 
963 (2d Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1020 (1998).
77. Id.
78. Id. at 964.
79. Id. at 966.
80. Id.
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elements.”81 The Second Circuit observed that the district court “credited 
Dragon’s expert testimony that each of the four design elements was per-
vasively used in the computer industry, but did not address the issue of 
whether the choice and manner of combination of the four elements was 
commonplace.”82 Expressing no opinion as to the merits of Softel’s claim, 
the Second Circuit remanded the case to the district court, instructing it 
to determine “whether the manner in which Softel combined the various 
design elements in its software was protectable expression.”83 There is no 
reported decision on remand.
2.1.2.4 Mitel v. Iqtel (1997)
This case involved simple codes programmed into communications hard-
ware for facilitating functions such as speed dialing. Mitel was the dominant 
company in the industry, and the technicians who installed the hardware 
and software were familiar with Mitel’s sixty commands. Iqtel developed 
competitive hardware with its own command system. The Iqtel software 
was capable of understanding the Mitel commands via a translation mod-
ule, which contained a copy of the Mitel commands. The Iqtel manual also 
contained a listing of the Mitel commands with a cross index to the Iqtel 
commands. The district court, following the First Circuit in Lotus v. Borland, 
held that the Mitel command set was an unprotected method of operation. 
The court also rested its decisions on grounds that Mitel’s commands codes 
were not original, were dictated by external factors, and were not protect-
able under the scènes à faire doctrine.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district 
court’s ruling.84 But instead of following Borland directly, the Tenth Circuit 
applied the Second Circuit’s abstraction-filtration-comparison test. After 
applying this test, it found that all Mitel’s commands were unprotected. The 
Tenth Circuit ruled that most of the commands were unoriginal because 
they were either arbitrary or simply sequential. The court found the few 
commands that were slightly original to be unprotected under the scènes à 
faire doctrine. Under this doctrine, a court excludes from protection those 
elements of a work that necessarily result from external factors inherent in 
the subject matter of the work. The Tenth Circuit listed the external fac-
tors set forth in Computer Associates v. Altai and Gates v. Bando Chemical85: 
81. Id.
82. Id. (citation omitted).
83. Id.
84. Mitel v. Iqtel, 124 F.3d 1366 (10th Cir. 1997).
85. 9 F.3d 823 (10th Cir. 1993).
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hardware standards and mechanical specifications, software standards and 
compatibility requirements, computer manufacturers’ design standards, the 
software industry’s programming practices, and the practices and demands 
of the industry being served.
2.1.2.5 Fly in the Ointment? Dun & Bradstreet v. Grace Consulting (2002)
In 2002, in Dun & Bradstreet Software Servs. v. Grace Consulting, Inc.,86 the 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit issued a decision that cited the 
then-25-year-old opinion in Apple v. Franklin87 and appeared to take a dif-
ferent tack from the decisions discussed above. Perhaps because the deci-
sion emerged from an appeal of a jury verdict, the facts in the opinion are 
incomplete and hard to follow. It seems that Dun & Bradstreet developed a 
suite of business programs that included software for payroll and other per-
sonnel functions. Former D&B employees developed a W-2 program based 
on D&B’s W-2 program and sold it to Grace. Grace, in turn, marketed the 
program to D&B customers for a price lower than that of the new release 
of D&B’s W-2 program. It appears that the Grace program sat on top of the 
D&B program, and, when it ran, called and copied various routines from 
the D&B program. “Grace admitted that the installation, testing, compil-
ing and link editing of its W-2 programs required copying [D&B’s] software 
and link editing the [D&B] code.”88 Thus, when the Grace program ran, 43 
percent of its compiled code derived from the D&B program.
Grace argued that calling and copying D&B routines was necessary to 
achieve interoperability between the Grace and D&B program and therefore 
did not infringe copyright. The Third Circuit rejected this argument, citing 
its decision in Apple v. Franklin that compatibility was a “commercial and 
competitive objective which does not enter into the somewhat metaphysi-
cal issue of whether particular ideas and expression have merged.”89 Addi-
tionally, the Third Circuit found that any elements copied from the D&B 
program were still protected by copyright because those elements were not 
constrained by compatibility requirements. The Third Circuit noted that 
the question was not whether Grace needed a particular element to achieve 
compatibility with the D&B product but whether D&B was constrained by 
compatibility requirements when it created the element Grace sought to 
copy. The court concluded that D&B was not so constrained.
86. 307 F.3d 197 (3d Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 538 U.S. 1032 (2003).
87. 714 F.2d 1240, 1253 (3d Cir. 1983), cert. dismissed, 464 U.S. 1033 (1984).
88. Grace Consulting, 307 F.3d at 213.
89. Franklin, 714 F.2d at 1253.
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It could very well be that D&B did not design its W-2 program as a plat-
form for other applications, and that Grace copied unconstrained elements. 
But the Third Circuit’s logic is flawed if applied to platforms. The court 
assumes that a developer designs a platform in a vacuum. In fact, the devel-
oper designs a platform precisely so that it can interoperate with appli-
cations. In other words, when writing a platform, the developer creates a 
system for communication between diverse elements. When he designs the 
hooks in the platform, he simultaneously designs the eyelets in the applica-
tions. The shape of the hook is constrained by the shape of the eyelet, and 
vice versa.90
Grace Consulting raises issues that are beyond the scope of copyright pro-
tection for interface specifications. Applications often call on routines or 
libraries in the platform it runs upon, and these elements are compiled 
together with the application in the computer’s RAM when the user runs 
the program. Grace Consulting suggests that calling on these elements with-
out the platform developer’s authorization might constitute infringement. 
To be sure, it could be that Grace copied such large amounts of the D&B 
program because Grace was, in essence, marketing a later release of the D&B 
program. Nonetheless, Grace Consulting remains a troubling precedent.91
The Grace Consulting decision is a marked departure from the direction 
of the other circuits. Not only does it resurrect the Apple v. Franklin decision 
(a decision that other courts rejected), it also repeats arguments, made by 
the district court in Lotus v. Borland, that were subsequently repudiated by 
First Circuit. Because the Grace Consulting decision conflicts with decisions 
made by other circuit courts, and because the facts are incomplete, other 
circuit courts are not likely to follow it. Nonetheless, it is the law in the 
Third Circuit.
2.1.2.6 Lexmark v. Static Control Components (2004)
In 2004, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit ruled in one of the 
more notorious Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) cases. In what 
was widely viewed as an abuse of the DMCA, Lexmark had tried to use the 
statute to prevent competition in the market for printer toner. (The Sixth 
90. An advantage of treating interface specifications as methods of operation, rather 
than analyzing them under the merger or scènes à faire doctrines, is that one avoids 
this “which came first, chicken or egg” discussion.
91. From the decision it is clear that the Third Circuit believed that Grace Consulting 
was beneath contempt. It breached an array of license agreements with D&B, and it 
induced D&B customers to breach their agreements with D&B.
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Circuit’s rejection of this claim is discussed in greater detail in chapter 3.) 
The Sixth Circuit also considered the scope of copyright protection in one 
of Lexmark’s computer programs—the toner loading program (TLP).
Lexmark designed the software embedded in its printer—the printer 
engine program (PEP)—to permit the printer to operate only if it recognized 
an authentication sequence from the TLP, which was embedded in the 
toner cartridge. Lexmark did this to prevent users from using less expensive 
toner cartridges in its printers. Static Control Components (SCC) manufac-
tured the Smartek chip and sold it to manufacturers of replacement toner 
cartridges. The Smartek chip contained a copy of the Lexmark TLP so that 
the replacement toner cartridges could operate in Lexmark printers. Lex-
mark sued SCC for infringing the copyright in the TLP and for violating the 
DMCA by circumventing the technological measures that protected access 
to the TLP and the PEP. The district court found that Lexmark was likely to 
prevail on the merits of both claims, and entered a preliminary injunction 
in its favor.
The Sixth Circuit reversed with respect to both the copyright claim and 
the DMCA claim.92 Much of the decision focused on whether the TLP was 
protectable under copyright law. The district court found that the TLP 
could have been written in different ways, and therefore contained protect-
able expression. The Sixth Circuit rejected this analysis, noting that exter-
nal constraints may limit a programmer’s choices as a practical matter. The 
Sixth Circuit emphasized that lock-out codes are particularly constrained:
Generally speaking, “lock-out” codes fall on the functional-idea rather than the 
original expression side of the copyright line. Manufacturers of interoperable de-
vices such as computers and software, game consoles and video games, printers and 
toner cartridges, or automobiles and replacement parts may employ a security system 
to bar the use of unauthorized components. To “unlock” and permit operation of 
the primary device (i.e., the computer, the game console, the printer, the car), the 
component must contain either a certain code sequence or be able to respond ap-
propriately to an authentication process. To the extent compatibility requires that a 
particular code sequence be included in the component device to permit its use, the 
merger and scènes à faire doctrines generally preclude the code sequence from obtain-
ing copyright protection.93
The Sixth Circuit found that the district court had failed to consider 
the external constraints that limited the practical options available to the 
Lexmark programmers. The Sixth Circuit was persuaded by the testimony 
92. Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 387 F.3d 522 (6th Cir. 2004).
93. Id. at 536.
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of SCC’s expert witness that the TLP “as it is written is the most ‘straightfor-
ward, efficient, natural way to express the program.’”94 A critical element in 
the Sixth Circuit’s analysis was that the TLP was a short, simple program, 
with only 45 commands using 55 bytes of memory. In distinguishing the 
Third Circuit’s decision in Apple v. Franklin, the Sixth Circuit observed that 
the Apple operating system’s “size and complexity is to the Toner Loading 
Program what the Sears Tower is to a lamppost.”95
Moreover, the district court had erred in assessing whether the TLP func-
tioned as a lock-out code. The Sixth Circuit found that the PEP used every 
data byte of the TLP as input in a calculation that had to produce a certain 
result before the PEP would allow the printer to operate: “If a single byte of 
the [TLP] is altered, the checksum value will not match the checksum calcu-
lation result.”96 The Sixth Circuit agreed with the testimony of SCC’s expert 
witness that it was “computationally impossible” to modify the checksum 
value without other information, which SCC did not possess (and which it 
could not have gathered through a reasonable amount of reverse engineer-
ing). The Sixth Circuit distinguished the facts in this case from those in 
Atari v. Nintendo.97 In Atari, different programs could produce the same data 
stream that unlocked the console. In Lexmark, the program itself was the 
data stream that unlocked the console. As an example, the court noted that 
“a poem in the abstract could be copyrightable, but that does not mean 
that the poem receives copyright protection when it is used in the context 
of a lock-out code.”98 (The court took this example, without attribution, 
from an amicus brief filed by the Computer & Communications Industry 
Association.)
Because the more complete record at the permanent-injunction phase 
might have demonstrated that the TLP was copyrightable, the Sixth Circuit 
also addressed SCC’s fair-use defense. In looking at the first factor (the pur-
pose of the use), the Sixth Circuit found that “it was far from clear that SCC 
copied the [TLP] for its commercial value as a copyrighted work.”99 Rather, 
SCC had copied the TLP to permit printer functionality. Accordingly, the 
first factor tipped toward SCC. With respect to the fourth factor (the effect 
of the use on the market for the copyrighted material), the Sixth Circuit 
94. Id. at 540.
95. Id. at 539.
96. Id. at 541.
97. 975 F.2d 832 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
98. Lexmark, 387 F.3d at 543.
99. Id. at 544.
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stated that the district court had focused on the wrong market. The district 
court had looked at the impact on toner cartridge market, when it should 
have looked at the impact on the market for TLPs. Of course, it appears that 
there is no market for Lexmark’s TLP.
Judge Feikens dissented from the Sixth Circuit’s finding that the TLP 
was not copyrightable. He thought that there was evidence in the record 
indicating that the TLP was not as constrained as found by the majority. 
Likewise, the judge felt that there was evidence in the record suggesting 
that the printer could run if the TLP were switched off, and that SCC could 
have determined this through a reasonable amount of reverse engineer-
ing. If so, the TLP really wasn’t a lock-out code, in which case the scènes à 
faire and merger doctrines shouldn’t have come into play. Accordingly, the 
dissenting judge would have remanded the issue to the district court for 
further fact finding.
2.1.3 Different Approaches, Same Result
Long before the emergence of the Law and Economics movement at the 
University of Chicago Law School or the emergence of Critical Legal Theory 
at the Harvard Law School, professors at the Yale Law School taught Legal 
Realism.100 The Legal Realists argued that judges typically reached a result 
in a case on the basis of their idiosyncratic notion of which side deserved to 
win, and then found a legal rationale justifying that result.101 Indeed, Criti-
cal Legal Theory arguably is just a refinement—or a perversion—of Legal 
Realism.
The decisions concerning the protectability of interface specifications 
discussed above—Lotus v. Borland, Bateman v. Mnemonics, Compaq v. Procom, 
Mitel v. Iqtel, and Lexmark v. SCC—can be best explained by Legal Real-
ism. In all five decisions, the courts concluded that the defendant software 
developers should be permitted to make copies of the plaintiffs’ programs 
to the extent necessary to achieve interoperability. Once they had reached 
that same conclusion, they selected different legal theories justifying how 
they got there.
This interpretation does not suggest that the courts were unprincipled 
in any way. Rather, it simply acknowledges that until the law in a particular 
100. This subsection is based on Jonathan Band and Noah Levine, “You Say Misuse, 
I Say Fair Use,” The Computer Lawyer, November 1996, at 10.
101. See Karin Wentz, 1987 Survey of Books Relating to the Law, 85 Michigan Law 
Review 1105 (1987); Joseph W. Singer, “Legal Realism Now,” 76 California Law Review 
465, 471–472 (1988) (both reviewing Laura Kalman, Legal Realism at Yale, 1927–1960 
(1986)).
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area is well settled, almost any result can be justified by several plausible 
legal theories. Under those circumstances, there is nothing unprincipled 
about a court’s selecting a victor on the basis of notions of fairness and 
consumer welfare, then finding the strongest legal basis for reaching 
that result. In all these cases, the courts recognized the importance of 
interoperability to competition in the software industry, and therefore 
interpreted the Copyright Act in a manner that did not conflict with 
interoperability.
In other words, Judge Birch, the author of the Eleventh Circuit’s decision 
in Bateman, like Judge Boudin before him, first identified his concern—
that the copying necessary to the development of interoperable computer 
software should not necessarily be precluded by copyright law—and only 
then proposed various alternatives for reaching such a conclusion through 
accepted forms of legal reasoning. And by listing five alternatives, Judge 
Birch made clear that he did not much care which legal theory the lower 
court used, so long as it reached the right result.
From a strict Legal Realist perspective, it makes little difference whether 
a judge selects misuse, fair use, or a variant of the idea/expression dichot-
omy. The result is the same: the copying is excused. But the selection does 
make a difference in the signal the decision sends to other courts and to 
the software industry. The fair-use defense focuses on the actions of the 
defendant—that is, on whether the defendant’s use was justified. Similarly, 
a defense predicated on section 102(b) focuses on whether the defendant is 
entitled to copy the work that is at issue. The misuse defense, by contrast, 
focuses on the actions of the plaintiff—that is, on whether the plaintiff 
overreached. In Borland, Bateman, Computer Associates, and Sega, the court, 
in essence, asked whether the defendant was permitted to make the copies 
that were necessary to achieve interoperability. But Judge Birch in Bateman 
also suggested an altogether different question: Was the plaintiff permitted 
to use his copyright to frustrate interoperability? Judge Birch’s mention of 
Table 2.1
Case Basis for Withholding Protection
Borland majority Method of operation (§ 102(b))
Judge Boudin (Borland) Fair use
Bateman Unoriginal, nonexpressive (§ 102(b)), fair use, copyright 
estoppel, misuse
Procom Scènes à faire (§ 102(b))
Mitel Unoriginal, scènes à faire (§ 102(b))
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misuse, and the resulting focus on the actions of the plaintiff, may indicate 
the judiciary’s deepening commitment toward software interoperability.
However, developers of interoperable products should not overlook the 
Third Circuit’s decision in Grace Consulting. Although it may have been 
wrongly decided, it still is a decision from a U.S. circuit court of appeals.
2.2 The Permissibility of Reverse Engineering
The preceding section looked at the case law concerning the protectabil-
ity of program elements necessary for interoperability. The other copyright 
concern of developers of interoperable software is that of potential liability 
for infringements committed in the process of uncovering these elements. 
Because software firms typically distribute their software only in machine-
readable object code, a developer of an interoperable program often can 
uncover the target program’s interface specifications only by reverse engi-
neering the program. This reverse engineering could involve the developer 
observing the program’s behavior while running it, or in translating the 
object code into a higher-level, human-readable form. In 1992, the Ninth 
Circuit in Sega v. Accolade ruled that copyright’s fair-use doctrine permitted 
this translation or disassembly to gain access to the unprotectable elements 
of the program. Subsequent courts permitted reverse engineering under 
theories of fair use or copyright misuse.
2.2.1 Bateman v. Mnemonics (1995)
As was discussed earlier in this chapter, Bateman developed a computer 
with an operating system for use in automated parking systems.102 Mne-
monics purchased the Bateman computers and developed compatible 
application programs. When Mnemonics began experiencing difficulties 
with the Bateman computers, Mnemonics disassembled the Bateman oper-
ating system to discern the interfaces necessary for interoperability with the 
existing application programs, then developed its own interoperable oper-
ating system. Bateman filed suit for copyright infringement of its operating 
system. A jury found for Bateman.
Mnemonics’ appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Cir-
cuit centered on the judge’s instructions to the jury concerning the scope 
of copyright protection for the operating system. But before reaching the 
issues on appeal, the Eleventh Circuit, in a footnote, discussed the lawful-
ness of Mnemonics’ disassembly. Although disassembly was not before the 
102. See subsection 1.2.1 of chapter 1 above.
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Eleventh Circuit, and indeed it appears that disassembly had not been an 
issue at trial, the Eleventh Circuit elected to provide the district court with 
guidance, noting that the lawfulness of disassembly “likely will appear on 
remand.”103 After briefly discussing the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Sega v. 
Accolade and the Federal Circuit’s decision in Atari v. Nintendo, the Eleventh 
Circuit stated: “We find the Sega opinion persuasive in view of the princi-
pal purpose of copyright—the advancement of science and the arts.”104 In 
effect, the Eleventh Circuit directed the district court to find Mnemonics’ 
disassembly for purposes of achieving interoperability to be a fair use.
2.2.2 DSC v. DGI (1996)
Both DSC and DGI manufactured various forms of telecommunications 
equipment, including microprocessor cards for phone-switching systems. 
The conflict between the companies arose when DGI began developing a 
microprocessor card that would be compatible with the DSC-manufactured 
phone switch and thus would be substitutable for the card produced by DSC.
DSC moved for a preliminary injunction with respect to three distinct 
sets of copies. First, DGI purchased some of DSC’s microprocessor cards on 
the open market and disassembled the programs embedded on those chips 
(“firmware”) into human-readable form. Relying on Sega v. Accolade, the 
district court found this copying likely to be a fair use because the disas-
sembly was “the only way to understand the functional elements of DSC’s 
firmware.”105 Second, DGI made removable, identical copies of the operat-
ing system in the DSC phone switch at a customer’s facility and brought 
the copies back to the DGI laboratories for study. Because DGI had obtained 
access to the operating system without DSC’s permission, the district court 
found this to be actionable infringement and granted DSC’s motion for a 
preliminary injunction enjoining such copying.106 Third, in order for any 
microprocessor card to operate in the DSC phone switch, the card had to 
download DSC’s copyrighted operating system into the card’s random-
access memory. Thus, for DGI to successfully test and run its product, it 
had to place its microprocessor cards in the DSC phone switch and thereby 
cause the making of a RAM copy of the DSC operating system. The dis-
trict court implicitly found this form of copying to be permitted. It did so 
103. Bateman v. Mnemonics, 79 F. 3d 1532, 1539 n. 18 (11th Cir. 1996).
104. Id.
105. DSC Communications Corp. v. DGI Technologies, Inc., 898 F. Supp. 1183, 1190 
(N.D. Tex. 1995), aff’d, 81 F.3d 597 (5th Cir. 1996).
106. See id. at 1193–1196.
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by limiting the preliminary injunctive order such that it did not prohibit 
“downloading into dynamic RAM on a microprocessor or test micropro-
cessor card which is incidental to the testing or operating of a compatible 
[microprocessor] card so long as the copy is not capable of being removed 
from the customer location and transported to any other location.”107
The issue on appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit 
concerned only the last form of copying. DSC argued that the preliminary 
injunction was too narrowly drawn because it did not also prohibit the 
copying incidental to testing or operating of DGI’s newly created micropro-
cessor cards. Because DGI conceded that a RAM copy of the DSC operating-
system software was made whenever the microprocessor cards were booted 
up, DGI relied on the copyright-misuse defense.108
Judge Garza, writing for the Fifth Circuit, expressed the same concern as 
Judges Boudin and Birch: that copyright law might be construed to bestow 
patent-like protection in the computer software context. He noted:
DSC seems to be attempting to use its copyright to obtain a patent-like monopoly 
over unpatented microprocessor cards. Any competing microprocessor card devel-
oped for use on DSC phone switches must be compatible with DSC’s copyrighted 
operating system software. In order to ensure that its card is compatible, a com-
petitor such as DGI must test the card on a DSC phone switch. Such a test necessar-
ily involves making a copy of DSC’s copyrighted operating system, which copy is 
downloaded into the card’s memory when the card is booted up. If DSC is allowed 
to prevent such copying, then it can prevent anyone from developing a competing 
microprocessor card, even though it has not patented the card.109
Seeking to prevent this result, Judge Garza argued that the copyright-mis-
use theory “forbids the use of the copyright to secure an exclusive right or 
limited monopoly not granted by the Copyright Office.”110
107. Id. at 1197.
108. The Fifth Circuit appeared to accept the Ninth Circuit’s ruling—in MAI Sys. 
Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc., 991 F.2d 511 (9th Cir. 1993), cert. dismissed, 510 U.S. 
1033 (1994)—that a RAM copy is a “copy” within the meaning of the Copyright Act.
109. DSC Communications Corp. v. DGI Technologies, Inc., 81 F.3d 597, 601 (5th Cir. 
1996). For similar concerns expressed by Judges Birch and Boudin, see Bateman, 79 
F.3d at 1547 n. 33 (“In no case, however, should copyright protection be extended to 
functional results obtained when program instructions are executed and such results 
are processes of the type better left to patent and trade secret protection.”); Borland, 
49 F.3d at 819 (Boudin, J., concurring) (“Granting protection, in other words, can 
have some of the consequences of patent protection in limiting other people’s ability 
to perform a task in the most efficient manner.”).
110. DSC Communications, 81 F.3d. at 601, quoting Lasercomb America v. Reynolds, 
911 F.2d 970, 977 (4th Cir. 1990).
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What is distinctive about DSC Communications is that Judge Garza chose 
to act on his concern about de facto patent protection through the affir-
mative defense of copyright misuse. In Lasercomb America v. Reynolds,111 
the Fourth Circuit based its misuse finding on the fact that Lasercomb—by 
the terms of its copyright license agreement—was attempting to monopo-
lize something that clearly was not part of the bundle of rights granted by 
copyright: the right to develop competing software utilizing the same ideas. 
Lasercomb could not make even a plausible argument that a copyright 
holder could effectively prevent other parties from creating a computer pro-
gram that would be similar to the copyright holder’s program only in that 
it would accomplish the same task.
Although DSC prohibited customers by license from running its operat-
ing-system software on non-DSC equipment,112 Judge Garza did not rest his 
decision on that license agreement. He instead found that the attempt by 
DSC to prevent the making of identical copies by another party to consti-
tute copyright misuse. This clearly extends the reasoning of Lasercomb. The 
right to create a program implementing only the same ideas—the activity 
Lasercomb sought to control—is not among the copyright holder’s exclu-
sive rights under the act. Conversely, the right to reproduce the program 
in question—which DSC sought to control—is an exclusive right of the 
copyright holder.113
What is even more remarkable about Judge Garza’s choice of copyright 
misuse as the basis for his decision is that he preferred the new and not 
widely accepted misuse defense over the venerable fair-use defense, which 
also was available to him. As was noted above, the district court found DGI’s 
disassembly of DSC’s firmware to constitute fair use under Sega Enterprises 
Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc.114 It could be that Judge Garza was reluctant to rely on 
Sega because the reproduction before him was a verbatim copy made by 
DGI while it was testing its product, rather than a translation DGI made 
in the course of reverse engineering. However, DGI arguably had a stron-
ger fair-use argument than Accolade had in the Sega case. Whereas DGI’s 
RAM copy of the DSC operating system could not impair the market for 
the operating system in any way, Accolade’s disassembly of Sega products 
could have led to the development of Accolade products that might have 
diminished the sales of Sega products.
At trial, DSC presented evidence that its license to its customers pro-
hibited the running of the DSC operating system on non-DSC cards. The 
111. 911 F.2d 970, 977 (4th Cir. 1990).
112. See DSC Communications, 81 F.3d at 600.
113. See 17 U.S.C. § 106(1).
114. 977 F.2d 1510 (9th Cir. 1992).
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jury found that DSC’s license agreement constituted copyright misuse. On 
appeal, the Fifth Circuit agreed: “DSC has used its copyright to indirectly 
gain commercial control over products DSC does not have copyrighted, 
namely its microprocessor cards.”115 On this basis, the Fifth Circuit denied 
DSC a permanent injunction. The Fifth Circuit thus established misuse as 
an alternative theory for excusing copying done during the development 
of interoperable products.
It should be noted that in a case brought by DSC against Pulse Com-
munications (another developer of interoperable cards) the Federal Circuit 
rejected Pulse’s assertion of fair use with respect to Pulse’s loading of DSC’s 
software onto Pulse’s cards:
Rather than being a part of an attempt at reverse engineering, the copying appears 
to have been done after Pulsecom had determined how the system functioned and 
merely to demonstrate the interchangeability of the Pulsecom cards with those made 
and sold by DSC.116
Here the Federal Circuit drew a clear distinction between product develop-
ment and product demonstration.
2.2.3 United States v. Microsoft (1999)
Once in a while, a passage appears in a judicial opinion that succinctly 
captures the essence of an exceedingly complex issue. Paragraph 52 of U.S. 
District Court Judge Jackson’s findings of fact in the U.S. government’s anti-
trust action against Microsoft is such a passage.117 In this one paragraph, 
Judge Jackson laid to rest many of the vexing factual questions relating to 
software interoperability in general and reverse engineering in particular. 
Because interoperability plays a crucial role in permitting competition in 
the networked environment, these insights are of growing importance as 
electronic commerce expands.
2.2.3.1 The Context of Paragraph 52
Judge Jackson’s lengthy Findings of Fact, issued on November 5, 1999, 
center on Microsoft’s efforts to protect the Application Program Interface 
(API) barrier to entry.118 According to Judge Jackson, the large number of 
115. Alcatel U.S.A., Inc., v. DGI Techs., Inc. 166 F.3d 772, 793 (5th Cir. 1999).
116. DSC Communications Corp. v. Pulse Communications, 170 F.3d 1354, 1363 (Fed. 
Cir. 1999).
117. This subsection is based on Jonathan Band, “Paragraph 52: A Window into 
Judge Jackson’s Findings of Fact,” The Computer Lawyer, March 2000, at 3. The copy-
right arguments advanced by the Department of Justice in this case are discussed 
below in subsection 2.3.1.
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application programs written to the APIs exposed by Windows hindered 
competition from rival operating systems, such as Apple’s Mac OS, which 
could not run these applications. The Findings of Fact recite in great detail 
Microsoft’s efforts to preserve the API barrier to entry by preventing the 
broad adoption of “middleware,” such as Netscape’s Navigator, which 
would run on top of Windows and expose a different and attractive set of 
APIs to independent software developers.
A critical element in Judge Jackson’s analysis was the inability of a com-
petitor to develop an operating system that exposed the same APIs as Win-
dows. In paragraph 46, Judge Jackson recounted IBM’s unsuccessful effort: 
“In late 1994, IBM introduced its Intel-compatible OS/2 Warp operating 
system and spent millions of dollars in an effort to attract independent 
software vendors (ISVs) to develop applications for OS/2 and in an attempt 
to reverse engineer, or ‘clone,’ part of the Windows API set. Despite these efforts, 
IBM could obtain neither significant market share nor ISV support for OS/2 
Warp.”119 In paragraph 52, Judge Jackson drew conclusions from IBM’s 
experience on the feasibility of reverse engineering Windows to uncover 
the APIs and then replicating them in a competing operating system—a 
process he referred to as “cloning.”
2.2.3.2 The Text of Paragraph 52
Paragraph 52 reads as follows:
Theoretically, the developer of a non-Microsoft, Intel-compatible PC operating sys-
tem could circumvent the applications barrier to entry by cloning the APIs exposed 
by the 32-bit versions of Windows (Windows 9x and Windows NT). Applications 
written for Windows would then also run on the rival operating system, and con-
sumers could use the rival system confident in that knowledge. Translating this theo-
ry into practice is virtually impossible, however. First of all, cloning the thousands of 
APIs already exposed by Windows would be an enormously expensive undertaking. 
More daunting is the fact that Microsoft continually adds APIs to Windows through 
updates and new versions. By the time a rival finished cloning the APIs currently in 
existence, Windows would have exposed a multitude of new ones. Since the rival 
would never catch up, it would never be able to assure consumers that its operating 
system would run all of the applications written for Windows. IBM discovered this 
to its dismay in the mid-1990s when it failed, despite a massive investment, to clone 
a sufficiently large part of the 32-bit Windows APIs. In short, attempting to clone 
the 32-bit Windows APIs is such an expensive, uncertain undertaking that it fails to 
present a practical option for a would-be competitor to Windows.120
118. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 84 F. Supp. 2d 9 (D.D.C. 1999).
119. Id. at 22 (emphasis added).
120. Id. at 24.
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2.2.3.3 The Lessons of Paragraph 52
As was noted above, Judge Jackson understood the “cloning” of the Win-
dows APIs to include the reverse engineering of Windows to uncover its 
APIs. Accordingly, in paragraph 52 Judge Jackson stated that the process 
of reverse engineering Windows to uncover its APIs, and their subsequent 
incorporation in a competing operating system, was expensive and time 
consuming—so time consuming, in fact, that the competitor could never 
keep up with Microsoft. This seemingly simple observation contains many 
implicit and explicit lessons for the continuing debate about interoperabil-
ity and competition in the information-technology industry.
The Availability of Interface Information
In numerous forums, Microsoft and other large software companies argued 
that reverse engineering was not necessary for achieving interoperability, 
because all the needed interface information could easily be licensed.121 
As IBM’s experience recounted in paragraph 52 clearly demonstrates, this 
information is not made available to would-be competitors. Microsoft may 
have been willing to license some of this information to an ISV developing 
an application program designed to run on Windows, but it was not will-
ing to license the full API set to the developer of a competing product—in 
this case, IBM.
Reverse Engineering Is Expensive
In the global debates over reverse engineering, opponents of the practice 
argued that it could be accomplished by the push of a button.122 Indeed, 
these opponents contended that reverse engineering was so easy that it 
facilitated “disguised piracy.” A pirate could “decompile” the object code of 
the program into a higher-level language, rename the variables and make 
other slight alterations, and then recompile the program.123 This recom-
piled program would look sufficiently different from the original program 
to defeat claims of copyright infringement. Paragraph 52 debunks this “dis-
guised piracy” myth. Reverse engineering is so time consuming and expen-
sive that it would never be employed for disguised piracy. In fact, in IBM’s 
case, it was so costly that it prevented IBM from developing a fully compat-
ible operating system.
121. On the Business Software Alliance’s presentation to Hong Kong’s Legislative 
Council in 1997, see section 5.3 below.
122. We discuss these global debates in chapter 5.
123. Id.
Copyright Cases in U.S. Courts 59
Legitimate Developers Engage in Reverse Engineering
In the late 1980s and the early 1990s, IBM was one of the major opponents 
of the legalization of reverse engineering.124 Yet, as paragraph 52 shows, in 
1994 it reverse engineered Windows. Further, there is ample evidence that 
Microsoft has reverse engineered competitors’ products, including America 
Online’s Instant Messaging protocols.125 Reverse engineering is a basic tool 
of software development.
Copyright Law Does Not Prevent Reverse Engineering
As important as what Judge Jackson said in paragraph 52 is what he did not 
say. Specifically, he did not say that copyright law prevented the “cloning” 
of the Windows APIs. This, of course, is consistent with the Ninth Circuit’s 
ruling in Sega v. Accolade126 that the copying incidental to decompilation 
was a fair use so long as the decompilation was the only way to uncover 
the information and the decompilation was performed for a legitimate 
purpose. It is also consistent with the line of cases, following the Second 
Circuit’s Computer Associates v. Altai,127 that refused to extend copyright 
protection to interface specifications. (Judge Jackson relied on these cases in 
an opinion rejecting the motion for summary judgment in which Microsoft 
argued that its copyright in Windows entitled it to impose whatever terms 
it wished in its Windows license agreements.128)
Interface Information Is Essential to Competition
Although Judge Jackson devoted only one paragraph to “cloning,” without 
question that paragraph formed a critical factual predicate for the entire 
case. “Theoretically,” Judge Jackson noted, “the developer of a non-Micro-
soft, Intel-compatible PC operating system could circumvent the applica-
tions barrier to entry”129 and thereby undermine Microsoft’s monopoly. 
However, “[t]ranslating this theory into practice is virtually impossible”130 
because of the difficulty of reverse engineering a program as complex as 
124. For example, IBM’s opposition to reverse engineering in Australia is discussed 
below in section 5.1. See also Band and Katoh, Interfaces on Trial, at 18–28.
125. Saul Hansell, “In Cyberspace, Rivals Skirmish over Messaging,” New York Times, 
July 24, 1999.
126. 977 F.2d 1510 (9th Cir. 1992).
127. 982 F.2d 693 (2d Cir. 1992).
128. U.S. v. Microsoft, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14231 (D.D.C. September 14, 1998).
129. Microsoft, 84 F. Supp. 2d at 24.
130. Id.
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Windows. In other words, Microsoft’s monopoly in Windows is sustained 
largely by the difficulty of uncovering information about the Windows 
APIs. Interface information is the key to competitiveness in the informa-
tion-technology industry, and there is no competition in the market for 
PC operating systems because Microsoft maintains tight control over the 
needed information.
It is interesting to consider how different the computer industry would 
be today had IBM succeeded in its Windows reverse-engineering effort. 
For a historical precedent, one can consider Phoenix Technologies’ reverse 
engineering of the IBM PC’s basic input/out system (BIOS) in the 1980s. 
With the information it obtained, Phoenix developed a compatible BIOS, 
which it then made available to other hardware manufacturers. This con-
tributed significantly to the emergence of the IBM-compatible-PC industry 
and to the rise of Dell and Gateway.131
2.2.4 Sony v. Connectix (2000)
As technology has become more pervasive, lawmakers have felt increas-
ing pressure from certain industries and from segments of the public to 
impose new regulations in an effort to limit technology’s perceived harm-
ful affects.132 Such regulation could be too broad and could have the unin-
tended consequence of frustrating the growth of useful technologies. To 
avoid that result, lawmakers would be well advised to follow the example 
of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in Sony v. Connectix.133
The case concerned Connectix’s development of software that emu-
lated the Sony PlayStation. This emulator, called the Virtual Game Station 
(VGS), enabled a user to run a PlayStation-compatible game on a Macin-
tosh computer. To ensure compatibility between the emulator and the 
PlayStation games, Connectix had to reverse engineer the Sony PlaySta-
tion. One step in the process of reverse engineering involved loading the 
PlayStation’s basic input/output system into a computer and running it 
repeatedly as Connectix engineers developed software that interacted with 
it. Once they had completed this software, the Connectix engineers devel-
oped their own BIOS to interact with the software. The repeated running 
of the BIOS caused the making of numerous temporary copies of the BIOS 
131. See Band and Katoh, Interfaces on Trial, at 29–32.
132. This subsection is based on Jonathan Band, “Rules to Live By: The Ninth Cir-
cuit’s Decision in Sony v. Connectix,” Stanford Technology Law Review (June 2000).
133. Sony Computer Entertainment, Inc. v. Connectix Corp., 203 F.3d 596 (9th Cir.), cert. 
denied, 121 S. Ct. 172 (2000).
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in the computer’s random-access memory. Sony asserted that these copies 
infringed its copyright in the BIOS. The district court agreed and issued a 
preliminary injunction.
Following its decision in Sega Enters., Ltd., v. Accolade, Inc., the Ninth Cir-
cuit reversed the district court’s decision. It found that the temporary cop-
ies were excused under the doctrine of fair use because they were necessary 
for the uncovering of elements not protected by Sony’s copyright—specifi-
cally, the BIOS’s interface specifications.
Sony suggested that Sega applied to disassembly, but not to the making 
of RAM copies while observing the program’s operation. The Ninth Circuit 
found no reason to distinguish between the different techniques of reverse 
engineering. Because both methods require intermediate copying, the court 
reasoned, “we find no reason inherent in these methods to prefer one as a 
matter of copyright law.”134 The Ninth Circuit also dismissed the district 
court’s finding that Connectix went beyond Sega in not only studying the 
BIOS but also using the BIOS to develop the interoperable software. Reverse 
engineering, the Ninth Circuit observed, “is a technically complex, fre-
quently iterative process. Within the limited context of a claim of intermedi-
ate infringement, we find the semantic distinction between ‘studying’ and 
‘use’ to be artificial, and decline to adopt it for purposes of determining fair 
use.”135
Sony argued that Connectix could have avoided making the RAM cop-
ies of the BIOS had it followed a different development process. Connectix 
could have developed its own BIOS at the beginning, and used that BIOS 
in the development of the interoperable software, rather than use the Sony 
BIOS in the development of the interoperable software and then develop 
its own BIOS.
The Ninth Circuit rejected Sony’s argument out of hand:
Even if we were inclined to supervise the engineering solutions of software compa-
nies in minute detail, and we are not, our application of the copyright law would not 
turn on such a distinction. . . . [T]he rule urged by Sony would require that a software 
engineer, faced with two engineering solutions that each require intermediate copy-
ing of protected and unprotected material, often follow the least efficient solution. 
. . .This is precisely the kind of ‘wasted effort that the proscription against the copy-
right of ideas and facts . . . [i]s designed to prevent.’136
The court further observed:
134. Connectix, 203 F.3d at 604.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 605 (citations omitted).
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Such an approach would erect an artificial hurdle in the way of the public’s access 
to the ideas contained within copyrighted software programs. . . . We decline to 
erect such a barrier in this case. If Sony wishes to obtain a lawful monopoly in the 
functional concepts in its software, it must satisfy the more stringent standards of 
the patent laws.137
In the same pro-competition vein, the Ninth Circuit rejected the district 
court’s finding that the Connectix VGS was not transformative under the 
first fair-use factor because it merely supplanted Sony’s PlayStation console. 
The court noted that the VGS was “a wholly new product” that “afforded 
game play in new environments, specifically anywhere a Sony PlayStation 
console and television are not available, but a computer with a CD-ROM 
drive is.”138
The Ninth Circuit acknowledged that the VGS might cause Sony to lose 
some sales of consoles. “But,” it noted,
because the Virtual Game Station is transformative, and does not merely supplant 
the PlayStation console, the Virtual Game Station is a legitimate competitor in the 
market for platforms on which Sony and Sony-licensed games can be played. For this 
reason, some economic loss by Sony as a result of this competition does not compel a 
finding of no fair use. Sony understandably seeks control over the market for devices 
that play games Sony produces or licenses. The copyright law, however, does not 
confer such a monopoly.139
In sum, the Ninth Circuit refused to supervise the engineering solutions 
of software companies in minute detail. It declined to force engineers to 
follow inefficient procedures. Instead, the court focused on the big pic-
ture—what Connectix was trying to do, and how that comported with the 
objectives of the copyright law.
At an even higher level of generality, the court seemed to say that we 
should be concerned not with the process but with the end result (unless, 
of course, a process patent is involved). In other words, our laws should 
not restrict intermediate steps or products. Instead, our laws should pro-
hibit only finished products that infringe intellectual-property rights, or 
the harmful use of non-infringing products (e.g., using a personal computer 
to upload infringing material onto the Internet). The Ninth Circuit fol-
lowed this approach in Kelly v. Arriba Soft,140 finding that fair use permitted 
137. Id.
138. Id. at 606.
139. Id. at 607 (citations omitted).
140. 336 F.3d 81 (9th Cir. 2003).
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the copying performed by a search engine in the course of developing its 
search database.
2.2.5 Cartoon Network v. CSC Holdings (2008)
The parties in Connectix, as well as the Ninth Circuit, assumed that all the 
RAM copies Connectix made while reverse engineering the Sony PlaySta-
tion were copies that could infringe the reproduction right. The U.S. Court 
of Appeals for the Second Circuit’s decision in Cartoon Network LP v. CSC 
Holdings, Inc.141 requires a reevaluation of that assumption.
Cablevision introduced a network digital video recording (DVR) service 
whereby users could direct the recording of a television program for later 
viewing. Rather than program his own DVR, the user would use a remote 
control to program a server at Cablevision’s facility to record the show 
and store it until the user retrieved it. The server could store the programs 
recorded by thousands of subscribers. The motion picture studios sued 
Cablevision for copyright infringement. By stipulation, the parties agreed 
to focus the litigation on whether Cablevision engaged in direct infringe-
ment. The studios agreed to waive arguments that Cablevision was second-
arily liable, and Cablevision agreed to waive any fair-use arguments.
The district court found that Cablevision directly infringed in three 
ways. First, it infringed the reproduction right when it made a temporary 
buffer copy from which a user could program a copy to be made. Second, 
Cablevision infringed the reproduction right when it made the copy on its 
server at the user’s direction. Third, Cablevision infringed the performance 
right when it allowed users to watch the shows they had stored on the 
Cablevision server.
The Second Circuit reversed the district court on all three issues, but 
only the first is relevant here. The Second Circuit ruled that the buffer copy 
Cablevision made did not meet the statutory definition of fixation and thus 
did not infringe the reproduction right. Section 106(1) of the Copyright 
Act grants the copyright owner the exclusive right “to reproduce the copy-
righted work in copies.” Section 101 defines copies as material objects “in 
which a work is fixed by any method now known or later developed, and 
from which the work can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communi-
cated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or other device.” Section 
101 also provides that “[a] work is ‘fixed’ in a tangible medium of expres-
sion when its embodiment in a copy . . . , by or under the authority of 
the author, is sufficiently permanent or stable to permit it to be perceived, 
141. 536 F.3d 121 (2d Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 2890 (2009).
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reproduced, or otherwise communicated for a period of more than transi-
tory duration.”
In MAI Systems Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc.,142 the Ninth Circuit found 
that an operating system loaded into RAM was “fixed” when the operat-
ing system’s error log was sufficiently permanent or stable to enable an 
independent service organization to view it in order to identify a computer 
malfunction. Based on this holding, most courts have assumed that all 
RAM copies met the statutory definition of fixation.143 However, the Sec-
ond Circuit in Cartoon Network examined the statutory definition closely 
and concluded that the buffer copy’s 1.2-second existence was too short 
to satisfy the requirement of being perceptible for “a period of more than 
transitory duration.” The Second Circuit distinguished MAI from the other 
cases involving RAM copies on the ground that in the other cases the copies 
lasted significantly longer than 1.2 second.
The Cartoon Network case did not involve reverse engineering. However, 
it suggests that some of the RAM copies made during the course of black-
box reverse engineering might be so temporary as not to satisfy the statu-
tory definition of fixation. Thus, Cartoon Network provides an alternative 
theory to fair use for permitting at least some of the “copies” made in the 
course of black-box reverse engineering. Even so, this alternate theory prob-
ably cannot be applied to disassembly, which involves the creation of a 
derivative work, not a copy.
2.3 The Executive Branch’s Endorsement of Copyright Case Law
U.S. courts have wrestled with the application of copyright protection to 
computer programs for more than 20 years.144 As we have seen, two issues 
in particular have received great attention in the courts because of their 
impact on competition in the software industry: the protectability of 
interface specifications and the permissibility of software reverse engineer-
ing. While the courts examined these issues, the executive and legislative 
branches of the U.S. government largely remained on the sidelines. But 
142. 991 F.2d 511 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1033 (1993).
143. For a more detailed discussion of temporary copies before the Cartoon Network 
decision, see Jonathan Band and Jeny Marcinko, “A New Perspective on Temporary 
Copies: The Fourth Circuit’s Opinion in CoStar v. LoopNet,” Stanford Technology Law 
Review (April 2005).
144. This subsection is based on Jonathan Band and Taro Isshiki, “Peace at Last? 
Executive and Legislative Branch Endorsement of Recent Software Copyright Case 
Law,” The Computer Lawyer (February 1999).
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once the courts finally reached a consensus on these issues favoring soft-
ware interoperability, the executive branch and the legislative branch rati-
fied the courts’ conclusions.
2.3.1 The Department of Justice
When the Second Circuit in 1992 issued Computer Associates v. Altai, the 
leading decision on the scope of protection for computer programs, the 
decision provoked extensive discussion in copyright circles and in the soft-
ware industry. The executive branch, however, remained mum, even as 
circuit after circuit voiced agreement with the Computer Associates court 
that copyright protection did not extend to the interface specifications of 
computer programs. However, in U.S. v. Microsoft, one of the most impor-
tant antitrust cases of the 1990s, the executive branch relied heavily on 
Computer Associates and its progeny.145 This reliance signaled the executive 
branch’s agreement with the reasoning and the results in those cases.
In the antitrust case against Microsoft, the Antitrust Division of the 
U.S. Department of Justice and nineteen state governments (collectively 
“the Government”) objected to Microsoft’s insertion in its licensing agree-
ments of restrictions requiring the pre-installation and display of Internet 
Explorer and preventing PC manufacturers from utilizing preferred means 
of developing and installing their own add-on programs or customizing the 
user interface. In its motion for summary judgment, Microsoft defended 
this practice on the ground that its copyright in Windows 95 and Windows 
98 programs entitled it to impose whatever terms it wished in its Windows 
license agreements. On August 31, 1998, the Government filed a response 
that rested heavily on the interoperability cases in its rejection of Micro-
soft’s contentions.
The district court agreed with the Government’s arguments and denied 
Microsoft’s motion.146 But more important than the district court’s agree-
ment with the arguments is the fact the Government made them at all. It 
is now the official policy of the U.S. government that copyright law should 
be construed narrowly so as not to impede the interoperability of software.
2.3.1.1 No Moral Right In Software
The Government first rejected Microsoft’s claim that it had a “moral right” 
in its software. Recognizing that “moral right” is a European concept largely 
145. We discuss Judge Jackson’s findings in the case concerning reverse engineering 
in subsection 2.2.3.
146. U.S. v. Microsoft, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14231 (D.D.C. September 14, 1998).
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foreign to American jurisprudence, the Government went on to assert that 
“whatever policy justifications might exist for a moral right in the integrity 
of works of art, they are substantially weaker when the work at issue is a 
computer program.”147 It then proceeded to discuss the functional nature 
of programs—particularly operating systems—and to note that numerous 
cases have allowed defendants to make alterations to plaintiffs’ programs. 
In the course of this discussion, the Government cited with approval six of 
the most important software copyright cases that created the contours of 
today’s software protection: Lotus v. Borland, DSC v. DGI, Mitel v. Iqtel, Mitek 
v. Arce, Sega v. Accolade, and Vault v. Quaid.148
2.3.1.2 The Limited Scope of Copyright Protection
The Government next refuted Microsoft’s argument that it is free to do 
whatever it wishes in licensing its copyrighted works. Citing Computer 
Associates v. Altai and two Supreme Court cases,149 the Government argued 
that copyright does not provide an unbounded property right but rather 
is a limited power designed to encourage the creation of new works of 
authorship.
Discussing the limits of copyright with respect to computer programs, 
the response states that “it is by now well established that the copyright in 
a computer program cannot extend to the functional aspects of that com-
puter program; to design choices dictated by necessity, cost, convenience or 
consumer demand.”150 To support this statement, the Government turned 
to the Tenth Circuit’s decision in Mitel v. Iqtel, which it summarized as fol-
lows: “[I]nterface specifications of a communications protocol are freely 
copiable because they are functional rather than expressive.”151 The Mitel 
decision squarely addressed and rejected the protectability of interface 
specifications.
147. Response of the United States to Microsoft’s Motion for Summary Judgment, 
U.S. v. Microsoft, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14231 (D.D.C. September 14, 1998) at 77.
148. Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int’l Inc., 49 F.3d 807 (1st Cir. 1995), aff’d by an 
equally divided Court, 116 S. Ct. 804 (1996); DSC Communications v. DGI Technologies, 
81 F.3d 597, 601 (5th Cir. 1996); Mitel v. Iqtel, 124 F.3d 1366 (10th Cir. 1997); Mitek 
Holdings v. Arce Eng’g, 89 F.3d 1548 (11th Cir. 1996); Sega Enterprises Ltd. v. Accolade, 
Inc., 977 F.2d 1510 (9th Cir. 1992); Vault v. Quaid Software, 847 F.2d 255 (5th Cir. 
1988).
149. Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207 (1990); Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 
U.S. 151 (1975).
150. U.S. Response at 79.
151. Id. Mitel is discussed in greater detail above in subsection 2.1.2.4.
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2.3.1.3 The Doctrine of Copyright Misuse
The Government then argued that copyright does not provide Microsoft 
with the unfettered right to license its intellectual property as it sees fit. The 
Government argued that the doctrine of copyright misuse imposes signifi-
cant restrictions on the ability of a copyright owner to leverage the copy-
right into control of adjacent markets, to prevent the development and use 
of interoperable programs by competitors, or to impose anti-competition 
restrictions on licensees. The Government found several cases instructive, 
including DSC v. DGI, in which the Fifth Circuit held that it probably was 
copyright misuse for DSC to use its copyright in the computer program 
operating a telephone switch to try to prevent a competitor from designing 
and testing a compatible switch that used DSC’s protocol.152 The response 
also cited two other appellate decisions, Lasercomb America v. Reynolds and 
PMI v. AMA,153 both of which found copyright misuse where a copyright 
owner entered into license agreements that restricted its licensees from 
competing with it.
2.3.1.4 Copyright Confers No Antitrust Immunity
Finally, the Government rebutted Microsoft’s claim that licensing of copy-
righted materials is exempted from antitrust scrutiny. Noting that a copy-
right does not give its owner immunity from antitrust laws and other laws 
of general applicability, the Government stated that a copyright owner may 
not use licensing agreements to impose anti-competition restrictions on its 
licensees. Furthermore, the Government quoted Justice Scalia’s dissent in 
Eastman Kodak v. Image Technical Services, in which he asserted that power 
gained through a legal advantage in copyright “can give rise to liability if 
a seller exploits his dominant position in one market to expand his empire 
into the next.”154
2.3.2 The Federal Trade Commission
A few months after the Second Circuit’s issuance of Computer Associates 
v. Altai, the Ninth Circuit handed down an equally momentous decision: 
Sega v. Accolade.155 In Sega, the court held that the copying incidental to the 
reverse engineering of software for the purpose of achieving interoperability 
152. 81 F.3d at 601. DSC is discussed in greater detail above in subsection 2.2.2.
153. Lasercomb America v. Reynolds, 911 F.2d 970 (4th Cir. 1990); Practice Management 
Info. Corp. v. American Med. Ass’n, 121 F.3d 516 (1997), cert. denied, 524 U.S. 952.
154. 504 U.S. 451, 498 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
155. 977 F.2d 1510 (9th Cir. 1992).
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was permitted under copyright’s fair-use doctrine. Although the U.S. gov-
ernment never questioned the case domestically, in foreign contexts both 
the Patent and Trademark Office and the Office of the U.S. Trade Repre-
sentative suggested that Sega was a minority view.156 They did this in an 
effort to dissuade foreign governments from adopting exceptions to their 
copyright laws permitting the reverse engineering of software.
However, on October 30, 1998, staff members of the Federal Trade Com-
mission’s Policy Planning Office and Bureaus of Consumer Protection and 
Competition sent a letter157 to the drafters of article 2B of the Uniform 
Commercial Code in which they publicly voiced concerns over several of 
the draft’s provisions.158 In particular, the FTC staff stated that article 2B’s 
provisions could limit the reverse engineering permitted under Sega and 
thereby dampen competition in the software industry. Thus, the FTC staff 
agreed with the Sega court’s reasoning and underlying pro-competition 
policy.
In a section titled “Balance of Innovation and Competition Incentives 
in Article 2B,” the FTC staff explained that article 2B was inconsistent with 
existing intellectual-property and antitrust laws and policies:
Some provisions in Article 2B implicitly endorse a contracting/licensing structure 
that allows software and other information to be distributed with significant restric-
tions on users’ rights to compete. Those restrictions could be contract/license terms 
that explicitly forbid competition with the seller/licensor of the good or terms that 
restrict in some manner ‘reverse engineering,’ i.e., the detailed analysis by one firm 
of another firm’s product in order to produce a related good.159
The FTC staff summarized the testimony the FTC had received during 
its 1995 hearings on Competition Policy in the New High-Tech, Global 
Market. It discussed expert testimony that “next-generation innovations 
156. See, e.g., Band and Katoh, Interfaces on Trial at 297–316. Also see sections 5.1 
and 5.3 of the present volume.
157. The first footnote in the letter notes: “This comment represents the views of the 
Bureaus of Consumer Protection and Competition and of the Policy Planning office 
and does not necessarily represent the views of the FTC or any individual Commis-
sioner. The FTC, however, has authorized the staff to submit this comment.”
158. Proposed article 2B of the Uniform Commercial Code ultimately became the 
Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act (UCITA). The interoperability 
debate in the context of article 2B/UCITA is discussed below in subsection 4.2.2.
159. Letter from the staff of the Federal Trade Commission Policy Planning Office 
and Bureaus of Consumer Protection and Competition to the drafters of article 2B of 
the Uniform Commercial Code (October 30, 1998) at 5, available at www.ftc.gov.
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. . . are often built on the basis of access to information regarding prior-
generation products.”160 Accordingly, contractual restrictions on access to 
such information may inhibit the quantity, the quality, and the rate of 
future innovation.
The FTC staff then surveyed relevant principles of intellectual-property 
law and quoted the Supreme Court’s statement in Feist v. Rural Telephone161 
that copyright “assures authors the right to their original expression, but 
encourages others to build freely upon the ideas and information conveyed 
in a work.” The FTC staff noted that “several courts of appeal have held 
that the Copyright Act’s protection for ‘fair use’ of a copyrighted product 
precludes a software vendor’s attempt to enjoin a purchaser’s reverse engi-
neering.”162 The staff proceeded to quote passages from the Ninth Circuit’s 
decision in Sega v. Accolade:
The Ninth Circuit . . . found that if it were to hold that reverse engineering “is per se 
an unfair use, the owner of the copyright [would gain] a de facto monopoly over the 
functional aspects of his work—aspects that were expressly denied copyright protec-
tion by Congress.” The court said that such “an attempt to monopolize the market 
by making it impossible for others to compete runs counter to the [Copyright Act’s] 
statutory purpose of promoting creative expression and cannot constitute a strong 
equitable basis for resisting the invocation of the fair use doctrine.”163
The FTC staff turned to copyright-misuse and antitrust cases in which 
copyright owners had attempted to use licensing to expand their copy-
right protection. Citing PMI and Lasercomb, the staff observed that restric-
tions that run afoul of the copyright laws include: a provision requiring 
the licensee to use the licensor’s product exclusively; and a provision sup-
pressing any attempt by the licensee to independently implement the idea 
expressed by the licensor’s product.
After this survey of applicable legal principles, the FTC staff addressed 
article 2B. It objected to article 2B’s broad scope of “contractual use restric-
tion” on the ground that it could inhibit innovation and competition in 
the markets for computer software and other products containing infor-
mation. Under article 2B, the reverse engineering necessary to develop a 
product could be prohibited by a license term. Although such a term may 
well be unenforceable under the copyright laws or the antitrust laws, arti-
cle 2B declares that the restrictive term “would in most circumstances be 
160. Id. at 6.
161. 499 U.S. 340, 350 (1991).
162. FTC staff letter at 7.
163. Id. (citations omitted).
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enforceable.”164 In the FTC staff’s view, this statement of presumptive valid-
ity could discourage licensees from asserting rights under federal and state 
intellectual-property and antitrust laws.
2.4 Congress’s Endorsement of Copyright Case Law
Not to be left out of the act, Congress expressed its support for software 
reverse engineering and interoperability. Section 1201 of the Digital Millen-
nium Copyright Act, passed by Congress in October of 1998, implements 
the provisions of the World Intellectual Property Organization Internet 
Treaties relating to technological protection measures.165 Specifically, sec-
tion 1201 prohibits the development, distribution, and use of technolo-
gies that circumvent other technologies that protect an author’s copyright. 
Developers of interoperable software explained to Congress that this pro-
hibition could prevent reverse engineering necessary for achieving interop-
erability. If a software vendor placed a software “lock” on a program that 
prevented the reverse engineering of the program, the circumvention of 
that software lock would violate section 1201. Thus, section 1201 could 
prevent the interoperable software developer from exercising the fair-use 
privilege recognized in Sega. Accordingly, Congress created an exception 
explicitly directed at reverse engineering. Section 1201(f) allows software 
developers to circumvent technological protection measures in a lawfully 
obtained computer program in order to identify the elements necessary 
to achieve interoperability of an independently created computer program 
with other programs. Section 1201 also permits a person to develop and 
employ technological means to circumvent for the purpose of achieving 
interoperability.166 This exception represents the first Congressional recog-
nition of the legitimacy of software reverse engineering.
164. The proposal recognized only enforceable “contractual use restrictions.” See § 
2B-102 Reporter’s Note 11: “The adjective ‘enforceable’ clarifies that the definition 
does not include terms invalidated under this Article or other law, including federal 
intellectual-property law and state laws which limit enforcement of some restrictions 
on use of information.”
165. 17 U.S.C. § 1201. We discuss the DMCA’s impact on interoperability in chapter 3.
166. Thus, section 1201(f) provides an exception to all the prohibitions of section 
1201: section 1201(a)(1)’s prohibition on the circumvention of access controls, sec-
tion 1201(a)(2)’s prohibition on the manufacture and distribution of devices which 
circumvent access controls, and section 1201(b)’s prohibition on the manufacture 
and distribution of devices which circumvent copy controls.
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To be sure, Congress did not say that all software reverse engineering 
was permissible, or that all copying incidental to reverse engineering would 
always be a fair use. Rather, Congress simply indicated that it would per-
mit circumvention when the underlying reverse engineering was not an 
infringement. But permitting circumvention when this condition was met 
indicated that Congress believed that the condition could be met—that is, 
that the copying incidental to reverse engineering could be a fair use. This 
signals Congress’s basic agreement with the judicial rulings in Sega v. Acco-
lade and its progeny. 
The Senate Judiciary Committee’s report could not have been clearer 
on the committee’s agreement with Sega. The report stated that this excep-
tion was “intended to allow legitimate software developers to continue 
engaging in certain activities for the purpose of achieving interoperability 
to the extent permitted by law prior to the enactment of this chapter.”167 
The committee evidently understood that if a dominant vendor placed on 
its program a technological measure that prevented reverse engineering, 
a legal prohibition on circumventing that technological protection could 
preclude other companies from obtaining the interface information neces-
sary to operate in the dominant vendor’s computing environment. Citing 
Sega, the committee stated that “[t]he objective is to ensure that the effect 
of current case law interpreting the Copyright Act is not changed by enact-
ment of this legislation for certain acts of identification and analysis done 
in respect of computer programs.”168 The committee concluded by noting 
that “[t]he purpose of this section is to foster competition and innovation 
in the computer and software industry.”169 
In this passage, the Senate Judiciary Committee asserted that Sega v. 
Accolade is good law. Although this is an obvious proposition to serious 
students of software copyright law, the Patent and Trademark Office and 
the Office of the United States Trade Representative, as well as some soft-
ware industry representatives, argued that Sega was a minority view and not 
entitled to much deference.170 This passage significantly undermined that 
argument. Further, in this passage the Senate Judiciary Committee recog-
nized not only that Sega is good law, but also that it is good policy: Reverse 
engineering “foster[s] competition and innovation in the computer and 
software industry.”171
167. S. Rep. No. 105–190, at 32 (1998).
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. See chapter 5 below.
171. S. Rep. No. 105–190, at 32 (1998).
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The FTC letter and section 1201 of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act 
indicate that it is the policy of the U.S. government to encourage competi-
tion in the software industry by eliminating barriers on reverse engineer-
ing. Likewise, the Government’s brief in the Microsoft case proclaims that 
copyright law cannot be abused to prevent legitimate competition. The 
executive and legislative branches have caught up with the judicial branch, 
and the pro-competition position of the U.S. government is unambiguous.
3 Interoperability under the DMCA
Section 1201 of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA), passed by 
Congress in October of 1998, implements the provisions of the World Intel-
lectual Property Organization Internet Treaties relating to technological 
protection measures. Specifically, section 1201 prohibits the development, 
distribution, and use of technologies that circumvent other technologies 
that protect an author’s copyright. Developers of interoperable software 
explained to Congress that this prohibition could prevent reverse engineer-
ing that was necessary for achieving interoperability. If a software vendor 
placed on a program a software “lock” that prevented reverse engineering 
of the program, the circumvention of that software lock would violate sec-
tion 1201. Thus, section 1201 could prevent a developer of interoperable 
software from exercising the fair-use privilege recognized in Sega v. Accolade.
Fortunately Congress, in response to advocacy by developers of interop-
erable software, included in the DMCA an exception explicitly directed at 
software reverse engineering and interoperability. And the courts generally 
have refused to apply the DMCA in a manner that prevents interoperability.
3.1 The Long Road to the DMCA
3.1.1 The Green Paper
In July of 1994, the Clinton administration’s Working Group on Intellec-
tual Property (chaired by Bruce Lehman, the Commissioner of the Patent 
and Trademark Office) issued a Green Paper that proposed a prohibition 
on the production and distribution of devices that circumvent anticopy-
ing technology.1 The copyright community, including the Motion Picture 
1. This subsection is based on Jonathan Band, “Throwing Out the Baby with the 
Bathwater, or Can Congress Prohibit Anticopy Circumvention Devices without Pre-
venting Legitimate Copying?” Computer Law Reporter, March 1996, at 7. For a detailed 
discussion of the DMCA and its history, see Jessica Litmann, Digital Copyright (Pro-
metheus, 2001).
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Association of America, the Recording Industry Association of America, and 
the Business Software Alliance, lobbied vigorously for such a prohibition 
as an essential weapon in their battle against infringement in the digital 
age. But the policy rationale for the prohibition was based on a series of 
assumptions that contained a fundamental logical flaw. The proponents 
of a circumvention ban assumed that the ease of infringement that digi-
tal networks made possible would encourage widespread disregard of the 
copyright laws. The proponents further assumed that technological protec-
tion measures could prevent this infringement. The proponents, however, 
recognized that the technological protection measures could be circum-
vented. Accordingly, the proponents supported legal remedies against the 
circumvention of technological protection measures. The logical flaw in 
this argument is as follows: If people would disregard a legal prohibition 
on reproduction and dissemination of copyrighted works, why would they 
respect a legal prohibition on circumvention of technological protection 
measures? In particular, why would they respect a legal prohibition on cir-
cumvention when they could readily access the circumvention tools using 
the Internet? The copyright community certainly had legitimate concerns 
that the Internet could erode the legal protection afforded by copyright. 
Nonetheless, the Working Group on Intellectual Property should have rec-
ognized that in the digital environment a circumvention law would be no 
more effective than a copyright law.
In the four years between the issuance of the Green Paper (1994) and 
the adoption of the DMCA (1998), there was extensive discussion of the 
need for and the likely effectiveness of a ban on circumvention. Within this 
broad discussion, there was a narrower debate on the effect of a circumven-
tion prohibition on interoperability. Although the circumvention provi-
sion first proposed by the Green Paper was intended to prevent wholesale 
misappropriation of copyrighted works flowing through the information 
infrastructure, it arguably might have restricted certain forms of software 
reverse engineering. If, for example, a software developer included in her 
program some code that prevented the disassembly of the program,2 dis-
abling the anti-disassembly code for the purpose of performing otherwise 
lawful reverse engineering might have been unlawful under the terms of 
the proposed provision.
The European Union’s Software Directive requires the member states 
to prohibit the distribution or a possession of devices for circumventing 
anticopying technology, but it explicitly states that this prohibition shall 
2. Disassembly involves translation of machine-readable object code into a higher-
level, human-readable form.
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not prejudice reverse-engineering rights under articles 5 and 6.3 Conversely, 
the Green Paper’s proposed language did not contain a reverse-engineering 
exemption. Instead, it broadly provided that “[n]o person shall import, 
manufacture or distribute any device . . . the primary purpose or effect 
of which is to avoid . . . , without authority of the copyright owner or 
the law, any process . . . which prevents. . . the violation of any of the 
exclusive rights under section 106.”4 In the comment period after this pro-
posal, several trade associations noted that this language might prevent the 
manufacture of anticopying-circumvention devices that are used to enable 
the making of lawful copies—e.g., back-up copies under 17 U.S.C. §117 or 
fair-use copies created during the course of reverse engineering.5 Working 
Group officials responded that the phrase “without the authority of . . . 
the law” restricted the provision to circumvention of anticopy devices for 
unlawful purposes. The trade associations pointed out that the provision’s 
“primary purpose or effect” test undermined this restriction. The American 
Committee for Interoperable Systems (ACIS) explained:
[C]onsider a software vendor who has incorporated an anticopy device in its busi-
ness software applications. Another vendor develops a mechanism that can circum-
vent the anticopy device. A year after this mechanism is placed on the market, it is 
determined that 55% of the copies made using the mechanism are unlawful copies, 
while 45% of the copies are lawful section 117 archival copies. Under such circum-
stances, what would be the “primary purpose or effect” of the mechanism? It seems 
clear that such a mechanism would be illegal under the proposed section. . . . It 
seems equally clear that this result would be inconsistent with the purposes and 
policies underlying the Copyright Act. To be sure, the makers of the unlawful copies 
are infringers and should be liable for damages, and, where appropriate, criminal 
penalties. At the same time, the vendors of the circumvention mechanism should 
be free from liability.6
ACIS also distinguished the other anticopying-circumvention provi-
sions cited by the Green Paper as analogies. In particular, ACIS noted that 
the Serial Copyright Management System provision in the Audio Home 
3. Council Directive 91/250/EEC, art. 7(1)(c), 1991 O.J. (L 122). The 1999 amend-
ments to the Australian copyright law contain a similar provision. See subsection 
5.1.3.2 of the present volume.
4. Information Infrastructure Task Force, Intellectual Property and the National Infor-
mation Infrastructure 128 (July 1994).
5. Two associations that raised concerns were the American Committee for Interop-
erable Systems and the Computer & Communications Industry Association.
6. ACIS Comments on Intellectual Property Issues Involved in the National Informa-
tion Infrastructure Initiative 5, n. 5 (December 10, 1993).
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Recording Act permitted the end user to make at least one digital copy and 
unlimited analog copies of a digital original.
At the request of the U.S. government, expansive anticopying-circum-
vention language appeared in an October 5, 1994 draft of the proposed Pro-
tocol to the Berne Convention.7 This too elicited the concern of developers 
of interoperable programs. In a letter to PTO Commissioner Lehman con-
cerning the Berne Protocol proposal, ACIS acknowledged that devices that 
defeat anticopy technologies could threaten the exclusive rights of authors, 
but argued as follows:
U.S. law clearly permits the making of reproductions without the author’s permis-
sion under certain circumstances. . . . Accordingly, any provision intended to regu-
late anti-copy circumvention devices must be carefully drafted so as to accommodate 
the making of lawful reproductions. . . . One possible approach would be to focus on 
the products resulting from the use of anti-copy circumvention devices, rather than 
on the devices themselves.8
3.1.2 The White Paper
Notwithstanding the aforementioned critique, the Working Group’s final 
report—the so-called White Paper, issued on September 5, 1995—retained 
the anticopying-circumvention language. The White Paper did, however, 
reply to the concerns raised by ACIS and others. The White Paper first 
argued that “[t]he fair use doctrine does not require a copyright owner to 
allow or to facilitate unauthorized access or use of a work” and that “[o]
therwise . . . museums could not require entry fees or prohibit the taking 
of photographs.”9 Accordingly, the fact that the provision might chill fair-
use rights was not seen as a legitimate ground for amending or eliminat-
ing the provision. Second, the White Paper repeated the Working Group’s 
earlier assertion that a circumvention device “primarily intended and used 
for legal purposes, such as fair use”10 would not violate the provision. Nev-
ertheless, the White Paper acknowledged that manufacturers “may inad-
vertently find themselves liable for devices which they intended for legal 
purposes, but which have the incidental effect of circumventing copyright 
protection systems.”11 Accordingly, the White Paper proposed the adoption 
7. Memorandum of WIPO International Bureau, ¶ 98(a)(i) (October 5, 1994).
8. Letter from Peter Choy, ACIS Chairman, to Bruce Lehman, Commissioner, U.S. 
Patent and Trademark Office (November 23, 1994).
9. Information Infrastructure Task Force, Intellectual Property and the National Infor-
mation Infrastructure, at 231.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 233, n. 569.
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of an innocent-infringer provision whereby a court could reduce damages if 
the violator proves that it “was not aware and had no reason to believe that 
its actions constituted a violation.”12
On September 28, 1995, the White Paper’s legislative proposals, includ-
ing the anticopying-circumvention language that was included as a new 
section (1201) in the Copyright Act, were introduced in both the House of 
Representatives (as H.R. 2441) and the Senate (as S. 1284). On November 
15, 1995, in a joint Senate Judiciary Committee–House Intellectual Prop-
erty Subcommittee hearing on the legislation, Register of Copyrights Mary-
beth Peters specifically addressed the proposed section 1201, noting that 
“the Copyright Office supports the concept of outlawing devices or services 
that defeat copyright protection systems.”13 Nonetheless, Peters expressed 
concerns about the “breadth of the language of Section 120[1] as drafted.”14 
With respect to the “primary purpose” test, Register Peters observed that 
“‘purpose’ is often difficult to prove, and which of several potential pur-
poses is ‘primary’ may not be evident.”15 Similarly, with respect to the “pri-
mary effect” test, she said “it is possible that a device intended for entirely 
legitimate purposes may be put to use primarily to defeat copyright protec-
tion technology, or that some unrelated function of a device may uninten-
tionally interfere with such technology.”16 Although she acknowledged the 
“innocent violation” defense, Peters preferred “to define the offense so as 
not to potentially sweep within its scope legitimate business behavior.”17
Despite her concern that section 1201 as drafted could restrict legiti-
mate business behavior, Register Peters agreed with the White Paper in its 
rejection of the argument that section 1201 was flawed because it could 
restrict legitimate copying such as disassembly: “It has always been a fun-
damental principle of copyright law that the copyright owner has no obli-
gation to make his work available to the public.”18 Peters’s and the White 
Paper’s analysis on this point, however, appears misdirected, as an exami-
nation of their examples reveals. The White Paper noted that a museum 
12. Id.
13. Joint Hearing on H.R. 2441 and S. 1284 Before the House Subcomm. on Courts, 
Intellectual Property, and the Administration of Justice of the House Comm. on the 
Judiciary, and the Senate Judiciary Committee, 104th Cong. 24 (1995) (statement of 
Marybeth Peters, Register of Copyrights).




18. Id. at 26.
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may require an entry fee and may prohibit the taking of photographs of a 
displayed painting. The White Paper neglected to mention, however, that 
the museum owns the painting itself but does not own the copyright in 
the painting. The museum’s ability to charge an entry fee and prohibit 
photography is not a function of federal copyright law, but a function of 
state property and contract law. The White Paper did not explain why the 
Copyright Act should be amended to improve enforcement of rights under 
state property and contract law.
Register Peters’s example involved an author who chose to keep his 
work locked in his office. To be sure, it would be unlawful for a would-be 
fair user to break into the office to gain access to the work; the violation, 
however, would not be of the federal Copyright Act, but of the state penal 
code (which criminalizes breaking and entering) and of state property law 
(which prohibits trespassing). In short, although copyright law tradition-
ally does not require access, it does not prevent access either. Rather, access 
is prevented by state law.
3.1.3 The WIPO Diplomatic Conference
As has been noted above, the Clinton administration was advancing the 
anticopying-circumvention provision in the World Intellectual Property 
Organization as well as in Congress. On November 15, 1995, in the joint 
hearing, Senator Orrin Hatch made it clear that he did not want the Berne 
Protocol process to preempt Congress’s consideration of the pending leg-
islation in any way. Further, in his statement introducing S. 1284, Senator 
Hatch emphasized that the bill in its present form was just the “starting 
point” of an in-depth deliberative process. Nonetheless, PTO Commis-
sioner Lehman aggressively pushed the circumvention issue at the WIPO 
Diplomatic Conference in Geneva in December of 1996. At the Diplomatic 
Conference, WIPO adopted a Copyright Treaty and a Performances and 
Phonograms Treaty. Both treaties contained provisions requiring contract-
ing parties to provide legal remedies against the circumvention of techno-
logical measures that protect authors’ copyrights.19 In short, Commissioner 
Lehman did precisely what Senator Hatch had instructed him not to do. 
19. Article II of the WIPO Copyright Treaty states: “Contracting Parties shall provide 
adequate legal protection and effective legal remedies against circumvention of 
effective technological measures that are used by authors in connection with the exer-
cise of their rights under this treaty or the Berne Convention and that restrict acts, in 
respect of their works, which are not authorized by the authors concerned or permitted 
by law.” Article 18 of the WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty contains similar 
language. (See the final section of the Statutory Appendix to the present volume.)
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He did an end-run around Congress by convincing WIPO to include in 
two treaties a prohibition on circumvention of technological protection 
measures.
3.1.4 The Administration’s Proposal for Implementation of the WIPO 
Treaties
After the 1996 WIPO Diplomatic Conference, the U.S. Patent and Trade-
mark Office began formulating the Clinton administration’s proposal for 
implementing the WIPO treaties.20 The PTO’s proposal was modified by 
the Office of the General Counsel of the Department of Commerce, which 
submitted it to Congress in July of 1997. The Administration’s proposal was 
promptly introduced in both chambers.21 Although the final law enacted 
by Congress is more balanced than the Clinton administration’s proposal, 
the basic framework of the administration’s section 1201 endured in the 
legislation enacted by Congress.
Section 1201(a)(1) prohibits gaining unauthorized access to a work 
by circumventing a technological protection measure (e.g., encryption) 
put in place by the copyright owner to control access to the copyrighted 
work.22 To facilitate enforcement of the copyright owner’s ability to con-
trol access to his copyrighted work, section 1201(a)(2) prohibits manufac-
turing or making available technologies, products, and services that can 
be used to defeat technological measures controlling access.23 Similarly, 
section 1201(b) prohibits the manufacture and distribution of the means 
of circumventing technological measures protecting the rights of a copy-
right owner (e.g., measures that prevent reproduction). Thus, section 1201 
prohibits two categories of circumvention devices: those that circumvent 
access-control technologies (section 1201(a)(2)) and those that circumvent 
20. This subsection is based on Jonathan Band and Taro Isshiki, “The New Anti-
Circumvention Provisions in the Copyright Act: A Flawed First Step,” Cyberspace 
Lawyer, February 1999, at 2.
21. H.R. 2281, 105th Cong. (1997); S. 1121, 105th Cong. (1997).
22. 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1). To “circumvent a technological measure” means to 
“descramble a scrambled work, to decrypt an encrypted work, or otherwise avoid, 
bypass, remove, deactivate, or impair a technological protection measure.” A techno-
logical measure effectively controls access to a work “if the measure, in the ordinary 
course of its operation, requires the application of information, or process or treat-
ment, with the authority of the copyright owner, to gain access to the work.” 17 
U.S.C. § 1201(a)(3). The full text of section 1201 appears in the Statutory Appendix 
to the present volume.
23. 17 U.S.C. §§ 1201(a)(2), (b).
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copy-control technologies (section 1201(b)).24 Violation of section 1201 
leads to civil and criminal liability. A repeat offender can be imprisoned for 
10 years and fined $1 million.
While the Clinton administration was still formulating its proposal, 
manufacturers of personal computers noted that a PC could be programmed 
to function as a circumvention device. To ensure that legitimate multi-
purpose devices could continue to be made and sold, the administration 
limited the prohibition to devices primarily designed or produced for the 
purpose of circumventing, devices that have only a limited commercially 
significant purpose or use other than to circumvent, and devices marketed 
for use in circumventing. Even with this modification, the provision still 
had fundamental defects: it prohibited the circumvention of access controls 
for lawful purposes, and it prohibited the manufacture and distribution of 
technologies that enabled circumvention for lawful purposes. To be sure, 
the administration inserted a savings clause (now section 1201(c)) stating 
that section 1201 did not affect rights, remedies, limitations, or defenses 
to copyright infringement. A defense to copyright infringement, however, 
is not a defense to the independent prohibition on circumvention and cir-
cumvention devices established in the new chapter 12 of Title 17. The Clin-
ton administration made another modification that gave the appearance 
of addressing this issue. Section 1201(b) originally contained a provision 
parallel to section 1201(a)(1)—a prohibition on the act of circumventing 
a copy control. The administration eliminated this provision in response 
to the library and education communities’ concerns about the impact of 
the legislation on fair use. The administration suggested that if the pro-
hibition on the circumvention of copy controls were to be eliminated, a 
library engaged in such circumvention for purposes of replacement copy-
ing (permitted under 17 U.S.C. § 108) would incur no liability. Though this 
is technically correct, the administration failed to note that so long as sec-
tion 1201(b) prohibited the manufacture of devices that could circumvent 
copy controls, the library had no way of engaging in the circumvention 
necessary to exercise its section 108 privilege.
Thus, the section 1201 proposed by the Clinton administration would 
have allowed the copyright owner to “circumvent” the panoply of excep-
tions and limitations on copyright owners’ exclusive rights established by 
Congress and the courts over the course of 200 years. A copyright owner 
24. Section 1201(b) also prohibits the manufacture of devices that circumvent tech-
nologies which protect the copyright owner’s other rights under the Copyright Act, 
including the distribution and performance rights.
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could surround his or her work with a technological protection, and could 
thereby prevent purchasers from making fair-use copies because the neces-
sary devices would not be available. Moreover, under the regime established 
by section 1201, a copyright owner could, as a practical matter, extend the 
term in the work indefinitely, because the uncircumventable technological 
protection would prevent reproduction once the term expired.
3.1.5 Introduction of Alternatives
Recognizing the basic defect just noted, Senator John Ashcroft (R-MO) and 
Representatives Rick Boucher (D-VA) and Tom Campbell (R-CA) introduced 
alternative legislation implementing the WIPO treaties.25 The Ashcroft-
Boucher-Campbell (ABC) approach read as follows:
No person, for the purpose of facilitating or engaging in an act of infringement, shall en-
gage in conduct so as knowingly to remove, deactivate or otherwise circumvent the 
application or operation of any effective technological measure used by a copyright 
owner to preclude or limit reproduction of a work or a portion thereof.26
Unlike the Clinton administration’s proposal, the ABC formulation 
focused only on the act of circumvention, not on circumvention devices. 
Moreover, the ABC formulation did not target all acts of circumvention, 
only acts of circumvention that facilitated infringement. This would have 
permitted circumvention for non-infringing purposes.
The copyright community rejected the ABC formulation as too difficult 
to enforce; it feared that if circumvention devices were available to consum-
ers, consumers would engage in circumvention that would lead to infringe-
ment. Accordingly, the copyright community urged Congress to proceed 
with the administration’s proposal to ban circumvention devices.
Notwithstanding the absence of any evidence supporting the copyright 
community’s concerns of rampant circumvention, Congress decided to fol-
low the Clinton administration’s proposal. However, it soon became aware 
that the administration’s proposal, because of its breadth, prohibited many 
legitimate activities. Thus, as the bill advanced through Congress, numer-
ous exceptions were grafted onto section 1201. These exceptions have 
different thresholds for qualification, and apply to different subsections 
of section 1201. The result is a confusing patchwork of prohibitions and 
exceptions that encourages litigation and impedes innovation. By being 
responsive to the copyright community’s concerns, Congress adopted an 
25. S. 1146, 105th Cong. (1997); H.R. 3048, 105th Cong. (1997).
26. S. 1146, § 1201 (emphasis added).
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approach that restricts access to information and threatens technological 
development.
In Congress’s defense, another dynamic was in operation with respect 
to section 1201 in addition to responsiveness to the copyright commu-
nity: the grand compromise of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act. Title 
I of the DMCA, which implemented the WIPO treaties, benefited the copy-
right community. Congress offset this benefit with a provision the copy-
right community did not want: title II of the DMCA, which limited the 
copyright-infringement liability of online service providers. In other words, 
Congress did not consider section 1201 in isolation, as we are doing here. 
Rather, it considered section 1201 in the context of a much broader piece of 
legislation, and it concluded that this broader legislation, taken as a whole, 
achieved a relatively balanced result.
3.1.6 Exceptions and Limitations to Section 1201
Only the reverse-engineering exception in section 1201(f) relates to interop-
erability. However, the other exceptions are worth considering.
3.1.6.1 Interoperability
Section 1201(f) allows software developers to circumvent technological 
protection measures in a lawfully obtained computer program in order to 
identify the elements necessary to make an independently created com-
puter program interoperable other programs. A person may engage in this 
circumvention only if the elements necessary to achieve interoperability 
are not readily available and the reverse engineering is otherwise permitted 
under the copyright law.27 A person may develop the tools necessary for 
such circumvention, whether for his own use or for use by other reverse 
engineers. Furthermore, a person may develop and employ technological 
means to circumvent, and may make such means available to others, for 
the purpose of achieving interoperability. In other words, section 1201(f) 
provides an interoperability exception to all the prohibitions of section 
1201: section 1201(a)(1)’s prohibition on the circumvention of access con-
trols, section 1201(a)(2)’s prohibition on the manufacture and distribution 
of devices that circumvent access controls, and section 1201(b)’s prohibi-
tion on the manufacture and distribution of devices that circumvent copy 
controls. This exception is notable in several respects.
First, section 1201(f), although it is titled “Reverse engineering,” goes 
far beyond circumvention for reverse engineering. It expressly permits the 
27. 17 U.S.C. § 1201(f).
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development and use of technological means of circumventing a tech-
nological measure for the purpose of enabling interoperability. In other 
words, a user may circumvent the lock on a platform every time he wishes 
to run an application on that platform. Moreover, a developer may provide 
the user with the lock-pick. Thus, section 1201(f)(2) provides an exemption 
from DMCA liability for circumvention of persistent access controls that 
prevent interoperability.28 However, the exemption evaporates if the cir-
cumvention infringes copyright or violates another provision of law, such 
as the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (18 U.S.C. § 1030).
Second, the definition of “interoperability,” and the language describing 
the acts of reverse engineering that justify circumvention, come directly 
from article 6 of the EU Software Directive. This may well be the first time 
language from an EU directive has been incorporated verbatim into the 
U.S. Code. Incorporation of article 6 language was no accident. Competing 
factions of the computer industry have long fought over the permissibil-
ity of software reverse engineering. The language of the Software Direc-
tive, adopted in 1991, resulted from a compromise between these factions. 
Accordingly, it was only logical to include this language, which both fac-
tions could accept, in the U.S. statute.29
28. Although section 1201(f) does go beyond reverse engineering, permitting cir-
cumvention for reverse engineering is obviously one of its major objectives. On the 
Senate Judiciary Committee’s endorsement of Sega v. Accolade in its report on the 
DMCA, see section 2.4 of the present volume.
29. For a more detailed discussion of the history and meaning of the European Soft-
ware Directive, see Band and Katoh, Interfaces on Trial at 227–262.
Table 3.1
Exceptions to section 1201 of the DMCA.
1201(a)—Access Controls 1201(b)—Copy Controls
Circumvention Devices Devices
Interoperability x x x
Encryption research x x
Security testing x x






Third, although Congress crafted a useful exception with respect to soft-
ware reverse engineering for purposes of interoperability, circumvention 
(and circumvention devices) enabling reverse engineering for other pur-
poses remains unlawful. Thus, it appears that a programmer is prohibited 
from circumventing when he is engaged in error correction or determining 
whether the target of the reverse engineering infringes his copyright. Rep-
resentative John Dingell, then the ranking Democrat on the House Energy 
and Commerce Committee, expressed concern that this exception was too 
narrow: “That provision is drafted narrowly to protect reverse engineering 
that is undertaken solely for the purpose of developing ‘interoperable’ prod-
ucts. While building ‘interoperable’ products may be a valuable exercise for 
software developers and producers of electronic games, many U.S. manu-
facturers use reverse-engineering techniques to build a better mousetrap.” 
But Representative Dingell did not succeed in broadening the exception.30
3.1.6.2 Encryption Research
Congress provided an exception for encryption research. The exception was 
intended to advance the state of knowledge in the field of encryption tech-
nology and to assist in the development of encryption products.31 Congress 
recognized that “[t]he development of encryption science requires ongoing 
research and testing by scientists of existing encryption methods in order 
to build on those advances, thus promoting encryption technology gener-
ally.”32 Such testing often involves “ethical hacking” in which efforts are 
made to circumvent the encryption.
Circumvention in the course of good-faith encryption research may be 
allowed if the following conditions are met: the researcher lawfully obtained 
the copyrighted work; circumvention is necessary for the encryption 
research; the researcher made a good-faith effort to obtain authorization 
from the copyright owner before the circumvention; and circumvention 
is otherwise permissible under the applicable laws.33 In addition to these 
conditions, section 1201(g) directs the court to consider three other fac-
tors: whether the information derived from the research was disseminated 
to advance the knowledge or development of encryption technology or to 
30. Statement of the Honorable John D. Dingell regarding the markup of H.R. 2281 
(June 17, 1998).
31. 17 U.S.C. § 1201(g).
32. Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong., Section-By-Section Analysis of H.R. 2281 
as Passed by the United States House of Representatives on August 4, 1998, at 16 
(1998).
33. 17 U.S.C. § 1201(g)(2).
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facilitate infringement; whether the researcher is engaged in a legitimate 
course of study, is employed, or is appropriately trained or experienced 
in the field of encryption technology; and whether the researcher timely 
notifies the copyright owner with the findings and documentation of the 
research.34
Furthermore, a person may develop and employ or provide to his collab-
orator technological means to circumvent for the sole purpose of perform-
ing acts of good-faith encryption research. Unlike the reverse-engineering 
exception, which applies to both access controls and copy controls (sec-
tions 1201(a) and (b)), the encryption-research exception applies only to 
access controls (section 1201(a)).
3.1.6.3 Security Testing
In addition to the exception for encryption research, section 1201 provides 
another exception for information-security activities. The exception for 
security testing was added during the last days of the 105th Congress to 
resolve concerns related to how the anti-circumvention provision might 
affect efforts to test “the security value and effectiveness of the technologi-
cal measures” employed to protect “the integrity and security of computers, 
computer systems, or computer networks.” Sometimes the only way for a 
company to test the security software that it has purchased to protect its 
computer network is to try to circumvent that software. The conference 
report analogizes this to a consumer’s “installing [a] lock on the front door 
and seeing if it can be picked.”35 Because the company does not own the 
copyright in the security software, this circumvention could run afoul of 
section 1201. The conference report explains that “the conferees were con-
cerned that section 1201(g)’s exclusive focus on encryption-related research 
does not encompass the entire range of legitimate information security 
activities” and that “not every technological means that is used to provide 
security relies on encryption technology, or does so to the exclusion of 
other methods.”36
The security-testing exception permits circumvention of access controls 
conducted in the course of security testing if the circumvention is otherwise 
legal under applicable law.37 Security testing is defined as obtaining access 
to a computer system, with the authorization of the owner or operator of 
34. 17 U.S.C. § 1201(g)(3).
35. H.R. Rep. No. 105-796, at 67 (1998) (Conf. Rep.).
36. Id. at 66.
37. 17 U.S.C. § 1201(j).
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the computer system, for the sole purpose of testing, investigating, or cor-
recting a potential or actual security flaw or vulnerability.38 Section 1201(j)
(3) requires a court, in determining whether this exception is applicable, 
to consider whether the information derived from the security testing was 
used solely to promote the security measures and whether it was used or 
maintained so as not to facilitate infringement.39 The conference report 
makes clear that the circumvention for purposes of security testing can be 
performed either by the operator of a computer system or by a firm retained 
to perform such testing.40 Section 1201(j)(4) also permits development, pro-
duction, or distribution of technological means for the sole purpose of per-
forming permitted acts of security testing.41 Like the encryption-research 
exception, the security-testing exception applies only to section 1201(a) 
(access controls), and not to section 1201(b) (copy controls).
3.1.6.4 Law-Enforcement and Intelligence Activities
Section 1201(e) permits circumvention and the development of circumven-
tion devices for any lawfully authorized investigative, protective, or intel-
ligence activity by a federal, state, or local government employee, or by a 
person under contract to the federal government, to a state government, or 
to a local government.42 Expanding the exception to contractors is particu-
larly important because it allows the private sector to develop circumven-
tion devices for use by government in law-enforcement activities.
3.1.6.5 Protection of Minors
As the Digital Millennium Copyright Act moved through Congress, con-
cerns were raised that section 1201 might prevent parents from effectively 
monitoring their children’s use of the Internet. Section 1201(h) was added 
to allow the development of circumvention components that would per-
mit a parent to access a restricted site visited by his or her child. Section 
1201(h) is drafted so narrowly, however, that few product developers are 
likely to take advantage of it. Rather than giving a clear exception for such 
a component, section 1201(h) merely permits a court to consider whether 
the component has this beneficial purpose. It does not tell a court what 
to do once it determines that this is the component’s purpose. Moreover, 
38. 17 U.S.C. § 1201(j)(1).
39. 17 U.S.C. § 1201(j)(3).
40. H.R. Rep. No. 105-796, at 66–67 (1998) (Conf. Rep.).
41. 17 U.S.C. § 1201(j)(4).
42. 17 U.S.C. § 1201(e).
Interoperability under the DMCA 87
it applies only if the component is included in a product that does not 
itself violate the provisions of section 1201.43 In other words, a stand-alone 
device intended to perform this function is not permitted. Finally, even if 
a company develops a component that meets section 1201(h)’s require-
ments, section 1201(h) arguably does not permit a consumer to use the 
component. This absurd result flows from the ambiguous manner in which 
the provision was drafted.
3.1.6.6 Protection of Personally Identifying Information
Section 1201(i) addresses concerns about personal privacy by permitting 
circumvention for the limited purpose of identifying and disabling tech-
nological means of collecting or disseminating personally identifying 
information reflecting users’ online activities, such as “cookies.”44 This 
exception applies only if: the user is not given adequate notice that infor-
mation is being collected; the user is not given the capability to prevent 
or restrict such collection or dissemination; and the circumvention has no 
other effect on the ability of any person to gain access to any work.
This provision has serious flaws. First, a user may not circumvent to pro-
tect his privacy if a website notifies him that it has implanted a cookie. 
Thus, once the user receives the notice, he must choose whether to sacrifice 
his privacy or to refrain from proceeding further with his online activity. 
Second, although this provision permits acts of circumvention to protect 
privacy, it does not specifically permit the development and distribution 
of the means of effectuating that circumvention; it creates an exception to 
section 1201(a)(1), but not an exception to section 1201(a)(2). It is not clear 
how users are expected to effectuate circumvention if developers are not 
permitted to manufacture and distribute circumvention devices.
3.1.6.7 Nonprofit Libraries, Archives, and Educational Institutions
Section 1201(d) provides an exemption for nonprofit libraries, archives, 
and educational institutions to gain access to a commercially exploited 
copyrighted work solely to make a good-faith determination of whether to 
acquire such work.45 A qualifying institution may gain access only when it 
cannot obtain a copy of an identical work by other means, and the access 
may not last longer than is necessary. The institution is not allowed to use 
this exemption for commercial advantage or financial gain.
43. 17 U.S.C. § 1201(h).
44. 17 U.S.C. § 1201(i).
45. 17 U.S.C. § 1201(d).
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The provision does not specifically permit the development and distri-
bution of the devices necessary to effectuate the permitted circumvention. 
Even if permission to develop the devices is implied, the exception is of 
little practical use. It is highly unlikely that a content provider will not 
make a work available to potential customers, particularly large institu-
tional customers such as libraries and schools. The library and educational 
associations did not request this exception; rather, it was “given” to them 
by the House Subcommittee on Courts and Intellectual Property so that the 
Subcommittee could claim to have responded to their concerns.
3.1.6.8 “No Mandate”
Section 1201 contains a “no mandate” provision which specifies that man-
ufacturers of consumer electronics, telecommunications, and computing 
products are not required to design their products to respond to any par-
ticular technological protection measure.46 The consumer electronics and 
computer industries had feared that section 1201 otherwise might require 
videocassette recorders and personal computers to respond to inconsistent 
types of technological protection. The “no mandate” provision also makes 
clear that manufacturers will not have to retrofit VCRs and PCs already on 
the market to accommodate new forms of protection that may be incorpo-
rated in copyrighted material in the future.
This section contains a highly technical provision that specifically 
addresses the protection of analog television programming and pre-
recorded movies in relation to recording capabilities of ordinary consumer 
analog VCRs. Section 1201 requires analog VCRs to conform to the two 
forms of copy-control technology that were in wide use in the market in 
1998: automatic gain control and colorstripe copy control.47 This provision 
prohibits rendering these analog copy-control technologies ineffective by 
redesigning VCRs or by using “black boxes” or “software hacks.”
Congress included specific encoding rules to preserve long-standing 
home taping practices. Copyright owners may use these technologies to 
prevent the making of a viewable copy of a pay-per-view program or a pre-
recorded tape, for example, but may not limit the copying of traditional 
over-the-air broadcasts or of programming provided through cable or other 
wireline or satellite systems or through future over-the-air systems. In addi-
tion, copyright owners may utilize these technologies only to prevent the 
making of a “second generation” copy of an original transmission provided 
46. 17 U.S.C. § 1201(c)(3).
47. 17 U.S.C. § 1201(k).
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through a pay-television service. Professional devices and Beta and 8-mil-
limeter VCRs are exempt from this provision’s requirements.
3.1.7 Rulemaking
Congress understood that, aside from the exceptions mentioned above, 
there may be other legitimate reasons for circumventing technological pro-
tections. Accordingly, Congress suspended application of the prohibition 
on circumvention of access controls for two years, until the Librarian of 
Congress could conduct a rulemaking proceeding to determine whether 
additional exceptions were needed. The DMCA further requires the Librar-
ian of Congress to conduct a similar rulemaking every three years there-
after.48 The Librarian’s principal question is whether the prohibition on 
circumvention will adversely affect the ability of users of copyrighted works 
to make non-infringing use of them.49
Under the rulemaking process, the Librarian of Congress is authorized 
only to create additional exceptions to section 1201(a)(1)—the prohibi-
tion on circumvention of access controls. On the face of the statute, how-
ever, the Librarian does not appear to be authorized to create additional 
exceptions to the device prohibitions of sections 1201(a)(2) and (b). Read 
literally, the statute allows the Librarian to permit acts of circumvention 
in additional situations, but not the devices necessary to perform acts of 
circumvention.
At the time of the DMCA’s adoption, questions were raised about the 
constitutionality of empowering the Librarian of Congress to issue regula-
tions. If the Library of Congress is part of the legislative branch, it may 
not have the constitutional authority to issue regulations. The constitu-
tional structure of checks and balances would be frustrated if Congress 
could delegate rulemaking authority to its own entity. The Department of 
48. Under section 1201(a)(1)(C), the Librarian of Congress grants exemptions upon 
the recommendation of the Register of Copyrights, who is required to consult with 
the Assistant Secretary for Communications and Information of the Department of 
Commerce (who heads the National Telecommunications and Information 
Administration).
49. The Librarian is directed to examine “(i) the availability for use of copyrighted 
works; (ii) the availability for use of works for nonprofit archival, preservation, and 
educational purposes; (iii) the impact that the prohibition on the circumvention of 
technological measures applied to copyrighted works has on criticism, comment, 
news reporting, teaching, scholarship, or research; (iv) the effect of circumvention of 
technological measures on the market for or value of copyrighted works; and (v) such 
other factors as the Librarian considers appropriate.” 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(C).
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Justice reportedly raised concerns about this issue, which President Clinton 
attempted to cure in his statement upon signing the DMCA. The presi-
dent asserted that the Library of Congress is, for constitutional purposes, 
an executive-branch entity. Thus, in his view, the Librarian could issue 
regulations.50
It remains to be seen whether President Clinton’s statement really fixes 
the separation-of-powers problem. If it does not, the question then becomes 
whether this constitutional flaw can be separated from the rest of section 
1201, or whether it poisons the entire provision.
This problem arose because of a jurisdictional squabble between the 
Commerce and Judiciary Committees in each chamber. Logical entities 
for a rulemaking of this sort would be the Patent and Trademark Office or 
the National Telecommunications and Information Administration. Those 
agencies, however, reside in the Department of Commerce, and the Judi-
ciary Committees in the House and the Senate feared that granting the 
rulemaking authority to the Department of Commerce would lessen the 
Judiciary Committees’ claim to primary jurisdiction over this issue. As a 
compromise to resolve this “turf battle,” the committees granted the ulti-
mate rulemaking authority to the Librarian of Congress, but required the 
librarian to consult with the NTIA.
In November of 2006, after the third rulemaking, the Librarian of Con-
gress adopted the following six exemptions, which remained in effect at the 
beginning of 2010:
• Audiovisual works included in the educational library of a college or uni-
versity’s film or media studies department, when circumvention is accom-
plished for the purpose of making compilations of portions of those works 
for educational use in the classroom by media studies or film professors.
• Computer programs and video games distributed in formats that have 
become obsolete and that require the original media or hardware as a con-
dition of access, when circumvention is accomplished for the purpose of 
preservation or archival reproduction of published digital works by a library 
or archive. A format shall be considered obsolete if the machine or sys-
tem necessary to render perceptible a work stored in that format is no lon-
ger manufactured or is no longer reasonably available in the commercial 
marketplace.
50. In Live365 v. Copyright Royalty Bd., 2010 WL 621718 (D.D.C. February 23, 2010), 
the District Court for the District of Columbia found that the Library of Congress was 
an executive department, at least for purposes of the Appointments Clause of the 
U.S. Constitution.
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• Computer programs protected by dongles that prevent access due to mal-
function or damage and which are obsolete. A dongle shall be considered 
obsolete if it is no longer manufactured or if a replacement or repair is no 
longer reasonably available in the commercial marketplace.
• Literary works distributed in ebook format when all existing ebook edi-
tions of the work (including digital text editions made available by autho-
rized entities) contain access controls that prevent the enabling either of 
the book’s read-aloud function or of screen readers that render the text into 
a specialized format.
• Computer programs in the form of firmware that enable wireless tele-
phone handsets to connect to a wireless telephone communication net-
work, when circumvention is accomplished for the sole purpose of lawfully 
connecting to a wireless telephone communication network.
• Sound recordings, and audiovisual works associated with those sound 
recordings, distributed in compact disc format and protected by techno-
logical protection measures that control access to lawfully purchased works 
and create or exploit security flaws or vulnerabilities that compromise the 
security of personal computers, when circumvention is accomplished solely 
for the purpose of good faith testing, investigating, or correcting such secu-
rity flaws or vulnerabilities.51
As was noted above, these exemptions technically apply only to the act of 
circumvention under section 1201(a)(1), and not to the trafficking in cir-
cumvention devices under section 1201(a)(2). However, no plaintiff has yet 
initiated legal action against a provider of a device manufactured and sold 
to carry out circumvention permitted by an exemption.
51. 71 Fed. Reg. 68472 (November 27, 2006). In the fourth rulemaking cycle, which 
began at the end of 2008, the Electronic Frontier Foundation sought a new exemp-
tion for the circumvention of technological protection measures that prevent unau-
thorized applications from running on cell phone handsets. The EFF specifically 
sought to permit the “jailbreaking” of the Apple iPhone so that iPhone owners can 
install applications from sources other than the iTunes Music Store. Apple filed a 
detailed opposition to the EFF’s request. Apple’s central legal argument was that “jail-
breaking” invariably involved the infringement of the iPhone operating system. In 
order to run unauthorized applications on an iPhone, a user had to install a copy of 
the operating system that did not include the module that locked out unauthenti-
cated applications. The user unlocked his handset by replacing the operating system 
with an abridged version of the operating system, i.e., a derivative work. Accordingly, 
the supplier of the replacement operating system provided not only a key but also an 
infringing copy. On this basis, Apple argued that the EFF’s request should be denied.
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3.1.8 An Assessment of Section 1201 as Enacted
Without question, the exceptions and the “no mandate” provision address 
many of the most serious deficiencies of the prohibitions proposed by the 
Clinton administration and first introduced in Congress. Nonetheless, the 
provision continues to prohibit some legitimate, socially useful activities, 
such as circumvention for error correction. And although the Librarian of 
Congress has approved some exemptions, the rulemaking process is bur-
densome and the Librarian has rejected far more exemptions than he has 
approved. Also, as will be discussed below, the DMCA has been used by 
aggressive plaintiffs to prevent competition and interoperability.
Section 1201 may have another unintended consequence. Both sec-
tion 1201(a)(2) and section 1201(b) prohibit trafficking in circumvention 
devices. Will an Internet service provider that hosts a site that makes cir-
cumvention devices available be liable for trafficking in the devices, even if 
it had no knowledge of the presence of the devices on the site? The ISP prob-
ably would not face criminal liability if it had no knowledge; but it might 
well assume civil liability, because section 1201 does not contain a scienter 
requirement. Because Title II of the DMCA provides safe harbors from copy-
right liability to ISPs, it would be ironic if Title I of the DMCA imposed addi-
tional liability on the ISPs. (The safe harbors of Title II provide shelter only 
from copyright liability, not section 1201 circumvention liability.)
Congress chose the approach of adopting an extremely broad prohibi-
tion, then granting an exception to any group powerful enough to lobby 
effectively for one. The breadth of the exception also turned on lobbying 
power; the security-testing exception is more comprehensive than the pri-
vacy exception because the banks and accounting firms that pushed for the 
security-testing exception had more political clout than the public-interest 
groups concerned about privacy.
The critical mistake Congress made that resulted in this complex, incon-
sistent provision was its acceptance of the Clinton administration’s overly 
broad prohibition. The administration’s proposal was too broad in three 
different ways:
• It regulated both devices and conduct, rather than just conduct. Because 
it regulated devices, Congress had to fashion exceptions for devices used in 
legitimate ways. Virtually any technology can be used for good or evil; the 
user determines the role the technology plays. Section 1201’s approach ran 
directly contrary to the Clinton administration’s stated philosophy with 
respect to the Internet; it relied on heavy regulation rather than on market-
driven solutions.
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• It regulated circumvention, regardless of whether the circumvention 
actually facilitated infringement. By divorcing the act of circumvention 
from the act of infringement, Congress had to create exceptions for acts of 
circumvention that did not lead to infringement.
• It addressed the circumvention of access-control technologies and copy-
control technologies, rather than just the circumvention of copy-control 
technologies. Because access control is far removed from copyright protec-
tion, the prohibition implicated many legitimate activities. Had Congress 
dealt only with copy controls, the majority of the exceptions—those for 
encryption research, security testing, protecting personal privacy, library 
purchasing, and monitoring children’s use of the Internet—would not have 
been needed.
Significantly, the WIPO treaties require none of these overly broad fea-
tures. The treaties simply require that “[c]ontracting Parties shall provide 
adequate legal protection and effective legal remedies against the circum-
vention of effective technological measures that are used by authors in 
connection with the exercise of their rights under this Treaty or the Berne 
Convention and that restrict acts, in respect of their works, which are not 
authorized by the authors concerned or permitted by law.”52
The WIPO treaties say nothing about devices; they speak only of circum-
vention. The content community argued that a ban on devices is necessary 
to afford them “adequate legal protection” and “effective legal remedies,” 
but this interpretation has no basis in the negotiating history of the treaties.
The WIPO treaties also say nothing about prohibiting circumvention in 
the absence of infringement. Indeed, the treaties could be read as prohibit-
ing only circumvention that does in fact lead to infringement.
Finally, the WIPO treaties say nothing about controlling access to a 
work. Rather, the treaties speak of the exercise of their rights under the 
treaties or the Berne Convention, which do not include an exclusive right 
over access to the work.
Thus, section 1201’s problematic nature flows directly from the Clin-
ton administration and Congress going far beyond the requirements of the 
WIPO treaties. Conversely, the approach sponsored by Ashcroft, Boucher, 
and Campbell went only as far as was required by the treaties, and thereby 
avoided the DMCA’s inadvertent restriction on legitimate activities.
52. World Intellectual Property Organization Copyright Treaty (1996), Art. 11; 
World Intellectual Property Organization Performances and Phonograms Treaty 
(1996), Art. 18.
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3.2 Efforts to Amend the DMCA
3.2.1 The Boucher-Doolittle Bill
On October 3, 2002, Representatives Boucher and Doolittle (R-CA) intro-
duced the Digital Media Consumers’ Rights Act of 2002 (H.R. 5544).53 One 
of the bill’s provisions would have amended section 1201.54 As was dis-
cussed above, section 1201(a)(1) prohibits the circumvention of access con-
trols, even if done for a non-infringing purpose, unless the circumvention 
is specifically permitted by one of the exceptions specified in section 1201. 
Likewise, sections 1201(a)(2) and 1201(b) prohibit the manufacture and 
distribution of circumvention devices, even if they are intended to be used 
for non-infringing purposes, unless the devices fall within section 1201’s 
specific exceptions. In other words, section 1201 prohibits circumvention 
activity and devices regardless of whether the circumvention results in 
infringement.
In introducing their bill, Representatives Boucher and Doolittle recog-
nized that section 1201, by divorcing circumvention from infringement, 
had the effect of prohibiting lawful uses of copyrighted works. Thus, 
although section 1201(c)(1) provided that section 1201 did not affect 
defenses to copyright infringement, including fair use, fair use was not a 
defense to a circumvention offense.55 Accordingly, Representatives Boucher 
and Doolittle proposed amendments that would have made non-infringe-
ment a defense to circumvention liability. Specifically, their bill would have 
amended section 1201(c)(1) to provide that “it is not a violation of this sec-
tion to circumvent a technological measure in connection with access to, or 
the use of, a work if such circumvention does not result in an infringement 
of the copyright in the work.”
53. H.R. 5544, 107th Cong. (2002). This subsection is based on Masanobu Katoh and 
Jonathan Band, “Backlash: Legislative Responses to Entertainment Industry Initia-
tives in the 107th Congress,” Journal of Internet Law, March 2003, at 8.
54. The bill also would have required record companies to label CDs that were copy 
protected or that would not play on certain devices, such as the CD drives of personal 
computers. In 2002, record companies began to use various forms of copy protection 
on their CDs without notifying consumers. When the consumers found that they 
couldn’t play the CDs on their computers or burn copies of them, they assumed that 
either the CDs or the computers were malfunctioning. The labeling requirement in 
the Boucher-Doolittle bill was intended to prevent this form of customer confusion.
55. See Universal City Studios, Inc., v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429 (2d Cir. 2001). For a critical 
discussion of the application of section 1201 since enactment, see “Unintended Con-
sequences: Ten Years under the DMCA” at www.eff.org.
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Further, the Boucher-Doolittle bill would have created an exception 
to the prohibition on the manufacture and distribution of circumven-
tion devices when “the person is acting solely in furtherance of scientific 
research into technological protection measures.” This provision would 
have codified an argument made by the U.S. Department of Justice during 
the declaratory judgment action brought by Edward Felten (a professor at 
Princeton University) against the Recording Industry Association of Amer-
ica.56 Felten sought a judicial declaration that his research on encryption 
was lawful. The RIAA responded that the case was moot because the RIAA 
had withdrawn its objections to his research. The Department of Justice filed 
a brief in support of the RIAA that argued, among other things, that Felten’s 
research was plainly permitted by the DMCA. In particular, the Department 
of Justice argued that, insofar as Felten had developed his software tools for 
research purposes, he obviously had not developed them “for the purpose 
of circumventing a technological measure that effectively controls access 
to a work”—a purpose that triggers liability under section 1201(a)(2)(A). In 
other words, even though Felten’s tool circumvented a technological mea-
sure, the tool’s real purpose was research, not circumvention.
Shortly after the introduction of the Boucher-Doolittle bill, Intel, Philips, 
Sun Microsystems, Verizon, and Gateway announced their support, as did 
the American Library Association, Consumers Union, and the Electronic 
Frontier Foundation. The content providers condemned the bill, asserting 
that the new exceptions would swallow the circumvention prohibition.57
Soon after the introduction of the Boucher-Doolittle bill, Richard Clarke, 
then the head of the White House Office of Cyber Security, asserted that 
the DMCA should be amended to permit the research of security flaws in 
software. Characterizing threats against academic researchers as a misuse of 
the law, Clarke said “I think a lot of people didn’t realize that it would have 
this potential chilling effect on vulnerability research.”58
No action was taken on the Boucher-Doolittle bill before Congress 
adjourned for the 2002 elections. However, at the beginning of the 108th 
Congress, in early January of 2003, Representatives Boucher and Doolittle 
reintroduced their bill.59 The bill (now designated H.R. 107—an intentional 
56. Felten v. Recording Industry Ass’n of America, Inc., Case No. 01-CV-2669, Defendant 
John Ashcroft’s Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss at 15–18, filed Sep-
tember 25, 2001 (D.N.J.), available at www.eff.org.
57. “Capitol Hill,” Washington Internet Daily, November 19, 2002.
58. Hiawatha Bray, “Cyber Chief Speaks on Data Network Security,” Boston Globe, 
October 17, 2002.
59. H.R. 107, 108th Cong. (2003). They were joined as co-sponsors by Representa-
tives Patrick Kennedy (D-RI) and Spencer Bachus (R-AL).
96 Chapter 3
allusion to section 107 of the Copyright Act, which codifies the fair-use 
doctrine) was referred to the House Energy and Commerce Committee. 
While Representative Billy Tauzin (R-LA) remained chairman, the com-
mittee took no action on the bill. But H.R. 107’s prospects improved after 
Tauzin resigned in February of 2004, and Representative Joe Barton (R-TX) 
assumed the chairmanship. Barton, who had signed on as a co-sponsor of 
H.R. 107 shortly after its introduction, reiterated his strong support after 
becoming chairman.
On May 12, 2004, the House Energy and Commerce Subcommittee on 
Commerce, Trade, and Consumer Protection held a hearing on H.R. 107. 
The subcommittee heard from fourteen witnesses, including Jack Valenti 
of the Motion Picture Association of America, Cary Sherman of the RIAA, 
Robert Holleyman of the Business Software Alliance, Gary Shapiro of the 
Consumer Electronics Association, Miriam Nisbet of the American Library 
Association, and two law professors: Peter Jaszi (for the Digital Future Coali-
tion) and Lawrence Lessig.
Valenti, Sherman, and Holleyman all testified that the legislation would 
facilitate piracy of content. But many of the other witnesses spoke strongly 
in favor of the bill, and Chairman Barton indicated his intention to report 
it out of the committee in the 108th Congress. However, strong lobbying 
by the copyright industries prevented progress of H.R. 107 in the 108th 
Congress and of H.R. 1201 (a similar bill introduced by Representative 
Boucher in the 109th Congress).60
3.2.2 The Lofgren Bill
On October 2, 2002, Representative Zoe Lofgren (D-CA) also introduced 
a bill directed at section 1201 of the DMCA: the Digital Choice and Free-
dom Act of 2002, H.R. 5522.61 The Lofgren bill, however, took a somewhat 
narrower approach than the Boucher-Doolittle bill. Under the Lofgren 
approach, a person could circumvent an access control if the circumven-
tion was “necessary to make a non-infringing use of the work” and “the 
copyright owner fails to make publicly available the necessary means to 
make such noninfringing use without additional cost or burden to such 
person.” Similarly, a person could manufacture and distribute the means to 
circumvent an access control if the “means are necessary to make a nonin-
fringing use,” the means are “designed, produced, and marketed to make 
a noninfringing use,” and “the copyright owner fails to make available the 
60. H.R.1201, 109th Cong. (2005).
61. H.R. 5522, 107th Cong. (2002).
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necessary means.” The Lofgren bill did not detail how the extra step of the 
copyright owner’s failing to make available the means of circumventing 
would operate.
The Lofgren bill contained several other provisions not related to cir-
cumvention. The general purpose of these provisions was to preserve in the 
digital environment exceptions that existed in the analog environment. 
Thus, the bill would have created a new section 123 to the Copyright Act 
that would have permitted a person who lawfully obtained a copy of a 
digital work to “reproduce, store, adapt, or access the digital work . . . for 
archival purposes . . . and . . . in order to perform or display the work, or an 
adaptation of the work, on a digital media device, if such performance or 
display is not public.” This provision would have codified the practice of 
“time-shifting” and “space-shifting” practiced by many consumers.
Additionally, the new section 123 would have provided that “[w]hen 
a digital work is distributed to the public subject to nonnegotiable license 
terms, such terms shall not be enforceable . . . to the extent that they 
restrict or limit any of the limitations on exclusive rights.” This provision 
was intended to invalidate “shrinkwrap” or “click-on” license terms that 
restrict fair use and other privileges Congress has granted to consumers. 
Significantly, section 123 would not apply to software, which was excluded 
from the definition of “digital works.”
The provision mentioned in the preceding paragraph was Representa-
tive Lofgren’s response to the Uniform Computer Information Transac-
tions Act (UCITA), which would have rendered shrinkwrap and click-on 
licenses enforceable under state contract law. Opponents of UCITA argued 
that under it the private law of contract would supersede the public law of 
copyright. Accordingly, UCITA’s opponents sought, with limited success, 
provisions within UCITA that would preclude the enforceability of contract 
terms inconsistent with fair use and other copyright exceptions and limita-
tions.62 This provision of the Lofgren bill addressed this issue at the federal 
level.
Finally, the Lofgren bill would have updated the first-sale doctrine for 
the digital age, allowing a person to transmit a work to another person pro-
vided that he deleted his copy of the work.
3.2.3 H.R. 1201 in the 110th Congress
On February 27, 2007, Representative Boucher introduced another bill to 
reform the DMCA. Although once again designated H.R. 1201, this bill was 
62. We discuss this issue in great detail in subsection 4.2.2.
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narrower than H.R. 1201 in the 109th Congress or H.R. 107 in the 108th 
Congress.63 Instead of amending section 1201 to require a nexus between 
circumvention and infringement, the new H.R. 1201 codified the exemp-
tions approved by the Librarian of Congress in the 2006 rulemaking.64 
Additionally, H.R. 1201 established other exceptions critical to preserving 
fair use in the digital age.65
3.3 DMCA Cases Relating to Interoperability
Since their enactment in 1998, the DMCA’s anti-circumvention provisions 
have generated strong reactions from various stakeholders.66 The motion 
picture industry credits the DMCA with the enormous success of the DVD.67 
The DMCA has permitted the studios and their business partners in the 
consumer electronics industry to prevent the distribution of DeCSS soft-
ware, which enables circumvention of the encryption system that protects 
movies distributed on DVDs.
Technologists, however, argued that the DMCA could chill legitimate 
research into computer security and the development of innovative 
63. H.R. 1201, 110th Cong. (2007).
64. See section 3.1.7 above.
65. H.R. 1201 would exempt the following from liability under section 1201(a)(1)
(A):
(i) an act of circumvention that is carried out solely for the purpose of making a compilation of 
portions of audiovisual works in the collection of a library or archives for educational use in a 
classroom by an instructor;
(ii) an act of circumvention that is carried out solely for the purpose of enabling a person to skip 
past or to avoid commercial or personally objectionable content in an audiovisual work;
(iii) an act of circumvention that is carried out solely for the purpose of enabling a person to 
transmit a work over a home or personal network, except that this exemption does not apply 
to the circumvention of a technological measure to the extent that it prevents uploading of the 
work to the Internet for mass, indiscriminate redistribution;
(iv) an act of circumvention that is carried out solely for the purpose of gaining access to one 
or more works in the public domain that are included in a compilation consisting primarily of 
works in the public domain;
(v) an act of circumvention that is carried out to gain access to a work of substantial public inter-
est solely for purposes of criticism, comment, news reporting, scholarship, or research; or
(vi) an act of circumvention that is carried out solely for the purpose of enabling a library or 
archives meeting the requirements of section 108(a)(2), with respect to works included in its 
collection, to preserve or secure a copy or to replace a copy that is damaged, deteriorating, lost, 
or stolen.
66. This section is based on Jonathan Band, “A New Day for the DMCA: The Cham-
berlain and Lexmark Decisions,” 9 Electronic Commerce & Law Report 987 (November 
2004).
67. DVD sales in the U.S. exceeded $12 billion in 2003. Source: Chris Jones, “Power 
to the People,” Chicago Tribune, February 1, 2004.
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products. Libraries and universities contended that the DMCA could pre-
vent copying that was lawful under copyright’s fair-use doctrine or under 
its library exceptions.
DMCA critics’ worst fears about the anti-competitive effect of the statute 
seemed to be validated when two dominant companies attempted to use 
the DMCA to threaten competitors in aftermarkets. The Chamberlain case 
involved universal transmitters for garage door openers; the Lexmark case 
involved toner cartridges for printers. Fortunately, the judges in these cases 
interpreted the DMCA in a manner that prevented its use to restrict legiti-
mate competition in interoperable components.
Section 1201(a)(1) of 17 U.S.C. prohibits the circumvention of access 
controls, regardless of the purpose of the circumvention, unless the cir-
cumvention is specifically permitted by one of the exceptions contained in 
section 1201. Likewise, sections 1201(a)(2) and 1201(b) prohibit the manu-
facture and distribution of circumvention devices, even if they are intended 
to be used for non-infringing purposes, unless the devices fall within sec-
tion 1201’s specific exceptions. Although section 1201(c)(1) provides that 
section 1201 does not affect defenses to copyright infringement, including 
fair use, courts had ruled that fair use was not a defense to a circumven-
tion offense.68 In sum, before the Chamberlain and Lexmark decisions sec-
tion 1201 was understood to prohibit circumvention activity and devices, 
regardless of whether the circumvention results in infringement.
3.3.1 Universal v. Reimerdes (2000)
The first circuit court interpretation of section 1201 of the DMCA, Univer-
sal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley,69 involved the distribution of DeCSS, a small 
computer program capable of decrypting the Content Scrambling System 
(CSS) used to protect digital versatile discs (DVDs). The defendants’ pri-
mary statutory defense before the district court and the Second Circuit was 
that the savings clause in section 1201(c)(1) permitted circumventions that 
enabled fair uses.70
The defendants also raised an interoperability defense before the district 
court. They claimed that DeCSS was necessary to achieve interoperability 
between computers running the Linux operating system and DVDs, and 
68. See Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429 (2d Cir. 2001).
69. Id.
70. As will be discussed later in this chapter, the Second Circuit rejected this defense. 
The Federal Circuit in Chamberlain attempted to minimize any apparent inconsis-
tency between its holding that section 1201 liability required a nexus between cir-
cumvention and language in the Corley decision suggesting that section 1201(a) 
imposes liability even if the access cannot facilitate infringement.
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thus section 1201(f) permitted their circumvention activities. In grant-
ing the plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction, the district court 
rejected this contention:
[T]he legislative history makes it abundantly clear that Section 1201(f) permits re-
verse engineering of copyrighted computer programs only and does not authorize 
circumvention of technological systems that control access to other copyrighted 
works, such as movies. In consequence, the reverse engineering exception does not 
apply.71
In other words, section 1201(f) applies to achieving interoperability between 
two computer programs, but not to achieving interoperability between 
a computer program and other entertainment products. But what if the 
entertainment product is a computer program, such as a computer game? 
As will be discussed below with respect to Davidson v. Jung, the interoper-
ability exception should apply in such a situation.72
Interestingly, when the district court issued its decision on the merits 
after trial, it omitted the aforementioned basis for rejecting the defendants’ 
section 1201(f) defense. Instead, the district court found as a factual mat-
ter that DeCSS was developed and run on Windows. Thus, the develop-
ers “knew that DeCSS could be used to decrypt and play DVD movies on 
Windows as well as Linux machines. They knew also that the decrypted 
files could be copied like any other unprotected computer file. . . . Hence, 
the Court finds that Mr. Johansen and the others who actually did develop 
DeCSS did not do so solely for the purpose of making a Linux DVD player if, 
indeed, developing a Linux-based DVD player was among their purposes.”73 
The district court did not explain this change in rationale, and the defen-
dants did not appeal the issue to the Second Circuit.
3.3.2 Chamberlain v. Skylink (2004)
As was noted above, after the Second Circuit’s Corley decision, section 1201 
was understood to prohibit circumvention activity and circumvention 
devices regardless of whether the circumvention in question resulted in 
71. Universal City Studios v. Reimerdes, 82 F. Supp. 2d 211, 218 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
72. See subsection 3.3.6. The district court considered the section 1201(f) interoper-
ability defense in granting a motion for temporary injunction in Sony Computer Enter-
tainment America Inc., v. Gamemasters, 87 F. Supp. 2d 976 (N.D. Cal. 1999). In that 
case the court enjoined the distribution of the Game Enhancer, a device that allowed 
U.S. users to play Sony video games purchased outside the U.S. on Sony PlayStations 
by circumventing the territorial codes on the foreign versions of Sony video games.
73. Universal City Studios v. Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d 294, 320 (S.D.N.Y. 2000), aff’d, 
273 F.3d 429 (2d Cir. 2001).
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infringement. The decision of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Cir-
cuit in Chamberlain Group, Inc. v. Skylink Techs., Inc.74 changed this under-
standing. Skylink had developed a universal transmitter that could activate 
Chamberlain garage door openers (GDOs). To do so, software in the Skylink 
transmitter circumvented a lockout code in a computer program embed-
ded in the Chamberlain GDO that controlled the operation of the GDO’s 
motor. Chamberlain sued Skylink, alleging that the Skylink transmitters 
violated the DMCA because they circumvented a technological protection 
measure to obtain unauthorized access to the software embedded in the 
GDO.
The district court granted summary judgment to Skylink on the ground 
that Chamberlain had given implicit authorization to its customers to cir-
cumvent the access controls in the GDOs they had purchased. On appeal, 
Chamberlain argued that it had not given such authorization. Skylink 
defended the district court’s holding. The Computer & Communications 
Industry Association filed an amicus brief advancing the alternative argu-
ment that the circumvention was permitted under the interoperability 
exception, 17 U.S.C. § 1201(f).
The Federal Circuit agreed with the district court that the customers’ cir-
cumvention was authorized, but devoted most of its opinion to a rationale 
completely different from that advanced by Skylink or its amici. It inter-
preted section 1201(a) to prohibit circumvention only if it enables access 
that infringes or facilitates infringement.
The starting point of the Federal Circuit’s analysis was its perception 
that the DMCA did not create a new property right but, rather, provided 
property owners with new ways to secure their property. After reviewing 
the legislative history of the DMCA, the court concluded that Congress’s 
objective had not been to change the balance of interests in the copyright 
law but instead to preserve them in the new digital environment.
Specifically, the Federal Circuit noted that in the DMCA “Congress 
attempted to balance the legitimate interests of copyright owners with 
those of consumers of copyrighted products. . . .Were we to interpret 
Congress’ words in a way that eliminated all balance and granted copy-
right owners carte blanche authority to preclude all use, Congressional 
intent would remain unrealized.”75 The court interpreted section 1201(a) 
as “prohibit[ing] only forms of access that bear a reasonable relationship 
to the protections that the Copyright Act otherwise affords copyright 
74. Chamberlain Group, Inc. v. Skylink Techs., Inc., 381 F.3d 1178 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
75. Id. at 1203.
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owners”76 and ruled that this was the “only meaningful reading of the stat-
ute.”77 Thus, the Federal Circuit held that trafficking in a circumvention 
device violates section 1201(a)(2) only if the circumvention enables access 
that “infringes or facilitates infringing a right protected by the Copyright 
Act.”78 Here, Chamberlain failed to show “the critical nexus between access 
and protection.”79 It “neither alleged copyright infringement nor explained 
how the access provided by the [Skylink] transmitter facilitates the infringe-
ment of any right the Copyright Act protects.”80
The Federal Circuit took great pains to minimize any apparent inconsis-
tency between its holding and that of Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley,81 
in which the Second Circuit held that section 1201(c)(1) did not provide a 
fair-use defense to a circumvention violation. In Corley, the plaintiffs pro-
vided evidence that the circumvention program at issue, DeCSS, allowed a 
user to circumvent the CSS protection system and to view or copy a motion 
picture without authorization. In contrast, Skylink’s product permitted 
only lawful uses of the software embedded in the Chamberlain garage door 
opener. The Federal Circuit acknowledged that some of the language in 
the Corley decision could be understood as suggesting that section 1201(a) 
imposes liability even if the access cannot facilitate infringement. The Fed-
eral Circuit argued, however, that “[i]t is unlikely . . . that the Second Cir-
cuit meant to imply anything as drastic as wresting the concept of ‘access’ 
from its context within the meaning of the Copyright Act.”82
3.3.3 Lexmark v. Static Control Components (2004)
Less than two months after the Federal Circuit issued its decision in Cham-
berlain, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit issued its decision in 
Lexmark v. Static Control Components.83 The Sixth Circuit’s decision is far more 
complex than that of the Federal Circuit because it contains three opinions 
and addresses more issues. Although the panel opinion does not go as far 
as Chamberlain, the concurring opinion by Judge Merritt goes even farther.
Lexmark had designed the software embedded in its printer—the printer 
engine program (PEP)—to permit the printer to operate only if it recognized 
76. Id. at 1202.
77. Id. at 1203.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 1204.
80. Id.
81. 273 F.3d 429 (2d Cir. 2001).
82. Chamberlain, 381 F.3d at 1199.
83. Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 387 F.3d 522 (6th Cir. 2004).
Interoperability under the DMCA 103
an authentication sequence from the toner loading program (TLP) embed-
ded in the toner cartridge. Lexmark had done this to prevent the use of 
other manufacturers’ less expensive toner cartridges in its printers. Static 
Control Components (SCC) manufactured the Smartek chip, which it sold 
to manufacturers of replacement toner cartridges. The Smartek chip con-
tained a copy of the Lexmark TLP that enabled the replacement toner car-
tridges to operate in Lexmark printers. Lexmark sued SCC for infringing 
the copyright in the TLP and for violating the DMCA by circumventing the 
technological measures that protected access to the TLP and the PEP. The 
district court found that Lexmark was likely to prevail on the merits of both 
claims and entered a preliminary injunction in its favor.
The Sixth Circuit reversed with respect to both the copyright claim and 
the DMCA claim. The majority and dissenting opinions focus largely on 
the copyrightability of the TLP. The details of this discussion are signifi-
cant with respect to the scope of copyright protection for program elements 
necessary for interoperability, but do not affect the core DMCA analysis 
relating to the PEP.84
3.3.3.1 Access to the PEP
Lexmark argued that the SCC Smartek chip was a device marketed to cir-
cumvent the technological measure that controlled access to the PEP. The 
district court agreed, finding that Lexmark’s authentication sequence effec-
tively controlled access to the Printer Engine Program because it controlled 
the consumer’s ability to make use of the program. The Sixth Circuit, how-
ever, found that there were other ways for the user to gain access to the 
PEP:
Anyone who buys a Lexmark printer may read the literal code of the [PEP] directly 
from the printer memory, with or without the benefit of the authentication se-
quence, and data from the program may be translated into readable source code 
after which copies may be freely distributed. No security device, in other words, 
protects access to the [PEP] and no security device accordingly must be circumvented 
to obtain access to that program code.85
Therefore,
Lexmark did not block another relevant form of “access”—the “ability to obtain” a 
copy of the work or to “make use of” the literal elements of the program (its code). 
Because the statute refers to “control[ling] access to a work protected under this 
title,” it does not naturally apply when the “work protected under this title” is oth-
84. We discuss the scope of protection issues in subsection 2.1.2.6.
85. 387 F.3d at 546–547.
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erwise accessible. Just as one would not say that a lock on the back door of a house 
“controls access” to a house whose front door does not contain a lock and just as 
one would not say that a lock on any door of a house “controls access” to the house 
after its purchaser receives the key to the lock, it does not make sense to say that this 
provision of the DMCA applies to otherwise-readily-accessible copyrighted works.86
Lexmark argued that in other DMCA cases courts had interpreted 
“access” as meaning “make use of.” The Sixth Circuit distinguished those 
cases. The Sixth Circuit explained that in cases such as 321 Studios v. MGM 
Studios87 or Corley copyright protection exists on two planes: in the literal 
code of the work and the audio or visual manifestation generated by the 
code’s execution. In these cases, restricting the use of the code had the 
effect of preventing consumers from gaining access to the audio or visual 
manifestation of the work. In this case, by contrast, the PEP operated only 
on one plane: the literal elements of the program. Unlike the code underly-
ing a video game or a DVD, the execution of the PEP did not create protect-
able expression—just functional output. Hence, restricting use of the PEP 
code did not prevent access to any protectable expression.
3.3.3.2 The Interoperability Exception
The Sixth Circuit then addressed the DMCA’s interoperability exception, 
section 1201(f). The district court had found that the exception was avail-
able for achieving interoperability between an independently created pro-
gram and other programs. Because SCC had copied the TLP, it had not been 
created independently, and thus SCC could not avail itself of the section 
1201(f) defense. However, the Sixth Circuit found that there was evidence 
that the Smartek chip contained programs “independently created” by SCC 
in addition to a copy of the TLP. Circumvention of the technological pro-
tection was necessary to allow these other programs to interoperate with 
the PEP.
Lexmark argued that these independently created programs had to exist 
before the reverse engineering of the TLP. The Sixth Circuit rejected this 
contention, holding that “nothing in the statute precludes simultaneous 
creation of an interoperability device and another program; it just must 
be ‘independently’ created.”88 Lexmark also argued that “the technologi-
cal means must be necessary or absolutely needed” to enable interoper-
ability. The court responded that “the statute is silent about the degree to 
which the ‘technological means’ means must be necessary, if indeed they 
86. Id. at 547 (citations omitted).
87. 307 F. Supp. 2d 1085 (N.D. Cal. 2004).
88. 387 F.3d at 551.
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are necessary at all, for interoperability.”89 In any event, the court found 
that SCC did in fact need to copy the TLP to achieve interoperability with 
the PEP.
The Sixth Circuit’s suggestion that the statute is silent about whether 
the technological means must be “necessary at all” to achieve interoper-
ability is curious in view of the plain language of section 1201(f). Section 
1201(f)(1) authorizes circumvention “for the sole purpose of identifying 
and analyzing those elements of the program that are necessary to achieve 
interoperability.” Similarly, section 1201(f)(2) permits the development of 
technological means to circumvent, “if such means are necessary to achieve 
. . . interoperability.”
Interestingly, the Sixth Circuit didn’t mention the Copyright Office’s 
opinion concerning the section 1201(f) defense. After the district court 
ruled in this case, SCC asked the Copyright Office for an exemption from 
section 1201(a) pursuant to the DMCA rulemaking procedure. The Copy-
right Office concluded that an exemption was unnecessary because of sec-
tion 1201(f). Since the Sixth Circuit’s view of section 1201(f) coincides with 
that of the Copyright Office, it is surprising that the Sixth Circuit didn’t cite 
the Copyright Office opinion.
Judge Feikens, in an opinion that dissented in part and concurred in 
part, developed a different rationale concerning the PEP DMCA claim. “By 
buying a Lexmark printer,” he said, “the consumer acquires an implied 
license to use the [PEP] for the life of that printer.”90 Because of this implied 
license, the consumer was authorized to circumvent the technological pro-
tection measures to gain access to the PEP. This argument is similar to the 
district court’s rationale in Chamberlain.91
3.3.3.3 Judge Merritt’s Concurrence
Judge Merritt wrote a concurring opinion that attempted to broaden the 
majority’s DMCA holding. “We should make clear,” he wrote, “that in the 
89. Id.
90. Id. at 564.
91. Lexmark also asserted that SCC violated the DMCA by accessing the TLP. How-
ever, the Sixth Circuit found that the Smartek chip doesn’t provide access to the TLP; 
it replaces the TLP. Moreover, as was noted above, the court found that the TLP was 
not copyrightable in the first place. Thus, the court held that it was not protected by 
the DMCA at all. Judge Feikens had dissented from the finding that the TLP was not 
copyrightable; accordingly, he could not agree with the majority that the DMCA did 
not apply to the TLP. Instead, Judge Feikens stated that the Smartek chip was not 
primarily designed or produced for the purpose of circumventing the protection of 
the TLP; its primary purpose was to access the PEP.
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future companies like Lexmark cannot use the DMCA in conjunction with 
copyright law to create monopolies of manufactured goods for themselves 
just by tweaking the facts of this case: by, for example, creating a [TLP] that 
is more complex and ‘creative’ than the one here, or by cutting off other 
access to the [PEP]. . . .The key question is the ‘purpose’ of the circumven-
tion technology.”92
Judge Merritt rejected Lexmark’s interpretation of the DMCA, which 
would have imposed liability for any circumvention of a technologi-
cal measure regardless of the purpose of the circumvention. If the court 
were to adopt Lexmark’s reading of the statute, he noted, “manufactur-
ers could potentially create monopolies for replacement parts simply by 
using similar, more creative, lock-out codes. Automobile manufacturers, for 
example, could control the entire market for replacement parts for their 
vehicles by including lock-out chips.”93 According to Judge Merritt, this 
reading “ignores . . . the main point of the DMCA—to prohibit the pirating 
of copyright protected works such as movies, music, and computer pro-
grams.”94 Judge Merritt concluded that unless a plaintiff can show that a 
defendant “circumvented protective measures ‘for the purpose’ of pirating 
works protected by the copyright statute,”95 its claim should not be allowed 
to go forward. This interpretation of the DMCA is similar to the Federal 
Circuit’s in Chamberlain. Judge Merritt, however, did not cite Chamberlain, 
even though the Federal Circuit decided it two months before he wrote his 
opinion.
Judge Merritt also opined that Lexmark’s interpretation ran contrary to 
the objective of the intellectual-property clause of the Constitution—pro-
moting the progress of science and useful arts:
[Lexmark’s reading] would allow authors exclusive rights not only over their own ex-
pression, but also over whatever functional use they can make of that expression in 
manufactured goods. Giving authors monopolies over manufactured goods as well 
as their own creative expression will clearly not “promote the Progress of Science 
and the useful Arts,” but rather would stifle progress by stamping out competition 
from manufacturers who may be able to design better or less expensive replacement 
parts like toner cartridges.96
92. 387 F.3d at 551–552 (Merritt, J., concurring).
93. Id. at 552.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 553.
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3.3.4 The Significance of the Chamberlain and Lexmark Decisions
The Chamberlain decision was a major development in DMCA jurispru-
dence. By requiring a nexus between the circumvention of access controls 
and infringement, the Federal Circuit prevented the DMCA from being 
employed to prevent legitimate competition in aftermarkets. The circuit 
court’s reasoning should also apply in other circumstances far removed 
from the facilitation of infringement.97
The panel decision in Lexmark is far narrower. To be sure, its holding that 
circumvention of one form of access control does not violate the DMCA so 
long as other unprotected means of access exist is significant. But in the 
future, product developers will be able to avoid this problem simply by 
eliminating other means of access. For example, Lexmark could encrypt the 
PEP in its next generation of printers.
However, both concurring opinions in Lexmark support a more far-reach-
ing interpretation of the DMCA—an interpretation similar to Chamber-
lain’s. As was noted above, Judge Merritt expressed concern that the panel’s 
decision was too narrow and could be avoided “just by tweaking the facts of 
this case.”98 Thus, Judge Merritt stated that “a better reading of the statute 
is that it requires plaintiffs as part of their burden of pleading and persua-
sion to show a purpose to pirate on the part of defendants.”99 Judge Feikens 
appeared to reach a similar conclusion. He described the DMCA’s legislative 
history as demonstrating that “Congress did not intend this provision to 
apply to devices that merely facilitated legitimate access.”100 Judge Feikens 
reasoned that “[b]ecause Defendant’s chip can only make non-infringing 
uses of the Lexmark [PEP], it is clear that Congress did not intend to apply 
the DMCA to this situation.”101
These two concurring opinions may not be binding precedent in the 
Sixth Circuit, but other courts certainly should find it persuasive that two 
of the three judges on the Lexmark panel agreed with the Chamberlain panel 
that DMCA liability should attach only to circumvention that facilitates 
infringement. In sum, these decisions accomplish precisely what Ashcroft, 
Boucher, and Campbell sought in their alternative to the Clinton admin-
istration’s WIPO-implementation bill and what Representative Boucher 
attempted to achieve in his amendments to section 1201.
97. See discussion of Storage Technology v. Custom Hardware in subsection 3.3.5.
98. 387 F.3d at 551 (Merritt, J., concurring).
99. Id. at 552.
100. Id. at 564 (Feikens, J., concurring in part).
101. Id.
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Although the Chamberlain panel and the Lexmark “majority” agreed that 
there must be a nexus between circumvention and infringement, they seem 
to have disagreed on the extent of the nexus. Chamberlain dealt only with 
a situation in which circumvention was incapable of facilitating infringe-
ment; it did not consider a situation in which circumvention facilitated 
both infringing and non-infringing uses. In a footnote, the Federal Circuit 
“[left] open the question as to when § 107 [the fair-use doctrine] might 
serve as an affirmative defense to a prima facie violation of § 1201.”102
In contrast, Judge Merritt seemed willing to permit circumvention so 
long as infringement was not intended, even if it was possible. Congress, he 
averred, “only sought to reach those who circumvented protective measures 
‘for the purpose’ of pirating works protected by the copyright statute.”103 
Later he stated that the DMCA, properly read, imposed on the plaintiff the 
burden of proving “a purpose to pirate on the part of the defendant.”104 
Judge Merritt’s interpretation of the DMCA would appear to allow circum-
vention for the purpose of making a fair use.105
The Chamberlain court’s caution seems to suggest a desire to avoid a con-
flict with earlier DMCA decisions—particularly Corley, in which the Second 
Circuit explicitly held that fair use was not a defense to circumvention. The 
Chamberlain court explained that in earlier DMCA decisions “the access 
alleged . . . was intertwined with a protected right.”106 By restricting its 
holding to situations where the circumvention could not enable infringe-
ment, the Chamberlain court steered clear of those other cases. Perhaps 
because he was merely writing a policy-oriented concurring opinion, Judge 
Merritt did not appear to be constrained by these earlier decisions. He did 
not address the apparent inconsistency between his view and other DMCA 
decisions. Indeed, Judge Merritt did not cite any decisions whatsoever. He 
referenced only the Constitution’s intellectual-property clause, the DMCA, 
and Lawrence Lessig’s book Free Culture.
The Chamberlain court also left open the question of the effect of a con-
tractual restriction on circumvention on DMCA liability: “It is not clear 
whether a consumer who circumvents a technological measure controlling 
access to a copyrighted work in a manner that enables uses permitted under 
the Copyright Act but prohibited by contract can be subject to liability 
102. Chamberlain, 381 F.3d at 1200 n.14.
103. Lexmark, 387 F.3d at 552.
104. Id.
105. Judge Feikens did not address this issue in his opinion.
106. Chamberlain, 381 F.3d at 1199.
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under the DMCA.”107 The Federal Circuit declined to address this ques-
tion because Chamberlain had not attempted to limit its customers’ use 
by contract before it had sued Skylink. However, the question is far from 
academic; after the district court handed down its opinion that Chamber-
lain had implicitly authorized its users to employ universal transmitters, 
Chamberlain began to sell its garage door openers subject to a license that 
prohibited use of competitors’ transmitters.
The Federal Circuit’s dicta certainly suggest that it would have preferred 
not to impose DMCA liability under such circumstances. In rejecting Cham-
berlain’s argument that it was entitled to prohibit legitimate purchasers of 
embedded software from using it in a certain manner, the Federal Circuit 
stated that this entitlement would “allow any copyright owner, through a 
combination of contractual terms and technological measures, to repeal 
the fair use doctrine with respect to an individual copyrighted work.”108 
The Federal Circuit stated that this implication contradicted the section 
1201(c)(1) savings clause directly. But even if circumvention in defiance of 
a contractual term was not a DMCA violation, the Federal Circuit’s decision 
in Bowers v. Baystate109 suggested that such circumvention could be a breach 
of contract. In Bowers, the Federal Circuit enforced a contractual restriction 
on software reverse engineering permitted by the Copyright Act.110
A remaining question is why both courts engaged in complex analy-
sis of the DMCA and its legislative history when they could have decided 
the cases on simpler, narrower grounds. In Chamberlain the Federal Circuit 
could merely have affirmed the district court’s finding that Chamberlain 
had authorized the circumvention, or it could have found the circumven-
tion permitted under the interoperability exception (section 1201(f)).111 
Similarly, since the Lexmark panel found that section 1201(f) could apply, 
107. Id. at 1202 n.17.
108. Id. at 1202.
109. Bowers v. Baystate Technologies, Inc., 320 F.3d 1317 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 539 
U.S. 928 (2003). We discuss enforceability of contractual restrictions on reverse engi-
neering in chapter 4.
110. Judge Dyk’s dissent in Bowers, however, could form the basis for a panel’s 
declining to enforce a contractual restriction on circumvention. See subsection 
4.1.2.2 below.
111. The Federal Circuit did not reach the interoperability exception: “Because § 
1201(f) is an affirmative defense, it becomes relevant only if Chamberlain can prove 
a prima facie case and shift the burden of proof to Skylink.” Chamberlain, 381 F.3d at 
1201 n.15.
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it had no need to rule that a circumvention did not violate the DMCA if 
other means of access existed.
Clearly, both panels objected to the DMCA’s being used “offensively” 
to prevent competition in aftermarkets. But, as the Lexmark panel recog-
nized, “Congress added the interoperability provision in part to ensure that 
the DMCA would not diminish the benefits to consumers of interopera-
ble devices in the consumer electronics environment.”112 Since Congress 
included section 1201(f) precisely to address these kinds of cases, why did 
the courts look beyond that section? Judge Merritt provided one explana-
tion of the reluctance to rely on the interoperability exception:
[W]e should be wary of shifting the burden to a rival manufacturer to demonstrate 
that its conduct falls under such an exception in cases where there is no indication 
that it has any intention of pirating a protected work. A monopolist could enforce 
its will against a smaller rival simply because the potential cost of extended litigation 
and discovery where the burden of proof shifts to the defendant is itself a deterrent 
to innovation and competition. Misreading the statute to shift the burden in this 
way could allow powerful manufacturers in practice to create monopolies where 
they are not in principle supported by law.113
By placing the initial burden of proving intent to infringe on the plaintiff, 
Judge Merritt (and perhaps the Chamberlain panel too) hoped to prevent 
abusive litigation by companies with market power.
The Chamberlain and Lexmark decisions reflect the practical wisdom of 
the federal appellate courts. Both panels were confronted by conduct that 
appeared to constitute prima facie violations of the DMCA, even though 
Congress clearly did not intend to target such conduct. Cognizant that in 
the future dominant companies might bring similar DMCA actions to pre-
vent competition from smaller firms, judges on both panels adopted broad 
rationales that not only would dictate the correct outcome in these cases 
but also would influence the course of the litigation. By placing on plain-
tiffs the burden of proving intent to infringe, the judges permitted smaller 
defendants to “short-circuit” the litigation through dispositive motions in 
cases where infringement is nowhere to be seen.
3.3.5 Storage Technology Corp. v. Custom Hardware (2005)
In 2005, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reaffirmed its 
Chamberlain holding in Storage Technology Corporation v. Custom Hardware.114 
112. Lexmark, 387 F.3d at 549 (citations omitted).
113. Id. at 552 (Merritt, J., concurring).
114. 421 F.3d 1307 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
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This second Federal Circuit ruling solidified the requirement of a nexus 
between circumvention and infringement. The case involved the actions 
of Custom Hardware, an independent service organization (ISO) that had 
circumvented the technological protection in diagnostic software included 
in storage systems offered by Storage Technology Corporation (StorageTek). 
The district court found that StorageTek was likely to prevail on its copy-
right claim that the ISO had infringed the copyright in the diagnostic soft-
ware when the ISO had booted up the customer’s computer. The district 
court further found that StorageTek was likely to prevail on its claim that 
the ISO had violated section 1201 of the DMCA by overriding a password 
protection system to gain access to error messages generated by the diag-
nostic software.
The Federal Circuit reversed on both grounds. The court found that Cus-
tom Hardware was not liable for making a copy of the program in the com-
puter’s random-access memory when it booted up the customer’s computer; 
the court held that the RAM copy exception for ISOs provided by 17 U.S.C. 
§ 117(c) permitted the RAM copies the ISO had made. (In response to the 
Ninth Circuit’s decision in MAI v. Peak, Congress included Title III of the 
DMCA to expand section 117 to protect hardware maintenance by ISOs.)
With respect to the DMCA claim, the Federal Circuit followed its rul-
ing in Chamberlain and reversed the lower court. The Federal Circuit ruled 
that “[t]o the extent that [the ISO’s] activities do not constitute copyright 
infringement or facilitate copyright infringement, StorageTek is foreclosed 
from maintaining an action under the DMCA.”115 Similarly, because “Stor-
ageTek’s rights under the copyright law are not at risk, the DMCA does not 
create a new source of liability.”116 “A court,” the Federal Circuit explained, 
“must look at the threat that the unauthorized circumvention potentially 
poses in each case to determine if there is a connection between the cir-
cumvention and a right protected by the Copyright Act.”117 Here, there was 
no nexus between circumvention and infringement, for two reasons. First, 
as was noted above, section 117(c) permitted the RAM copies made by the 
ISO. Second, the RAM copying occurred automatically whenever the pro-
gram rebooted, regardless of whether the ISO circumvented the technologi-
cal protection. Thus, the circumvention did not facilitate infringement.118
115. 421 F.3d at 1318.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 1319.
118. In Nordstrom Consulting, Inc. v. M&S Technologies, Inc., 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
17259 (N.D. Ill. March 4, 2008), the court relied on Chamberlain and Storage Technol-
ogy to find that an ISO that bypassed a password system to service a program did not 
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3.3.6 Davidson v. Jung (2005)
In contrast to the sophisticated analysis of the DMCA by the Federal Cir-
cuit in Chamberlain and by the Sixth Circuit in Lexmark, the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit’s incorrect interpretation of the interoper-
ability exception in Davidson & Associates v. Jung119 reveals obvious mis-
understandings of fact and law.120 Thus, other courts should not accord it 
much weight.
3.3.6.1 Facts
Blizzard Entertainment, a subsidiary of Vivendi Universal Games, offers 
a service, called Battle.net, that allows owners of Blizzard games to play 
against one another online. Some dissatisfied users of Battle.net developed 
an open-source alternative that they named bnetd. They designed the bnetd 
software to emulate much of the functionality of Battle.net. In particular, 
owners of Blizzard games could log onto the bnetd server and play against 
other Blizzard gamers who had logged onto that server.
To develop the bnetd software, the gamers reverse engineered the Bliz-
zard game and its communications with the Battle.net software after they 
had accepted end-user license agreements (EULAs) in both the games and 
the Battle.net website that prohibited reverse engineering. Additionally, the 
bnetd software did not contain an authentication feature that was present 
in Battle.net. Blizzard assigned a unique identifier to each copy of its games. 
Battle.net would not allow a gamer to log on if another gamer with the 
same number was already logged on. This made it difficult for possessors of 
infringing copies to log on to Battle.net, for the infringing copies had the 
same identifier as the original from which they were copied. Because bnetd 
did not contain this authentication feature, bnetd interoperated freely with 
infringing copies of Blizzard games.
3.3.6.2 The District Court’s Decision
Blizzard alleged that the developers of bnetd had breached the EULAs pro-
hibiting reverse engineering. Following the Federal Circuit’s decision in 
violate section 1201: “Plaintiffs have failed to show that Defendants’ circumvention 
of the password protection to gain access to [Plaintiffs’] software infringed or facili-
tated infringing on Plaintiffs’ rights under the Copyright Act. It is undisputed that 
[Defendant] accessed [Plaintiffs’] software in order to repair or replace the software of 
a client of [Defendant] and a valid licensee of [Plaintiffs’] software.”
119. 422 F.3d 630 (8th Cir. 2005).
120. This subsection is based on Jonathan Band, “Caught in a Blizzard,” Journal of 
Internet Law, November 2005.
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Bowers v. Baystate,121 the district court found that the EULAs were not pre-
empted by section 301(a) of the Copyright Act and that the bnetd develop-
ers had breached them.
Blizzard also claimed that the developers of bnetd had enabled the cir-
cumvention of a technological protection measure in violation of section 
1201 of the DMCA. Specifically, bnetd allowed owners of Blizzard games 
to circumvent a technological protection in the game so that the gamers 
could play their games in the Battle.net mode on a bnetd server rather than 
on the Battle.net server. After finding that bnetd enabled circumvention of 
the technological protection, the district court considered, and rejected, the 
interoperability defense contained in section 1201(f) of the DMCA.
Section 1201(f)(2) permits software developers to provide consumers 
with means of circumventing technological protection measures for the 
purpose of achieving interoperability between two computer programs. The 
district court dismissed the interoperability defense on the grounds that 
the bnetd developers’ actions “constituted more than enabling interoper-
ability” and “extended into the realm of copyright infringement.”122 The 
district court, however, did not clearly explain how the defendants’ actions 
“extended into the realm of copyright infringement.”
The developers of bnetd appealed the district court’s ruling concerning 
preemption and the DMCA’s interoperability exception.
3.3.6.3 The Eighth Circuit’s DMCA Holding123
The Eighth Circuit correctly acknowledged that the DMCA “contains sev-
eral exceptions, including one for individuals using circumvention technol-
ogy ‘for the sole purpose’ of trying to achieve ‘interoperability’ of computer 
programs through reverse engineering.”124 The court then accurately listed 
the requirements of the exception, including that “the alleged circumven-
tion did not constitute infringement.”
The Eighth Circuit next stated that “Appellants’ circumvention in this 
case constitutes infringement.” It proceeded to describe the bnetd develop-
ers’ actions, none of which constituted infringement by the developers. 
“The bnetd.org emulator,” the court observed, “enabled users of Blizzard 
games to access Battle.net mode features without a valid or unique CD Key 
to enter Battle.net. The bnetd.org emulator did not determine whether the 
121. 320 F.3d 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2003). We discuss this case in greater detail in subsec-
tion 4.1.1.
122. Davidson & Associates v. Internet Gateway, 334 F. Supp. 2d 1164 (E.D. Mo. 2004), 
aff’d, 422 F.3d 630 (8th Cir. 2005).
123. We discuss the Eighth Circuit’s preemption holding in subsection 4.1.2.
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CD Key was valid or currently in use by another player. As a result, unau-
thorized copies of the Blizzard games were freely played on the bnetd.org 
servers.”125
The Eighth Circuit failed to recognize that the developers of bnetd had 
not made the copies of the Blizzard games; the gamers had. Moreover, the 
bnetd developers had not contributed to this infringement; at most, they 
had provided a venue for the infringing copies to be used after the infringe-
ment had occurred.
But even if the developers of bnetd had infringed or induced the infringe-
ment of the copyright in Blizzard games under MGM Studios v. Grokster,126 
that would not have affected the availability of the section 1201(f) defense 
with respect to bnetd. Under sections 1201(f)(2) and (3), a person may 
develop, employ, and make available to others a technological means of 
circumventing a protection for purposes of achieving interoperability so 
long as the development, employment, or distribution of the technology 
does not constitute infringement. Thus, the relevant question was whether 
the bnetd program itself infringed any Blizzard copyright.
Interestingly, the developers entered into a consent decree under which 
they admitted that they had copied Blizzard code, files, and images in 
bnetd. In their brief on appeal, the developers argued that these were “a 
few small, unrelated icon files” that were included in bnetd “to help players 
recognize others when they ‘chatted’ on the system.”127 They claimed that 
this “de minimus” copying had nothing to do with accessing the Battle.net 
mode or with any circumvention. Blizzard, in its brief to the Eighth Circuit, 
emphasized this copying: “Appellants copied into their final product origi-
nal works of Blizzard—its images and code were unnecessary for an inde-
pendent work and unnecessary to achieve interoperability—solely because 
Appellants wanted to recreate Battle.net Mode as faithfully as possible.”128
It is hard to understand why the Eighth Circuit ignored the admitted 
copying by the developers of bnetd and instead based its rejection of the 
1201(f) defense on infringements by unknown third parties. It is con-
ceivable that the Eighth Circuit did not fully comprehend the complex 
124. Jung, 422 F.3d at 641.
125. Id. at 642.
126. 545 U.S. 913.
127. Opening Brief of Defendants-Appellants, Davidson v. Jung, 422 F.3d 630 (8th 
Cir. 2005) (No. 04-3654), 2005 WL 1467962, at 45.
128. Opposition Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellees, Davidson v. Jung, 422 F.3d 630 (8th Cir. 
2005) (No. 04-3654), 2005 WL 1521191.
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technical facts before it, or that it misread the statute. Surely the Eighth 
Circuit did not intend to deprive software developers of the 1201(f) safe 
harbor on account of infringements by unaffiliated third parties.
Consider the following example: Company X develops accounting soft-
ware which users can install in their computers to maintain their household 
finances. When taxes are due, a user can log onto Company X’s website, 
where a program calculates the amount of taxes the user owes. The website 
and the accounting software have an authentication protocol—a “secret 
handshake”—which ensures that only authorized owners of the account-
ing software can log onto the website and use the tax calculator. Although 
the accounting software is well designed, the tax calculator makes serious 
errors. Accordingly, Company Y designs its own tax calculator, which users 
of X software can access. In order to interoperate with the users’ X software, 
the Y calculator emulates the X calculator’s handshake. However, because 
the Y calculator’s handshake is somewhat simpler than the X calculator’s, 
it allows users of infringing copies of X accounting software to gain access 
to the Y calculator.
From a policy perspective, it makes no sense to deny the 1201(f) safe 
harbor to Y just because some users have made unauthorized copies of X’s 
accounting software. Legitimate users of X accounting software should not 
be denied the use of a superior tax calculator just because infringers of the 
accounting software can also use the superior tax calculator. The plain lan-
guage of 1201(f) does not require such an absurd result.
In any event, given the confusing facts in this case, subsequent courts 
are likely to focus on the Eighth Circuit’s statement that “Appellants’ cir-
cumvention in this case constitutes infringement,” and not to worry about 
the details. Future defendants will be able to distinguish this case if they are 
able to convince courts that their acts of circumvention did not constitute 
infringement. And if a court looks into how the circumvention in this case 
constituted infringement, the record indicates that bnetd copied original 
Blizzard material.
3.3.7 The TracFone Cases (2007, 2008)
Two district courts in Florida have issued problematic decisions that are 
inconsistent not only with Chamberlain and Lexmark but also with a specific 
exemption to section 1201(a) granted by the Librarian of Congress.
A mobile telephone handset contains a computer program, in a firm-
ware format, that enables the handset to connect to the network of a 
mobile communications provider. The program in the handset can be 
reprogrammed to enable a user to connect to another provider’s network. 
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To prevent this reprogramming, and thereby lock a user into a particular 
network, the provider typically employs a technological measure that pre-
vents access to the program.
TracFone adopted a business model of making handsets available below 
cost while generating profit by selling prepaid airtime cards. Several com-
petitors purchased the inexpensive TracFone handsets in bulk, circum-
vented the technological protection measure on the handsets’ programs, 
reprogrammed the handsets so that they could connect to another net-
work, and sold the reprogrammed handsets to consumers. TracFone sued 
the competitors for violating the DMCA, and the competitors applied for 
an exemption in the 2006 rulemaking cycle.
In her recommendation to the Librarian of Congress to grant an exemp-
tion, the Register of Copyrights found that a user who unlocks a phone to 
connect to another network is not “engaging in copyright infringement 
or in an activity that in any way implicates copyright infringement or the 
interests of the copyright holder.”129 Once the program was unlocked, it 
was reprogrammed, not copied. The reprogramming of a particular piece of 
firmware could be seen as making an adaptation of a copyrighted work, but 
17 U.S.C. 117(a)(1) specifically permits the owner of a copy of a program to 
adapt that copy “as an essential step in the utilization of the computer pro-
gram in conjunction with a machine.” Accordingly, the Librarian of Con-
gress approved the following exemption: “Computer programs in the form 
of firmware that enable wireless telephone handsets to connect to a wireless 
telephone communication network, when circumvention is accomplished 
for the sole purpose of lawfully connecting to a wireless telephone com-
munication network.”130
Notwithstanding the exemption, TracFone has continued to sue its 
competitors for violating section 1201(a) of the DMCA. Two federal district 
courts in Florida have ruled, for the flimsiest of reasons, that the exemption 
does not apply. The exemption permits circumvention when it is “accom-
plished for the sole purpose of lawfully connecting to a wireless telephone 
communication network.” However, according to the courts in TracFone 
v. GSM Group131 and TracFone v. Dixon,132 the competitors circumvented 
for the purpose of reselling handsets for a profit, not for the purpose of 
connecting to a communications network. In other words, the exemption 
129. Recommendation of the Register of Copyrights 50 (November 17, 2006).
130. 71 Fed. Reg. 68472 (November 27, 2006).
131. 555 F.Supp. 2d 1331 (S.D. Fla. 2008).
132. 475 F.Supp. 2d 1236 (M.D. Fla. 2007).
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was available only to the user who would actually connect to the com-
munications network, and not to the firm with the expertise to reprogram 
the handset for the user. This limitation of the exemption to end users 
effectively renders the exemption nugatory—a result the Librarian of Con-
gress could not have intended when he granted the exemption. The courts’ 
flawed reasoning could also be applied to the other exemptions granted by 
the Librarian, rendering them ineffective as well.
In the rulemaking cycle beginning in December of 2008, TracFone’s 
competitors requested a modification of the exemption to clarify its appli-
cation to the providers of reprogrammed handsets in addition to end users. 
The competitors could not rely on the interoperability exception in sec-
tion 1201(f), because the objective of the circumvention is not achieving 
interoperability between two computer programs; rather, the objective is 
receiving a wireless frequency. On the other hand, under the Chamberlain 
court’s interpretation of section 1201(a), the TracFone competitors had not 
violated the DMCA, because there is no nexus between their circumvention 
and copyright infringement.
3.3.8 MDY Industries v. Blizzard Entertainment (2009)
In early 2009, a federal district court in Arizona issued a problematic DMCA 
decision concerning the computer game World of Warcraft (WoW). MDY 
had developed Glider, a computer program that continued playing WoW 
while the user was away from the computer. Blizzard, owner of the copy-
right in WoW, had implemented technological measures to defeat pro-
grams such as Glider. For example, Blizzard used a program called Warden, 
which scanned a user’s hard drive for unauthorized programs before allow-
ing the user to log onto the game server. Another component of Warden 
periodically scanned the user’s memory while the user was playing WoW, 
again looking for unauthorized software such as Glider. MDY had rede-
signed Glider several times to avoid detection by Warden.
Blizzard sued MDY, claiming (among other things) that it was traffick-
ing in a circumvention technology in violation of 17 U.S.C. 1201(a)(2). 
The district court found that Blizzard had succeeded in showing all the ele-
ments of a circumvention violation.133 The court held that Glider’s efforts 
to avoid detection by Warden constituted circumvention of a technologi-
cal protection measure. The court further found that Warden prevented 
access to “dynamic nonliteral elements” of WoW controlled by the server 
133. MDY Indus., LLC v. Blizzard Entm’t, Inc., 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9898 (D. Az. Janu-
ary 28, 2009).
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software. These dynamic elements were “the real-time experience of travel-
ing through different worlds, hearing their sounds, viewing their structures, 
encountering their inhabitants and monsters, and encountering other 
players.” MDY argued that these elements were not sufficiently fixed to 
constitute protectable works. Although the court’s reasoning on this point 
is weak, some of the nonliteral elements probably are sufficiently fixed to 
constitute protectable works.
The court acknowledged that under the Federal Circuit’s decision 
in Chamberlain v. Skylink the circumvention had to infringe or facilitate 
infringement. The court found that because Glider enabled a user to access 
the dynamic nonliteral elements by circumventing Warden, the Cham-
berlain “nexus to infringement” requirement was met. However, any user 
without Glider could also access the dynamic nonliteral elements and 
record them. Glider did not provide a user with any special access that facil-
itated infringement. This aspect of the decision appears erroneous. Also, 
the interoperability exception in section 1201(f) could have been used to 
excuse MDY’s circumvention. Glider avoided detection by Warden for the 
purpose of achieving interoperability with the WoW server software. How-
ever, the court did not address section 1201(f) in its opinion.
3.4 Free-Trade Agreements
Pursuant to the Trade Promotion Authority Act of 2002, the United States 
has negotiated a series of free-trade agreements (FTAs) with its trading part-
ners. Each of these agreements contains an intellectual-property chapter 
that, among other things, requires parties to take measures to “provide 
adequate legal protection and effective legal remedies against the circum-
vention of effective technological measures”134 used by authors to restrict 
unauthorized uses of their works. The agreements then specify that the par-
ties shall provide legal remedies against any person who “circumvents with-
out authority any effective technological measure that controls access to a 
protected work.”135 Further, the parties must impose liability on any person 
who manufactures, offers to the public, or otherwise traffics in devices or 
components that are primarily designed for the purpose of enabling or facil-
itating the circumvention of an effective technological measure. In other 
words, through the free-trade agreements, the United States is exporting 
section 1201 to its trading partners. Like section 1201, the circumvention 
134. See, e.g., Korea-U.S. Free Trade Agreement, Art. 18.4.7(a), June 30, 2007.
135. Id. at (a)(i).
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provisions of the FTAs grossly exceed the requirements of the circumven-
tion articles of the WIPO Internet treaties.
The FTAs include exceptions modeled on the exceptions to section 1201. 
With respect to interoperability, each party may permit “[n]oninfringing 
reverse engineering activities with regard to a lawfully obtained copy of 
a computer program, carried out in good faith with respect to particular 
elements of that computer program that have not been readily available 
to the person engaged in those activities, for the sole purpose of achieving 
interoperability of an independently created computer program with other 
programs.”136
The FTAs mandate that parties confine limitations and exceptions to 
those enumerated in the agreement or subsequently approved through “a 
legislative or administrative proceeding by substantial evidence.” The FTAs 
thus do not permit parties to restrict the prohibition on circumvention 
activities only to situations where there is a nexus between circumvention 
and infringement. Thus, the Chamberlain and Lexmark decisions arguably 
render the United States non-compliant with its obligations under the FTAs.
The FTAs’ high degree of specificity with respect to circumvention con-
strain the ability of U.S. law to evolve in response to new technologies and 
other changed circumstances. Senator Patrick Leahy (D-VT), chairman of 
the Senate Judiciary Committee, criticized this characteristic of the FTAs 
in 2007, when the Senate was considering the U.S.-Peru Trade Promotion 
Agreement. Senator Leahy observed that in the Trade Promotion Act, Con-
gress instructed the Clinton administration to negotiate agreements with 
other nations that reflect a standard of intellectual-property protection 
“similar to that found in the United States.” Although the Peru agreement 
met that goal in many respects, Leahy voiced concern. “Some aspects of the 
intellectual property chapter,” said Leahy,
136. Id. at (d)(i). The United States has proposed that the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade 
Agreement (ACTA) now being negotiated include a provision based on section 1201. 
Under the U.S. proposal, each party “shall provide adequate legal protection and 
effective legal remedies against the circumvention of effective technological mea-
sures that are used by authors …in connection with the exercise of their rights and 
that restrict unauthorized acts in respect of their works….” The U.S. proposal, how-
ever, does not specifically require adoption of an interoperability exception. Instead, 
the proposal simply provides that each country “may adopt exceptions and limita-
tions to measures implementing subparagraph (4) so long as they do not signifi-
cantly impair the adequacy of legal protection of those measures or the effectiveness 
of legal remedies for violations of those measures.” (Emphasis added.) Thus, the U.S. 
proposal makes the circumvention prohibition mandatory, but exceptions only per-
missive. In this manner, the U.S. proposal lacks the balance found in section 1201.
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prescribe rules for protection so specifically that Congress will be hampered from 
making constructive policy  changes in the future. The art of drafting the chapter is 
in raising intellectual property protections to a standard similar to ours, without lim-
iting Congress’s ability to make appropriate refinements to the intellectual property 
law in the future. The flexibility necessary for the proper balance is found in many 
provisions of the intellectual property chapter, for which I commend the U.S. Trade 
Representative. Other provisions, however, are too fixed and rigid, and may have 
the perverse effect of restricting the Congress’s ability to make legitimate changes in 
United States law, while keeping our international commitments.137
There is a positive aspect to the export of the DMCA via the FTAs: Trad-
ing partners now have interoperability exceptions to their laws prohibit-
ing circumvention.138 Many of these countries have not yet addressed the 
permissibility of software reverse engineering in their copyright laws. The 
presence of a statutory interoperability exception relating to circumven-
tion implies legislative support for the lawfulness of the underlying reverse-
engineering activity.
Two events during the summer of 2010 demonstrated the ongoing rele-
vance of the DMCA to interoperability. First, the Fifth Circuit, in MGE UPS 
Systems Inc. v. GE Consumer and Industrial Inc., 2010 WL 2820006, at *3 (5th 
Cir. July 20, 2010), agreed with the Federal Circuit in Chamberlain that 
DMCA liability cannot result from “accessing a work simply to view it or to 
use it within the purview of ‘fair use’ permitted under the Copyright Act.” 
Rather, “the DMCA prohibits only forms of access that violate or impinge 
on the protections the Copyright Act otherwise affords copyright owners.” 
Second, the Librarian of Congress granted an exemption under section 
1201(a)(1)(C) for the “jailbreaking” of cell phone handsets, discussed in 
footnote 51 above. The prohibition on circumvention will not apply to 
“computer programs that enable wireless telephone handsets to execute 
software applications, where circumvention is accomplished for the sole 
purpose of enabling interoperability of such applications . . . with computer 
programs on the telephone handset” (75 Fed. Reg. 43825, July 27, 2010). 
However, the Librarian narrowed the exemption for unlocking a handset to 
connect to another provider’s network to used handsets.
137. Congressional Record S14720, December 4, 2007 (Statement of Senator Leahy).
138. See, e.g., subsection 5.1.4 below.
4 Contractual Limitations on Reverse Engineering
Most software is distributed subject to a license of some sort, and many of 
these licenses prohibit reverse engineering for any reason. The EU Software 
Directive fashioned a simple rule that contractual restrictions on reverse 
engineering permitted under that directive were null and void. But the situ-
ation in the United States is far more complex and unsettled. There seems 
little doubt that a reverse-engineering restriction contained in a negotiated 
agreement between parties of equal bargaining strength would be enforce-
able. Moreover, in Bowers v. Baystate Techs., Inc.1 the Federal Circuit ruled 
that a shrinkwrap restriction on reverse engineering is also enforceable.2 
However, the dissent in Bowers raises serious questions concerning the 
majority’s opinion, highlighting its divergence from the Fifth Circuit’s deci-
sion in Vault Corp. v. Quaid Software Ltd.3 In Bowers the Federal Circuit also 
assumed, perhaps erroneously, that the shrinkwrap license was an enforce-
able contract under state law. In sum, whether shrinkwrap restrictions on 
reverse engineering are enforceable in the United States is far from resolved.
4.1 Preemption
4.1.1 Bowers v. Baystate Technologies (2003)
4.1.1.1 Facts
Harold L. Bowers (doing business as HLB Technology) and Baystate Tech-
nologies, Inc. both produced software tools for CADKEY, a tool used in 
computer-aided design. At one point, Bowers suggested to Baystate that 
1. 320 F.3d 1317 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 539 U.S. 928 (2003).
2. A shrinkwrap license is printed on or within the plastic wrapping enclosing a 
software product. According to most shrinkwrap licenses, the licensee agrees to its 
terms by tearing the plastic shrinkwrap, which the licensee must do to use the 
product.
3. 847 F.2d 255 (5th Cir. 1988).
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they bundle their software together; Baystate declined, saying it could 
develop those functions internally. Instead, Baystate obtained Bowers’ 
software, reverse engineered it in disregard of the shrinkwrap license, and 
incorporated many elements of Bowers’ software in its own product. Bay-
state subsequently purchased Cadkey, Inc. and Bowers went out of busi-
ness. Bowers sued for copyright infringement, patent infringement, and 
breach of contract. The jury found for Bowers on all three counts. Baystate 
appealed. In its first decision, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Cir-
cuit, applying what it understood to be the law of the First Circuit, reversed 
the finding of patent infringement, but upheld the holding that Baystate 
had breached the license by reverse engineering Bowers’ software. Baystate 
petitioned for rehearing, arguing primarily that the shrinkwrap prohibition 
on reverse engineering was preempted by the Intellectual Property Clause 
of the Constitution. The Computer & Communications Industry Associa-
tion and other groups filed an amicus brief in support of Baystate’s argu-
ments. The panel issued a new decision in late January of 2003.4 Two of the 
judges generally restated their earlier opinion, with some additional dis-
cussion of the points raised by Baystate in its petition for rehearing. Judge 
Dyk, however, filed a sharp dissent, in essence adopting the arguments of 
Baystate and its amici. We now wade into the abstruse dispute between the 
majority and the dissent.
4.1.1.2 Section 301(a) Preemption
There are two theories of preemption: statutory preemption under section 
301(a) of the Copyright Act, and constitutional preemption under the Intel-
lectual Property Clause. Section 301(a) preempts state laws creating “rights 
that are equivalent to any of the exclusive rights within the general scope 
of copyright.” Courts have interpreted section 301(a) as not preempting a 
state cause of action that requires proof of “extra elements” not present in a 
copyright claim. The Seventh Circuit ruled in ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg5 that 
section 301(a) did not preempt enforcement of a contract prohibiting the 
copying of telephone listings, because the contract claim required proof of 
an extra element: the existence of an enforceable contract.
On the other hand, the copyright treatise Nimmer on Copyright has 
rejected the ProCD analysis: 
[A]t times a breach of contract cause of action can serve as a subterfuge to control 
nothing other than the reproduction, adaptation, public distribution, etc. of works 
4. 320 F.3d 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
5. 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996).
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within the subject matter of copyright. That situation typically unfolds when the 
“contract” at issue consists of a “shrinkwrap license” to which the copyright owner 
demands adhesion as a condition to licensing its materials. To the extent that such 
a contract is determined to be binding under state law, then that law may be at-
tempting to vindicate rights indistinguishable from those accorded by the Copyright 
Act. Under that scenario, the subject contract cause of action should be deemed 
pre-empted. . . . Although the vast majority of contract claims will presumably sur-
vive scrutiny . . . nonetheless pre-emption should strike down claims that, although 
denominated “contract,” nonetheless complain directly about the reproduction of 
expressive materials.6
The district court in Selby v. New Line Cinema7 relied on the preceding 
passage in Nimmer on Copyright when it declined to enforce an implied-in-
fact contract prohibiting the use of an idea without attribution. Similarly, 
in Symantec Corp. v. McAfee Assocs., Inc.,8 the district court rejected a state 
law unfair-competition claim based on an alleged breach of a contractual 
restriction on reverse engineering. The court found that the mere existence 
of the agreement was not sufficient to transform “what essentially is a copy-
right infringement claim” into “something more.”9
6. Melville B. Nimmer and David Nimmer, Nimmer on Copyright, § 1.01[B][1][a] at 
1–19 and 1–22 (2001) (citations omitted).
7. 96 F. Supp. 2d 1053 (C.D. Cal. 2000).
8. 1998 WL 740798 (N.D. Cal. June 9, 1998).
9. Id. at *5. See Kabehie et al. v. Zoland, et al., 125 Cal. Rptr. 721 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002):
The cases that have decided the issue of federal copyright preemption of state breach 
of contract causes of action can be roughly divided into two groups: (1) a minority 
of the cases hold state breach of contract causes of action are never preempted by 
federal copyright law; and (2) a majority of the cases hold state breach of contract 
actions are not preempted by federal copyright law when they seek to enforce rights 
that are qualitatively different from the exclusive rights of copyright. . . . We adopt 
the majority view. . . . The promise alleged to have been breached in a breach of 
contract action does not always make the contract action qualitatively different 
from a copyright infringement action. If the promise was simply to refrain from 
copying the material or infringing the rights protected by copyright, then the 
promisor has promised nothing more than that which was already required under 
federal copyright law. The promise not to infringe adds nothing to a breach of con-
tract action for copyright infringement. A breach of contract action based on this 
type of promise must be preempted in order to prevent parties from circumventing 
federal copyright law and nullifying the preemption provided for in section 301.
See also Health Grades Inc. v. Robert Wood Johnson University Hospital, Inc., 2009 
WL 1763327 (D. Colo. June 19, 2009); Ritchie v. Williams, 395 F.3d 283, 287 n. 3 
(6th Cir. 2005); Wrench LLC v. Taco Bell Corp., 256 F.3d 446, 457 (6th Cir. 2001); 
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The Bowers majority cited First Circuit authority that seemed to agree 
with the analysis in Nimmer on Copyright. In Data Gen. Corp. v. Grumman 
Sys. Support Corp.,10 the First Circuit noted that not every extra element will 
establish a qualitative variance between rights under copyright and those 
protected by state law. Thus, if the extra elements are “illusory . . . mere 
labels attached to the same odious business conduct,”11 preemption will 
occur. Nonetheless, the Bowers majority agreed with ProCD and found that 
the shrinkwrap license constituted an extra element.
Rather than challenge ProCD directly, Judge Dyk distinguished it. He 
said that in ProCD the shrinkwrap enabled price discrimination between 
commercial and non-commercial users. Non-commercial users received 
fewer rights under the shrinkwrap in exchange for a lower price. Thus, the 
shrinkwrap in ProCD really was an extra element, and not just a prohibition 
on copying permitted under the Copyright Act. In this case, by contrast, 
the shrinkwrap was simply intended to limit fair use.
4.1.1.3 Constitutional Preemption
Both the majority and the dissenting opinions in Bowers also discussed 
constitutional preemption—an issue not addressed by the ProCD court. In 
1988, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit set aside a contractual 
restriction on reverse engineering in Vault Corp. v. Quaid Software Ltd.12 The 
Fifth Circuit cited Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co.,13 in which the Supreme 
Court relied on the U.S. Constitution’s Supremacy Clause to conclude that 
“[w]hen state law touches upon an area of [the copyright statutes], it is 
‘familiar’ doctrine’ that the federal policy ‘may not be set at naught, or 
its benefits denied’ by state law.”14 The Fifth Circuit held that a reverse-
engineering prohibition in a shrinkwrap license “conflicts with the rights 
of computer program owners under section 117 and clearly ‘touches upon 
an area’ of federal copyright law.”15 Likewise, the Supreme Court in Bonito 
Boats v. Thunder Craft Boats relied on the Supremacy Clause to preempt a 
Tavormina v. Evening Star Prods., Inc., 10 F. Supp. 2d 729, 734 (S.D. Tex. 1998); Am. 
Movie Classics Co. v. Turner Entm’t Co., 922 F. Supp. 926, 931 (S.D. N.Y. 1996).
10. 36 F.3d 1147 (1st Cir. 1994).
11. Id. at 1165.
12. 847 F.2d 255 (5th Cir. 1988).
13. 376 U.S. 225 (1964).
14. Sears, 376 U.S. at 229 (citations omitted).
15. Vault, 847 F.2d at 270.
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Florida “anti-plug-molding” statute it found inconsistent with the federal 
intellectual-property system.16
Judge Dyk, in his dissent in Bowers, followed the reasoning of Vault and 
Bonito Boats to argue for constitutional preemption. The majority responded 
with a line of First Circuit cases upholding the waiver of privileges by con-
tract. Judge Dyk countered by saying that a waiver might be valid in the 
context of a negotiated agreement, but not a shrinkwrap license. He empha-
sized that the majority’s position would allow publishers to eliminate fair 
use and other copyright limitations by printing words to that effect on a 
copyrighted work.17
In sum, the Bowers majority found that all contracts always provide an 
extra element and thus are never preempted. The Bowers dissent stated that 
a negotiated contract provided an extra element, but a shrinkwrap license 
did not. New Line Cinema, Symantec, and Kabehie could be understood as 
holding that a contract never provides the extra element, unless it imposes 
an obligation not related to the exclusive rights under the Copyright Act. 
Vault v. Quaid reaches the same conclusion under the Constitution rather 
than section 301(a).
4.1.2 Davidson v. Jung (2005)
Davidson & Assocs. v. Jung18 concerned gamers who had developed an alter-
native platform on which they could play a popular computer video game.19 
The game’s developer sued, claiming that the gamers had violated the Digi-
tal Millennium Copyright Act by circumventing a lockout system on the 
platform and had breached the end user license agreement’s prohibition 
on reverse engineering. The DMCA issues were discussed above in chapter 
3.20 Here, we will examine the Eighth Circuit’s flawed adherence to Bowers.
4.1.2.1 Facts
Blizzard Entertainment provides the Battle.net service, which allows own-
ers of Blizzard games to play against one another online. Some users of 
Battle.net developed an open-source alternative, bnetd, to emulate much 
of the functionality of Battle.net. Owners of Blizzard games could log onto 
16. Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141 (1989).
17. We discuss Judge Dyk’s dissent in greater detail in subsection 4.1.2.
18. 422 F.3d 630 (8th Cir. 2005).
19. This subsection is based on Jonathan Band, “Caught in a Blizzard,” Journal of 
Internet Law, November 2005.
20. See subsection 3.3.6.
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the bnetd server and play against other Blizzard gamers also logged onto 
the bnetd server.
To develop the bnetd software, the gamers reverse engineered the 
Blizzard game and its communications with the Battle.net software after 
accepting end-user license agreements (EULAs) in both the games and the 
Battle.net website that prohibited reverse engineering. Blizzard alleged 
that the developers of bnetd had breached the EULAs prohibiting reverse 
engineering. The district court found that the EULAs were not preempted 
by section 301(a) of the Copyright Act and that the bnetd developers had 
breached them. The bnetd developers appealed the district court’s ruling 
concerning preemption.
4.1.2.2 The Eighth Circuit’s Preemption Holding
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit correctly recognized that 
two forms of preemption come into play when considering contractual 
restrictions on a privilege granted under the Copyright Act: express preemp-
tion under section 301(a) of the Copyright Act, and conflict preemption 
(which arises when state law stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment 
and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress). As was dis-
cussed above, courts have interpreted section 301(a) as not preempting a 
state cause of action that requires proof of “extra elements” not present in 
a copyright claim. Several courts have held that contract claims survive sec-
tion 301(a) challenge because they require proof of an extra element: the 
existence of an enforceable contract.21
This leaves constitutional preemption, which was the focus of the bnetd 
developers’ preemption argument. A split on this issue exists between the 
Fifth Circuit and the Federal Circuit (interpreting the law in the First Cir-
cuit). The Fifth Circuit, in Vault v. Quaid,22 considered a Louisiana statute 
which provided that shrinkwrap licenses prohibiting reverse engineering 
were enforceable. The court found that a reverse-engineering prohibition in 
a shrinkwrap license conflicts with the rights of computer program owners 
under 17 U.S.C. § 117 and clearly “touches upon an area” of federal copy-
right law.23 Accordingly, the Fifth Circuit refused to enforce the Louisiana 
statute and the shrinkwrap prohibition.
In contrast, the Federal Circuit, in Bowers v. Baystate, found that the First 
Circuit permits the waiver of statutory privileges by contract. The Eighth 
Circuit agreed with the Federal Circuit, quoting its statement that “private 
21. See, e.g., ProCD v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996).
22. 847 F.2d 255 (5th Cir. 1988).
23. Id. at 270.
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parties are free to contractually forgo the limited ability to reverse engineer 
a software product under the exemptions of the Copyright Act.”24
But the Eighth Circuit did not explain why it preferred the Federal Cir-
cuit’s rule over the Fifth Circuit’s. Rather, it simply asserted that “[u]nlike 
in Vault, the state law issue here neither conflicts with the interoperability 
exception under 17 U.S.C. § 1201(f) nor restricts rights given under federal 
law.”25 This makes no sense. Numerous courts have interpreted section 107 
as excusing the making of reproductions in the course of reverse engineer-
ing, and section 1201(f)(1) specifically permits circumvention to effectu-
ate reverse engineering for purposes of achieving interoperability. Thus, 
enforcing the EULA here creates a direct conflict with the Copyright Act.26
Perhaps the Eighth Circuit was attempting to distinguish Vault on the 
ground that Vault concerned a state statute rather than a contract. But it 
was a statute dealing with the enforcement of contracts. There is no differ-
ence between refusing to enforce a contractual term and refusing to enforce 
a statute that provides that a contractual term is enforceable. As Judge Dyk 
wrote in his dissent in Bowers, “[f]rom a preemption standpoint, there is 
no distinction between a state law that explicitly validates a contract that 
restricts reverse engineering (Vault) and general common law that permits 
such a restriction (as here).”27
Moreover, the Eighth Circuit cited a statement in Judge Dyk’s dissent as 
support for its position. It evidently did not understand that Judge Dyk’s 
statement undercut its position. The Eighth Circuit quoted Judge Dyk as 
saying that “a state can permit parties to contract away a fair-use defense or 
to agree not to engage in uses of copyrighted material that are permitted by 
the copyright law if the contract is freely negotiated.”28 The last clause—“if 
the contract is freely negotiated”—is Judge Dyk’s critical point. Judge Dyk 
was suggesting a way of reconciling Vault with the First Circuit precedent 
on which the Bowers majority relied. In Judge Dyk’s view, a person could 
waive his privileges under the Copyright Act by contract, provided that the 
24. Bowers, 320 F.3d at 1325–1326.
25. Jung, 422 F.3d at 639.
26. See DVD Copy Control v. Bunner, 31 Cal. 4th 864, 901 n.5 (Sup. Ct. Cal. 2003)
(Moreno, J., concurring) (“[I]f trade secret law did allow alleged trade secret holders 
to redefine ‘improper means’ to include reverse engineering, it would likely be pre-
empted by federal patent law, which alone grants universal protection for a limited 
time against the right to reverse engineer. See Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, 
Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 155 (1989).”)
27. Bowers, 320 F.3d at 1337 (Dyk, J., dissenting).
28. Jung, 422 F.3d at 639.
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contract was freely negotiated. But a software firm could not eliminate such 
privileges simply “by printing a few words on the outside of its product.”29 
Such an approach “permits state law to eviscerate an important federal 
copyright policy reflected in the fair use defense.”30
The Eighth Circuit did not grasp Judge Dyk’s proposed reconciliation of 
the First and Fifth Circuits. It incorrectly concluded that Judge Dyk agreed 
that contract overrides copyright in all cases. Thus, it enforced the prohi-
bition on reverse engineering in the Blizzard EULAs, although they were 
not the product of negotiations between the parties. Rather, the EULAs 
were adhesion contracts imposed by Blizzard; the bnetd developers had to 
agree to the EULAs’ terms before they could use the Blizzard games and the 
Battle.net server. Had the Eighth Circuit understood Judge Dyk’s differen-
tiation between negotiated and non-negotiated contracts, it might have 
reached a different result.31
As the case law continues to evolve, courts may adopt yet another posi-
tion, somewhere between the Bowers majority and the dissent. Courts may 
conclude that shrinkwrap licenses for mass-market products are “illusory” 
extra elements, but that shrinkwrap licenses in limited distribution contexts 
are “real” extra elements. As the distribution is more limited, the relation-
ship between licensor and licensee becomes an increasingly confidential 
one. This is particularly the case when the licensor provides services such as 
maintenance in addition to the actual product. Bowers involved a special-
ized product distributed to a specialized market; the court’s conclusion may 
have been different had the case involved a mass-market product, such as 
the one at issue in Jung.
4.2 The Enforceability of Shrinkwrap Licenses
4.2.1 Divergent Case Law
Both the majority and the dissent in Bowers assumed that the shrinkwrap 
license formed an enforceable contract under state contract law, and focused 
29. Bowers, 320 F.3d at 1337 (Dyk, J., dissenting).
30. Id. at 1335.
31. Judge Dyk also drew a distinction between commercial and non-commercial 
contracts: “The Copyright Act does not confer a right to pay the same amount for 
commercial and personal use. It does, however, confer a right to fair use. . . .” (Bowers, 
320 F.3d at 1338 (Dyk, J., dissenting)) Thus, Judge Dyk might conclude that a prohi-
bition on reverse engineering in a non-commercial license is not preempted, pro-
vided that reverse engineering was permitted under a more expensive commercial 
license.
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their attention on whether a particular term of the license was preempted. 
But the enforceability of shrinkwrap, click-on, or browse-wrap licenses32 is 
not a foregone conclusion. Because a user cannot use a program without 
“agreeing” to the terms of such a license (either by opening the package or 
by clicking on the “I agree” icon), the user may not have manifested assent 
to the license’s terms. And without a manifestation of assent, there is no 
binding contract. Courts around the country have just begun to consider 
the enforceability of shrinkwrap and click-on licenses, and a consensus has 
not yet emerged.33 Moreover, numerous commentators have questioned 
the enforceability of such contracts.34 If the contracts are not enforceable, 
then obviously their terms prohibiting reverse engineering have no effect.
To the extent any pattern can be discerned in these cases, courts seem 
more willing to enforce click-on licenses than to enforce browse-wrap or 
shrinkwrap licenses, largely because it is difficult for a licensee to argue 
that he did not manifest assent when he clicked on an “I agree” icon. In 
32. A click-on license appears when a user is installing a program on his computer. 
The user must click on an “I agree” icon in order to complete the installation 
sequence. A “browse-wrap” license, which typically appears in a website’s terms of 
service, provides that by using the website the user agrees to the terms of service.
33. Compare Novell, Inc. v. Network Trade Ctr., Inc., 25 F. Supp. 2d 1218, 1230 (D. Utah 
1997); Morgan Labs., Inc. v. Micro Data Base Sys., Inc., 41 U.S.P.Q.2d 1850 (N.D. Cal. 
1997); Arizona Retail Sys., Inc. v. The Software Link, Inc., 831 F. Supp. 759, 764–766 (D. 
Ariz. 1993); Step-Saver Data Sys. v. Wyse Tech., 939 F.2d 91, 98–100 (3d Cir. 1991); 
Foresight Resources Corp. v. Pfortmiller, 719 F. Supp. 1006, 1010 (D. Kan. 1989); Ticket-
master Corp. v. Tickets.com, Inc., 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12987 (C.D. Cal. August 10, 
2000), aff’d, 248 F. 3d 1173 (9th Cir. 2001); Specht v. Netscape Communications Corp., 
306 F.3d 17 (2d Cir. 2002); Softman Prods. Co. v. Adobe Systems, Inc., 171 F. Supp. 2d 
1075 (C.D. Cal. 2001); and Klocek v. Gateway, Inc., 104 F. Supp. 2d 1332, 1338–1339 
(D. Kan. 2000); with ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1449 (7th Cir. 1996), 
Register.com, Inc. v. Verio, Inc., 356 F.3d 393 (2d Cir. 2004); cf. Hill v. Gateway 2000, 
Inc., 105 F.3d 1147, 1150 (7th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 808 (1997).
34. E.g., Michael J. Madison, “‘Legal Ware’: Contract and Copyright in the Digital 
Age,” 67 Fordham Law Review 1025 (December 1998); Robert J. Morrill, “Contract 
Formation and the Shrink Wrap License: A Case Comment on ProCD, Inc. v. Zeiden-
berg,” 32 New England Law Review 513, 537–550 (1998); Apik Minassian, “The Death 
of Copyright: Enforceability of Shrinkwrap Licensing Agreements,” 45 UCLA Law 
Review 569 (1997); Christopher L. Pitet, Comment, “The Problem with ‘Money Now, 
Terms Later’: ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg and the Enforceability of ‘Shrinkwrap’ Software 
Licenses,” 31 Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review 325 (1997); L. Ray Patterson and Stan-
ley W. Lindberg, The Nature of Copyright: A Law of Users’ Rights 220 (University of 
Georgia Press, 1991).
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addition, courts seem more willing to enforce these licenses against corpo-
rate licensees than against consumers, presumably because they feel that 
corporate licensees are better able to protect their interests. The assumption 
of enforceability in Bowers is consistent with the latter view.
4.2.2 UCITA
The Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act (UCITA) was a proj-
ect of the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws 
(NCCUSL), which adopted UCITA in 1999 after a lengthy drafting process. A 
fundamental goal of UCITA was to render shrinkwrap and click-on licenses 
clearly enforceable as a matter of state contract law. UCITA encountered 
opposition from state attorneys general, organized groups of licensees, the 
American Law Institute, the Federal Trade Commission, and the American 
Bar Association. For this reason, only two states, Maryland and Virginia, 
have adopted UCITA. Nonetheless, even in states where UCITA has not 
been adopted, courts might look to it and its lengthy comments as an 
authoritative statement concerning contract law in the digital age.
Accordingly, UCITA has weakened the argument that shrinkwrap and 
click-on licenses are unenforceable as a matter of state contract law. For 
this reason, entities interested in preserving the reverse-engineering privi-
lege attempted to persuade the UCITA drafters to adopt an explicit reverse-
engineering exception.
Initially, the UCITA drafters took the position that any conflict between 
UCITA and the federal Copyright Act was addressed by UCITA’s general 
preemption provision included: “A provision of this Act which is pre-
empted by federal law is unenforceable to the extent of the preemption.”35 
In an effort to rebut criticism of UCITA, some UCITA proponents asserted 
that under this provision a contractual term that attempted to limit a privi-
lege granted under the Copyright Act was per se unenforceable. The UCITA 
reporter’s comments, however, noted that “[e]xcept for rules that directly 
regulate specific contract terms, no general preemption of contracting 
arises under copyright or patent law.”36 In other words, the Copyright Act 
as a general matter did not preempt contract terms. The comment observed 
that preemption occurs only when the Copyright Act specifically prohibits 
a particular term, or in other situations recognized by the evolving case law.
Advocates of user privileges, including reverse engineering, argued 
that the limited and uncertain scope of preemption acknowledged in the 
35. Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act (UCITA) § 105(a).
36. UCITA § 105(2), Reporter’s Cmt.
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reporter’s comment rendered preemption a questionable means of preserv-
ing user privileges in an era in which the distribution of content subject 
to shrinkwrap or click-on license was increasingly prevalent. Ten years or 
more might pass before the Supreme Court rules on whether a shrinkwrap 
license term limiting a user privilege under the copyright laws impermis-
sibly interferes with the federal intellectual-property system. In the mean-
time, courts in UCITA jurisdictions would enforce the license terms.
In response to this argument, NCCUSL adopted section 105(b), which 
permits “public policy invalidation”: If a term of a contract violates a fun-
damental public policy, the court may refuse to enforce the contract, may 
enforce the remainder of the contract without the impermissible term, or 
may limit the application of the impermissible term so as to avoid a result 
contrary to public policy, in each case to the extent that the interest in 
enforcement is clearly outweighed by a public policy against enforcement 
of the term.37 The reporter’s comments to this provision explicitly discuss 
reverse engineering:
This Act does not address . . . issues of national policy, but how they are resolved 
may be instructive to courts in applying this subsection. A recent national state-
ment of policy on the relationship between reverse engineering, security testing, 
and copyright in digital information can be found at 17 U.S.C. Section 1201 (1999). 
It expressly addresses reverse engineering and security testing in connection with 
circumvention of technological protection measures that limit access to copyrighted 
works. It recognizes a policy not to prohibit some reverse engineering where it is 
needed to obtain interoperability of computer programs. . . . It further recognizes a 
policy to not prohibit security testing where it is needed to protect the integrity and 
security of computers, computer systems or computer networks. . . .This policy may 
outweigh a contract term to the contrary.38
Without question, section 105(b) and the reporter’s comments provided 
some comfort to developers of interoperable software. This comfort, how-
ever, was limited. First, the comment was very cautious; it implied that 
reverse engineering for purposes of achieving interoperability was a funda-
mental public policy, but it did not say so explicitly. Second, the reporter’s 
comments had no legal status; a court was not required to give them any 
weight. Thus, notwithstanding the comments’ implications, there was no 
guarantee that a court would conclude that reverse engineering for pur-
poses of interoperability was a fundamental public policy. Third, even if 
a court did conclude that reverse engineering was a fundamental public 
37. Id. at § 105(3).
38. Id.
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policy, it still had to balance that policy against the policy favoring enforce-
ment of contracts. Section 105(b) directed courts to refuse to enforce a term 
only “to the extent that the interest in enforcement is clearly outweighed by 
a public policy against enforcement of the term.”39 “Clearly outweighed” 
is a very high standard to meet. The comment suggested that reverse engi-
neering “may outweigh a contract term to the contrary,” but did it clearly 
outweigh a term to the contrary?
In the face of this uncertainty, supporters of reverse engineering contin-
ued to press for an express exemption, even after NCCUSL adopted UCITA 
in 1999, and after UCITA was enacted in Virginia and Maryland in 2000. 
In November of 2001, the UCITA Standby Committee held an open meet-
ing to consider possible amendments to the official text of UCITA. Several 
amendments relating to reverse engineering were proposed and debated at 
the meeting.
On December 17, 2001, the Standby Committee issued a report that 
recommended adopting the following new section concerning reverse 
engineering:
Section 115. Terms on Reverse Engineering
Notwithstanding the terms of a contract under this Act, a licensee that lawfully ob-
tained the right to use a copy of a computer program may identify, analyze, and use 
those elements of the program which are necessary to achieve interoperability of an 
independently created computer program with other programs, if:
the elements have not previously been readily available to the licensee;
the identification, analysis, or use is performed solely for the purpose of enabling 
such interoperability; and
the identification, analysis, or use is not prohibited by other law.
In this section, “interoperability” means the ability of computer programs to ex-
change information, and of such programs mutually to use the information that has 
been exchanged.40
The report’s comment on section 115 explains that it “adopts the position 
taken in Europe, which permits reverse engineering despite a contrary con-
tract clause if the reverse engineering is needed for interoperability and is 
permitted under trade secret, copyright and other law.”41 And indeed the 
language of section 115 is very similar to that of the reverse-engineering 
exception in section 1201(f) of the DMCA, which in turn is similar to the 
39. UCITA § 105(b)(emphasis added).
40. Standby Committee Report Recommendation 19 at 25.
41. Id. at 25–26.
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language of article 6 of the EU Software Directive. Thus, section 115 harmo-
nizes U.S. law with EU law.
In January of 2002, the NCCUSL Executive Committee adopted the rec-
ommendation, along with the other amendments proposed in the Decem-
ber 2001 report. In the summer of 2002, the reverse-engineering provision 
was adopted by the NCCUSL commissioners, at their annual meeting, as 
section 118 of UCITA. However, Maryland and Virginia have not amended 
their enactments of UCITA to reflect this reverse-engineering provision.
In sum, notwithstanding the Federal Circuit’s decision in Bowers, strong 
arguments can still be made that both the Constitution and the Copyright 
Act preempt enforcement of contractual restrictions on reverse engineer-
ing. Additionally, such terms in shrinkwrap licenses may not be enforce-
able under state contract law if users do not manifest their assent to the 
terms. The new section 118 of UCITA provides a “bright line,” but it has not 
yet been enacted in any jurisdiction.

5 Interoperability Overseas
The Internet has convinced policy makers around the world of the impor-
tance of interoperability. In particular, Australian and Asian policy mak-
ers have concluded that their domestic firms can participate in the global 
market for information technology only if those firms’ products can inter-
operate with the products developed by the dominant U.S. firms. As policy 
makers in the Asia-Pacific region have studied the issue, they have learned 
that the domestic firms can achieve interoperability only if they can reverse 
engineer the dominant firms’ products.
Because of the nature of computer programs, most forms of software 
reverse engineering require the making of an interim copy of the program. 
Making such a copy may infringe the copyrights of the program’s devel-
oper, unless it is permitted by an exception to the developer’s exclusive 
rights. Two models for such exceptions emerged during the 1990s. First, 
the European Union adopted a software directive that contains a specific 
exception for reverse engineering.1 (All the member states of the European 
Union have implemented the EU Software Directive, as have several other 
countries in Eastern Europe.) Second, courts in the United States found the 
copying incidental to software reverse engineering to be excused under the 
U.S. Copyright Act’s fair-use doctrine.2
The Asia-Pacific countries considering the issue of reverse engineering 
had these two models before them. These countries, however, did not con-
front reverse engineering in a complete vacuum. First, the British Com-
monwealth countries had to consider whether their fair-dealing provisions, 
1. Council 91/250/EEC 1991 O.J. (L 122). For more detailed discussions of the EU 
Software Directive, see section 1.2 above and pp. 227–282 of Band and Katoh, Inter-
faces on Trial.
2. We discuss U.S. case law concerning reverse engineering in subsection 1.3.2 and 
in section 2.2.
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which were based on British copyright law, were flexible enough to per-
mit software reverse engineering. The Court of Appeal in Singapore, for 
example, determined that its fair-dealing provision did not permit reverse 
engineering, which led the Singapore Parliament to amend the copy-
right law. Second, these countries had to deal with political pressure from 
dominant U.S. software companies and from the Office of the U.S. Trade 
Representative (USTR). These U.S. interests generally opposed any amend-
ment permitting reverse engineering. At the same time, these U.S. interests 
signaled a preference for the U.S. fair-use approach over the EU Software 
Directive approach if the country decided to proceed with an amendment. 
Although the United States persuaded Hong Kong to adopt the fair-use 
approach rather than the Software Directive approach, it did not succeed in 
convincing it to abandon a reverse-engineering provision altogether, as it 
had previously convinced Korea and Japan.3 Australia adopted the Software 
Directive approach notwithstanding strong U.S. government opposition. 
The Philippines responded to the U.S. pressure by enacting a hybrid of Soft-
ware Directive and fair use.
It is not entirely clear why the USTR and the U.S. software firms pre-
ferred the fair-use approach to the Software Directive approach. As will be 
discussed below, the former is more flexible than the latter, and might per-
mit a wider range of reverse-engineering activities. This preference for the 
fair-use approach might have reflected a belief that Sega Enters. Ltd, Inc. v. 
Accolade, Inc.4 was an anomalous decision that U.S. courts eventually would 
reject. However, the opposite occurred; as was discussed in chapter 2, Sega 
has become more firmly entrenched in U.S. jurisprudence.
5.1 Australia
5.1.1 The Report of the Australian Copyright Law Review Committee
On April 12, 1995, the Australian Copyright Law Review Committee (CLRC) 
concluded a nearly eight-year study of copyright issues having to do with 
software.5 The CLRC’s 350-page final report culminated an open process 
of public hearings, several rounds of comments, technical demonstrations, 
3. On the U.S. defeat of the Japanese reverse-engineering initiative, see pp. 297–316 
of Band and Katoh, Interfaces on Trial. We discuss the defeat of the Korean initiative 
in section 5.5 of the present volume.
4. 977 F.2d 1510 (9th Cir. 1992).
5. This subsection is based on passages in the following publications: Jonathan Band 
and Masanobu Katoh, “Interoperability Down Under: The Australian Copyright Law 
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and draft recommendations.6 For each of the many issues it considered, the 
final report carefully discussed all perspectives; it then reached the conclu-
sion that a statutory amendment was necessary.
Among the more contentious issues to emerge in the course of the 
CLRC’s deliberations were the protectability of interface specifications and 
the permissibility of software reverse engineering. As was noted above, 
these same issues contemporaneously were the subject of debate in the 
European Union and the United States. The CLRC explained its approach 
to these issues as follows:
[I]n the creation and protection of any property rights, an attempt must be made 
to strike the right balance between adequate protection and the need to provide the 
community with reasonable access to intellectual property and the benefits which it 
confers. . . . The striking of the balance is something which must be attempted in the 
public interest. The task has not been an easy one.7
In this subsection, we discuss how the CLRC approached its difficult task 
and ultimately succeeded in striking the right balance.
5.1.1.1 The Copyright Law Review Committee
The Copyright Amendment Act of 1984 brought computer programs under 
the protection of the Australian copyright law. In October of 1988, the 
Attorney General asked the CLRC (an officially convened group of jurists, 
intellectual-property lawyers, and industry representatives) to consider 
whether Australian copyright law “adequately and appropriately protects 
computer programs.”8 In February of 1989, the CLRC requested comments 
from interested parties on this question, and in April of 1990 it released an 
issues paper based on those comments. The paper recited the arguments 
for and against a reverse-engineering exception. Although the paper did 
not specifically address the protectability of interface specifications, it did 
discuss protection for program structure. Making no recommendations on 
the issues it raised, the paper invited further comments.
Review Committee’s Final Report,” The Computer Lawyer, July 1995, at 20; Jonathan 
Band and Taro Isshiki, “Interoperability in the Pacific Rim: Reversal of Fortunes in 
Singapore and Australia,” Journal of Proprietary Rights, July 1997, at 2; Jonathan Band, 
“Software Reverse Engineering Amendments in Singapore and Australia,” Journal of 
Internet Law, January 2000, at 17.
6. Copyright Law Review Committee, Computer Software Protection (1995) (hence-
forth cited as CLRC Report).
7. CLRC Report at 4.
8. CLRC Issues Paper 1 (April 1990).
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On July 26 and 27, 1990, the CLRC held a public hearing. Alcatel STC 
testified that reverse engineering was essential to the computer industry, 
and that copyright law should not be permitted to impede the practice. The 
U.S. Software Publishers Association, in contrast, testified that most copy-
right owners are vehemently opposed to permitting the reverse engineering 
of their products.
In September of 1990, IBM submitted written comments to the CLRC 
stating that “no special category of ‘fair use,’ or similar exception, [should] 
be created which might sanction the incidental copying of computer pro-
grams where it is part of the process of decompilation.”9 In October of 
1990, Fujitsu Australia submitted detailed comments taking an opposing 
view. Fujitsu Australia argued that if Australian software vendors “cannot 
develop products that conform to de facto interfacing standards (almost 
always established outside Australia, most typically in the U.S.),” then “pro-
grammers in Australia face extremely limited market opportunities (both in 
Australia and overseas).”10 Accordingly, “the rules, formats, languages, pro-
tocols and similar information underlying a program, including its inter-
faces, should not themselves be copyrightable.”11
Fujitsu Australia further argued that “[r]everse analysis is an essential 
tool in the development of interoperable products. Unless discrete informa-
tion can be discerned through machine analysis techniques, the develop-
ment of compatible products can be frustrated; whether intentionally or 
otherwise. The absence of an ability to engage in reverse analysis would 
lead to de facto protection for product-to-product interfaces whenever a 
company failed to document that information.”12 For this reason, Fujitsu 
Australia urged that reverse engineering “used to analyze or understand the 
uncopyrightable elements of a computer program” should be “viewed as 
completely permissible under Australian law.”13
On November 22, 1990, IBM conducted a demonstration of reverse engi-
neering before the CLRC. IBM sought to show how decompilation facilitated 
disguised piracy. IBM also submitted a detailed paper on decompilation. 
IBM stated unambiguously that no reverse-engineering technique short of 
9. IBM Submission to the CLRC 25 (September 1990). Decompilation is a technique 
of software reverse engineering that involves converting machine-readable object 
code into a higher-level, human-readable form.
10. Fujitsu Australia, Submission to the CLRC 11 (October 5, 1990).
11. Id. at 3.
12. Id. at 18.
13. Id. at 3.
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decompilation is “regarded as objectionable or fundamentally inconsistent 
with the principles of copyright law.”14 Nonetheless, IBM asserted, “there is 
no justification for legitimizing” decompilation, which “involves a flagrant 
infraction of the copyright owner’s exclusive rights to control reproduc-
tion, especially where the intent of such process is to quickly develop a 
substitute program.”15
IBM emphasized that decompilation would facilitate undetectable piracy, 
and that decompilation is unnecessary because “software suppliers publish 
ample information about their programs” and because less intrusive means 
of reverse engineering exist.16 IBM argued that permitting decompilation 
would reduce a competitor’s costs and the first developer’s lead time. This, 
in turn, would reduce the incentives to create new programs. IBM, then the 
world’s largest computer vendor, was particularly solicitous of small devel-
opers: “An exception could impose particular hardship on small vendors 
who may have only a single successful innovative product.”17
Several developers of interoperable software sought to attend IBM’s 
reverse–engineering demonstration, but IBM insisted that the CLRC exclude 
them. This galvanized the developers of interoperable software into action. 
They formed Supporters of Interoperable Systems in Australia (SISA), which 
conducted its own reverse-engineering demonstration before the CLRC on 
February 7, 1991.18 SISA also provided the CLRC with presentations on the 
users’ perspective and the business perspective. The main thrust of SISA’s 
advocacy was that the CLRC should clearly exclude interface specifications 
from copyright protection and should permit access to interface specifica-
tions by reverse engineering so that the Australian information-technology 
industry could compete effectively in a global market.
5.1.1.2 Autodesk v. Dyason (1992)
On February 12, 1992, while the CLRC was considering the submissions of 
SISA and the proprietary vendors, the High Court of Australia handed down 
its decision in Autodesk v. Dyason.19 This confused decision underscored the 
14. IBM, Submission to the CLRC 6 (November 22, 1990).
15. Id. at 6–7.
16. Id. at 13.
17. Id. at 14.
18. SISA’s members included, in addition to several software companies based in 
Australia, the Australian subsidiaries of Bull, ICL, Unisys, NCR, Sun Microsystems, 
and Fujitsu.
19. Autodesk Inc. v. Dyason, (1992) 173 C.L.R. 330.
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importance of the CLRC’s work by demonstrating the need for clarification 
of the proper application of copyright law to computer programs.
Autodesk produced the computer-assisted design program AutoCAD. It 
sold AutoCAD with a hardwired lock that had to be physically installed on 
the PC or terminal on which AutoCAD was running. Because only one lock 
was sold with each AutoCAD program, the lock ensured that only as many 
copies of AutoCAD as had been purchased were in operation at any time. 
The AutoCAD program issued a repeating cycle of challenges to the Auto-
CAD lock. Using a shift register, the lock transmitted a series of responses 
to the AutoCAD program. The AutoCAD program then used a lookup table 
to determine whether the responses matched the challenges. If it did not 
receive a proper response, the AutoCAD program (not the lock) would issue 
instructions to stop the program.
After reverse engineering the AutoCAD lock, the defendants developed 
an “Auto Key lock” that responded properly to the challenges issued by 
AutoCAD. This made it possible to use copies of AutoCAD on PCs without 
the AutoCAD lock. The Auto Key lock, therefore, allowed a user to circum-
vent the Autodesk lock and use unauthorized copies of Autodesk.
The Autodesk case presented several issues of first impression for Austra-
lian courts. First, the trial court had to determine whether the hardwired 
AutoCAD lock constituted a computer program at all. The AutoCAD lock 
did not issue instructions; rather, it issued a data stream in response to the 
AutoCAD program’s data stream, which the program then evaluated. Sec-
ond, the court had to determine whether the defendant had copied any of 
the plaintiff’s protected expression.
The trial court found for Autodesk, ruling that the AutoCAD lock was 
a computer program and that the Auto Key lock infringed the AutoCAD 
copyright because it performed the same function. The trial court’s deci-
sion also implied that the defendant’s studying the AutoCAD lock’s output 
using an oscilloscope might be improper under copyright law.
The full Federal Court reversed the trial court, finding that the AutoCAD 
lock was not a computer program and that similarity in function did not 
infringe copyright. The High Court then reversed the Federal Court and 
restored the trial court’s finding of infringement, but for reasons different 
from those articulated by the trial court. The High Court agreed with the 
Federal Court that the AutoCAD lock was a piece of hardware and not a 
computer program, and thus was not covered by the Australian copyright 
law. The High Court nonetheless found infringement because the defen-
dant’s Auto Key lock, even though a computer program, reproduced the 
protected expression of the AutoCAD lookup table, and this lookup table 
represented a “substantial part” of the AutoCAD program. Further, one of 
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the concurring opinions suggested, as did the trial court, that the defen-
dant’s act of reverse engineering also infringed Autodesk’s copyright.
In a detailed criticism of the Autodesk decision, submitted to the CLRC, 
SISA stated that “[t]he danger of the High Court’s Autodesk decision is that 
it will be portrayed as holding that all interface information by which 
two separate products interoperate is necessarily protectable ‘expression’ 
in Australia.”20 SISA first argued that the High Court had erred in treat-
ing the lookup table as protected expression: “[d]ata which serves a purely 
functional purpose should not be viewed as expressive material.” SISA next 
argued that even if the lookup table contained expressive elements, those 
elements merged with the “idea” of achieving interoperability with the 
program:
[I]n order for Auto Key to work in place of the AutoCAD lock, the responses or return 
codes to signals sent to [the AutoCAD program] had to be identical. There was a very 
real functional imperative which limited the possible responses to stimuli sent from 
[the AutoCAD program] . . . . [I]f a discrete amount of data that is passed between 
computer programs must be identical in order for the programs to work together, 
that very real absence of choice on the part of the developer creating a new product 
intended to work with or substitute for an existing product must be considered in 
determining whether, as to that bit series, “idea” and “expression” have merged.21
SISA further contended that Autodesk should not be interpreted as prohibit-
ing reverse engineering. Finally, SISA argued that Autodesk was an instance 
of bad facts leading to bad law.
The High Court understandably had little sympathy for the defen-
dant, who had sought to circumvent Autodesk’s copy-protection device. 
Dyason’s product was not intended to increase consumer choice, but to 
facilitate unauthorized copying. SISA concluded that “[i]n light of the High 
Court’s Autodesk decision SISA believes more than ever in the importance” 
of amending Australian copyright law” to exclude interface specifications 
from protection and to permit reverse engineering.22
5.1.1.3 The CLRC’s Draft Report
In July of 1993, the CLRC issued a 350-page draft report23 that contained a 
lengthy and somewhat confusing discussion of U.S. case law on the scope of 
protection for non-literal program elements. The draft report recommended 
20. SISA’s Views on the High Court’s Autodesk Decision 9–10 (1992).
21. Id. at 16.
22. Id. at 18.
23. CLRC Draft Report on Computer Software Protection (1993).
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against any amendment to the Australian Copyright Act specifically deal-
ing with the scope of protection. Thus, it did not support SISA’s request for 
a provision specifically excluding interface specifications from copyright 
protection.
The draft report also contained a lengthy discussion of reverse engineer-
ing. It acknowledged that because programs typically are distributed in an 
object-code form that is not understandable by humans, certain exceptions 
to the copyright owner’s exclusive rights are required to ensure that the 
public has access to the unprotected elements of the program. The draft 
report recommended the adoption of a provision similar to article 6 of the 
EU Software Directive, permitting decompilation for purposes of achiev-
ing interoperability.24 Indeed, the draft report improved on the language of 
the Software Directive by eliminating article 6’s confusing reference to the 
Berne Convention.25 The draft report also endorsed permitting decompila-
tion for error correction. Finally, the draft report recommended that the 
“fair dealing” provision of the Australian Act govern the permissibility of 
decompilation “to understand techniques.”
Thus, the CLRC proposed decompilation rights somewhat broader than 
those under the Software Directive. The CLRC envisioned an unambiguous 
right to decompile for purposes of interoperability and error correction, 
and a flexible case-by-case fair-use approach to determining the lawfulness 
of decompilation to understand elements of the target program not related 
to interoperability. The draft report, however, made no mention of a provi-
sion similar to article 5(3) of the Software Directive, which permits black-
box reverse engineering.26
24. The draft report recommended the following language:
[D]ecompilation of a computer program should be allowed where it is necessary to achieve the 
interoperability of an independently created computer program with other programs provided:
(a) decompilation is performed by the owner of a lawfully acquired copy of the program or 
another person having a right to use the copy or on their behalf by a person authorized to do so;
(b) the information necessary to achieve interoperability has not previously been readily avail-
able; and
(c) the acts are confined to the parts of the program necessary to achieve interoperability.
The following limitations should apply:
(i) the decompilation should only be used to achieve interoperability; and
(ii) the information obtained should only be given to others when necessary for the interopera-
bility of the independently created program.
25. See Band and Katoh, Interfaces on Trial at 254–255.
26. Black-box reverse engineering includes research methods other than decompila-
tion, including line traces and input-output tests.
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In detailed comments on the draft report, SISA stated that it believed 
that the CLRC’s draft report struck a fair balance between the interests of 
copyright holders and the public at large. SISA also believed that the draft 
report was consistent with and in furtherance of the emerging interna-
tional consensus of protecting computer programs as literary works while 
avoiding excess protection by creating express exceptions to the copyright 
holder’s exclusive rights.27
SISA did, however, recommend several revisions. First, it renewed its 
request for a specific exclusion for interface specifications. Second, it advo-
cated the adoption of a black-box reverse-engineering provision similar 
to article 5(3) of the Software Directive. Third, it recommended several 
changes to the equivalent of the Software Directive’s article 6, most notably 
broadening it to cover explicitly decompilation for purposes of achieving 
interoperability between hardware and software.28
The U.S. Computer and Business Equipment Manufacturers Association 
(CBEMA) also filed comments on the draft report on behalf of proprietary 
vendors.29 It offered several reasons why Australian copyright law did not 
need to permit decompilation for purposes of achieving interoperability. 
First, the policy objective of fostering interoperability “was already being 
satisfactorily advanced by a combination of market forces and liberal cross 
licensing policies of software developers,” and “there is no evidence at all 
that a ‘crisis’ has developed in the industry due to an absence of special 
rules aimed at fostering interoperability.”30 Second, CBEMA hauled out the 
disguised-piracy rationale: “the protected expressions obtained through 
decompilation of computer program, often in an easily disguised form, 
can be used for a number of illegitimate purposes, which may cause sub-
stantial harm to the right holder.”31 Third, citing the reliance of the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit on the fair-use doctrine to excuse 
27. Comments on the Draft Report of the Copyright Law Review Committee on 
Computer Software Protection submitted by the Supporters of Interoperable Systems 
in Australia 1 (1993).
28. This had been a contentious, and somewhat unresolved, issue during the legisla-
tive battle leading up to the adoption of the EU Software Directive. See Band and 
Katoh, Interfaces on Trial at 248.
29. CBEMA’s members included IBM, Apple, and Digital Equipment Corporation. In 
2001, the organization changed its name to the Information Technology Industry 
Council.
30. CBEMA Comments on CLRC Draft Report 6 (October 1993) (hereafter cited as 
CBEMA Comments).
31. Id. at 7.
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decompilation in Sega v. Accolade,32 CBEMA argued that fair dealing (the 
Australian analogue to fair use) provided the means for “an Australian court 
to balance interests in the area.”33 Further, “there is little evidence to suggest 
that Australian courts, as their U.S. counterparts, will have any difficulty in 
reaching fair results in specific factual situations through the application 
of the doctrine of fair dealing.”34 The disingenuousness of this argument 
requires emphasis. In two amicus briefs to the Ninth Circuit, CBEMA vigor-
ously opposed excusing decompilation under the fair-use doctrine. Yet in 
Australia CBEMA employed the Ninth Circuit’s fair-use finding as a justifi-
cation for not adopting a specific decompilation exception.
Perhaps in response to SISA’s renewed request for a specific exclusion 
for interface specifications, CBEMA raised several arguments against the 
adoption of such an exception. CBEMA first argued that including specific 
terms of art in statutes “narrows the scope of the law, and, thus reduces its 
applicability in the full range of factual situations which may arise over 
time.”35 CBEMA next argued that “the copyrightability of specific elements 
of a program should be determined by the same rules as the copyrightabil-
ity of specific elements of any other work.”36 CBEMA finally argued that an 
express exception for interface specifications for the purpose of promot-
ing standardization and interoperability was unnecessary because over the 
past decade the software market had become increasingly standardized on 
its own: “[C]ompatibility (or interoperability) has evolved without specific 
rules diminishing protection.”37
The U.S. government also commented on the CLRC draft report. It 
approved the decompilation provision, noting that it “appear[s] to be 
generally consistent with the provisions of Article 6 of the EC Software 
Directive and appear[s] to be directed to achieving the goal of the creation 
of interoperable programs while protecting the copyright owner against 
abuse.”38 The U.S. government, however, suggested that the decompila-
tion provision explicitly state, as does Article 6 of the directive, that the 
“end result of the process must be the creation of a program that is itself 
32. 977 F.2d 1510 (9th Cir. 1992).
33. CBEMA Comments at 6.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 3.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 4.
38. United States Government Comments on the Copyright Law Review Commit-
tee’s Draft Report on Computer Software Protection, United States Government 
Cable to United States Embassy, Australia (1993).
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original.”39 Moreover, the U.S. government expressed concern about per-
mitting decompilation for error correction.
5.1.1.4 The CLRC’s Final Report
The CLRC’s final report, issued in April of 1995, included several significant 
changes that favored interoperability.
It adopted the distinction, made by Professor Randall Davis of the Mas-
sachusetts Institute of Technology, between computer programs as “text” 
and computer programs as “behavior.”40 The CLRC concluded that behav-
ior should not receive copyright protection, thereby permitting the devel-
opment of functionally equivalent programs with different texts.41
It did not accept SISA’s invitation to specifically exclude interface speci-
fications from copyright protection. It did, however, explicitly endorse the 
Computer Associates v. Altai decision of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sec-
ond Circuit.42 It described the Second Circuit’s three-step test, noting that 
the unprotectable elements to be removed in the filtration step included 
“elements dictated by external factors, such as . . . compatibility require-
ments with other programs.” It then stated that the CLRC “regards the 
test set out by the court in that case as a very practical and useful guide 
for determining infringement if computer programs and supports the 
approach it adopted.”43
The report proceeded to discuss the favorable reception of Computer 
Associates by courts in Canada and the United Kingdom44 and to reject the 
district court’s decision in Lotus v. Paperback.45 (The appeal in Lotus v. Bor-
land was still pending when the final report was drafted.) It also discussed 
“look and feel,” concluding that “the need for standardization and the 
need for efficient user interfaces to be used and developed outweighs the 
need to grant authors express copyright protection in the ‘look and feel’ of 
their programs’ behaviours.”46 “While industrial efficiency may not be a 
consideration in determining protection of other categories of works,” the 
report stated, “that it is in the case of computer program serves to mark 
39. Id.
40. CLRC Report at 102.
41. See id. at 112–113.
42. 982 F.2d 693 (2d Cir. 1992). See subsection 1.3.2 of the present volume.
43. CLRC Report at 109.
44. Id. at 109. See Band and Katoh, Interfaces on Trial at 147–149 and 262–269 for a 
discussion of these cases.
45. 740 F. Supp. 37 (D. Mass. 1990). We discuss this case in subsection 2.1.1.
46. CLRC Report at 114.
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them out on account of their functional nature.”47 These statements, taken 
together, suggest that the CLRC opposed copyright protection for interface 
specifications.
With respect to reverse engineering, the CLRC adopted SISA’s recom-
mendation of a black-box reverse-engineering exception similar to that 
in article 5(3) of the Software Directive.48 The CLRC also considered, and 
rejected, CBEMA’s opposition to a decompilation exception. The report 
concluded that the existing fair-dealing provision in Australian copyright 
law was narrower than the fair-use doctrine in U.S. copyright law and prob-
ably would not permit decompilation in a commercial context.49
The CLRC also rejected IBM’s contention that decompilation facilitated 
“disguised piracy.” It stated that it found IBM’s reverse-engineering demon-
stration unconvincing: “At that presentation, only a simple form of decom-
pilation was demonstrated, namely the disassembly of a relatively small 
program. No evidence of generalised decompilation to high level computer 
languages was provided.”50
The CLRC noted that “any new program that is produced by reverse 
engineering an existing program and which is a copy or adaptation of the 
latter program is no less an infringement.”51 The CLRC thus suggested 
that the focus of the copyright analysis should be the finished product 
brought to market, and not the intermediate development steps. The CLRC 
acknowledged IBM’s argument that many operating system interfaces were 
published, but responded that many other products were not publicly 
documented. The CLRC further observed that reverse engineering is time 
consuming, costly, and rarely leads back to a complete version of original 
source code. For this reason it is likely to be performed only by interoper-
able-software developers with no alternative means of obtaining the inter-
face information necessary for interoperability.
The CLRC then considered SISA’s specific recommendations for amend-
ing the decompilation language proposed in the draft report. SISA had 
opposed the provision limiting decompilation to those parts of the pro-
gram necessary for interoperability on the ground that it was not possible 
to know in advance what parts of the program needed to be decompiled. 
The CLRC agreed and replaced the problematic language. The CLRC also 
47. Id. at 113.
48. Id. at 175–176.
49. Id. at 147–149.
50. Id. at 153.
51. Id. at 153.
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agreed with SISA’s suggestion that decompilation be permitted for pur-
poses of achieving interoperability between hardware and software, as well 
as between two programs.52 Further, the CLRC endorsed SISA’s suggestion 
that contractual restrictions on reverse engineering not be enforceable. The 
CLRC reviewed the criticisms of its provision permitting decompilation 
for purposes of error correction, particularly those submitted by the U.S. 
government. The CLRC rejected the criticisms and retained the provision. 
The CLRC also retained its approval of decompilation to uncover ideas not 
related to interoperability pursuant to Australia’s fair-dealing exception.
Finally, the CLRC considered the status of reverse engineering in other 
jurisdictions. It correctly concluded that its recommendations were con-
sistent with the Software Directive in the European Union and the Sega 
decision in the United States, and that they complied with the Berne Con-
vention and the World Trade Organization Agreement on the Trade Related 
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS).53
Because of the parallels between the CLRC’s recommendations and the 
EU Software Directive, the report is particularly useful in interpreting and 
applying the directive’s provisions. Specifically, the report resolves three 
potential ambiguities in article 6 of the directive: it eliminates the confus-
ing reference to the Berne Convention, it permits decompilation to achieve 
interoperability between software and hardware, and it removes the tech-
nologically infeasible limitation of decompilation to only those parts of 
52. The final report worded the decompilation exception as follows:
[D]ecompilation of a computer program should be allowed where it is necessary to achieve the 
interoperability of an independently created computer program or hardware device with other 
programs or hardware devices provided.. . . 
(a) decompilation is performed by the owner of lawfully acquired copy of the program or 
another person having a right to use the copy or on their behalf by a person authorized to do so; 
and
(b) the information necessary to achieve interoperability has not previously been readily avail-
able; and
(c) the acts are confined to those necessary to achieve interoperability.
The following limitations should apply:
(i) the decompilation should only be used to achieve interoperability; and
(ii) the information obtained should only be given to others when necessary for the interopera-
bility of the independently created computer program or hardware device.
Id. at 10.
53. The final report states that “in Japan the law, if literally interpreted, would pro-
hibit the reproduction and adaptation of computer programs for the purpose of 
reverse engineering” (CLRC Report at 177). A close examination of Japanese copy-
right law, however, reveals that it permits reverse engineering. See Band and Katoh, 
Interfaces on Trial at 294–297.
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the program that are necessary for interoperability. The CLRC’s thoughtful 
resolution of these potential ambiguities should be followed in Europe.
5.1.2 Case Law after the CLRC Report: Data Access v. Powerflex (1996)
After the CLRC issued its final report, an Australian federal court decided a 
case involving the protectability of functional components of a computer 
program dictated by compatibility concerns. The court harmed the cause 
of interoperability by holding that compatibility concerns could not negate 
the protectability of program elements. What makes this decision particu-
larly interesting is its use and interpretation of United States copyright law, 
carefully selecting which U.S. decisions it agreed with.
5.1.2.1 Facts
The Powerflex case focused on infringement by the end product, not 
infringement due to copying during the development process. The Data 
Access Corporation had developed DataFlex, a compilation of programs 
described by the Australian Federal Court “as an application development 
system.”54 Specifically, the DataFlex programs were used for not only the 
creation of databases but also for the development of database application 
programs, which could in turn be used to create and work with databases. 
As such, the DataFlex system provided users with a programming language 
in which they could write their own programs. The DataFlex system also 
incorporated a “run time” program that allowed a user to operate the appli-
cations created through the use of the DataFlex language. The defendants 
in the copyright infringement suit were David Bennett, his wife, and the 
company they had incorporated to sell the allegedly infringing product, 
PFXplus. Bennett, according to the court, “aspired to create an application 
development system which would be highly compatible with the DataFlex 
computer language.”55
As far as issues of interoperability were concerned, the infringement suit 
focused on two aspects of Bennett’s software. First, the PFXplus language 
used 192 of the 225 instruction words in the DataFlex language. The use of 
the same words in the source code of either the DataFlex or PFXplus lan-
guages caused the computer to perform the same functions. The program 
code implementing each of these functions, however, was completely dif-
ferent. The second interoperability issue arose in the context of Bennett’s 
intentional reproduction, in identical form, of certain compression tables 
54. Data Access Corporation v. Powerflex Services Pty, Ltd. No. 93-VG473 (Federal Ct. 
Austl. February 9, 1996) at 2.
55. Powerflex at 3.
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used in one of the DataFlex programs. These tables, which were elements of 
the DataFlex “run time” program, merely allowed the software user to save 
storage space through the compression of the program into smaller data 
strings. This raised an interoperability issue because of Bennett’s assertion 
in his defense that it was necessary to use the same compression tables in 
his programs in order to achieve compatibility.
5.1.2.2 The Federal Court’s Ruling
Merger of Idea and Expression
Bennett presented a merger defense to the copying of the words of the 
DataFlex language. His merger defense was based on language in the U.S. 
Supreme Court decision Baker v. Selden,56 relied upon by the Australian 
High Court in Autodesk v. Dyason,57 that when an expression of an idea 
is inseparable from its function, it is part of the idea itself and therefore 
unprotected by copyright. Specifically, Bennett appealed to the logic of 
the First Circuit’s Lotus Development Corp. v. Borland International58 decision 
(although not specifically to the “method of operation” argument, since 
the Australian copyright statute has no companion to section 102(b) of the 
U.S. Act). It appears that, as in Borland, Bennett had to use the same words 
in order to make PFXplus compatible with DataFlex and desirable to cus-
tomers who had learned the DataFlex language and did not want to learn a 
new set of commands.
The Australian court chose to disregard the ruling in Borland and instead 
turned to Judge Keeton’s district court decision in Lotus Development Corp. v. 
Paperback Software International,59 which as a practical matter had been over-
ruled by the First Circuit’s Borland decision. The Australian court quoted 
extensively from the Paperback decision and seemed to place great impor-
tance on Judge Keeton’s decision that if the expression of an idea goes 
beyond the functional elements within that idea and beyond the obvious, 
and if there are numerous other ways of expressing the same idea, that form 
of expression is copyrightable.60 The Australian court found that the choice 
of words here went “beyond the functional elements of the ideas they 
56. 101 U.S. 99 (1879).
57. (1992) 173 C.L.R. 330. We discuss this case in subsection 5.1.1.2.
58. 49 F.3d 807 (1st Cir. 1995), aff’d by an equally divided Court, 516 U.S. 233 (1996). 
We discuss this case in detail in subsection 2.1.1.
59. 740 F. Supp. 37 (D. Mass. 1990).
60. See Powerflex at 12–13.
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express, and beyond the obvious,” and that the words were “elements of 
expression, original and substantial, and therefore copyrightable.”61 Thus, 
the Australian court rejected Borland’s notion that elements of a computer 
program so “essential to operating something” should be outside the scope 
of copyright protection.62
Elements Dictated by Compatibility
In its findings regarding Bennett’s copying of the compression tables, the 
Australian court demonstrated its position on whether compatibility con-
cerns could affect the protectability of program elements even more starkly. 
Bennett once again presented a merger defense, arguing that in order for a 
person using the DataFlex application development system to use a PFX-
plus program, the PFXplus compression table must be identical to that of 
DataFlex. He further contended that this meant there was but one man-
ner in which to express the idea of “function through compatibility,” and 
therefore the idea and the expression merge, making the compression table 
unprotectable under copyright.63
The court rejected this argument, referring once again to Judge Keeton’s 
Paperback opinion. The Australian court held that compatibility concerns 
could not negate the protectability of a program element:
The function of compression by means of the Hoffman method may be, and has been, 
performed by any one of very many different expressions in integer code. The expres-
sion given in the DataFlex table is but one of the many possible expressions. The 
conclusion is established that the DataFlex table is copyright [sic] before consideration 
is given to the PFXplus table. The desire of Dr. Bennett for the compatibility he achieved 
by reproduction of the DataFlex table, not any inseparability of function and expression of 
the Hoffman compression method, constrained him to merge function and expression.64
Viewed in this light, the Australian decision was very near the opposite 
side of the spectrum—in terms of protection offered to interface specifica-
tions—from judicial decisions in the United States. Perhaps the contrast 
can be discerned most clearly by comparing the Powerflex decision to the 
Eleventh Circuit’s ruling in Bateman v. Mnemonics, Inc.65 In Bateman, the 
Eleventh Circuit found that, although interface specifications were not per 
se uncopyrightable, compatibility concerns would typically negate the pro-
tectability of certain elements of computer programs.
61. Id. at 13.
62. Borland, 49 F.3d at 816.
63. Powerflex at 17.
64. Id. (emphasis added).
65. 79 F.3d 1532 (11th Cir. 1996). We discuss this case in subsection 2.1.2.1.
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By distinguishing constraints dictated by compatibility from constraints 
flowing from the inseparability of function and expression, the Austra-
lian court basically decided on a per se basis that no elements of computer 
programs dictated by compatibility concerns could be determined to be 
unprotected. In light of the state of U.S. law as represented by Borland and 
Bateman, the Australian court’s reliance on the opinion of Judge Keeton 
in Paperback as an example of U.S. legal authority seems puzzling. Perhaps 
more mystifying is the Australian court’s failure to consider an even more 
obvious U.S. case relevant to the questions before the court: Computer Asso-
ciates International, Inc. v. Altai, Inc.,66 which established the abstraction-
filtration-comparison test for questions of infringement by non-literal 
copying of computer programs.
Interestingly, the Australian court made a completely contrary finding 
with respect to another portion of the facts presented, thereby casting doubt 
on the above-described holding. Bennett also copied a substantial portion 
of the error text table contained in the DataFlex programs. When an error 
occurred during use of the DataFlex software, the program referred to an 
error table that contained numbered errors corresponding to specific lines of 
text to be displayed on the computer screen, describing the error to the user. 
Bennett’s error text lines were substantially similar to those provided in the 
DataFlex table. Nonetheless, in this circumstance, the court found that the 
“expression of the idea is inseparable from its function and is not copyright-
able.”67 The court provided no explanation as to why it so easily applied the 
merger doctrine to the error text lines, but not to the words of the DataFlex 
language. However mixed the message of the court may be, it certainly can-
not be interpreted as favorable to developers of interoperable software.
Although the court arguably misused U.S. authorities, it did not refer 
to any of the four recently decided software copyright cases in other Com-
monwealth countries: two in Canada and two in the United Kingdom.68
5.1.3 Australia’s Software Reverse Engineering Amendment
In the spring of 1999, four years after the CLRC issued its final report, a 
set of copyright amendments relating to computer programs, including a 
66. 982 F.2d 693 (2d Cir. 1992).
67. Powerflex at 15.
68. See Jonathan Band, “Computer Associates Crosses the Atlantic and Lake Ontario: 
Richardson v. Flanders and Delrina v. Triolet,” International Computer Law, June 1993, at 
2; Band, “Matrox Electronic Systems v. Gaudreau,” 6 European Intellectual Property Review 
D-138 (1994).
152 Chapter 5
reverse-engineering exception similar to the that of the EU Software Direc-
tive, were introduced in the Australian Parliament.69 The amendments were 
passed by the Senate on June 29 and by the House of Representatives on 
August 12. They went into effect on September 30.
5.1.3.1 The Need for a Reverse-Engineering Exception
On August 11, 1999, in the Second Reading Speech, Attorney-General Daryl 
Williams explained the government’s rationale for introducing the legis-
lation. He described the growing importance of computers and computer 
networks to the economy. With the advent of the Internet, he said, “there is 
an obvious need for computers and the programs which drive them to com-
municate, connect, or ‘interoperate’ with each other.”70 He then explained 
the need for interface information in order to achieve interoperability, and 
how, as a technical matter, this information often can be obtained only 
through reverse engineering. He singled out the reverse-engineering tech-
nique known as “decompilation,” which involves translating the machine-
readable object code into a higher-level, human-readable format.71
Williams noted that “the law of the leading software producing coun-
try in the world, the United States, allows makers of new programs to use 
decompilation to find out the interface information of existing programs 
for achieving interoperability. The countries of the European Union, and 
other countries, also allow this to be done. However, Australian law does not 
make such a provision.”72 He contended that an amendment was required 
to enable the Australian software industry to compete in the world market:
Australia’s software producers are recognized as innovative by world standards. Be-
cause our industry is not of a scale to compete across the board with such dominant 
industries as that of the United States, its comparative advantage lies in the abil-
ity to cater for niche markets. In order to do this, it must be able to ensure that 
its successful niche products interoperate with other, existing products, including 
those produced by big scale producers. . . . If Australian industry is to be allowed to 
compete on level terms with producers of similar products in the USA and Europe, 
Australian software copyright laws must be brought more into line with the law in 
those countries.73
69. Copyright Amendment (Computer Programs) Act, 1999.
70. Speech on Copyright Amendment (Computer Programs) Bill 1999, Second Read-
ing at 2.
71. Id. at 2–3.
72. Id. at 3.
73. Id. at 3–4.
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At this point, Williams explained the provisions of the amendment: 
“[A]s an exception to the copyright reproduction right, where interface 
information about other programs is not readily available to a software pro-
ducer, the producer will now be able to decompile another program to the 
extent necessary to get the required interface information for making an 
interoperable product.”74 He hastened to add that the amendment would 
“not weaken the existing proscription of software piracy,” explaining that 
pirates do not reverse engineer but rather engage in wholesale copying.75
Finally, Williams described two other reverse-engineering exceptions 
created by the amendment: one for error correction, such as Y2K remedia-
tion, where an error-free version is not available at a commercial price, and 
another for security testing, such as testing a computer’s systems protection 
against hackers or viruses.76
5.1.3.2 The Structure of the Reverse-Engineering Exception
In an explanatory memorandum that accompanied the amendment, the 
government discussed the four alternatives it had considered.77
The first alternative was to leave the law unchanged. This was rejected 
for the reasons outlined in the Speech on Second Reading: the costs to the 
Australian software industry would be too great.
The second alternative was to expand the fair-dealing provisions of 
the Copyright Act, presumably to bring it more in line with the fair-use 
provisions of the U.S. Copyright Act. Although the U.S. government and 
the Business Software Alliance supported this option, the Australian gov-
ernment did not pursue it, because of the uncertain extent of protection 
against infringement actions such a provision would provide to software 
developers. Since fair dealing, like fair use, is determined case by case by 
courts, the contours of the new fair-dealing provision would emerge only 
from lengthy and expensive litigation.78
The third alternative was to adopt the reverse-engineering provisions of 
the EU Software Directive. The government found this preferable to simply 
amending the fair-dealing provision, insofar as a statutory exception pro-
vided more certainty to developers of interoperable software. At the same 
74. Id. at 4.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 5–6.
77. Explanatory Memorandum on Copyright Amendment (Computer Programs) Bill 
of 1999 at § 4.3.
78. Id.
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time, the government concluded that the Software Directive was deficient 
in two respects. First, it did not permit decompilation for purposes of secu-
rity testing. Second, the Software Directive could be understood to permit 
decompilation only for purposes of achieving interoperability between two 
software products, but not between software and hardware.79 The Austra-
lian government decided that decompilation should clearly be permitted 
for both software-to-software and software-to-hardware interoperability. 
Accordingly, the Australian government decided to pursue a fourth alterna-
tive: starting with the EU Software Directive and adding provisions con-
cerning security testing and software-hardware interoperability.80
The amendment passed by Parliament has five sections concerning 
reverse engineering.
Black-Box Reverse Engineering
Section 47B(3) parallels article 5(3) of the EU Software Directive and permits 
the copying done in the course of black-box reverse engineering such as 
input-output tests. The section permits reproductions “made in the course 
of running a copy of the program for the purpose of studying the ideas 
behind the program and the way in which it functions.”
Decompilation for Interoperability
Section 47D parallels article 6 of the EU Software Directive and permits 
making adaptations of a program (e.g., decompiling a program) “for the 
purpose of obtaining information necessary to enable the owner or licensee 
to make independently another program (the new program), or an article, 
to connect to and be used together with, or otherwise to interoperate with, 
the original program or any other program.” The reference to the making of 
“an article” is the language that permits decompilation for the purpose of 
achieving software-to-hardware interoperability. The wording of the final 
clause of the provision—“to connect to and be used together with, or oth-
erwise to interoperate with, the original program or any other program”—
makes clear that the exception is directed to the making of both products 
79. A manufacturer of a peripheral device such as a disk drive or a printer may have 
to reverse engineer a computer’s operating system to ensure that the peripheral 
device functions properly with the computer. On why the EU Software Directive 
permits decompilation for software-to-hardware interoperability, see Band and 
Katoh, Interfaces on Trial at 248–249.
80. Explanatory Memorandum on Copyright Amendment (Computer Programs) Bill 
of 1999 at § 4.3.
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that attach to the original program and products that compete with the 
original program.81
The other provisions of section 47D place limits on decompilation. 
Under subsection (c), the adaptation can be “made only to the extent rea-
sonably necessary to obtain” the interface information. Under subsection 
(e), decompilation can be performed only when the interface information 
“is not readily available to the owner or licensee from another source when 
the . . . adaptation is made.” Article 6 of the EU Software Directive contains 
similar limitations.
Section 47D contains a significant provision not found in the EU Soft-
ware Directive. Subsection (d) permits decompilation under the following 
condition: “to the extent that the new program reproduces or adapts the 
original program, it does so only to the extent necessary to enable the new 
program to connect to and be used together with, or otherwise to interoper-
ate with, the original program or the other program.” This subsection makes 
it unambiguous that a developer of interoperable software can include in 
the new program the interface information derived from the original pro-
gram. Although this concept is implicit in the EU Software Directive (what 
would be the point of permitting decompilation if one could not use the 
fruit of that research?), there is no explicit statement allowing the use of the 
information or declaring such information per se unprotected by copyright. 
The closest the directive gets is in article 1(2), which states that “[i]deas and 
principles which underlie any element of a computer program, including 
those which underlie its interfaces, are not protected by copyright.”82 Sec-
tion 47D(d) eliminates any ambiguity by directly permitting the copying of 
any element necessary for interoperability.
81. As was discussed in chapter 2, the question of attaching versus competing has 
long been central in the interoperability debate. Dominant software vendors have 
argued that reverse engineering should be permitted only for the development of 
attaching, but not competing, products. However, because these dominant software 
vendors are typically vertically integrated, the distinction between attaching and 
competing is artificial. For example, a new word processing product designed to 
“attach” to Microsoft Windows would also “compete” with Microsoft Word. More-
over, to achieve true backward and forward compatibility—to ensure that the com-
petitive product can interoperate with products on the market as well as those not 
yet introduced—the competition often must examine both sides of the interface.
82. We discuss this issue in greater detail in subsection 1.3.2. Under U.S. law, the 
unprotectability of interface information is primarily based on judicial interpretation 
of 17 U.S.C. 102(b). See Computer Associates v. Altai, 982 F.2d 693 (2d Cir. 1992); Band 
and Katoh, Interfaces on Trial at 83–165; subsection 1.3.1 and section 2.1 above.
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Error Correction
Section 47E permits reproducing or adapting computer programs to cor-
rect an error in the program that prevents it from operating as its author 
intended or in accordance with specifications or documentation supplied 
with the original copy. The adaptations can be made only for the owner or 
licensee of a lawful copy of the original program, only to the extent rea-
sonably necessary to correct the error, and only if an error-free copy is not 
available within a reasonable time at a commercial price.
The EU Software Directive does not contain a detailed provision dealing 
exclusively with error correction. However, article 5(1) states that a lawful 
acquirer of a computer program may engage in any of the acts restricted by 
articles 4(a) and (b), including reproduction and translation, “where they 
are necessary for the use of the computer program . . . in accordance with its 
intended purpose, including for error correction.” The Australian amendment, 
therefore, supplies additional specificity to a concept appearing in the EU 
Software Directive. This specificity appears to narrow the privileges granted 
under the directive. Under section 47E the error correction can be per-
formed only if an error-free copy is not available at an ordinary commercial 
price. Conversely, article 5(1) of the directive contains no such condition.
Security Testing
Section 47F permits the making of a reproduction or adaptation of a 
program for the purpose of (1) testing the security of the program or a 
computer system of which the program is a part or (2) investigating or cor-
recting a security flaw or vulnerability in the program or a computer system 
of which the program is a part. This exception applies only if the informa-
tion resulting from the reproduction or adaptation is not readily available 
from another source.
The EU Software Directive does not contain a parallel provision, but the 
dangers posed by hacking and viruses were better understood in 1999 than 
in 1991 (when the EU adopted the Software Directive). Moreover, the 1998 
U.S. Digital Millennium Copyright Act exempted computer system security 
testing from its ban on circumvention and circumvention devices.83
Limitation on Contractual Terms
Section 47H provides that “[a]n agreement, or a provision of an agreement, 
that excludes or limits, or has the effect of excluding or limiting, the opera-
tion” of the reverse-engineering subsections (i.e., 47B(3), 47D, 47E, and 47F) 
83. See 17 U.S.C. § 1201(j), discussed above in subsection 3.1.6.3.
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“has no effect.” This provision prevents a software company from restrict-
ing the reverse engineering permitted under the amendment by imposing 
contract terms prohibiting such reverse engineering. The Australian gov-
ernment recognized that enforcing contractual restrictions on reverse engi-
neering would undermine the pro-competition and pro-interoperability 
objective of the legislation. The EU Software Directive contains a similar 
provision in article 9(1).
In enacting a software reverse-engineering amendment, Australia chose 
to follow the more certain civil-code approach of the EU Software Direc-
tive. Because Australia’s software industries depend on interoperability, and 
interoperability often can be achieved only through reverse engineering, 
the government was impelled to eliminate the legal barriers to software 
reverse engineering.
5.1.4 Australia’s Implementation of the Australia-U.S. Free Trade 
Agreement
In 2004, Australia and the United States entered into a free-trade agreement 
that required the parties to “provide adequate legal protection and effective 
legal remedies against the circumvention of effective technological mea-
sures that authors, performers, and producers of phonograms use in con-
nection with the exercise of their rights and that restrict unauthorised acts 
in respect of their works, performances, and phonograms.”84 The agree-
ment specified that the parties shall provide legal remedies against any 
person who “knowingly, or having reasonable grounds to know, circum-
vents without authority any effective technological measure that controls 
access to a protected work, performance, or phonogram, or other subject 
matter.”85 The agreement further required the parties to provide remedies 
against any person who “manufactures, imports, distributes, offers to the 
public, provides, or otherwise traffics in devices, products, or components, 
or offers to the public, or provides services…” that circumvent an effective 
technological measure. The agreement allowed the parties to adopt excep-
tions to these prohibitions, including one for “non-infringing reverse engi-
neering activities with regard to a lawfully obtained copy of a computer 
program, carried out in good faith with respect to particular elements of 
that computer program that have not been readily available to the person 
engaged in those activities, for the sole purpose of achieving interoperabil-
ity of an independently created computer program with other programs.”86
84. Australia-U.S. Free Trade Agreement, Art. 17.4.7(a), May 18, 2004.
85. Id. at (a)(i).
86. Id. at (e)(i).
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In 2006, the Australian Parliament amended the Copyright Act of 1968 
to implement the changes required by the Australia-U.S. FTA. The amend-
ments included civil and criminal prohibitions on the circumvention of 
an access-control technological protection measure, on the manufacture 
or distribution of a device that circumvents a technological protection 
measure, or on providing a circumvention service. The amendments also 
provided interoperability exceptions to these prohibitions. Under these 
exceptions, the prohibitions on circumvention and circumvention devices 
do not apply when the circumvention:
(i) relates to a copy of a computer program (the original program) that is 
not an infringing copy and that was lawfully obtained; and
(ii) will not infringe the copyright in the original program; and
(iia) relates to elements of the original program that will not be readily 
available to the person when the circumvention occurs; and
(iii) will be done for the sole purpose of achieving interoperability of an 
independently created computer program with the original program or any 
other program.87
Although the FTA refers to “non-infringing reverse engineering activities 
. . . carried out . . . for the sole purpose of achieving interoperability,” these 
exceptions are not limited to reverse engineering. Rather, they apply to 
any circumvention activity performed to achieve interoperability between 
computer programs, including the circumvention of an authentication 
handshake designed to prevent interoperability with software products 
developed by other vendors. Thus, the exception in the Australian copy-
right law has the same breadth as the interoperability exception in section 
1201(f) of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act.
5.2 Singapore
Singapore amended its copyright laws to permit software reverse engineer-
ing in 1998—the year before Australia adopted its own reverse-engineering 
87. Copyright (Amendment) Act, 2006 §§ 116AN(3), 116AO(3), 116AP(3), 
132APC(3), 132APD(3), and 132APE(3). This exception was anticipated by the CLRC 
Report’s discussion of the modification of “locked” programs. Although the CLRC 
Report recommended that the “modification of a locked program for the purpose of 
circumventing the lock should be prohibited” (10.94 at 175), it suggested that cir-
cumvention should be permitted for “back-up copying, interoperability, and error 
correction.”
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amendment.88 The two countries employed different legislative processes 
and statutory approaches, yet ended up in similar places for similar rea-
sons. In each instance, the government made clear that the amendments 
were necessary to allow the domestic software industry to compete in the 
global market. As was discussed above, Australians pursued a lengthy and 
often contentious deliberative process to arrive at an amendment modeled 
on the EU Software Directive. In contrast, Singapore quietly developed an 
approach that closely follows the United States’ reliance on the fair-use 
doctrine. Singapore’s statutory amendment was necessitated by the 1996 
ruling of the Singapore Court of Appeal’s decision in Aztech v. Creative Tech-
nologies—a decision that had the affect of prohibiting software companies 
from engaging in reverse engineering in Singapore.
5.2.1 Singapore Courts and Interoperability: Aztech v. Creative Technology 
(1997)
In 1995, the High Court in Singapore relied on the U.S. decisions con-
cerning reverse engineering to find the practice permissible under Singa-
pore’s copyright law. The following year, the Court of Appeal reversed this 
decision.
5.2.1.1 Facts
Creative Technology had developed “Sound Blaster” sound cards for use 
with personal computers. Along with its sound cards, the company pack-
aged some computer software, including a specific program known as TEST-
SBC. Somewhat later, Aztech began developing a sound card that would 
interoperate with applications designed for use with either the Sound 
Blaster or other standard sound cards in the industry. As part of the process 
of developing its own sound cards, Aztech copied Creative Technology’s 
TEST-SBC program into the random-access memory of its own computers. 
This was done to allow Aztech’s research-and-development team to run 
the computer program and to test it by running it along with other pro-
grams. Through this process, Aztech’s researchers hoped to study the man-
ner in which the Creative Technology program communicated directions 
to the Sound Blaster sound card. Thus, the reverse engineering involved 
88. This section is based on passages in the following publications: Jonathan Band 
and Taro Isshiki, “Interoperability in the Pacific Rim: Reversal of Fortunes in Singa-
pore and Australia,” Journal of Proprietary Rights, July 1997, at 2; Jonathan Band, “Soft-
ware Reverse Engineering Amendments in Singapore and Australia,” Journal of 
Internet Law, January 2000, at 17.
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only running Creative Technology’s program in tests (i.e., black-box reverse 
engineering), not the decompilation of the program from object code into a 
higher-level form. The legal issue presented was whether Aztech’s copying 
of the computer program into memory, in order to run the program as part 
of its hardware development process, qualified as “fair dealing”—the Com-
monwealth equivalent to the U.S. fair-use doctrine. The court evidently 
assumed that a transitory RAM copy was a copy within the meaning of 
Singapore’s copyright law.
5.2.1.2 The High Court’s Ruling
Fair Dealing
The four enumerated factors applied in determining whether a use should be 
considered “fair dealing” under the Singapore Copyright Act were remark-
ably similar to those under section 107 of the U.S. Copyright Act. However, 
Singapore’s statute was more restrictive in that it also required that the use 
of a literary work be “for the purpose of research or private study.”89 The 
statute also explicitly excluded from its definition of “research” industrial 
research or research carried out by companies or other business groups. But 
even under this restrictive definition of fair dealing the Singapore High 
Court found the use by Aztech to constitute “private study” within the 
intended meaning of the statute. “It seems to me,” the judge stated, “that 
a study is private if the study and the information and knowledge acquired 
through it are kept or removed from public knowledge or observation and 
this is so even if the purpose may be of a commercial nature.”90 This aspect 
of the decision is important, since a failure to construe “private study” to 
reach commercially motivated study would necessarily have excluded all 
forms of reverse analysis of computer software in a commercial context 
from the fair-dealing defense under Singapore law. It is also notable in that 
it shows the court’s stretching of the traditionally restrictive doctrine to 
accommodate the analysis practiced by Aztech.
In its evaluation of the four enumerated fair-dealing factors, the court 
emphasized that Aztech copied the Creative Technology program into the 
memory of its own computers only in order to run the program. The judge 
wrote that the program “was copied to the memory of the computer.” He 
continued: “That is the ordinary way of running the program and it was 
undoubtedly the way Creative intended it to be run. It was not copied in 
89. Aztech Systems Pte Ltd v. Creative Technology Ltd (1996) 1 SLR 683.
90. Id.
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any other way nor in any other form. It was not disassembled or printed 
out. No copies of it in any form were made for distribution or which could 
be distributed. I think this weighs in favour of fairness.”91 This was impor-
tant to the first fair-dealing factor—the purpose and character of the deal-
ing—because it indicated that the computer program was copied for the 
intended purpose of running the program. It was also important to the 
court’s determinations on the second and third factors (the nature of the 
work and the amount and substantiality of the part copied), since the 
nature of a computer program requires that it be copied in its entirety into 
the computer’s memory in order for the program to be run efficiently.
A significant distinction emphasized by the court several times during 
its fair-dealing determination was that Aztech was attempting to develop 
a competing sound card, not a software program that would compete with 
Creative Technology’s TEST-SBC program: “I think it has to be borne in 
mind though that the product that was developed and marketed by Aztech 
was the sound card. It was not a software program that emulated TEST-SBC or 
the instructions in it.”92 The court found this to be important in evaluating 
not only the commercial purpose of the dealing but also the effect upon the 
potential market or value of the work, since the development of a compet-
ing hardware product would not compete directly, or perhaps at all, with 
the analyzed software.
Finally, the court also considered, as an independent and additional fac-
tor in its fair-dealing determination, the public interests advanced by the 
dealing at issue. Like the Ninth Circuit in Sega, the Singapore High Court 
found that increasing the competitors in the market “to more than just 
Creative and those licensed by it” would be a benefit “in consonance with 
the purpose of the Act.”93 The court then concluded that the balance of the 
considerations required a finding that Aztech’s use of Creative Technolo-
gy’s program constituted fair dealing under the act and therefore succeeded 
as a defense to infringement.
Two Important Caveats
The limited extent of the reverse engineering reviewed in this case must be 
noted. All the High Court considered was Aztech’s copying of the TEST-SBC 
program into RAM in order to study a specific command of the program. 





Technology’s software. This observation creates the implication that the 
High Court might have ruled differently in a case involving decompilation 
of a computer program’s object code.
A second potential limitation suggested by the High Court’s opinion is 
that reverse engineering of computer programs for the purpose of develop-
ing competing software might not be construed as fair dealing. Here, Aztech 
studied the Creative Technology program in order to develop competing 
hardware. As was stated above, this was a crucial factual distinction in the 
court’s evaluation of two of the four statutory fair-dealing factors. The pres-
ence of direct competition might have altered the court’s ultimate finding 
of fair dealing.
Use of Foreign Law
It is interesting that the High Court considered U.S. copyright decisions 
regarding reverse engineering specifically, and fair use generally, and yet 
left open the possibility of the limitations discussed above. The court first 
justified its examination of U.S. decisions because the provisions for fair 
dealing in Singapore and for fair use in the United States “are in many 
respects similar.”94 The U.S. decision discussed most extensively by the 
court was the Ninth Circuit’s Sega decision. However, Sega contains neither 
of the limitations implicitly imposed by the High Court—the exclusion of 
decompilation and reverse engineering for the purpose of direct competi-
tion. The Singapore High Court instead turned to the Sega decision rather 
warily, embracing only its recognition of the public interest as relevant in 
fair-use determinations:
While I am conscious of the need to approach the American authorities with caution 
in view of the development in that jurisdiction of the distinction between ideas and 
functional concepts which are not protected by copyright and the expression of those 
unprotected elements which is protected it is at least comforting to know that the 
broader public interest is a factor to be taken into consideration albeit in respect of 
the “purpose and character” of the use although I would prefer to treat it as a sepa-
rate matter to which regard is to be had.95
The court also investigated the applicability of an 1871 patent case, Betts 
v. Wilmont, in which a British court held that a purchaser of goods patented 
by another party has control of the goods such that, absent a clear and 
explicit agreement to the contrary, the purchaser may sell or use the articles 




of the software from Creative Technology gave it the “right to use it for a 
reasonable purpose.”96 The court agreed:
When a man buys a Sound Blaster sound card and with it comes TEST-SBC he ex-
pects to have and to exercise his rights of ownership over it. He can use it. That is one 
of the rights of ownership. He can run the software in his PC. That is what it is for. 
To run it the program has to be copied to the PC’s memory. He can run the program 
in as many PCs and as often as he pleases. He can study it to see what it is doing and 
he can experiment with it. That is exercising his right as an owner to use it. But he 
cannot make and distribute copies of it. That is not using it. That is not using the 
software he has bought.97
Most importantly, the court located the above-described right in Aztech’s 
ownership of the software, not in the reasonableness of the use for which 
the software was employed.98 Thus, even though the court suggested poten-
tial limitations on the fair-dealing defense, it provided a fairly broad and 
independent defense based on the right of ownership as recognized in Betts 
v. Wilmont.
5.2.1.3 Reversal by the Court of Appeal
In 1997, the Court of Appeal reversed the High Court’s holding that 
Aztech’s copying of Creative Technology’s program during the course of 
reverse engineering it to develop a compatible product was a fair dealing 
under the Singapore Copyright Act.99
Fair Dealing Defense
Section 35(1) of the act provided that “fair dealing . . . for the purpose of 
research or private study shall not constitute an infringement of the copy-
right.” Section 35(5) defined “research” as excluding “industrial research, 
research carried out by bodies corporate . . . or bodies or persons carrying on 
any business.” As was noted above, the High Court had ruled that Aztech’s 
reverse engineering was private study and not research, and therefore was 
permitted under section 35(1). The Court of Appeal disagreed with the High 
Court and decided that section 35(1) excludes commercial research as well 
as private study for commercial purposes. The Court of Appeal said that 
in order to come within the “private study” exception, the copying must 




99. Creative Technology, Ltd v. Aztech Systems Pte Ltd (1997) 1 SLR 621.
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argument that if it were to adopt a broader construction of “private study” 
to extend to “private study for commercial purposes” it effectively would 
render meaningless the specific exclusion of commercial research under 
section 35(5). Since the Court of Appeal concluded that Aztech’s admitted 
copying of TEST-SBC did not qualify as “research or private study,” the fair-
dealing defense was not available to Aztech.
“Essential Step” Defense
Section 39(3) of SCA, which is derived from section 117 of the U.S. Copy-
right Act, allows the owner of a computer program to copy or adapt that 
program as an essential step in the utilization of the program in conjunc-
tion with a machine. The Court o f Appeal considered whether the essential 
steps in using a computer program could include copying it into RAM for 
the purpose of studying the underlying ideas and concepts of the program. 
Relying for guidance on interpretations of section 117 of the U.S. Copyright 
Act, including Apple Computer, Inc. v. Formula International, Inc.100 and Allen-
Myland, Inc. v. IBM Corp.,101 the Court of Appeal agreed with Creative Tech-
nology that section 39(3) was enacted for the limited purpose of allowing 
the rightful owner of the program to load and use it in his computer. In the 
Court of Appeal’s view, section 39(3) did not allow copying or adaptation 
for the purpose of creating of a compatible product. Therefore, Aztech’s 
RAM copy of TEST-SBC could not be deemed an essential step in the uti-
lization of the program. In reaching this conclusion, the Court of Appeal 
explicitly rejected the Fifth Circuit’s decision in Vault Corp. v. Quaid Soft-
ware Ltd.,102 which held that section 117 permitted RAM copying during the 
course of reverse engineering.
Implied License
Aztech argued that when it purchased TEST-SBC, it obtained along with 
its physical ownership the right to use it for a reasonable purpose. Aztech 
again relied upon the 1871 British patent case, Betts v. Wilmont, which 
held that the purchaser of a patented article has an implied license to sell 
the article and to use it for any reasonable purpose, absent some clear and 
explicit agreement to the contrary. Aztech asserted that its use was for a rea-
sonable purpose; the copy of TEST-SBC was made to ascertain functionality 
100. 594 F. Supp. 617 (C.D. Cal. 1984), aff’d, 725 F.2d 521 (9th Cir. 1984).
101. 746 F. Supp. 520 (E.D. Pa. 1990), vacated and remanded, 33 F.3d 194 (3d Cir. 
1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1066 (1994).
102. 847 F.2d 255 (5th Cir. 1988).
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with the object of building a non-infringing compatible product. The trial 
judge made no finding on whether such use was indeed reasonable, but 
was persuaded that Aztech merely exercised an inherent right of ownership 
conferred by the purchase of TEST-SBC.
The Court of Appeal disagreed with the trial judge and held that the 
proposition in Betts is inapplicable in the Singaporean copyright context. 
The Court of Appeal noted that the exclusive rights granted to the patent 
owner differ materially from those accorded to the copyright owner and 
that to uphold such an implied license would run contrary to the provi-
sions of the SCA.
Decompilation of Firmware
At trial and on appeal, Creative Technology alleged that Aztech had decom-
piled a substantial portion of the firmware embedded in the Sound Blaster 
microprocessor. The High Court decided as a factual matter that Aztech had 
not decompiled the firmware.
The Court of Appeal disagreed. After an extensive review of the facts, the 
Court of Appeal determined that Aztech had the means, the motive, and 
the opportunity to decompile Creative Technology’s firmware. Further-
more, the literal similarities between Aztech’s and Creative Technology’s 
firmware raised the “irresistible inference that the chances of independent 
development on the part of Aztech were low.”103 However, because no more 
than 4 percent of Aztech’s code was identical to Creative Technology’s, the 
Court of Appeal held that Aztech’s copying did not amount to a substantial 
taking.
Although the appellate court found no liability for the decompilation, it 
nonetheless seemed disturbed by the act of decompilation itself:
This . . . in no way prejudices our finding of [decompilation], which involves a de-
gree of reproduction and adaptation having a greater impact in terms of revealing 
the ideas and interfaces of a copyright holder’s program, insights which would not 
otherwise have been obtained by independent development or empirical observa-
tion within a given time frame.104
In other words, the Court of Appeal viewed the decompilation negatively 
precisely because it revealed features not protected by copyright.
There is a clear contrast between the Court of Appeal’s hostile view 
toward decompilation and the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Sega Enters, Ltd. 
103. Creative Technology, Ltd v. Aztech Systems Pte Ltd (1997) 1 SLR 621.
104. Id.
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v. Accolade, Inc.105 In Sega, the court decided that decompilation in order 
to gain access to the unprotectable elements of the program, when no 
other means of access was available, was a fair use. The Sega court did not 
view decompilation as an independent wrong, but as a legitimate means 
of studying the ideas of the computer program in order to create a non-
infringing product. (Interestingly, the Court of Appeal followed Sega’s hold-
ing that section 117 did not permit decompilation.)
After the Aztech decision, no commercially motivated research or study 
was entitled to the fair-dealing defense in Singapore. Thus, developers of 
interoperable software could not use the fair-dealing defense to excuse the 
interim copies made during decompilation and other forms of reverse engi-
neering, nor could they rely on “essential step” or “implied license” argu-
ments to justify their interim copying.
5.2.2 Responding to Aztech: Singapore’s Software Reverse-Engineering 
Amendments
In response to the Court of Appeal’s decision in Aztech, Singapore’s Attor-
ney-General of Law drafted an amendment to the Copyright Act, which 
was introduced in the Singapore Parliament in February of 1998.106 The 
amendment deleted section 35(5), thereby allowing a court to interpret 
research and private study to include commercial reverse engineering. In 
introducing the amendment, the Attorney-General of Law stated: “[T]he 
deletion . . . of section 35(5) of the Act will bring us in line with the United 
States, the United Kingdom, other European Union countries, Hong Kong, 
and Australia, which do not bar the use of copyright materials for commer-
cial research.”107
Professor Chin Tet Yung, in the brief debate of the amendment in Parlia-
ment, said:
It is very important to ensure that there is a fair balance in any Copyright Bill be-
tween the interests of holders of rights in “cutting edge” software and the interest of 
competitors who want to design and market non-infringing competing programmes 
which interface or are inter-operable with the basic programmes.
The Court of Appeal’s decision in Creative Technology v. Aztech established that 
currently Singapore’s copyright law does not permit most kinds of reverse engineer-
ing. Companies cannot decompile programmes to establish how they were put to-
gether and armed with that knowledge to develop new inter-operable programmes. 
105. 977 F.2d 1510 (9th Cir. 1992).
106. Copyright (Amendment) Bill of 1998.
107. Second Reading of Copyright (Amendment) Bill of 1998 (February 19, 1998). 
On the interoperability debate in Hong Kong, see section 5.3 of the present chapter.
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Whether competitors should be able to reverse engineer and, if so, to what extent, 
is a very difficult matter to resolve. It seems clear, however, that most countries in 
the world are trying to draw a line between those two differing computer industry 
groups so that those who own the copyright in the leading programmes can main-
tain their strong copyright protection over their software, but that in certain circum-
stances others may decompile because there is a public interest in doing so.
In the United States, use is made of the “fair use” defence, whereby courts are 
required to weigh up, on the facts of every case, whether the defendants could jus-
tify their activities. In Singapore, with the current amendment to section 35(5), I am 
pleased to see that the Copyright Bill brings the law of Singapore very close to that 
of the United States. This is especially welcome and should receive warm support 
from the industry.108
In short, the amendment was clearly intended to overturn the result in 
Aztech and permit software reverse engineering to the extent permitted by 
the U.S. fair-use doctrine.109 The government sought to allow Singapore 
companies to develop interoperable software products.
In 2004, Singapore amended its copyright law to include provisions 
modeled on the black-box reverse-engineering provision and the decom-
pilation provision of the EU Software Directive. At the same time, it left its 
amended fair-dealing provision in place. Furthermore, the new provisions 
(39A and B) specifically stated that they were “without prejudice to the gen-
erality of section 35” and “d[id] not limit the operation of that section.”110 
Thus, reverse-engineering activities that did not fall directly within the two 
new provisions could still be permitted by the fair-dealing section.
The 2004 amendments also implemented the Singapore-U.S. Free Trade 
Agreement, signed by the parties the previous year. Like the Australia-
U.S. FTA, the Singapore-U.S. FTA required the parties to provide effective 
legal remedies against the circumvention of technological protection mea-
sures.111 Similarly, the Singapore-U.S. FTA permitted parties to provide a 
reverse-engineering exception to the circumvention prohibition. Thus, 
under section 261D(1)(d) of the Singapore Copyright Act, the prohibitions 
108. Second Reading of Copyright (Amendment) Bill of 1998 (February 19, 1998).
109. As was discussed above in chapters 1 and 2, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Ninth Circuit, in Sega Enter. Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510, 1527–1528 (9th Cir. 
1992), held that “where disassembly is the only way to gain access to the ideas and 
functional elements embodied in a copyrighted computer program and where there 
is a legitimate reason for seeking such access, disassembly is a fair use of the copy-
righted work, as a matter of law.”
110. Copyright Act, Singapore Statutes Chap. 63.
111. See subsection 5.1.4 of the present chapter.
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on circumvention and circumvention devices do not apply when the cir-
cumvention is done
i. in good faith;
ii. in relation to a copy of a computer program that is not an infringing copy; and
iii. with respect to particular elements of the computer program that are not readily 
available to the person doing the act,
for the sole purpose of achieving interoperability of an independently created com-
puter program with another computer program. . . .112
5.3 Hong Kong
In the months before the turnover of Hong Kong to China, the Hong Kong 
Legislative Council busily worked at revising its copyright laws with the 
understanding that the new laws would continue in effect after the depar-
ture of the British on July 1, 1997.113 One of the provisions the Legisla-
tive Council considered would have specifically permitted decompilation 
for purposes of achieving interoperability. Rather than let the Legislative 
Council determine for itself what was in the best interests of Hong Kong, 
U.S. software companies represented by the Business Software Alliance114 
encouraged the U.S. Trade Representative to pressure the Legislative Coun-
cil into dropping the provision. The Legislative Council ultimately aban-
doned the decompilation provision, but in its place adopted, with BSA’s 
blessing, another provision based on the U.S. fair-use doctrine. This fair-use 
language arguably permits more reverse engineering than the decompila-
tion provision would have permitted.
5.3.1 The November 1996 Copyright Bill Consulting Paper
In November of 1996, the Department of Intellectual Property of Hong 
Kong’s Board of Trade and Industry produced a consultation paper on a 
new copyright law, which included a proposed text for the bill. Section 
57 of the Consultation Paper draft specifically permitted decompilation 
of object code for purposes of achieving interoperability. Section 57(1)(a) 
defined decompilation as the conversion of a “computer program expressed 
112. Copyright Act, Singapore Statutes Chap. 63.
113. This section is based on Jonathan Band, “Gunboat Diplomacy on the Pearl 
River: The Tortuous History of the Software Reverse Engineering Provisions of Hong 
Kong’s New Copyright Bill,” The Computer Lawyer, February 1998, at 8.
114. The BSA’s members included Microsoft, Novell, Autodesk, and Lotus (a subsid-
iary of IBM).
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in a low level language . . . into a version expressed in a higher-level lan-
guage.”115 The only permitted objective of the decompilation was obtaining 
“the information necessary to create an independent program which can 
be operated with the program decompiled or with another program.” Sec-
tion 57(3) prohibited decompilation when the “information necessary to 
achieve the permitted objective” was “readily available” to the user by other 
means, when the decompiling was not confined “to such acts as are neces-
sary to achieve the permitted objective,” when the information obtained by 
decompilation was supplied to a person not essential to achievement of the 
permitted objective, or when the information obtained by decompilation 
was used “to create a program which is substantially similar in its expres-
sion to the program decompiled.” Finally, section 57(4) expressly voided 
contractual restrictions on decompilation otherwise permitted by section 
57.
Section 57 of the Consultation Paper closely followed the decompilation 
provision of the UK copyright statute, section 50B, which closely followed 
the article 6 of the EU Software Directive. In other words, from a substan-
tive perspective there was nothing controversial about section 57. Nonethe-
less, section 57 drew a sharp reaction from the U.S. government. In a cable 
sent in December of 1996, the U.S. government recommended deletion of 
section 57. The United States specifically objected to the voiding of con-
tractual restrictions on decompilation, noting that this stood “in marked 
contrast to the EC Software Directive.” The cable explained that “a similar 
restriction on the freedom of contract was proposed and rejected during 
consideration of the directive.” In fact, the opposite was true. Article 9(1) of 
the directive explicitly provides that “[a]ny contractual provisions contrary 
to Article 6 [the decompilation provision] . . . shall be null and void.” Thus, 
an official communication between the U.S. government and the Hong 
Kong Department of Intellectual Property contained an obvious legal error.
The cable suggested that section 57 had a broader permitted objective 
than article 6 of the EU Software Directive in that section 57 permitted 
decompilation for the purpose of creating new programs, whereas the EU 
Software Directive permits decompilation only for the purpose of achieving 
interoperability of existing programs. However, this interpretation of article 
6 of the directive as permitting decompilation only to achieve interoperabil-
ity between two existing products, and not to develop a new interoperable 
product, had no basis in the text of the directive or in its legislative history.
115. It is this act of conversion or translation that implicates the copyright owner’s 
right to create a derivative work.
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The cable also indicated that a decompilation provision would be inap-
propriate in view of the challenges of enforcing copyrights in Hong Kong. 
Yet the cable failed to explain how permitting decompilation would weaken 
enforcement. Good enforcement flows from an effective judicial system, 
and decompilation, of course, would have no effect on Hong Kong’s judi-
ciary. A decompilation provision also would not complicate judicial pro-
ceedings; section 57 would not provide a colorable defense to a software 
“pirate” engaged in wholesale copying.
The cable concluded by suggesting that Hong Kong delete section 57 
because several other countries in the Asia-Pacific region, including Austra-
lia, New Zealand, Japan, and Korea, had considered and rejected a decom-
pilation provision based on the EU Software Directive. This, too, was a 
misstatement. The Australian Copyright Law Review Committee in 1995 
recommended legislative enactment of a decompilation provision,116 and, 
as was discussed above, in 1999 Australia amended its copyright law to 
include a decompilation exception based on the EU Software Directive. 
In Japan, a private-sector advisory committee began to consider a reverse-
engineering exception at the request of the Cultural Affairs Agency. The 
CAA’s simple act of making the request, however, drew a sharp rebuke from 
the U.S. government, and the advisory committee concluded that it was 
premature to consider the issue.117 Similarly, as will be discussed below, 
the Korean Ministry of Information and Communications suspended its 
consideration of a reverse-engineering exception in the face of protests by 
the U.S. government.118 In short, neither Japan nor Korea rejected a decom-
pilation provision after considering its merits; rather, they abandoned their 
efforts in response to U.S. pressure, but left the door open to revisiting the 
issue in the future.119
Although the U.S. government urged the Department of Intellectual 
Property to discard section 57, the American Committee for Interoperable 
Systems120 pressed for amendments to make section 57 even more con-
ducive to interoperability. Specifically, ACIS noted (in comments dated 
November 27, 1996) that section 57 contained an ambiguity that was 
116. See subsection 5.1.1 of the present chapter.
117. See Band and Katoh, Interfaces on Trial at 297–316.
118. See section 5.5 of the present chapter.
119. Additionally, most scholars agree that software reverse engineering is currently 
permitted under Japanese law. See, e.g., Ozaki, “Copyright Protection of Software: 
The Japanese View,” 1990 Computer Law Reporter 950 (1990).
120. The members of ACIS included Sun Microsystems, Storage Technology Corpo-
ration, 3Com, Fujitsu Systems Business of America, and NCR.
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present in article 6 of the EU Software Directive. Both provisions permitted 
decompilation to achieve interoperability between two software products, 
but were silent about decompilation to permit interoperability between 
software and hardware. ACIS observed that the French National Assembly 
rectified this problem when it implemented the EU Software Directive by 
explicitly permitting decompilation to achieve software-hardware interop-
erability. Likewise, the Australian CRLC’s decompilation provision applied 
to software-hardware interoperability. ACIS also urged that section 57 be 
extended to permit decompilation for purposes of error correction, again 
citing the Australian CLRC as a precedent.
5.3.2 The First Reading in the Legislative Council
In late February of 1997, the Board of Trade and Industry submitted its 
Copyright Bill to the Legislative Council, and it had its first reading. The 
bill retained the decompilation provision, which now appeared as section 
60. The new section 60 differed from the original section 57 in one signifi-
cant respect; whereas original section 57(4) voided contractual restrictions 
on decompilation, new section 60 expressly stated that the decompilation 
privilege was “subject to any agreement to the contrary.” In other words, 
the bill on first reading took the completely opposite position on this issue 
from the Consultation Paper.
On April 11, 1997, ACIS submitted comments to the Legislative Council’s 
Bills Committee applauding the retention of a decompilation exception. 
ACIS noted the consistency of section 60 with the EU Software Directive, 
with the case law in the United States treating decompilation as a fair use, 
and with the Australian CLRC’s recommendations.
ACIS proceeded to observe that section 60 differed from its anteced-
ents on the issue of the enforceability of contractual restrictions on reverse 
engineering. After quoting article 9(1) of the EU Software Directive, which 
voided contractual restrictions on decompilation, ACIS explained that 
“[t]he European Community included article 9(1) in the Directive because 
it correctly understood that without such a provision, software companies 
with market power would undo the delicate balance reached in the Direc-
tive by routinely including in their licenses clauses overriding Article 6.” 
ACIS concluded that “Section 60(4) as a practical matter renders the rest of 
Section 60 a nullity.”
5.3.3 The Bills Committee Hearings
Had the Business Software Alliance simply endorsed section 60 as intro-
duced by the Board of Trade and Industry, it probably would have won 
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the day. Whereas section 60 theoretically permitted decompilation for pur-
poses of achieving interoperability, section 60(4) allowed members of BSA 
to prohibit decompilation by shrinkwrap license.
BSA, however, continued to lobby for complete elimination of the 
decompilation privilege. By pitting itself against the Board of Trade and 
Industry, it set in motion a process that resulted in a legal framework far 
more liberal than section 60 on first reading, and indeed arguably more 
liberal than section 57 of the Consultation Paper.
During April and May of 1997, the Bills Committee held a series of 
public hearings on the Copyright Bill. The Business Software Alliance and 
the Software Publishers Association testified against section 60; ACIS tes-
tified in its favor, provided that section 60(4) was deleted or reversed. 
(Emery Simon, a former official in the Office of the U.S. Trade Representa-
tive, testified for BSA; Peter M. C. Choy, Deputy General Counsel of Sun 
Microsystems, testified on behalf of ACIS. Transcripts of the hearings are 
not available.) On April 18, BSA filed a detailed written submission, to 
which ACIS replied point by point on April 25. BSA made the following 
arguments: 
1. Decompilation reveals the source code of a computer program.
2. Decompilation is cheaper than obtaining a license and easier than devel-
oping a new program from the beginning.
3. Decompilation facilitates “hidden” piracy by allowing the reverse engi-
neer to copy a program’s functionality.
4. Decompilation is not necessary for interoperability because copyright 
owners make available the information necessary for interoperability.
5. Decompilation is not necessary because there are non-infringing means 
of obtaining interoperability information.
6. In the five years since the European Union adopted the Software Direc-
tive, no other country has followed its lead on decompilation.
7. A decompilation provision will suggest to the international community 
that Hong Kong is not serious about copyright infringement.121
ACIS responded as follows:
1. Decompilation at most reveals a shadow of the original source code, 
because it cannot recover the programmer’s comments nor restore the 
original sequence of the code. Additionally, decompilation does not yield 
121. Presentation of the Business Software Alliance to the Bills Committee (April 18, 
1997). As we discussed in subsection 2.2.3, Judge Jackson disagreed with many of 
these contentions in his decision in U.S. v. Microsoft, 84 F.Supp.2d 9 (D.D.C. 1999).
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instructions in a high level programming language, but only in assembly 
language.
2. While the actual act of decompilation is cheap and easy, the engineer 
using decompilation must still invest significant resources to understand 
the jumbled, decompiled code.
3. Decompilation does not facilitate hidden piracy because copying a 
program’s functionality, but not its code, does not constitute copyright 
infringement.
4. While some software developers may be willing to license interface infor-
mation if doing so is consistent with their business plan, there often are 
circumstances when a firm may not be willing to license the information 
on reasonable terms. Moreover, even when a firm does license the informa-
tion on reasonable terms, the information may be incomplete or untimely.
5. Sometimes other reverse engineering techniques—so called black-box 
reverse engineering—will reveal the interface information necessary for 
interoperability, but sometimes decompilation is the only effective method.
6. In addition to the then fifteen members of the EU, eight European coun-
tries had adopted a decompilation exception based on article 6 of the Soft-
ware Directive—Norway, Switzerland, Bulgaria, Estonia, Poland, Romania, 
Russia, and Slovenia. Further, courts in four different federal circuits in the 
U.S. had ruled that decompilation constitutes a fair use.122
7. Given the lawfulness of decompilation in twenty-four nations, ranging 
from highly industrialized countries such as the U.S., the U.K., Germany 
and France, to much less developed countries such as Bulgaria and Roma-
nia, the world community would not view Hong Kong’s adoption of a 
decompilation provision as a signal that it did not take copyright seriously. 
In this context, ACIS noted that BSA’s European counsel had described 
article 6 of the Directive as a “reasonable exception,” and that BSA had 
not objected to its adoption throughout Central and Eastern Europe, where 
copyright infringement also was a serious concern.123
5.3.4 The Imposition of a Fair-Use Approach
When BSA representative Emery Simon testified before the Legislative 
Council on April 18, he suggested that decompilation be handled case by 
122. Sega Enters. Ltd. v. Accolade Inc., 977 F.2d 1521 (9th Cir. 1992); Atari Games Corp. 
v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., 975 F.2d 832 (Fed. Cir. 1992); Bateman v. Mnemonics Inc., 79 
F.3d 1532 (11th Cir. 1996); DSC Communications v. DGI Techs., 898 F. Supp. 1183 
(N.D. Tex. 1995), aff’d, 81 F.3d 597 (5th Cir. 1996).
123. ACIS Response to BSA’s April 18 Presentation to the Bills Committee (April 25, 
1997).
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case under Hong Kong’s fair-dealing exception. The Legislative Council 
directed the Board of Trade and Industry to delete section 60 and to pre-
pare amendments to the fair-dealing provisions that would accommodate 
decompilation in appropriate circumstances. The staff of the Board of Trade 
and Industry’s Department of Intellectual Property proposed adding the 
following language to section 37 concerning fair dealing: “The incidental 
copying by a lawful user of a computer program in the course of research 
or private study is fair dealing if it is done for the purpose of studying the 
operation of the program under study, or of creating another indepen-
dent program which is compatible with, but not substantially similar to or 
adapted from the program under study.” In essence, the proposal imported 
the language of section 60 into the fair-dealing provision.
Exactly what happened next is unclear, but it is rumored that when BSA 
learned on May 14 of the fair-dealing amendment proposed by the Depart-
ment of Intellectual Property, it requested that the Office of the U.S. Trade 
Representative intervene. A senior official in the Office of the USTR called 
the Secretary of Trade and Industry and insisted that the Board of Trade 
and Industry replace its fair-dealing amendment with language from the 
fair-use provision of the U.S. Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 107. The staff of the 
Department of Intellectual Property then prepared the following language 
as a new section 37(3):
In determining whether any dealing with a work of any description is fair dealing, 
the factors to be considered include—
a. the purpose and nature of the dealing;
b. the nature of the work; and
c. the amount and substantiality of the portion dealt with in relation to the work 
as a whole.
Additionally, the Department of Intellectual Property staff proposed a new 
section 36(2A): “In determining whether or not an act is permitted, the 
primary consideration is whether the act conflicts with a normal exploita-
tion of the work and unreasonably prejudices the legitimate interests of the 
copyright owner.”
ACIS and BSA agreed to this language. On June 24, when the Secretary 
of Trade and Industry submitted the bill—including this language—for its 
second reading, she issued a statement explaining that the language was 
intended to implement Hong Kong’s policy with respect to decompilation. 
After describing the decompilation provision in the bill gazetted in March, 
she alluded to the concerns raised by ACIS and BSA: “[W]e accept that the 
decompilation provision as drafted would be so limited as to be of little 
practical help to software companies wanting to decompile. On the other 
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hand, as an exception to copyright restriction, the provision has aroused 
serious concerns amongst leading software companies.”124
The Secretary of Trade and Industry stated that the Board of Trade and 
Industry had reviewed its policy intention on decompilation, and had con-
cluded that it “would like to encourage competition in the information 
technology industry by facilitating timely access to information and ideas 
underlying computer programs.” She continued:
Doing so is necessary for the independent creation of new products that attach to 
or compete with the programs under study. We accept that the incidental copying 
of a computer program by a lawful user during the course of decompilation or other 
reverse engineering performed to understand the operation of the program under 
study, or to develop a product inter-operable with the program under study, need 
not be absolutely restricted by copyright. Nor should it be completely deregulated. 
In determining whether the act should be allowed, we believe the overriding test is 
whether such act conflicts with the normal exploitation of the work by the copy-
right owner and unreasonably prejudices the legitimate interests of the copyright 
owner.125
The Secretary of Trade and Industry then explained how the modifica-
tions to the fair-dealing provisions flowed from these conclusions:
The object is to allow decompilation to be deemed a fair use provided it does not 
conflict with the normal exploitation of the rights and legitimate interests of the 
copyright owner. Drawing from the relevant provisions in the United States, we pro-
pose that other factors, including the purpose and nature of the dealing, the nature 
of the copyrighted work, and the amount and substantiality of the portion dealt 
with in relation to the copyright work as a whole, will also be taken into account in 
determining what constitutes “fair use.”126
The Legislative Council gave the bill its second reading on June 24, 1997, 
and its third reading on June 27. It took immediate effect on its third read-
ing. Under the turnover agreement with China it will remain in effect for 
50 years.
5.3.5 Fair Use vs. Fair Dealing vs. the EU Software Directive
Although the proposed section 60 explicitly permitted decompilation, it 
did so only for purposes of achieving interoperability, only if there was no 
other way of obtaining the necessary information, and, most significantly, 
124. Speech by Secretary of Trade and Industry on Resumption of Second Reading 
Debate at 10 (June 24, 1997). Under Hong Kong law, such floor statements constitute 
legislative history upon which courts should rely when interpreting a statute.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 11.
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only if it was not prohibited by a license term. By contrast, section 37(3) 
as enacted by the Legislative Council is far broader. The speech by the Sec-
retary of Trade and Industry makes clear that decompilation could be law-
ful when conducted “to understand the operation of the program under 
study” as well as “to develop a product inter-operable with the program 
under study.” Thus, section 37(3) recognizes legitimate objectives beyond 
achieving interoperability. This expansive reading of section 37(3) is even 
more compelling when its origins are considered. A Hong Kong court 
applying this language to a case involving decompilation will understand 
that it derives from the U.S. fair-use doctrine, and presumably will import 
the interpretation of the doctrine given by the U.S. courts. The Ninth Cir-
cuit ruled in Sega v. Accolade that the fair-use doctrine permitted decom-
pilation not only for purposes of learning the information necessary for 
interoperability, but for any legitimate reason: “[W]here disassembly is the 
only way to gain access to the ideas and functional elements embodied in 
a copyrighted computer program and where there is a legitimate reason for 
seeking such access, disassembly is a fair use of the copyrighted work, as a 
matter of law.”127
When section 37(3) was enacted, its terms were more expansive than 
those of the fair-use doctrine codified at 17 U.S.C. § 107.128 Section 37(3) 
omitted the phrase “including whether such use is of a commercial nature 
or is for nonprofit educational purposes” found in section 107(1), thereby 
eliminating the possibility of a presumption that commercial uses (such as 
decompilation by a profit-maximizing software firm) are unfair.
Section 37(3) also omitted the phrase “the effect of the use upon the 
potential market for or value of the copyrighted work” (found in section 
107(4)) and inserted in its place language from article 9(2) of the Berne 
Convention: “whether the act conflicts with the normal exploitation of 
the work and unreasonably prejudices the legitimate interests of the copy-
right owner.” Both the statute and the statement of the Secretary of Trade 
and Industry emphasize that this is the primary, overriding test. The inclu-
sion of this language did not signal an intent that section 37(3) had nar-
rower application than article 6 of the EU Software Directive, for article 
6(3) itself contains this same language. According to William Cornish of 
Cambridge University, this language is implicated only if decompilation is 
127. The terms “disassembly” and “decompilation” have the same meaning in legal 
parlance, but “disassembly” is commonly used in U.S. court decisions, whereas 
“decompilation” is used outside the U.S.
128. In 2007, Hong Kong amended its fair-dealing provision to track 17 U.S.C. § 107 
more closely.
Interoperability Overseas 177
used to develop a program substantially similar in expression to the decom-
piled program.129
Section 37(3) is broader than either of the earlier decompilation pro-
visions (57 and 60) in another significant respect. The earlier provisions 
referred to decompilation, but were silent about the lawfulness of the copy-
ing that occurs during the course of black-box reverse engineering—for 
example, the making of interim copies of the program in RAM when the 
program is run for the purpose of observing its operation. Section 37(3), by 
contrast, is broad enough to excuse such incidental copying. Once again, 
the statement by the Secretary of Trade and Industry confirms this by refer-
ring to the incidental copying “during the course of decompilation or other 
reverse engineering.”
Finally, section 60 specifically permitted contractual limitations on the 
decompilation privilege. Section 37, by contrast, is silent on this issue, leaving 
open the possibility that a Hong Kong court could determine that enforcing 
such a limitation would undermine the “policy intention” of “encourag[ing] 
competition in the information technology industry by facilitating timely 
access to information and ideas underlying computer programs.”
Since the Business Software Alliance had acknowledged that article 6 of 
the EU Software Directive was a reasonable compromise in the European 
context, and since courts in four circuits had found decompilation to be a 
fair use, it is not clear why BSA so strongly preferred fair use to article 6 in 
Hong Kong. By all appearances, the BSA gained nothing when it pressured 
countries to follow the fair-use model rather than the EU Software Directive 
model.
5.4 The Philippines
In 1997, the government of the Philippines proposed a reverse-engineer-
ing exception based on the EU Software Directive. Not surprisingly, that 
proposal encountered fierce opposition from the Office of the U.S. Trade 
Representative (USTR) and the Business Software Alliance. In response, the 
Philippines crafted a hybrid of the fair-use provision of the U.S. Copyright 
Act and article 6 of the EU Software Directive:
The fair use of a copyrighted work for criticism, comment, news reporting, teach-
ing including multiple copies for classroom use, scholarship, research, and similar 
129. William R. Cornish, “Computer Program Copyright and the Berne Conven-
tion,” in A Handbook of European Software Law (1993). The same language also appears 
in article 13 of the TRIPS Agreement.
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purposes is not an infringement of copyright. Decompilation, which is the reproduction 
of code and translation of the form of the computer program indispensable to obtain the 
information necessary to achieve the inter-operability of an independently created computer 
program with other programs may also constitute fair use. In determining whether the 
use made of a work in any particular case is fair use, the factors to be considered 
shall include:
a. The purpose and character of the use, including whether use is of a commercial 
nature or is for non-profit educational purposes;
b. The nature of the copyrighted work;
c. The amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted 
work as a whole; and
d. The effect of the use upon the potential market for value of the copyrighted 
work.130
As was noted above, when the Hong Kong Department of Intellectual Prop-
erty had proposed a similar grafting of reverse-engineering language onto 
the fair-use provision, the USTR voiced strong opposition. But there is no 
public record of the USTR’s objecting to the Philippine approach. As with 
the provision adopted in Hong Kong, it is far from clear that this formula-
tion constrains reverse engineering more than article 6 of the directive; 
indeed, the opposite may be the case. The provision was enacted in June of 
1997 and took effect in January of 1998.
5.5 Korea
Though one may question the wisdom and the propriety of the heavy-
handedness of the USTR and the Business Software Alliance in Hong Kong 
and in the Philippines, those American interventions were far less success-
ful than similar efforts in Japan and Korea. The Japanese Cultural Affairs 
Agency and the Korean Ministry of Information and Communications sus-
pended consideration of a reverse exception in 1994 and 1995, respectively, 
in the face of U.S opposition. The history of the Japanese deliberations of 
this issue is well documented131 and will not be discussed further here. By 
contrast, little has been written about the Korean deliberations. What fol-
lows is a brief summary.
The Korean episode began in early May of 1995, when the Ministry 
of Information and Communication of the Republic of Korea (i.e., South 
130. Intellectual Property Code of the Philippines, § 185.1 (emphasis added).
131. See Band and Katoh, Interfaces on Trial at 297–310. See also Crystal D. Talley, 
“Japan’s Retreat from Reverse Engineering: An Unnecessary Surrender?” 29 Cornell 
International Law Journal 807 (1997).
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Korea) proposed consideration of a reverse-engineering exception in the 
Computer Program Protection Act. The provision would excuse reproduc-
tions “where the program is temporarily reproduced or translated within 
the limits required for purposes of research and analysis necessary for the 
creation of interoperable programs.”
BSA promptly submitted lengthy comments opposing the amendment. 
Although the proposal by the Ministry of Information and Communication 
addressed software reverse engineering generally, BSA’s comments focused 
on decompilation. Decompilation, according to BSA, wasn’t necessary, 
because there were other ways to obtain interface information, including 
other reverse-engineering techniques and licensing; decompilation would 
facilitate disguised piracy and thereby harm the Korean software industry 
and prevent foreign investment in Korea; the Sega decision was “the view 
of only one U.S. court on a matter of first impression decided on an incom-
plete factual record and on a particular set of facts”; the level of protection 
currently afforded represented a further erosion; and the proposed excep-
tion was far broader than that in the EU Software Directive.132
The U.S government also strongly protested the Ministry of Information 
and Communication’s proposal. A position paper prepared by the U.S. Pat-
ent and Trademark Office made three points that paralleled those of the 
BSA. First, “Korea’s current system of protection is too weak to permit any 
limitation on protection in the form of a decompilation exception.” Sec-
ond, the EU Software Directive’s decompilation provision was far narrower 
than the proposed Korean exception. In particular, under the directive 
“[d]ecompilation can never be used to create a program that competes with 
the program which is being decompiled.” Third, the Sega and Atari deci-
sions were read very narrowly, with the conclusion that “[d]ecompilation 
could not be used to create programs which competed with the programs 
being decompiled.”133
The American Committee for Interoperable Systems, in letters to the 
PTO and the USTR, responded sharply to what it called “errors” in the U.S. 
government’s position paper. ACIS first referred to the legislative history of 
the EU Software Directive and its implementations in the member states to 
132. Business Software Alliance Position Paper Submitted to the Ministry of Informa-
tion and Communications of the Republic of Korean on proposed Exceptions from 
Protection for Computer Programs Under the Computer Program Protection Act 
(May 2, 1995).
133. U.S. Government Views on Decompilation Position in Korean Computer Pro-
gram Law (June 12, 1995).
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demonstrate that article 6 of the directive permitted decompilation for pur-
poses of developing both attaching and competing programs. Next, ACIS 
rebutted the U.S. government’s parsimonious reading of Sega and “improper 
trivializ[ation]” of Atari. Finally, though ACIS explicitly declined to address 
programs of piracy in Korea, it directly challenged the U.S. government’s 
suggestion that the decompilation could facilitate disguised piracy.134
In a letter to the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, the Computer 
& Communications Industry Association “object[ed] in the strongest terms 
possible to the Government’s flawed analysis of the EU Directive and the 
Sega decision.” “We are,” CCIA continued, “especially concerned that the 
Government is making representations to foreign governments that do not 
reflect an accurate and balanced analysis of the developing international 
jurisprudence relating to the permissibility of disassembly.”135
As ACIS and CCIA corresponded with the U.S. government, the European 
Committee for Interoperable Systems and the Supporters of Interoperable 
Systems in Australia communicated directly with the Ministry of Informa-
tion and Communication. ECIS suggested that “[a] provision permitting 
reverse engineering for interoperability purposes will facilitate legitimate 
competition and further consumer welfare without permitting piracy.” 
Likewise, SISA applauded the Ministry of Information and Communica-
tion’s simple exemption for reverse engineering to achieve interoperability.
In late July of 1995, the president of the Republic of Korea traveled to 
Washington to participate in the dedication of the Korean War Memorial 
on the National Mall. Secretary of Commerce Ron Brown used the opportu-
nity to complain to his Korean counterpart about the Ministry of Informa-
tion and Communication’s reverse-engineering proposal. Soon thereafter, 
the MIC abandoned the proposal.
5.6 Israel
In November of 2007, Israel’s legislature, the Knesset, enacted a new copy-
right law. The law included both a fair-use provision based on 17 U.S.C. 
134. Letter from Peter M. C. Choy, Chairman, ACIS, to Bruce Lehman, Commis-
sioner, U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (June 26, 1995); letter from Peter M. C. 
Choy, Chairman, ACIS, to Thomas Robertson, Assistant General Counsel, Office of 
the U.S. Trade Representative (June 26, 1995).
135. Letter from Gregory E. Gorman, Government Affairs Manager, CCIA, to Thomas 
Robertson, Assistant General Counsel, Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (July 5, 
1995).
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§107, and an exception for software reverse engineering based on the EU 
Software Directive. Indeed, the reverse-engineering exception in section 24 
appears similar to the expanded version of the EU Software Directive that 
Australia had adopted. It permitted the making of derivative works (i.e., 
decompilation) for purposes of error correction and security testing, and also 
for purposes of obtaining the information necessary for interoperability:
(c) Copying of a computer program, or making a derivative work there from, is per-
mitted for a person who possesses an authorized copy of the computer program, for 
the following purposes and to the extent necessary to achieve said purposes:
(1) Use of the computer program for purposes for which it was intended, including 
correction of errors in the computer program or making it interoperable with a com-
puter system or with another computer program;
(2) Examination of the information security in the program, correction of security 
breaches and protection from such breaches;
(3) Obtaining information which is needed to adapt a different and independently 
developed computer system or program, in such a way that it will be interoperable 
with the computer program.
(d) The provisions of subparagraph (c) shall not apply with respect to the copying of 
a computer program or the making of a derivative work there from, as stated in said 
subparagraph, if the information which has been obtained through the aforemen-
tioned means was used in a manner set forth below, or where such information was 
readily available without use of the aforesaid means:
(1) The said information is transmitted to another person for a purpose different 
than the purposes set forth in subparagraph (c);
(2) The said information is used to make a different computer program which in-
fringes copyright in the said computer program.
Although in the 1990s the U.S. government urged countries to adopt a gen-
eral fair-use provision instead of a specific reverse-engineering exception 
based on the EU Software Directive, it subsequently rejected the requests 
of U.S. Internet companies to include fair use in bilateral free-trade agree-
ments. Search engines based in the United States rely on fair use to permit 
the copying they perform to assemble their search databases and to display 
search results.136 The copyright regimes of other countries are not as hos-
pitable to search engines; a Belgian court, for example, imposed copyright 
liability on Google for search activities that would be considered fair use in 
the United States. To secure the legal environment necessary for them to 
136. See Jonathan Band, “Google and Fair Use,” 3 Journal of Business & Technology 
Law 1 (2008).
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increase their presence overseas, U.S. search-engine companies asked the 
Office of the U.S. Trade Representative to help “export” fair use to other 
countries. But in 2007, USTR denied the request that it include fair use in 
its “template” for future free-trade agreements:
The precise language that is used to achieve our objectives in this area is likely to 
vary from one trade agreement to another. . . . For example, our assessment of the 
commitment and capacity of a given trading partner to ensure effective protection 
and enforcement of the copyright-protected creations may be a factor in shaping 
our approach in future negotiations. We believe determining the best approach to 
these issues will continue to require a careful analysis based on each trading partner’s 
copyright system. . . .137
Here USTR implied that in most countries a fair-use provision would be 
abused.
Patrick Leahy, chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee, had a differ-
ent view. He stated that the Trade Promotion Authority Act of 2002
instructed the administration to negotiate agreements that provide strong protec-
tion for new and emerging technologies and new methods of transmitting and dis-
tributing products embodying intellectual property. This, too, is an objective I sup-
port. Under our laws, many such new technologies and consumer devices rely, at 
least in part, on fair use and other limitations and exceptions to the copyright laws. 
Our trade agreements should promote similar fair use concepts, in order not to stifle 
the ability of industries relying on emerging technologies to flourish.138
In December of 2009, the Obama administration articulated a position 
similar to Senator Leahy’s. At a session of the Standing Committee on 
Copyright and Related Rights of the World Intellectual Property Organiza-
tion, Justin Hughes, the head of the U.S. delegation, stated:
We recognize that some in the international copyright community believe that any 
international consensus on substantive limitations and exceptions to copyright law 
would weaken international copyright law. The United States does not share that 
point of view. The United States is committed to both better exceptions in copyright 
law and better enforcement of copyright law. Indeed, as we work with countries to 
establish consensus on proper, basic exceptions within copyright law, we will ask 
countries to work with us to improve the enforcement of copyright. This is part and 
parcel of a balanced international system of intellectual property.139
137. Letter from Stanford K. McCoy, Acting Assistant U.S. Trade Representative, to 
Duane Webster, Executive Director, Association of Research Libraries (July 19, 2007).
138. Cong. Rec. S14720, December 4, 2007 (Statement of Sen. Leahy).
139. United States of America, Statement on Copyright Exceptions and Limitation for 
Persons with Print Disabilities, World Intellectual Property Organization, Standing 
Committee on Copyright and Related Rights, 19th Session (December 15, 2009) at 5.
 
6 The Road Ahead
As was noted in chapter 1, many factors have contributed to the migra-
tion from the locked-in computing environment of the 1970s to today’s 
interoperable world. These factors include consumer demand, business 
strategy, government policy, and the ideology of technologists. The evolu-
tion of copyright law over the past 30 years has also played a critical role. As 
it became increasingly clear to companies in the information-technology 
industry that copyright did not facilitate control of interface specifications, 
companies had less incentive to try to improve their market position by 
preventing interoperability. If a competitor could lawfully achieve interop-
erability by reverse engineering and then using the interface specifications 
developed by a dominant company, the dominant company gained little 
long-term advantage over its competitor by concealing the interface speci-
fications. In this manner, the evolution of copyright law discussed in this 
volume and its forerunner has helped encourage the voluntary disclosure of 
interface information, particularly through open-source software licenses. 
Although open-source software licenses promote interoperability, patents 
remain a threat on the horizon.
6.1 Open-Source Software
The interoperability debate arose because some firms attempted to exercise 
proprietary control over interface specifications. These firms concealed the 
interface specifications by distributing software only in object code, and 
they used legal mechanisms (including copyright, contract, and anti-cir-
cumvention laws) to prevent the reverse engineering that would be neces-
sary to uncover the interface specifications. In addition, these firms claimed 
that copyright prevented competitors from complying with these interface 
specifications. By contrast, open-source developers distribute their software 
in source code, thereby making reverse engineering unnecessary. Moreover, 
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open-source developers employ license agreements that permit reproduc-
tion and distribution of the software and the creation of derivative works. 
These licenses typically require the licensee to distribute the modified pro-
grams to the public only in source code.1
As was discussed in chapter 3, proprietary developers have attempted to 
use software licenses to prevent interoperability. Conversely, open-source 
developers employ software licenses to mandate interoperability. Among 
the first entities to use software licenses in this manner was the Free Soft-
ware Foundation, established in 1985. The label “open source” gained 
wider acceptance in 1998 with the founding of the Open Source Initiative. 
The GNU General Public License currently is the most widely used open-
source license, but numerous other licenses have been adopted, including 
the Apache License, the BSD License, the MIT License, the Eclipse Public 
License, and the Mozilla Public License.
As open-source software has been adopted more widely by major infor-
mation-technology firms and their corporate customers,2 the dispersed 
developers working within particular open-source programming environ-
ments have coalesced into networks of varying degrees of formality. In 
essence, these networks act as standards organizations for the various pro-
gramming environments. They include a group of developers affiliated with 
Linus Torvalds (creator of the Linux operating system kernel), the Mozilla 
Foundation (which supports the Firefox Web browser), the Apache Soft-
ware Foundation (which supports the Apache Web server), and the Eclipse 
Foundation (which supports the Eclipse software-development platform).
In August of 2008, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit pro-
vided legal legitimacy to open-source licenses by finding that a person who 
breaches the terms of an open-source license infringes the copyright in 
the underlying program.3 Robert Jacobsen managed an open-source soft-
ware group for model railroad enthusiasts, the Java Model Railroad Inter-
face (JMRI). JMRI created an application called DecoderPro, which allowed 
model railroad enthusiasts to program the decoder chips that control model 
trains. The DecoderPro files were available for free download and use, sub-
ject to the terms of the “Artistic License” (one of the many open-source 
licenses in use). Matthew Katzer offered Decoder Commander, a commercial 
1. The Open Source Initiative maintains an “Open Source Definition” for determin-
ing whether a software license is an open-source license. It is available at opensource.
org.
2. See Pamela Samuelson, Open Source and Competition in the Software Industry, 
available at www.aals.org.
3. Jacobsen v. Katzer, 535 F.3d 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
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software product for model railroad enthusiasts. One of Katzer’s employees 
included decoder definition files from DecoderPro in Decoder Commander. 
However, in contravention of the DecoderPro license terms, Katzer did not 
include in Decoder Commander the names of the DecoderPro authors, the 
JMRI copyright notices, an identification of JMRI as the original source of 
the definition files, or a description of how the computer code and the 
computer file names had been changed from the original source code.
In response to Jacobsen’s claim that Katzer had infringed the DecoderPro 
copyright by copying the program without following all the terms of the 
license, Katzer argued that the license terms were mere covenants, action-
able under contract law, and not conditions on the software license. Katzer’s 
argument was premised on the assumption that Jacobsen’s copyright gave 
him no economic rights because he had made his computer code avail-
able to the public at no charge. From this assumption, Katzer argued that 
copyright law does not recognize a cause of action for non-economic rights.
The Federal Circuit rejected this argument, finding that Jacobsen did 
receive economic benefit from these terms. The attribution provision 
directed downstream users to Jacobsen’s website, where they could learn 
about and perhaps join the collaborative efforts of JMRI. Moreover, by 
requiring that changes made by downstream users be visible to the copy-
right holder and to others, the copyright holder learned about the uses of 
his software and gained others’ knowledge that could be used to advance 
future software releases. Thus, the attribution and modification transpar-
ency requirements advanced significant economic goals of the copyright 
holder. Accordingly, the terms were conditions on the software license, and 
their breach resulted in copyright infringement and in breach of contract.4
By holding that the breach of the terms of an open-source license consti-
tuted a copyright infringement, the Federal Circuit significantly strength-
ened the remedies available to an open-source licensor against a breaching 
licensee. In particular, the licensor can seek statutory damages. This, in 
turn, will discourage a licensee from attempting to “hijack” an open-source 
product and render it less interoperable.
6.2 Software Patents
Although copyright law has evolved in a manner that prevents its use to 
exercise control of interface specifications, and open-source licensing has 
become widely accepted by both the private and public sectors, Microsoft 
4.  The decision is also notable for its extensive positive dicta on open-source soft-
ware and Creative Commons licenses.
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and other companies continue to pursue proprietary business strategies, 
with great success. Developers of interoperable software have long feared 
that companies seeking to exclude competitors will use patent law to pre-
vent interoperability.5
Patents implicate interoperability in two respects. First, and most 
directly, a software developer could receive a patent on a set of interface 
specifications or on a lockout mechanism. The holder of such a patent 
could defeat the development of interoperable products by preventing all 
others from making products that conform to the interface specifications 
or lockout mechanism.6 Second, a software developer could receive a patent 
on a particular function implemented by software. The holder of such a pat-
ent could defeat the development of interoperable products by preventing 
all others from making software products that perform the same function.7
Software patents have provoked extensive controversy in their own 
right. The controversy does not relate specifically to interoperability, how-
ever; rather, it concerns the issuance of software patents that do not meet 
the statutory requirements of the Patent Act and abuses peculiar to patent 
litigation in the information-technology industry.
6.2.1 Statutory Requirements
6.2.1.1 Statutory Subject Matter
Section 101 of the Patent Act classifies “any new and useful process, 
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter” as subject matter eli-
gible for patent protection.8 The Supreme Court suggested in 1972 that an 
invention involving processes performed by a computer should not receive 
patent protection, because the invention simply represented unpatentable 
subject matter (e.g., scientific truths, mathematical expressions, or algo-
rithms).9 Then, in 1981, the Supreme Court ruled that “a claim drawn to 
5. For a comprehensive discussion of this topic, see Pamela Samuelson, “Are Patents 
on Interfaces Impeding Interoperability?” 93 Minnesota Law Review 1943 (2009).
6. For examples of patents on software and telecommunications interfaces, see id. at 
1965–1969.
7. Patent law does not contain a “fair-use” provision that permits experimental use. 
Thus, a developer may infringe a patent if he uses a patented technology in the 
course of developing software that does not itself infringe. Moreover, unlike copy-
right law, patent law does not have an independent-invention defense. Accordingly, 
a person can infringe a patent without ever seeing the patentee’s invention.
8. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006).
9. Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63 (1972).
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subject matter otherwise statutory does not become non-statutory simply 
because it uses a mathematical formula, computer program, or digital com-
puter.”10 Since then, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which 
has exclusive jurisdiction over most patent appeals, has issued a series of 
complex and contradictory decisions that attempt to define the statutory 
subject matter in software and in business methods (which often are imple-
mented by software). For example, the Federal Circuit held in In re Alap-
pat that a process satisfied the statutory-subject-matter test if it produced 
a “useful, concrete, and tangible result.”11 More recently, however, in In re 
Bilski, the Federal Circuit articulated a more restrictive test in an effort to 
insure that “a process claim is tailored narrowly enough to encompass only 
a particular application of a fundamental principle rather than to pre-empt 
the principle itself.”12 Under this test, a claimed process is patent eligible 
if “(1) it is tied to a particular machine or apparatus; or 2) it transforms 
a particular article into a different state or thing.”13 The court added that 
“[p]urported transformations or manipulations simply of public or private 
legal obligations or relationships, business risks, or other such abstractions 
cannot meet the test because they are not physical objects or substances, 
and they are not representative of physical objects or substances.”14
When the Supreme Court granted Bilski’s petition to review the Fed-
eral Circuit’s decision, the information-technology industry hoped that the 
Supreme Court would provide much-needed clarity in this area. Unfortu-
nately, the Supreme Court’s decision, Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. ____, 2010 
WL 2555192 (June 28, 2010), increased the uncertainty. All nine justices 
agreed that Bilski’s method for hedging risk in commodities transactions 
was not eligible for patent protection, but for different reasons. The five jus-
tices who joined in the majority opinion rejected Bilski’s patent because the 
concept of hedging was an unpatentable “abstract idea” but provided no 
guidance for determining when ideas were too abstract. The majority also 
reversed the Federal Circuit’s holding that the “machine-or-transformation 
test” was the only measure of patentability for a process. Though the test 
was a useful tool for determining whether claimed inventions were pro-
cesses under section 101, it was not the exclusive test. Further, the majority 
10. Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1981).
11. In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526 (Fed. Cir. 1994). Following Alappat, the Federal Circuit 
decided In re Beauregard, 53 F.3d 1583 (Fed. Cir. 1995), to allow claims to software so 
long as reduced to machine-readable format.
12. In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 954 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc).
13. Id.
14. Id. at 963.
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15. Patent Reform Act of 2007, H.R. 1908, 110th Cong. (2007).
found that section 101 did not categorically preclude business-method pat-
ents. In contrast, four justices, in a concurring opinion written by retir-
ing Justice Stevens, would have held all business methods categorically 
unpatentable.
6.2.1.2 Nonobviousness
An invention consisting of statutory subject matter must meet the require-
ments of novelty and non-obviousness before it can receive a patent. The 
Patent Act provides that an invention’s improvement or innovation over 
the existing technology (termed “prior art”) cannot be obvious to “a person 
having ordinary skill in the art” to which the invention pertains. A pat-
ent examiner must determine in the first instance whether an invention 
meets this non-obviousness requirement. The U.S. Patent and Trademark 
Office began issuing software patents in the 1980s. In that decade and in 
the 1990s, many programmers believed that the PTO’s examining corps did 
not have enough familiarity with software technology or enough access to 
appropriate databases to make such assessments properly. Thus, the PTO 
granted patents on processes that programmers claimed to have known and 
used for decades.
In response to concerns about the “quality” of software patents, the PTO 
revised its internal procedures concerning software patents. Congress revised 
the reexamination procedure to allow a third party to mount an adminis-
trative challenge to the issuance of a patent within the PTO, rather than 
having to resort to litigation in federal district court. Federal-court litigation 
typically is more expensive than administrative litigation. Moreover, federal 
courts must give issued patents a presumption of validity, which makes the 
patents more difficult to challenge before a court than before the PTO.
Notwithstanding these changes, there is a continuing perception that a 
patent-quality problem persists with the patenting of software and business 
methods. Thus, when Congress began to consider patent-reform legisla-
tion in 2005, patent quality was one of the major issues on the table. In 
the 110th Congress, the House passed a patent-reform bill that liberalized 
the reexamination procedures.15 One reason why parties are reluctant to 
use the existing process is that if they initiate a reexamination, they are 
estopped from raising in district-court litigation “prior art” that they could 
have raised in the reexamination but did not raise. In addition, under the 
current process, evidence of public use or sale cannot be used as grounds 
for requesting a reexamination. The House bill attempted to correct these 
deficiencies.
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The legislation encountered significantly more resistance in the Senate.16 
The Senate bill dealt with the issue of patent quality by establishing a new 
post-grant opposition proceeding before the PTO—a proceeding similar to 
the opposition proceedings in other countries. Supporters of reform wanted 
two “windows” for initiating the opposition proceeding: one within twelve 
months of issuance and one after receipt of a cease-and-desist letter. 
Information-technology and financial-services companies, among others, 
asserted that, in view of the broad and often imprecise language used for 
software and business method claims, they often had no idea that a patent 
might apply to them until they received a cease-and-desist letter.17 They 
might first receive such a letter five or ten years after the issuance of a 
patent. Hence, they often would not be able to avail themselves of the 
new post-grant opposition proceeding if they had to initiate the proceeding 
within twelve months of issuance of the patent. Opponents of the second 
window said that they needed “quiet title” to their patents—that the pos-
sibility of an opposition proceeding should not hang over their patents 
indefinitely. Of course, no patent owner really has “quiet title” to his pat-
ent until a court rules that it is valid, which can occur years after issuance 
of the patent.18 In any event, the Senate could not reach agreement on the 
issue of one or two windows for oppositions, and the 110th Congress ended 
without enactment of patent-reform legislation.
On March 3, 2009, early in the 111th Congress, identical patent-reform 
bills were introduced in the House (H.R. 1260) and in the Senate, (S. 515).19 
These bills would establish a post-grant opposition proceeding with one 
window for the twelve months after issuance. To create a second window 
for challenging a patent administratively, the bills would strengthen the 
existing reexamination proceeding. H.R. 1260 and S. 515 as introduced 
would eliminate estoppel with respect to prior art that could have been 
raised. They also would allow documentary evidence of public use or sale of 
prior art. The Senate Judiciary Committee considered S. 515 just a month 
16. Patent Reform Act of 2007, S. 1145, 110th Cong. (2007).
17. Under the “doctrine of equivalents,” a device or process that does not fall within 
the literal terms of the patent claims may still infringe if a court finds it “equivalent” 
to the claimed invention. The doctrine of equivalents creates significant uncertainty 
with respect to ambiguous software and business-method claims. The patent-reform 
legislation does not attempt to restrict the doctrine of equivalents, and thus fails to 
address a major contributor to the patent-quality problem.
18. Moreover, even if one court finds a patent valid with respect to one defendant, a 
different court can find the patent invalid in a case involving another defendant.
19. Patent Reform Act of 2009, H.R. 1260, 111th Congress (2009); S. 515, 111th 
Congress (2009).
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after its introduction. It approved the post-grant opposition proceeding 
and the elimination of estoppel in the reexamination proceeding, but it 
dropped the provision permitting documentary evidence of public use or 
sale.
The patent-reform legislation remains controversial, and its prospects 
for enactment remain uncertain. Poor-quality software patents remain a 
potential threat to interoperability; the more patents there are, the greater 
is the likelihood of a patent on a critical interface.
6.2.2 Litigation Reform
Information-technology companies have identified a host of problems 
relating to patent litigation, including venue, the lack of interlocutory 
appeals from Markman hearings on claim construction, the standards for 
injunctive relief, the standards for measuring damages, the standards for 
willful infringement, and the standards for inequitable conduct. Attempts 
to solve these problems have provoked controversy.
Underlying the controversy is the belief that the patent system affects 
different industries differently. The pharmaceutical and biotech industries 
generally are satisfied with the status quo; the information-technology and 
financial-services industries feel burdened by it. One explanation of this 
disparate impact is that a typical pharmaceutical product is covered by a 
small number of patents, whereas an IT product may be covered by thou-
sands of patents.
The Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America (PhRMA) 
and the Biotechnology Industry Organization (BIO) observe that many 
of the litigation concerns identified by the information-technology and 
financial-services industries are rooted in interpretations of the Patent Act 
by the Federal Circuit, not in the Patent Act itself. Accordingly, the Federal 
Circuit and the Supreme Court can correct these interpretations. PhRMA 
and BIO correctly point to several decisions by the Supreme Court and the 
Federal Circuit since Congress began considering patent reform as demon-
strating that the patent system is “self-correcting.”
6.2.2.1 eBay v. MercExchange (2006)
The most salient example of self-correction is the Supreme Court’s deci-
sion in eBay v. MercExchange. After finding that the auction website eBay 
had infringed MercExchange’s patent, the district court refused to issue an 
injunction, finding that damages were sufficient to make MercExchange 
whole. The Federal Circuit reversed, following its “general rule” of grant-
ing an injunction when a court has found that a valid patent has been 
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infringed. Some interpreted the Federal Circuit’s opinion as holding that an 
injunction should always issue after a finding of infringement.
A unanimous Supreme Court reversed the Federal Circuit in an opin-
ion written by Justice Thomas.20 The Court stated that the four traditional 
equitable factors for issuing injunctive relief apply to patent cases. In each 
case, a court, in determining whether to issue an injunction, must consider 
whether the plaintiff suffered an irreparable injury, whether damages are 
inadequate to compensate for that injury, the balance of hardships between 
plaintiff and defendant, and the public interest. The Supreme Court based 
this finding both on the plain language of section 283 of the Patent Act and 
by analogy on the Copyright Act. The Supreme Court also found that the 
Patent Act’s statements that a patent gave the patentee “a right to exclude” 
referred to the nature of the right, not the nature of the remedy, and held 
that the Federal Circuit had been wrong in applying a “general rule” in 
favor of injunctions. By the same token, the district court had erred in find-
ing categorically that a licensing entity is made whole by money damages 
alone. The Supreme Court observed that “some patent holders, such as 
university researchers or self-made inventors, might reasonably prefer to 
license their patents, rather than undertake efforts to secure the financing 
necessary to bring their works to market themselves,” and that “[s]uch pat-
ent holders may be able to satisfy the traditional four-factor test, and we see 
no basis for categorically denying them the opportunity to do so.”21 Accord-
ingly, the Supreme Court vacated the injunction and remanded the case to 
the district court for consideration of all four factors.
In addition to the unanimous opinion written by Justice Thomas, there 
were two interesting concurring opinions. Chief Justice Roberts, joined by 
Justices Scalia and Ginsburg, observed that courts have a long history of 
granting injunctions in patent cases. Although this historical practice does 
not entitle a patentee to an injunction, “[w]hen it comes to discerning and 
applying those standards, in this area as others, ‘a page of history is worth 
a volume of logic.’”22 In other words, courts should look to these earlier 
decisions for guidance, which as a practical matter will mean that patentees 
usually will receive injunctions.
However, Justice Kennedy, in an opinion joined by Justices Stevens, 
Souter, and Breyer, noted that times have changed, and “in many instances 
the nature of the patent being enforced and the economic function of the 
20. eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 (2006).
21. Id. at 393.
22. Id. at 395.
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patent holder present considerations quite unlike earlier cases.”23 Citing 
a 2003 Federal Trade Commission report on the need for patent reform, 
the Kennedy concurrence referred to firms’ using patents mainly to col-
lect license fees, rather than to produce and sell goods. For such firms, the 
threat of an injunction “can be employed as a bargaining tool to charge 
exorbitant fees.”24 In addition, the Kennedy concurrence noted that “when 
the patented invention is but a small component of the product the com-
panies seek to produce and the threat of an injunction is employed simply 
for undue leverage in negotiations, legal damages may well be sufficient.”25 
Finally, the Kennedy concurrence alluded to the “burgeoning number of 
patents over business methods, which were not of much economic and 
legal significance in earlier times” and noted that “the potential vagueness 
and suspect validity of some of these patents may affect the calculus under 
the four factor test.”26 This last clause is particularly odd because a court 
should perform the calculus only after determining that the patent is valid.
The information-technology industry considered the decision a victory, 
particularly the Kennedy concurrence. At the same time, the decision did 
not appear to be detrimental to the pharmaceutical industry, because the 
gloss provided by the Roberts concurrence helps that industry and the Ken-
nedy concurrence doesn’t really apply to it. There are few if any patent 
trolls or business-method patents in the pharmaceutical industry; typically 
a drug is covered by only a limited number of patents, and the chemical 
nomenclature usually provides clear notice concerning what those patents 
cover.
Congress began considering patent reform before the Supreme Court 
issued the eBay decision in 2006, and the issue of the proper standard for 
injunctive relief in patent cases was very much on the legislative table in 
the 109th Congress in 2005.27 When the Supreme Court agreed to review 
the Federal Circuit’s decision, action on patent legislation stopped and 
Congress waited to see what the Supreme Court would do. Arguably, the 
Supreme Court’s decision was more favorable to defendants than the lan-
guage in both the House and Senate bills. The Supreme Court clearly stated 
that the standards for injunctive relief in patent cases were the same as 
for all other cases; in contrast, the legislative language attempted to forge 
23. Id. at 396.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 397.
27. See, e.g., Patent Reform Act of 2005, H.R. 2795, 109th Congress (2005).
The Road Ahead 193
a compromise between an automatic injunction rule and the traditional 
injunction standard in non-patent cases.
The eBay decision favors interoperability. It suggests that when an entity 
infringes on a valid patent on an interface, the court should not enjoin the 
entity from distributing the interoperable products. Rather, because money 
damages typically will make the patentee whole and the public interest 
favors competition, the court usually should allow the entity to remain in 
the market if it pays a reasonable royalty to the patentee.28
6.2.2.2 Determination of Damages
In light of the eBay decision, the determination of damages in a case involv-
ing a patent on an interface emerges as a critical issue for interoperability. 
Congress has been considering the proper methodology for determining 
damages since 2005 but has made little real progress.
The Status Quo29
Patent damages are governed by 35 U.S.C. § 284, the relevant portion of 
which reads as follows: “Upon finding for the claimant the court shall 
award the claimant damages adequate to compensate for the infringement, 
but in no event less than a reasonable royalty for the use made of the inven-
tion.”30 In awarding damages, courts grant a prevailing plaintiff “lost prof-
its” or a “reasonable royalty” for the infringement.31 Notably, damages for 
patent infringement are to be “adequate to compensate for the infringe-
ment”32 and therefore “by definition, make the patentee whole, as opposed 
to punishing the infringer.”33 In instances of willful infringement, the stat-
ute allows courts to “increase the damages up to three times the amount 
found or assessed.”34
28. See Samuelson, “Are Patents on Interfaces Impeding Interoperability?” at 
1983–1984.
29. The section is based on Jonathan Band and Ben Grillot, “The Hobgoblin Argu-
ment: An Inconsistent Approach to Intellectual Property Damages,” The Computer & 
Internet Lawyer, November 2008, at 1.
30. 35 U.S.C. § 284.
31. Although other types of damages are theoretically possible, courts nearly always 
adopt one of these two approaches—or both of them, to the extent that it is not 
duplicative.
32. 35 U.S.C. § 284.
33. Riles v. Shell Exploration & Prod. Co., 298 F.3d 1302, 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
34. 35 U.S.C. § 284.
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The debate on damages in patent-reform legislation has centered on the 
calculation of a reasonable royalty. Courts have interpreted this reasonable 
royalty award to be the amount that the parties would have agreed to as 
the result of business negotiations at the time the patent was infringed.35 
In Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. United States Plywood Corp., the district court set 
out fifteen factors for courts to consider when determining the appropriate 
amount of a reasonable royalty award.36 These “Georgia-Pacific factors” have 
become standard in jury instructions for reasonable royalty cases.37 Factor 
13 allows apportionment by separating out the “portion of the realizable 
profit that should be credited to the invention as distinguished from non-
patented elements, the manufacturing process, business risks, or significant 
features or improvements added by the infringer.”38 The royalty rate then is 
applied to the portion of the revenue “credited to the invention.”
In contrast to apportionment, the entire-market-value rule allows the 
owner of an infringed patent to recover damages on the basis of value of 
the entire product in the marketplace. Historically, the entire-market-value 
rule was applied only when the patentee could show that the entire value 
of the product was “properly and legally attributable” to the patented 
improvement.39 When considering component parts of the same machine 
in Marconi Wireless Telegraph Co. v. United States, the U.S. Court of Claims 
held that damages were recoverable under the entire-market-value rule if 
the patented unit was “of such paramount importance that it substantially 
created the value of the component parts.”40 In several cases in the early 
1980s, the Federal Circuit expanded the entire-market-value rule to include 
35. See Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. U.S. Plywood Corp., 318 F.Supp. 1116, 1121 (S.D.N.Y. 
1970) (citing Faulkner v. Gibbs, 199 F.2d 635, 639 (9th Cir. 1952), holding that “the 
primary inquiry . . . is what the parties would have agreed upon if both were reason-
ably trying to reach an agreement”), modified and aff’d, 446 F.2d 295 (2d Cir. 1971), 
cert. denied, 404 U.S. 870 (1971).
36. See Georgia-Pacific Corp., 318 F.Supp. at 1120 (stating that “[a] comprehensive list 
of evidentiary facts relevant, in general, to the determination of the amount of a 
reasonable royalty for a patent license may be drawn from a conspectus of the lead-
ing cases.”).
37. See Model Patent Jury Instructions § 12.16 (Am. Intellect. Prop. Law Ass’n 2008), 
available at www.aipla.org. Similar jury instructions are provided by the Federal Cir-
cuit Bar Association and the American Bar Association.
38. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 318 F.Supp. at 1120.
39. See Garretson v. Clark, 111 U.S. 120, 121 (1884) (finding that the entire-market-
value rule did not apply to a patent for a method of attaching a mop head to a mop 
handle).
40. 53 USPQ 246, 250 (Ct. Cl. 1942), aff’d in part and vacated in part, 320 U.S. 1 (1943).
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physically separate components when those components “together consti-
tuted a functional unit” as long as the patented feature was the “basis for 
customer demand.”41
In its 1995 Rite-Hite decision, the Federal Circuit clearly articulated a two-
step test for applying the entire-market-value rule to the sale of unpatented 
components along with patented components: the components must func-
tion together and the patented component must be the basis for customer 
demand.42 However, when applying Rite-Hite’s two-step test in subsequent 
cases, courts have relaxed the “customer demand” requirement to allow 
evidence of marketing or promotion to satisfy the requirement that the 
patented improvement is “the basis of customer demand.”43
Furthermore, in Code-Alarm, Inc. v. Electromotive Technologies Corp., an 
unpublished 1997 decision, the Federal Circuit found that application of 
the entire-market-value rule was “within the district court’s discretion . . . 
as long as there [was] a functional relationship between these compo-
nents and the patented invention,” thus ignoring the “customer demand” 
requirement under Rite-Hite.44 Since then, other decisions (e.g. Lucent 
Technologies, Inc. v. Gateway) have similarly mistaken the prongs of Rite-
Hite’s two-step test as two individual alternative grounds for applying the 
entire-market-value rule.45 The jury award in Lucent of $1.52 billion for 
the infringement of a Lucent patent on MP3 technology by Microsoft’s 
41. Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelley Co., Inc., 56 F.3d 1538, 1549–1550 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en 
banc), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 184 (1995) (summarizing development of the entire-
market-value rule). See also Paper Converting Machine Co. v. Magna-Graphics Corp., 745 
F.2d 11 (Fed. Cir. 1984); Velo-Bind, Inc. v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 647 F.2d 965 
(9th Cir. 1981).
42. Rite-Hite Corp., 56 F.3d at 1550.
43. See Bose Corp. v. JBL, Inc, 274 F.3d 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (applying the entire-
market-value rule for loudspeaker system based on infringement of enclosure design 
where there was a functional connection and the improvement wasn’t the basis for 
the demand, but contributed to it); Micro Chemical, Inc. v. Lextron, Inc., 318 F. 3d 1119 
(Fed. Cir. 2003) (allowing award based on reasonably foreseeable future sales without 
requiring patented process to be basis of customer demand); Fonar Corp. v. General 
Elec. Co., 107 F.3d 1543, 1552–1553 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (upheld jury award based on 
entire value of MRI machine based on specific imaging feature used to market MRI 
machine). See also Amy L. Landers, “Let the Games Begin: Incentives to Innovation 
in the New Economy of Intellectual Property Law,” 46 Santa Clara Law Review 307, 
355–359 (2006).
44. 114 F.3d 1206, 1997 WL 3115542, (Fed. Cir. 1997) (nonprecedential opinion).
45. Post-trial Jury Instructions at 56, Lucent Technologies, Inc. v. Gateway, 509 F. Supp 
2d 912 (S.D. Cal. 2007) (No. 02-2060). Jury Instruction 62 in Lucent instructed jurors 
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Windows Media Player was based, in part, on the market value of the entire 
computer system. Although the presiding judge overturned the judgment 
on other grounds, the award demonstrated the potential scope of damage 
awards under the entire-market-value rule when courts ignored the “cus-
tomer demand” requirement.
In addition to receiving either lost profits or reasonable royalty awards, 
patent owners can receive up to three times the amount of the damages 
award if a jury or a court finds that the infringement was willful. The pat-
ent owner pleads willfulness in 92 percent of patent cases, and willfulness 
is found in nearly 60 percent of cases.46 Until recently, an infringer was 
liable for willful infringement if he had notice of another’s patent rights 
and did not exercise “due care” to determine whether his use was infring-
ing.47 While patent reform legislation was pending in Congress, the Federal 
Circuit overturned this standard in In re Seagate Technology, LLC, stating 
that the previous standard was “akin to negligence” and therefore “fail[ed] 
to comport with the general understanding of willfulness in the civil con-
text.”48 The Federal Circuit then articulated a new, higher standard for will-
fulness, holding that a patent owner must show, first, that “the infringer 
acted despite an objectively high likelihood that its actions constituted 
infringement” and, second, that this risk “was either known or so obvious 
it should have been known to the accused infringer.”49
Patent Legislation in the 110th Congress
In April of 2007, against this backdrop, the Patent Reform Act of 2007 was 
introduced simultaneously in the House (H.R. 1908) and in the Senate (S. 
1145).50 In his statement introducing the legislation, Representative How-
ard Berman argued that “recent case law has tilted towards overcompen-
sation which works against the primary goal of promoting innovation.”51 
to apply the entire-market-value rule if the patented features “were the basis for cus-
tomer demand or that the patented features and the computer function together as a 
single unit” (emphasis added).
46. See Kimberly A. Moore, “Empirical Statistics on Willful Patent Infringement,” 14 
Fed. Cir. B.J. 227, 232 (2004).
47. Underwater Devices Inc. v. Morrison-Knudsen Co., 717 F.2d 1380 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
48. 497 F.3d 1360, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
49. Id.
50. Similar bills were introduced in the 109th Congress. See, e.g., Patent Reform Act 
of 2005, H.R. 2795, 109th Congress (2005); S. 1145, 109th Congress (2005).
51. Statement of Representative Howard Berman on the Patent Reform Act of 2007 
(April 18, 2007), available at www.house.gov.
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Senator Orrin Hatch, in his introductory remarks, observed that “courts 
have allowed damages for infringement to be based on the market for an 
entire product when all that was infringed was a minor component of the 
product.”52
The bills proposed several changes to the law regarding reasonable roy-
alty awards.53 First, H.R. 1908 addressed apportionment by directing a court 
to “conduct an analysis to ensure that a reasonable royalty. . . is applied 
only to that economic value properly attributable to the patent’s specific 
contribution over the prior art.”54 Next, the act clarified the entire-market-
value rule, stating that “upon a showing . . . that the patent’s specific con-
tribution over the prior art is the predominant basis for market demand . . . 
damages may be based upon the entire market value of the products or 
processes involved.”55 Finally, H.R. 1908 placed explicit limitations on will-
ful infringement, including that “a court may not find that an infringer has 
willfully infringed . . . for any period of time during which the infringer had 
an informed good faith belief that the patent was invalid.”56
The bills’ specific reference to apportionment, and their limitation of the 
entire-market-value rule to the traditional customer-demand test, proved 
enormously controversial.57 Supporters of the bills’ damages provisions 
included the Coalition for Patent Fairness (representing a large number of 
computer and Internet companies),58 the Business Software Alliance (rep-
resenting software firms),59 and the Financial Services Roundtable (repre-
senting large financial-services institutions). These entities create and use 
products and services with many component elements that may rely on 
thousands of patents. Limiting the entire-market-value rule and codifying 
apportionment, they argued, would prevent outsized damage judgments 
such as those awarded in Lucent.
52. 153 Cong. Rec. S4691 (2007).
53. Lost-profits awards are not affected by the Patent Reform Act.
54. H.R. 1908 § 5(b)(2). The language in the Senate version (S. 1145) was nearly 
identical.
55. H.R. 1908 § 5(b)(3) (emphasis added).
56. H.R. 1908 § 5(c).
57. The amendment relating to willful infringement, particularly after the Seagate 
decision, was far less controversial.
58. Members of the Coalition for Patent Fairness included Hewlett-Packard, Amazon, 
and Google.
59. Members of the Business Software Alliance included Adobe, Apple, Corel, and 
Microsoft.
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Proponents of patent damages reform claimed that there were two pri-
mary problems in the patent system: first, there was “uncertainty concerning 
the extent and value of patent rights”; and second, “innovative industry” 
was forced to pay “high licensing, litigation, and transaction costs” in order 
to “obtain clear answers.”60 Professor Viet Dinh of the School of Law at the 
University of California at Berkeley argued that although the reasonable roy-
alty rate was intended to approximate the market rate, “judicially awarded 
reasonable royalty rates often compensate well above the market rate.”61 
Testifying in a hearing held by the House Intellectual Property Subcommit-
tee hearing, Professor John Thomas of the Georgetown University Law Cen-
ter identified ten cases, in addition to Lucent, “awarding damages that may 
far exceed an individual patent’s contribution to an infringing product.”62
Professor Thomas and other proponents of patent reform argued that 
these large damage awards had several negative consequences. First, they 
encouraged patent litigation rather than licensing, thereby increasing the 
license fees in settlement of this litigation. Professor Thomas termed this 
a “royalty burden” on innovative companies. Second, the large awards 
resulted in an increase in “[s]o called trolls—entrepreneurial speculators 
who prefer to acquire and enforce patents rather than engage in research, 
development, manufacturing, or other socially productive activity.”63 
Third, by failing to apportion damages properly, courts awarded damages 
for elements taken from prior art, the public domain, and technology pat-
ented by third parties, overcompensating plaintiffs unjustly.
Advocates of patent reform pointed to statistical evidence that patent lit-
igation had undergone several shifts in the last 20 years, moving away from 
bench trials to jury trials and away from lost profits awards to reasonable 
royalty awards. According to a PricewaterhouseCoopers study, through the 
1990s damages for lost profits were awarded in a majority of infringement 
60. Patent Reform Act of 2007: Hearing on H.R. 1908 Before the H. Subcomm. on Courts, 
the Internet, and Intellectual Property of the H. Comm. on Judiciary, 110th Cong. 65 
(2007) (statement of Professor John R. Thomas, Georgetown University Law Center)
(hereafter cited as Thomas Statement).
61. Viet Dinh and William Paxton, Patent Reform: Protecting Property Rights and 
the Marketplace of Ideas, white paper prepared for Coalition for Patent Reform, 
December 3, 2007.
62. Thomas Statement at 58.
63. Thomas Statement at 60. See also eBay Inc., 547 U.S. at 396 (2006) (Kennedy, J., 
concurring), observing that “[a]n industry has developed in which firms use patents 
not as a basis for producing and selling goods but, instead, primarily for obtaining 
licensing fees.” See also Landers, “Let the Games Begin,” at 343–347 (2006).
The Road Ahead 199
cases, but after 2000 reasonable royalties were awarded in 65 percent of 
cases.64 Since lost profits are available only in cases where the patent holder 
could have made a sale but failed to do so as a result of the infringement, 
this rise in reasonable royalty awards reflected an increase in ownership of 
patents “for the purpose of licensing (or litigation)” by entities that did not 
have manufacturing or distribution capabilities.65
Opponents of the Patent Reform Act included the Coalition for 21st 
Century Patent Reform (representing major chemical, pharmaceutical, and 
manufacturing companies66), the Innovation Alliance (representing bio-
technology, venture capital, and technology research firms67), universities, 
and independent inventors. The products manufactured by some of these 
entities tend to include fewer patents per product than those manufactured 
by the supporters of patent reform.
William Rooklidge, an attorney with Howrey LLP and a former presi-
dent of the American Intellectual Property Law Association, argued in a 
white paper that although the Patent Reform Act claimed to codify existing 
law regarding apportionment and the entire-market-value rule, it in fact 
“would make substantial changes destructive to the patent system.”68 These 
changes, Rooklidge asserted, included “[f]orcing the courts to conduct an 
apportionment analysis in every case,” which “would be a colossal waste 
of time” since “apportionment is only occasionally addressed by courts.”69 
Further, although historically the burden of proof for apportionment 
has been on the infringer, the proposed legislation would place it on the 
court.70 In addition, by relying on “prior art subtraction,” Rooklidge argued, 
the bill “vastly oversimplifies the analysis of which contributions should 
be apportioned.”71 Gary Griswold, Chief Counsel of Intellectual Property 
at 3M, said in testimony before the House Subcommittee on Courts, the 
Internet and Intellectual Property that “prior art subtraction ignores the 
reality that at some level all inventions are combinations of old elements,” 
64. PricewaterhouseCoopers, Patent and Trademark Damages Study 22, 2007.
65. S. Rep. No. 110-259 (2008).
66. The coalition’s members included DuPont, Dow Chemical, Exxon Mobil, Astra-
Zeneca, Merck, 3M, and Corning.
67. The Innovation Alliance included US Nanocorp and Intermolecular, Inc.
68. William C. Rooklidge, “Reform” of Patent Damages: S. 1145 and H.R. 1908 
(2007), available at www.patentsmatter.com.
69. Id. at 4.
70. Id., citing Elizabeth v. Pavement Co., 97 U.S. 126, 141 (1877) (holding that the 
burden of proof for apportionment is on the infringer).
71. Id. at 5.
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and that infringement of the patent on Post-It notes would result in mini-
mal damages since both the paper and the adhesive are examples of prior 
art.72 These opponents saw no reason for elevating apportionment above 
the fourteen other Georgia-Pacific factors.
Opponents argued that there was “no need for such substantial changes” 
when “[f]urther judicial development and less-intrusive legislation could 
solve any problems that truly exist in the patent damages area.”73 In a 
speech to the Association of Corporate Patent Counsel, Federal Circuit 
Chief Judge Paul Michel said: “It’s an extremely blunt instrument to legis-
late; it’s not a scalpel, it’s a hammer.”74 Opponents pointed to In re Seagate, 
in which the Federal Circuit raised the standard for a finding of willful 
infringement, as an example of the type of judicial reform that made legis-
lation unnecessary.75
Moreover, Kevin Sharer, chief executive officer of the biotechnology 
company Amgen, argued during the House intellectual-property subcom-
mittee’s hearing that “the net effect of these provisions is to make it cheaper 
and easier to infringe a patent,” which thereby “discourages innovation 
and encourages copying.”76 This argument was echoed in a September 6, 
2007 Statement of Administration Policy issued by the Office of Manage-
ment and Budget stating that “the Administration continues to oppose 
H.R. 1908’s limits on the discretion of the court in determining damages” 
because such a change “is unwarranted and risks reducing the rewards from 
innovation.”77
72. Patent Reform Act of 2007: Hearing on H.R. 1908 Before the H. Subcomm. on Courts, 
the Internet, and Intellectual Property of the H. Comm. on Judiciary, 110th Cong. 65 
(2007) (statement of Gary Griswold, Chief Counsel of Intellectual Property, 3M).
73. Id.
74. Hon. Paul R. Michel, Chief Judge U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, 
address to the Association of Corporate Patent Counsel, January 28, 2008 (transcript 
by Federal News Service).
75. S. Rep. No. 110-259 (January 24, 2008), Minority View (“These decisions signify 
an effort by the Supreme Court and the Federal Circuit to rectify perceived imbal-
ances in the patent system. At a minimum, this recent trend by the courts in the 
patent field suggests that Congress should exercise extreme caution before tilting the 
playing field even further towards the interests of potential infringers.”)
76. Patent Reform Act of 2007: Hearing on H.R. 1908 Before the H. Subcomm. on 
Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual Property of the H. Comm. on Judiciary, 110th 
Cong. 65 (2007) (statement of Kevin Sharer, CEO of Amgen).
77. Office of Management and Budget, Executive Office of the President, Statement 
of Administration Policy, H.R. 1908—Patent Reform Act of 2007 1 (2007), available 
at www.whitehouse.gov.
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The House of Representatives passed H.R. 1908 on September 7, 2007. 
In the Senate, the bill encountered fierce resistance centering on the appor-
tionment of damages and the post-grant opposition proceeding. Although 
the Senate Judiciary Committee favorably reported on the bill with appor-
tionment language on January 24, 2008, it then stalled.
Patent Legislation in the 111th Congress
The identical bills introduced in both chambers of Congress on March 3, 
200978 contained apportionment of damages language similar to that con-
tained in the House and Senate bills in the 110th Congress. They estab-
lished the following framework for the calculation of a reasonable royalty:
(1) IN GENERAL- The court shall determine, based on the facts of the case and after 
adducing any further evidence the court deems necessary, which of the following 
methods shall be used by the court or the jury in calculating a reasonable royalty 
pursuant to subsection (a). The court shall also identify the factors that are relevant 
to the determination of a reasonable royalty, and the court or jury, as the case may 
be, shall consider only those factors in making such determination.
(A) ENTIRE MARKET VALUE- Upon a showing to the satisfaction of the court that 
the claimed invention’s specific contribution over the prior art is the predominant 
basis for market demand for an infringing product or process, damages may be based 
upon the entire market value of that infringing product or process.
(B) ESTABLISHED ROYALTY BASED ON MARKETPLACE LICENSING- Upon a show-
ing to the satisfaction of the court that the claimed invention has been the subject 
of a nonexclusive license for the use made of the invention by the infringer, to a 
number of persons sufficient to indicate a general marketplace recognition of the 
reasonableness of the licensing terms, if the license was secured prior to the filing 
of the case before the court, and the court determines that the infringer’s use is of 
substantially the same scope, volume, and benefit of the rights granted under such 
license, damages may be determined on the basis of the terms of such license. Upon 
a showing to the satisfaction of the court that the claimed invention has sufficiently 
similar noninfringing substitutes in the relevant market, which have themselves 
been the subject of such nonexclusive licenses, and the court determines that the 
infringer’s use is of substantially the same scope, volume, and benefit of the rights 
granted under such licenses, damages may be determined on the basis of the terms 
of such licenses.
(C) VALUATION CALCULATION- Upon a determination by the court that the 
showings required under subparagraphs (A) and (B) have not been made, the court 
shall conduct an analysis to ensure that a reasonable royalty is applied only to the 
portion of the economic value of the infringing product or process properly attribut-
able to the claimed invention’s specific contribution over the prior art. In the case 
78. H.R. 1260, 111th Cong. (2009); S. 515, 111th Cong. (2009).
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of a combination invention whose elements are present individually in the prior art, 
the contribution over the prior art may include the value of the additional function 
resulting from the combination, as well as the enhanced value, if any, of some or all 
of the prior art elements as part of the combination, if the patentee demonstrates 
that value.
(2) ADDITIONAL FACTORS- Where the court determines it to be appropriate in de-
termining a reasonable royalty under paragraph (1), the court may also consider, or 
direct the jury to consider, any other relevant factors under applicable law.79
In short, the bills stated that if the evidence showed that the invention’s 
specific contribution over the prior art was the predominant basis for mar-
ket demand for an infringing product, damages were to be based on the 
entire market value of the product. If there was evidence of license fees for 
use of the invention, then the fees were the standard for a reasonable roy-
alty. The court would apportion damages only if the plaintiff could meet 
neither of these tests.
The information-technology industry felt that this language provided 
courts with sufficient guidance as to when they should apply which test. 
The opponents of reform, however, convinced a group of senators on the 
Judiciary Committee to oppose significant reform. These senators forced 
a compromise with Senator Leahy, the chairman of the Senate Judiciary 
Committee, that weakened the bill substantially. This weakened bill was 
reported out of the Senate Judiciary Committee on April 2, just a month 
after the bill’s introduction.
With respect to apportionment of damages, S. 515 as reported replaced 
the language quoted above with the following:
(1) IN GENERAL- The court shall identify the methodologies and factors that are 
relevant to the determination of damages, and the court or jury, shall consider only 
those methodologies and factors relevant to making such determination.
(2) DISCLOSURE OF CLAIMS- By no later than the entry of the final pretrial order, 
unless otherwise ordered by the court, the parties shall state, in writing and with par-
ticularity, the methodologies and factors the parties propose for instruction to the 
jury in determining damages under this section, specifying the relevant underlying 
legal and factual bases for their assertions.
(3) SUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE- Prior to the introduction of any evidence concern-
ing the determination of damages, upon motion of either party or sua sponte, the 
court shall consider whether one or more of a party’s damages contentions lacks a 
legally sufficient evidentiary basis. After providing a nonmovant the opportunity to 
be heard, and after any further proffer of evidence, briefing, or argument that the 
court may deem appropriate, the court shall identify on the record those method-
79. H.R. 1260 § 284(c).
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ologies and factors as to which there is a legally sufficient evidentiary basis, and the 
court or jury shall consider only those methodologies and factors in making the 
determination of damages under this section. The court shall only permit the intro-
duction of evidence relating to the determination of damages that is relevant to the 
methodologies and factors that the court determines may be considered in making 
the damages determination.80
This language is completely procedural and does not contain any substan-
tive standards. It simply specifies that the parties must propose to the court 
the methodologies they believe are appropriate, and the court must then 
decide the sufficiency of the evidentiary record for each methodology. To 
be sure, the provision directs the court to perform a “gatekeeper” func-
tion, enabling it to keep the entire-market-value rule away from juries when 
there is not enough evidence to warrant this methodology. Nonetheless, 
the language represents a significant defeat for proponents of patent liti-
gation reform, because it does not provide courts with any guidance as to 
what constitutes a legally sufficient evidentiary basis for apportionment or 
application of the entire-market-value rule.
The bill as reported did, however, retain the language in the bill as intro-
duced concerning willful infringement. In essence, that language codified 
the standards articulated by the Federal Circuit in Seagate.
Five months after the Senate Judiciary Committee passed the compro-
mise patent bill, the Federal Circuit arguably engaged in self-correction 
when it reversed application of the entire-market-value rule in Lucent Tech-
nologies v. Gateway, Inc.81 (a separate case from the Lucent case discussed 
above). Here, the Federal Circuit considered a $350 million patent-infringe-
ment judgment against Microsoft for the date-picker tool and other fea-
tures of a version of Microsoft Outlook. Writing for the court, Judge Michel 
emphasized that “[f]or the entire market value rule to apply, the paten-
tee must prove that the ‘patent-related feature is the basis for customer 
demand.’”82 Referring to articles by Mark Lemley and Amy Landers, Judge 
Michel acknowledged that “[s]ome commentators suggest that the entire 
market value rule should have little role in reasonable royalty law.”83 He 
responded by arguing that “[t]here is nothing inherently wrong with using 
the market value of the entire product, especially when there is no estab-
lished market value for the infringing component or feature, so long as 
80. S. 515 § 284(b) (as reported by S. Comm. on the Judiciary, April 2, 2009).
81. 580 F.3d 1301 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
82. Id. at 1336 (citations omitted).
83. Id. at 1339.
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the multiplier accounts for the proportion of the base represented by the 
infringing component or feature.”84 In other words, if a product includes 
ten components, only one of which infringes, the defendant should be 
indifferent as to whether the damages are a 10 percent royalty on the com-
ponent or a 1 percent royalty on the entire product. For Judge Michel, the 
key is that the multiplier—the royalty rate—account for the proportion of 
the base represented by the infringing component. This, however, sounds 
like apportionment. Judge Michel, therefore, appears to have blurred the 
distinction between apportionment and the entire-market-value rule. Judge 
Michel then rejected application of the entire-market-value rule in this case 
because there was no evidence that the infringing component was the basis 
for consumer demand for Outlook. Moreover, the evidence did not support 
the royalty rate Lucent’s damages expert applied to Outlook.
To the extent that the entire-market-value rule survives Judge Michel’s 
opinion in Lucent, restoration in the patent legislation of meaningful stan-
dards for the application of the apportionment and entire-market-value 
rules would promote interoperability. Basing the reasonable royalty only 
on the value of the infringed interfaces, rather than on the value of the 
entire interoperable product, will encourage the development of interoper-
able products by reducing the risk of draconian damages. Similarly, rigor-
ous standards for claims of willful infringement will diminish the exposure 
of developers of interoperable products to ruinous damages.
Even if copyright does not protect a program’s interface specifications, 
and even if the interface’s implementation is distributed in source code that 
is subject to an open-source license, a patent that applies to the program’s 
interface or basic functionality can frustrate interoperability with that pro-
gram. This is particularly the case when the patent is held by a third party 
who does not participate directly in the market for the program or related 
products. Such a patentee simply seeks to maximize revenue by charging 
the highest possible toll for the use of the patented invention, without the 
countervailing need to cross-license patented technologies from its compet-
itors. For this reason, resolution of the central issues in the patent-reform 
debate—patent quality and patent damages—could have a significant effect 
on the development of interoperable software products in the future.
84. Id. Judge Michel added that entire-market-value rule reflects the realities of 
patent licensing: “[S]ophisticated parties routinely enter into licensing agreements 
that base the value of the patented invention as a percentage of the commercial 
products’ sales price.” Id.
 
Statutory Appendix
U.S. Copyright Act (1998)
§ 107 Limitations on exclusive rights: Fair use
Notwithstanding the provisions of sections 106 and 106A, the fair use of a 
copyrighted work, including such use by reproduction in copies or phono-
records or by any other means specified by that section, for purposes such 
as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching (including multiple copies 
for classroom use), scholarship, or research, is not an infringement of copy-
right. In determining whether the use made of a work in any particular case 
is a fair use the factors to be considered shall include—
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a 
commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the 
copyrighted work as a whole; and
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copy-
righted work.
The fact that a work is unpublished shall not itself bar a finding of fair use if 
such finding is made upon consideration of all the above factors.
§ 1201 Circumvention of copyright protection systems
(a) Violations regarding circumvention of technological measures.
(1) (A) No person shall circumvent a technological measure that effectively 
controls access to a work protected under this title. The prohibition con-
tained in the preceding sentence shall take effect at the end of the 2-year 
period beginning on the date of the enactment of this chapter [enacted 
October 28, 1998].
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(B) The prohibition contained in subparagraph (A) shall not apply to per-
sons who are users of a copyrighted work which is in a particular class 
of works, if such persons are, or are likely to be in the succeeding 3-year 
period, adversely affected by virtue of such prohibition in their ability to 
make noninfringing uses of that particular class of works under this title, as 
determined under subparagraph (C).
(C) During the 2-year period described in subparagraph (A), and during each 
succeeding 3-year period, the Librarian of Congress, upon the recommenda-
tion of the Register of Copyrights, who shall consult with the Assistant Secre-
tary for Communications and Information of the Department of Commerce 
and report and comment on his or her views in making such recommenda-
tion, shall make the determination in a rulemaking proceeding for purposes 
of subparagraph (B) of whether persons who are users of a copyrighted work 
are, or are likely to be in the succeeding 3-year period, adversely affected 
by the prohibition under subparagraph (A) in their ability to make nonin-
fringing uses under this title of a particular class of copyrighted works. In 
conducting such rulemaking, the Librarian shall examine—
(i) the availability for use of copyrighted works;
(ii) the availability for use of works for nonprofit archival, preservation, 
and educational purposes;
(iii) the impact that the prohibition on the circumvention of technological 
measures applied to copyrighted works has on criticism, comment, news 
reporting, teaching, scholarship, or research;
(iv) the effect of circumvention of technological measures on the market 
for or value of copyrighted works; and
(v) such other factors as the Librarian considers appropriate.
(D) The Librarian shall publish any class of copyrighted works for which 
the Librarian has determined, pursuant to the rulemaking conducted under 
subparagraph (C), that noninfringing uses by persons who are users of a 
copyrighted work are, or are likely to be, adversely affected, and the pro-
hibition contained in subparagraph (A) shall not apply to such users with 
respect to such class of works for the ensuing 3-year period.
(E) Neither the exception under subparagraph (B) from the applicability 
of the prohibition contained in subparagraph (A), nor any determination 
made in a rulemaking conducted under subparagraph (C), may be used as a 
defense in any action to enforce any provision of this title other than this 
paragraph.
(2) No person shall manufacture, import, offer to the public, provide, or 
otherwise traffic in any technology, product, service, device, component, 
or part thereof, that—
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(A) is primarily designed or produced for the purpose of circumventing a 
technological measure that effectively controls access to a work protected 
under this title;
(B) has only limited commercially significant purpose or use other than 
to circumvent a technological measure that effectively controls access to a 
work protected under this title; or
(C) is marketed by that person or another acting in concert with that per-
son with that person’s knowledge for use in circumventing a technological 
measure that effectively controls access to a work protected under this title.
(3) As used in this subsection—
(A) to “circumvent a technological measure” means to descramble a scram-
bled work, to decrypt an encrypted work, or otherwise to avoid, bypass, 
remove, deactivate, or impair a technological measure, without the author-
ity of the copyright owner; and
(B) a technological measure “effectively controls access to a work” if the 
measure, in the ordinary course of its operation, requires the application 
of information, or a process or a treatment, with the authority of the copy-
right owner, to gain access to the work.
(b) Additional violations.
(1) No person shall manufacture, import, offer to the public, provide, or 
otherwise traffic in any technology, product, service, device, component, 
or part thereof, that—
(A) is primarily designed or produced for the purpose of circumventing 
protection afforded by a technological measure that effectively protects a 
right of a copyright owner under this title in a work or a portion thereof;
(B) has only limited commercially significant purpose or use other than to 
circumvent protection afforded by a technological measure that effectively 
protects a right of a copyright owner under this title in a work or a portion 
thereof; or
(C) is marketed by that person or another acting in concert with that 
person with that person’s knowledge for use in circumventing protection 
afforded by a technological measure that effectively protects a right of a 
copyright owner under this title in a work or a portion thereof.
(2) As used in this subsection—
(A) to “circumvent protection afforded by a technological measure” means 
avoiding, bypassing, removing, deactivating, or otherwise impairing a tech-
nological measure; and
(B) a technological measure “effectively protects a right of a copy-
right owner under this title” if the measure, in the ordinary course of its 
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operation, prevents, restricts, or otherwise limits the exercise of a right of a 
copyright owner under this title.
(c) Other rights, etc., not affected.
(1) Nothing in this section shall affect rights, remedies, limitations, or 
defenses to copyright infringement, including fair use, under this title.
(2) Nothing in this section shall enlarge or diminish vicarious or contribu-
tory liability for copyright infringement in connection with any technol-
ogy, product, service, device, component, or part thereof.
(3) Nothing in this section shall require that the design of, or design and 
selection of parts and components for, a consumer electronics, telecommu-
nications, or computing product provide for a response to any particular 
technological measure, so long as such part or component, or the prod-
uct in which such part or component is integrated, does not otherwise fall 
within the prohibitions of subsection (a)(2) or (b)(1).
(4) Nothing in this section shall enlarge or diminish any rights of free 
speech or the press for activities using consumer electronics, telecommuni-
cations, or computing products.
(d) Exemption for nonprofit libraries, archives, and educational institutions.
(1) A nonprofit library, archives, or educational institution which gains 
access to a commercially exploited copyrighted work solely in order to 
make a good faith determination of whether to acquire a copy of that work 
for the sole purpose of engaging in conduct permitted under this title shall 
not be in violation of subsection (a)(1)(A). A copy of a work to which access 
has been gained under this paragraph—
(A) may not be retained longer than necessary to make such good faith 
determination; and
(B) may not be used for any other purpose.
(2) The exemption made available under paragraph (1) shall only apply 
with respect to a work when an identical copy of that work is not reason-
ably available in another form.
(3) A nonprofit library, archives, or educational institution that willfully 
for the purpose of commercial advantage or financial gain violates para-
graph (1)—
(A) shall, for the first offense, be subject to the civil remedies under section 
1203; and
(B) shall, for repeated or subsequent offenses, in addition to the civil reme-
dies under section 1203, forfeit the exemption provided under paragraph (1).
(4) This subsection may not be used as a defense to a claim under sub-
section (a)(2) or (b), nor may this subsection permit a nonprofit library, 
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archives, or educational institution to manufacture, import, offer to the 
public, provide, or otherwise traffic in any technology, product, service, 
component, or part thereof, which circumvents a technological measure.
(5) In order for a library or archives to qualify for the exemption under this 
subsection, the collections of that library or archives shall be—
(A) open to the public; or
(B) available not only to researchers affiliated with the library or archives 
or with the institution of which it is a part, but also to other persons doing 
research in a specialized field.
(e) Law enforcement, intelligence, and other government activities. 
This section does not prohibit any lawfully authorized investigative, pro-
tective, information security, or intelligence activity of an officer, agent, or 
employee of the United States, a State, or a political subdivision of a State, 
or a person acting pursuant to a contract with the United States, a State, or 
a political subdivision of a State. For purposes of this subsection, the term 
“information security” means activities carried out in order to identify and 
address the vulnerabilities of a government computer, computer system, or 
computer network.
(f) Reverse engineering.
(1) Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (a)(1)(A), a person who 
has lawfully obtained the right to use a copy of a computer program may 
circumvent a technological measure that effectively controls access to a 
particular portion of that program for the sole purpose of identifying and 
analyzing those elements of the program that are necessary to achieve 
interoperability of an independently created computer program with other 
programs, and that have not previously been readily available to the person 
engaging in the circumvention, to the extent any such acts of identification 
and analysis do not constitute infringement under this title.
(2) Notwithstanding the provisions of subsections (a)(2) and (b), a person 
may develop and employ technological means to circumvent a technologi-
cal measure, or to circumvent protection afforded by a technological mea-
sure, in order to enable the identification and analysis under paragraph (1), 
or for the purpose of enabling interoperability of an independently created 
computer program with other programs, if such means are necessary to 
achieve such interoperability, to the extent that doing so does not consti-
tute infringement under this title.
(3) The information acquired through the acts permitted under paragraph 
(1), and the means permitted under paragraph (2), may be made available 
to others if the person referred to in paragraph (1) or (2), as the case may 
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be, provides such information or means solely for the purpose of enabling 
interoperability of an independently created computer program with other 
programs, and to the extent that doing so does not constitute infringement 
under this title or violate applicable law other than this section.
(4) For purposes of this subsection, the term “interoperability” means the 
ability of computer programs to exchange information, and of such pro-
grams mutually to use the information which has been exchanged.
(g) Encryption research.
(1) Definitions. For purposes of this subsection—
(A) the term “encryption research” means activities necessary to identify 
and analyze flaws and vulnerabilities of encryption technologies applied to 
copyrighted works, if these activities are conducted to advance the state of 
knowledge in the field of encryption technology or to assist in the develop-
ment of encryption products; and
(B) the term “encryption technology” means the scrambling and descram-
bling of information using mathematical formulas or algorithms.
(2) Permissible acts of encryption research. Notwithstanding the provisions 
of subsection (a)(1)(A), it is not a violation of that subsection for a person 
to circumvent a technological measure as applied to a copy, phonorecord, 
performance, or display of a published work in the course of an act of good 
faith encryption research if—
(A) the person lawfully obtained the encrypted copy, phonorecord, perfor-
mance, or display of the published work;
(B) such act is necessary to conduct such encryption research;
(C) the person made a good faith effort to obtain authorization before the 
circumvention; and
(D) such act does not constitute infringement under this title or a violation 
of applicable law other than this section, including section 1030 of title 18 
and those provisions of title 18 amended by the Computer Fraud and Abuse 
Act of 1986.
(3) Factors in determining exemption. In determining whether a person 
qualifies for the exemption under paragraph (2), the factors to be consid-
ered shall include—
(A) whether the information derived from the encryption research was dis-
seminated, and if so, whether it was disseminated in a manner reasonably 
calculated to advance the state of knowledge or development of encryption 
technology, versus whether it was disseminated in a manner that facilitates 
infringement under this title or a violation of applicable law other than this 
section, including a violation of privacy or breach of security;
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(B) whether the person is engaged in a legitimate course of study, is 
employed, or is appropriately trained or experienced, in the field of encryp-
tion technology; and
(C) whether the person provides the copyright owner of the work to which 
the technological measure is applied with notice of the findings and docu-
mentation of the research, and the time when such notice is provided.
(4) Use of technological means for research activities. Notwithstanding the 
provisions of subsection (a)(2), it is not a violation of that subsection for a 
person to—
(A) develop and employ technological means to circumvent a technologi-
cal measure for the sole purpose of that person performing the acts of good 
faith enc1ryption research described in paragraph (2); and
(B) provide the technological means to another person with whom he or 
she is working collaboratively for the purpose of conducting the acts of 
good faith encryption research described in paragraph (2) or for the pur-
pose of having that other person verify his or her acts of good faith encryp-
tion research described in paragraph (2).
(5) Report to Congress. Not later than 1 year after the date of the enact-
ment of this chapter [enacted October 28, 1998], the Register of Copyrights 
and the Assistant Secretary for Communications and Information of the 
Department of Commerce shall jointly report to the Congress on the effect 
this subsection has had on—
(A) encryption research and the development of encryption technology;
(B) the adequacy and effectiveness of technological measures designed to 
protect copyrighted works; and
(C) protection of copyright owners against the unauthorized access to their 
encrypted copyrighted works.
The report shall include legislative recommendations, if any.
(h) Exceptions regarding minors.
In applying subsection (a) to a component or part, the court may consider 
the necessity for its intended and actual incorporation in a technology, 
product, service, or device, which—
(1) does not itself violate the provisions of this title; and
(2) has the sole purpose to prevent the access of minors to material on the 
Internet.
(i) Protection of personally identifying information.
(1) Circumvention permitted. Notwithstanding the provisions of sub-
section (a)(1)(A), it is not a violation of that subsection for a person to 
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circumvent a technological measure that effectively controls access to a 
work protected under this title, if—
(A) the technological measure, or the work it protects, contains the capa-
bility of collecting or disseminating personally identifying information 
reflecting the online activities of a natural person who seeks to gain access 
to the work protected;
(B) in the normal course of its operation, the technological measure, or 
the work it protects, collects or disseminates personally identifying infor-
mation about the person who seeks to gain access to the work protected, 
without providing conspicuous notice of such collection or dissemination 
to such person, and without providing such person with the capability to 
prevent or restrict such collection or dissemination;
(C) the act of circumvention has the sole effect of identifying and disabling 
the capability described in subparagraph (A), and has no other effect on the 
ability of any person to gain access to any work; and
(D) the act of circumvention is carried out solely for the purpose of pre-
venting the collection or dissemination of personally identifying informa-
tion about a natural person who seeks to gain access to the work protected, 
and is not in violation of any other law.
(2) Inapplicability to certain technological measures. This subsection does 
not apply to a technological measure, or a work it protects, that does not 
collect or disseminate personally identifying information and that is dis-
closed to a user as not having or using such capability.
(j) Security testing.
(1) Definition. For purposes of this subsection, the term “security test-
ing” means accessing a computer, computer system, or computer network, 
solely for the purpose of good faith testing, investigating, or correcting, a 
security flaw or vulnerability, with the authorization of the owner or opera-
tor of such computer, computer system, or computer network.
(2) Permissible acts of security testing. Notwithstanding the provisions of 
subsection (a)(1)(A), it is not a violation of that subsection for a person to 
engage in an act of security testing, if such act does not constitute infringe-
ment under this title or a violation of applicable law other than this section, 
including section 1030 of title 18 and those provisions of title 18 amended 
by the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1986.
(3) Factors in determining exemption. In determining whether a person 
qualifies for the exemption under paragraph (2), the factors to be consid-
ered shall include—
(A) whether the information derived from the security testing was used 
solely to promote the security of the owner or operator of such computer, 
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computer system or computer network, or shared directly with the devel-
oper of such computer, computer system, or computer network; and
(B) whether the information derived from the security testing was used or 
maintained in a manner that does not facilitate infringement under this 
title or a violation of applicable law other than this section, including a 
violation of privacy or breach of security.
(4) Use of technological means for security testing. Notwithstanding the 
provisions of subsection (a)(2), it is not a violation of that subsection for a 
person to develop, produce, distribute or employ technological means for 
the sole purpose of performing the acts of security testing described in sub-
section (2), provided such technological means does not otherwise violate 
section (a)(2).
(k) Certain analog devices and certain technological measures.
(1) Certain analog devices.
(A) Effective 18 months after the date of the enactment of this chapter, no 
person shall manufacture, import, offer to the public, provide or otherwise 
traffic in any—
(i) VHS format analog video cassette recorder unless such recorder con-
forms to the automatic gain control copy control technology;
(ii) 8mm format analog video cassette camcorder unless such camcorder 
conforms to the automatic gain control technology;
(iii) Beta format analog video cassette recorder, unless such recorder con-
forms to the automatic gain control copy control technology, except that 
this requirement shall not apply until there are 1,000 Beta format analog 
video cassette recorders sold in the United States in any one calendar year 
after the date of the enactment of this chapter [enacted October 28, 1998];
(iv) 8mm format analog video cassette recorder that is not an analog video 
cassette camcorder, unless such recorder conforms to the automatic gain 
control copy control technology, except that this requirement shall not 
apply until there are 20,000 such recorders sold in the United States in any 
one calendar year after the date of the enactment of this chapter; or
(v) analog video cassette recorder that records using an NTSC format video 
input and that is not otherwise covered under clauses (i) through (iv), 
unless such device conforms to the automatic gain control copy control 
technology.
(B) Effective on the date of the enactment of this chapter, no person shall 
manufacture, import, offer to the public, provide or otherwise traffic in—
(i) any VHS format analog video cassette recorder or any 8mm format ana-
log video cassette recorder if the design of the model of such recorder has 
been modified after such date of enactment so that a model of recorder that 
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previously conformed to the automatic gain control copy control technol-
ogy no longer conforms to such technology; or
(ii) any VHS format analog video cassette recorder, or any 8mm format 
analog video cassette recorder that is not an 8mm analog video cassette 
camcorder, if the design of the model of such recorder has been modified 
after such date of enactment so that a model of recorder that previously 
conformed to the four-line colorstripe copy control technology no longer 
conforms to such technology.
Manufacturers that have not previously manufactured or sold a VHS format 
analog video cassette recorder, or an 8mm format analog cassette recorder, 
shall be required to conform to the four-line colorstripe copy control tech-
nology in the initial model of any such recorder manufactured after the 
date of the enactment of this chapter, and thereafter to continue conform-
ing to the four-line colorstripe copy control technology. For purposes of 
this subparagraph, an analog video cassette recorder “conforms to” the 
four-line colorstripe copy control technology if it records a signal that, 
when played back by the playback function of that recorder in the normal 
viewing mode, exhibits, on a reference display device, a display containing 
distracting visible lines through portions of the viewable picture.
(2) Certain encoding restrictions. No person shall apply the automatic gain 
control copy control technology or colorstripe copy control technology to 
prevent or limit consumer copying except such copying—
(A) of a single transmission, or specified group of transmissions, of live 
events or of audiovisual works for which a member of the public has exer-
cised choice in selecting the transmissions, including the content of the 
transmissions or the time of receipt of such transmissions, or both, and as 
to which such member is charged a separate fee for each such transmission 
or specified group of transmissions;
(B) from a copy of a transmission of a live event or an audiovisual work 
if such transmission is provided by a channel or service where payment is 
made by a member of the public for such channel or service in the form of 
a subscription fee that entitles the member of the public to receive all of the 
programming contained in such channel or service;
(C) from a physical medium containing one or more prerecorded audiovi-
sual works; or
(D) from a copy of a transmission described in subparagraph (A) or from a 
copy made from a physical medium described in subparagraph (C).
In the event that a transmission meets both the conditions set forth in 
subparagraph (A) and those set forth in subparagraph (B), the transmission 
shall be treated as a transmission described in subparagraph (A).
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(3) Inapplicability. This subsection shall not—
(A) require any analog video cassette camcorder to conform to the auto-
matic gain control copy control technology with respect to any video signal 
received through a camera lens;
(B) apply to the manufacture, importation, offer for sale, provision of, or 
other trafficking in, any professional analog video cassette recorder; or
(C) apply to the offer for sale or provision of, or other trafficking in, any 
previously owned analog video cassette recorder, if such recorder was 
legally manufactured and sold when new and not subsequently modified 
in violation of paragraph (1)(B).
(4) Definitions. For purposes of this subsection:
(A) An “analog video cassette recorder” means a device that records, or a 
device that includes a function that records, on electromagnetic tape in an 
analog format the electronic impulses produced by the video and audio 
portions of a television program, motion picture, or other form of audio-
visual work.
(B) An “analog video cassette camcorder” means an analog video cassette 
recorder that contains a recording function that operates through a camera 
lens and through a video input that may be connected with a television or 
other video playback device.
(C) An analog video cassette recorder “conforms” to the automatic gain 
control copy control technology if it—
(i) detects one or more of the elements of such technology and does not 
record the motion picture or transmission protected by such technology; or
(ii) records a signal that, when played back, exhibits a meaningfully dis-
torted or degraded display.
(D) The term “professional analog video cassette recorder” means an ana-
log video cassette recorder that is designed, manufactured, marketed, and 
intended for use by a person who regularly employs such a device for a 
lawful business or industrial use, including making, performing, displaying, 
distributing, or transmitting copies of motion pictures on a commercial 
scale.
(E) The terms “ VHS format,” “8mm format,” “Beta format,” “automatic 
gain control copy control technology,” “colorstripe copy control technol-
ogy,” “four-line version of the colorstripe copy control technology,” and 
“NTSC” have the meanings that are commonly understood in the con-
sumer electronics and motion picture industries as of the date of the enact-
ment of this chapter.
(5) Violations. Any violation of paragraph (1) of this subsection shall be 
treated as a violation of subsection (b)(1) of this section. Any violation of 
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paragraph (2) of this subsection shall be deemed an “act of circumvention” 
for the purposes of section 1203(c)(3)(A) of this chapter.
EU Software Directive (1991)
Article 1 Object of protection
1. In accordance with the provisions of this Directive, Member States shall 
protect computer programs, by copyright, as literary works within the 
meaning of the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artis-
tic Works. For the purposes of this Directive, the term ‘computer programs` 
shall include their preparatory design material.
2. Protection in accordance with this Directive shall apply to the expres-
sion in any form of a computer program. Ideas and principles which under-
lie any element of a computer program, including those which underlie its 
interfaces, are not protected by copyright under this Directive.
3. A computer program shall be protected if it is original in the sense that it 
is the author’s own intellectual creation. No other criteria shall be applied 
to determine its eligibility for protection.
Article 2 Authorship of computer programs
1. The author of a computer program shall be the natural person or group 
of natural persons who has created the program or, where the legislation of 
the Member State permits, the legal person designated as the rightholder 
by that legislation. Where collective works are recognized by the legislation 
of a Member State, the person considered by the legislation of the Member 
State to have created the work shall be deemed to be its author.
2. In respect of a computer program created by a group of natural persons 
jointly, the exclusive rights shall be owned jointly.
3. Where a computer program is created by an employee in the execu-
tion of his duties or following the instructions given by his employer, the 
employer exclusively shall be entitled to exercise all economic rights in the 
program so created, unless otherwise provided by contract.
Article 3 Beneficiaries of protection
Protection shall be granted to all natural or legal persons eligible under 
national copyright legislation as applied to literary works.
Article 4 Restricted acts
Subject to the provisions of Articles 5 and 6, the exclusive rights of the 
rightholder within the meaning of Article 2, shall include the right to do 
or to authorize:
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(a) the permanent or temporary reproduction of a computer program by 
any means and in any form, in part or in whole. Insofar as loading, dis-
playing, running, transmission or storage of the computer program neces-
sitate such reproduction, such acts shall be subject to authorization by the 
rightholder;
(b) the translation, adaptation, arrangement and any other alteration of 
a computer program and the reproduction of the results thereof, without 
prejudice to the rights of the person who alters the program;
(c) any form of distribution to the public, including the rental, of the origi-
nal computer program or of copies thereof. The first sale in the Community 
of a copy of a program by the rightholder or with his consent shall exhaust 
the distribution right within the Community of that copy, with the excep-
tion of the right to control further rental of the program or a copy thereof.
Article 5 Exceptions to the restricted acts
1. In the absence of specific contractual provisions, the acts referred to 
in Article 4 (a) and (b) shall not require authorization by the rightholder 
where they are necessary for the use of the computer program by the law-
ful acquirer in accordance with its intended purpose, including for error 
correction.
2. The making of a back-up copy by a person having a right to use the com-
puter program may not be prevented by contract insofar as it is necessary 
for that use.
3. The person having a right to use a copy of a computer program shall be 
entitled, without the authorization of the rightholder, to observe, study 
or test the functioning of the program in order to determine the ideas and 
principles which underlie any element of the program if he does so while 
performing any of the acts of loading, displaying, running, transmitting or 
storing the program which he is entitled to do.
Article 6 Decompilation
1. The authorization of the rightholder shall not be required where repro-
duction of the code and translation of its form within the meaning of 
Article 4 (a) and (b) are indispensable to obtain the information necessary 
to achieve the interoperability of an independently created computer pro-
gram with other programs, provided that the following conditions are met:
(a) these acts are performed by the licensee or by another person having a 
right to use a copy of a program, or on their behalf by a person authorized 
to do so;
(b) the information necessary to achieve interoperability has not previ-
ously been readily available to the persons referred to in subparagraph (a); 
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and (c) these acts are confined to the parts of the original program which 
are necessary to achieve interoperability.
2. The provisions of paragraph 1 shall not permit the information obtained 
through its application:
(a) to be used for goals other than to achieve the interoperability of the 
independently created computer program;
(b) to be given to others, except when necessary for the interoperability 
of the independently created computer program; or (c) to be used for the 
development, production or marketing of a computer program substantially 
similar in its expression, or for any other act which infringes copyright.
3. In accordance with the provisions of the Berne Convention for the pro-
tection of Literary and Artistic Works, the provisions of this Article may not 
be interpreted in such a way as to allow its application to be used in a man-
ner which unreasonably prejudices the right holder’s legitimate interests or 
conflicts with a normal exploitation of the computer program.
Article 7 Special measures of protection
1. Without prejudice to the provisions of Articles 4, 5 and 6, Member States 
shall provide, in accordance with their national legislation, appropriate 
remedies against a person committing any of the acts listed in subpara-
graphs (a), (b) and (c) below:
(a) any act of putting into circulation a copy of a computer program know-
ing, or having reason to believe, that it is an infringing copy;
(b) the possession, for commercial purposes, of a copy of a computer pro-
gram knowing, or having reason to believe, that it is an infringing copy;
(c) any act of putting into circulation, or the possession for commercial 
purposes of, any means the sole intended purpose of which is to facilitate 
the unauthorized removal or circumvention of any technical device which 
may have been applied to protect a computer program.
2. Any infringing copy of a computer program shall be liable to seizure in 
accordance with the legislation of the Member State concerned.
3. Member States may provide for the seizure of any means referred to in 
paragraph 1 (c).
Article 8 Term of protection
1. Protection shall be granted for the life of the author and for fifty years 
after his death or after the death of the last surviving author; where the 
computer program is an anonymous or pseudonymous work, or where a 
legal person is designated as the author by national legislation in accor-
dance with Article 2 (1), the term of protection shall be fifty years from the 
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time that the computer program is first lawfully made available to the pub-
lic. The term of protection shall be deemed to begin on the first of January 
of the year following the abovementioned events.
2. Member States which already have a term of protection longer than that 
provided for in paragraph 1 are allowed to maintain their present term until 
such time as the term of protection for copyright works is harmonized by 
Community law in a more general way.
Article 9 Continued application of other legal provisions
1. The provisions of this Directive shall be without prejudice to any other 
legal provisions such as those concerning patent rights, trade-marks, unfair 
competition, trade secrets, protection of semi-conductor products or the 
law of contract. Any contractual provisions contrary to Article 6 or to the 
exceptions provided for in Article 5 (2) and (3) shall be null and void.
2. The provisions of this Directive shall apply also to programs created 
before 1 January 1993 without prejudice to any acts concluded and rights 
acquired before that date.
Article 10 Final provisions
1. Member States shall bring into force the laws, regulations and adminis-
trative provisions necessary to comply with this Directive before 1 January 
1993.
When Member States adopt these measures, the latter shall contain a ref-
erence to this Directive or shall be accompanied by such reference on the 
occasion of their official publication. The methods of making such a refer-
ence shall be laid down by the Member States.
2. Member States shall communicate to the Commission the provisions of 
national law which they adopt in the field governed by this Directive.
Article 11
This Directive is addressed to the Member States.
Done at Brussels, 14 May 1991. For the Council The President J. F. POOS
Australian Copyright Act (2006)
Section 47D Reproducing computer programs to make interoperable 
products
(1) Subject to this Division, the copyright in a literary work that is a com-
puter program is not infringed by the making of a reproduction or adapta-
tion of the work if:
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(a) the reproduction or adaptation is made by, or on behalf of, the owner 
or licensee of the copy of the program (the original program) used for mak-
ing the reproduction or adaptation; and
(b) the reproduction or adaptation is made for the purpose of obtaining 
information necessary to enable the owner or licensee, or a person acting 
on behalf of the owner or licensee, to make independently another pro-
gram (the new program), or an article, to connect to and be used together 
with, or otherwise to interoperate with, the original program or any other 
program; and
(c) the reproduction or adaptation is made only to the extent reasonably 
necessary to obtain the information referred to in paragraph (b); and
(d) to the extent that the new program reproduces or adapts the original 
program, it does so only to the extent necessary to enable the new program 
to connect to and be used together with, or otherwise to interoperate with, 
the original program or the other program; and
(e) the information referred to in paragraph (b) is not readily available to 
the owner or licensee from another source when the reproduction or adap-
tation is made.
(2) Subsection (1) does not apply to the making of a reproduction or adap-
tation of a computer program from an infringing copy of the computer 
program.
Section 47E Reproducing computer programs to correct errors
(1) Subject to this Division, the copyright in a literary work that is a com-
puter program is not infringed by the making, on or after 23 February 1999, 
of a reproduction or adaptation of the work if:
(a) the reproduction or adaptation is made by, or on behalf of, the owner 
or licensee of the copy of the program (the original copy) used for making 
the reproduction or adaptation; and
(b) the reproduction or adaptation is made for the purpose of correcting 
an error in the original copy that prevents it from operating (including in 
conjunction with other programs or with hardware):
(i) as intended by its author; or
(ii) in accordance with any specifications or other documentation supplied 
with the original copy; and
(c) the reproduction or adaptation is made only to the extent reasonably 
necessary to correct the error referred to in paragraph (b); and
(d) when the reproduction or adaptation is made, another copy of the pro-
gram that does operate as mentioned in paragraph (b) is not available to 
the owner or licensee within a reasonable time at an ordinary commercial 
price.
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(2) Subsection (1) does not apply to the making of a reproduction or adap-
tation of a computer program from an infringing copy of the computer 
program.
Section 47F Reproducing computer programs for security testing
(1) Subject to this Division, the copyright in a literary work that is a com-
puter program is not infringed by the making of a reproduction or adapta-
tion of the work if:
(a) the reproduction or adaptation is made by, or on behalf of, the owner 
or licensee of the copy of the program (the original copy) used for making 
the reproduction or adaptation; and
(b) the reproduction or adaptation is made for the purpose of:
(i) testing in good faith the security of the original copy, or of a computer 
system or network of which the original copy is a part; or
(ii) investigating, or correcting, in good faith a security flaw in, or the vul-
nerability to unauthorised access of, the original copy, or of a computer 
system or network of which the original copy is a part; and
(c) the reproduction or adaptation is made only to the extent reasonably 
necessary to achieve a purpose referred to in paragraph (b); and
(d) the information resulting from the making of the reproduction or adap-
tation is not readily available to the owner or licensee from another source 
when the reproduction or adaptation is made.
(2) Subsection (1) does not apply to the making of a reproduction or adap-
tation of a computer program from an infringing copy of the computer 
program.
Section 47H Agreements excluding operation of certain provisions
An agreement, or a provision of an agreement, that excludes or limits, or 
has the effect of excluding or limiting, the operation of subsection 47B(3), 
or section 47C, 47D, 47E or 47F, has no effect.
Section 116AO Manufacturing etc. a circumvention device for a 
technological protection measure
(1) An owner or exclusive licensee of the copyright in a work or other sub-
ject-matter may bring an action against a person if:
(a) the person does any of the following acts with a device:
(i) manufactures it with the intention of providing it to another person;
(ii) imports it into Australia with the intention of providing it to another 
person;
(iii) distributes it to another person;
(iv) offers it to the public;
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(v) provides it to another person;
(vi) communicates it to another person; and
(b) the person knows, or ought reasonably to know, that the device is a 
circumvention device for a technological protection measure; and
(c) the work or other subject-matter is protected by the technological pro-
tection measure.
Exception—interoperability
(3) Subsection (1) does not apply to the person if:
(a) the circumvention device will be used to circumvent the technological 
protection measure to enable the doing of an act; and
(b) the act:
(i) relates to a copy of a computer program (the original program) that is 
not an infringing copy and that was lawfully obtained; and
(ii) will not infringe the copyright in the original program; and
(iia) relates to elements of the original program that will not be readily 
available to the person doing the act when the circumvention occurs; and
(iii) will be done for the sole purpose of achieving interoperability of an 
independently created computer program with the original program or any 
other program.
Singapore Copyright Act (2004)
Fair dealing in relation to works
35.—(1) Subject to this section, a fair dealing with a literary, dramatic, 
musical or artistic work, or with an adaptation of a literary, dramatic or 
musical work, for any purpose other than a purpose referred to in section 
36 or 37 shall not constitute an infringement of the copyright in the work.
(1A) The purposes for which a dealing with a literary, dramatic, musical or 
artistic work, or with an adaptation of a literary, dramatic or musical work, 
may constitute a fair dealing under subsection (1) shall include research 
and study.
(2) For the purposes of this Act, the matters to which regard shall be had, in 
determining whether a dealing with a literary, dramatic, musical or artistic 
work or with an adaptation of a literary, dramatic or musical work, being 
a dealing by way of copying the whole or a part of the work or adaptation, 
constitutes a fair dealing with the work or adaptation for any purpose other 
than a purpose referred to in section 36 or 37 shall include—
(a) the purpose and character of the dealing, including whether such deal-
ing is of a commercial nature or is for non-profit educational purposes;
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(b) the nature of the work or adaptation;
(c) the amount and substantiality of the part copied taken in relation to the 
whole work or adaptation;
(d) the effect of the dealing upon the potential market for, or value of, the 
work or adaptation; and
(e) the possibility of obtaining the work or adaptation within a reasonable 
time at an ordinary commercial price.
(3) Notwithstanding subsection (2), a dealing with a literary, dramatic or 
musical work, or with an adaptation of such a work, being a dealing by way 
of the copying, for the purposes of research or study—
(a) if the work or adaptation comprises an article in a periodical publica-
tion, of the whole or a part of that work or adaptation; or
(b) in any other case, of not more than a reasonable portion of the work 
or adaptation,
shall be taken to be a fair dealing with that work or adaptation for the pur-
pose of research or study.
(4) Subsection (3) shall not apply to a dealing by way of the copying of the 
whole or a part of an article in a periodical publication if another article in 
that publication, being an article dealing with a different subject-matter, is 
also copied.
Decompilation
39.A.—(1) Subject to subsection (2), the copyright in a literary work, being 
a computer program expressed in a low level language, is not infringed by 
a lawful user of the computer program decompiling it if—
(a) it is necessary to decompile the computer program to achieve the 
objective of obtaining the information necessary to create an independent 
computer program which can be operated with the computer program 
decompiled or with another computer program (referred to in this section 
as the permitted objective); and
(b) the information so obtained is not used for any purpose other than the 
permitted objective.
(2) Subsection (1) shall not apply if the lawful user—
(a) has readily available to him the information necessary to achieve the 
permitted objective;
(b) does not confine the decompiling to such acts as are necessary to 
achieve the permitted objective;
(c) supplies the information obtained by the decompiling to any person to 
whom it is not necessary to supply the information in order to achieve the 
permitted objective; or
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(d) uses the information—
(i) to create a computer program which is substantially similar in its expres-
sion to the computer program decompiled; or
(ii) to do any act restricted by copyright.
(3) Where an act is permitted under this section—
(a) it shall be irrelevant whether or not there exists any term or condition 
in an agreement which purports to prohibit or restrict the act; and
(b) any such term or condition shall, insofar as it purports to prohibit or 
restrict the act, be void.
(4) For the avoidance of doubt, this section is without prejudice to the 
generality of section 35 and does not limit the operation of that section.
(5) For the purposes of this section and sections 39B and 39C, a person is 
a lawful user of a computer program if he has a right to use the computer 
program, whether under a license to do any act restricted by the copyright 
in the computer program or otherwise.
(6) In this section, “decompiling,” in relation to a computer program 
expressed in a low level language, means—
(a) converting the computer program into a version expressed in a higher 
level language; or
(b) incidentally in the course of so converting the computer program, 
copying the computer program,
and “decompile” shall be construed accordingly.
Observing, studying and testing of computer programs
39.B.—(1) The copyright in a literary work, being a computer program, is 
not infringed by a lawful user of the computer program observing, studying 
or testing the functioning of the computer program in order to determine 
the ideas and principles which underlie any element of the computer pro-
gram, if he does so while performing any of the acts of loading, display-
ing, running, transmitting or storing the computer program which he is 
entitled to do.
(2) Where an act is permitted under this section—
(a) it shall be irrelevant whether or not there exists any term or condition 
in an agreement which purports to prohibit or restrict the act; and
(b) any such term or condition shall, insofar as it purports to prohibit or 
restrict the act, be void.
(3) For the avoidance of doubt, this section is without prejudice to the 
generality of section 35 and does not limit the operation of that section.
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Other acts permitted to lawful users
39.C.—(1) Subject to subsection (3), the copyright in a literary work, being 
a computer program, is not infringed by a lawful user of the computer pro-
gram copying or adapting the computer program, if such copying or adapt-
ing is necessary for his lawful use.
(2) For the avoidance of doubt, it may be necessary for the lawful use of a 
computer program to copy or adapt the computer program for the purpose 
of correcting errors in the computer program.
(3) Subsection (1) shall not apply to any copying or adapting permitted 
under section 39 or 39A.
Hong Kong Copyright Ordinance (2007)
Section 38 Research and private study
(1) Fair dealing with a work for the purposes of research or private study 
does not infringe any copyright in the work or, in the case of a published 
edition, in the typographical arrangement.
(2) Copying by a person other than the researcher or student himself is not 
fair dealing if-
(a) in the case of a librarian, or a person acting on behalf of a librarian, he 
does anything which regulations under section 49 would not permit to be 
done under section 47 or 48 (articles or parts of published works: restriction 
on multiple copies of same material); or
(b) in any other case, the person doing the copying knows or has reason to 
believe that it will result in copies of substantially the same material being 
provided to more than one person at substantially the same time and for 
substantially the same purpose.
(3) In determining whether any dealing with a work is fair dealing under 
subsection (1), the court shall take into account all the circumstances of the 
case and, in particular-
(a) the purpose and nature of the dealing, including whether the dealing 
is for a non-profit-making purpose and whether the dealing is of a com-
mercial nature;
(b) the nature of the work;
(c) the amount and substantiality of the portion dealt with in relation to 
the work as a whole; and
(d) the effect of the dealing on the potential market for or value of the 
work.
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Intellectual Property Code of the Philippines (1997)
Section 185.1 Fair Use of a Copyrighted Work
The fair use of a copyrighted work for criticism, comment, news reporting, 
teaching including multiple copies for classroom use, scholarship, research, 
and similar purposes is not an infringement of copyright. Decompilation, 
which is the reproduction of code and translation of the form of the com-
puter program indispensable to obtain the information necessary to achieve 
the inter-operability of an independently created computer program with 
other programs may also constitute fair use. In determining whether the 
use made of a work in any particular case is fair use, the factors to be con-
sidered shall include:
The purpose and character of the use, including whether use is of a com-
mercial nature or is for non-profit educational purposes;
The nature of the copyrighted work;
The amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copy-
righted work as a whole; and
The effect of the use upon the potential market for value of the copyrighted 
work.
Israeli Copyright Act (2007)
Section 19 Fair Use
(a) Fair use of a work is permitted for purposes such as: private study, 
research, criticism, review, journalistic reporting, quotation, or instruction 
and examination by an educational institution.
(b) In determining whether a use made of a work is fair within the meaning 
of this paragraph the factors to be considered shall include, inter alia
(1) The purpose and character of the use;
(2) The character of the work used;
(3) The scope of the use, quantitatively and qualitatively, in relation to the 
work as a whole;
(4) The impact of the use on the value of the work and its potential market.
(c) The Minister may make regulations prescribing conditions under which 
a use shall be deemed a fair use.
Section 24 Computer Programs
(c) Copying of a computer program, or making a derivative work there 
from, is permitted for a person who possesses an authorized copy of the 
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computer program, for the following purposes and to the extent necessary 
to achieve said purposes:
(1) Use of the computer program for purposes for which it was intended, 
including correction of errors in the computer program or making it 
interoperable with a computer system or with another computer program;
(2) Examination of the information security in the program, correction of 
security breaches and protection from such breaches;
(3) Obtaining information which is needed to adapt a different and inde-
pendently developed computer system or program, in such a way that it 
will be interoperable with the computer program.
(d) The provisions of subparagraph (c) shall not apply with respect to the 
copying of a computer program or the making of a derivative work there 
from, as stated in said subparagraph, if the information which has been 
obtained through the aforementioned means was used in a manner set 
forth below, or where such information was readily available without use 
of the aforesaid means:
(1) The said information is transmitted to another person for a purpose dif-
ferent than the purposes set forth in subparagraph (c);
(2) The said information is used to make a different computer program 
which infringes copyright in the said computer program.
Korea-U.S. Free Trade Agreement (2007)
Footnote 11
Each Party shall confine limitations or exceptions to the rights described 
in paragraph 1 to certain special cases that do not conflict with a normal 
exploitation of the work, performance, or phonogram, and do not unrea-
sonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the right holder. For greater 
certainty, each Party may adopt or maintain limitations or exceptions to 
the rights described in paragraph 1 for fair use, as long as any such limita-
tion or exception is confined as stated in the previous sentence.
Article 18.4.7
(d) Each Party shall confine exceptions and limitations to measures imple-
menting subparagraph (a) to the following activities, which shall be applied 
to relevant measures in accordance with subparagraph (e):
(i) noninfringing reverse engineering activities with regard to a lawfully 
obtained copy of a computer program, carried out in good faith with respect 
to particular elements of that computer program that have not been readily 
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available to the person engaged in those activities, for the sole purpose of 
achieving interoperability of an independently created computer program 
with other programs. . . .
World Intellectual Property Organization Copyright Treaty (1996)
Article 11 Obligations concerning technological measures
Contracting Parties shall provide adequate legal protection and effective 
legal remedies against the circumvention of effective technological mea-
sures that are used by authors in connection with the exercise of their rights 
under this Treaty or the Berne Convention and that restrict acts, in respect 
of their works, which are not authorized by the authors concerned or per-
mitted by law.
World Intellectual Property Organization Performances and Phonograms 
Treaty (1996)
Article 18 Obligations concerning technological measures
Contracting Parties shall provide adequate legal protection and effective 
legal remedies against the circumvention of effective technological mea-
sures that are used by performers or producers of phonograms in connec-
tion with the exercise of their rights under this Treaty and that restrict acts, 
in respect of their performances or phonograms, which are not authorized 
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